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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the development of agrarian capitalism in the coffee and cut 
flower sectors of contemporary Ethiopia. Particular emphasis is placed on processes 
of capital accumulation by large-scale domestic producers, and how their 
operations interact with the Ethiopian ‘developmental state’, which is striving for a 
rapid structural transformation of the economy. Chapter One introduces the 
research question, develops research themes, and presents the main argument. 
Chapter Two discusses the relevant literature on economic development and 
agrarian change. It points to the main shortcomings of institutional approaches, and, 
drawing on different formulations of the agrarian question, develops the theoretical 
framework used here: historical political economy. Chapter Three presents the 
methodological operationalisation of this framework in mixed methods fieldwork, 
describes the fieldwork and discusses data sources and constraints. Chapter Four 
shows how Ethiopia’s political economy developed across three very different 
political regimes and illustrates how policies affecting capital accumulation have to 
be understood in the light of their contribution to the strategic interests of the 
governing elite. The history of the coffee trade, both in Ethiopia and globally, is 
examined in Chapter Five. Large-scale private plantations are shown to have 
important historical antecedents in Ethiopia. Coffee sector regulation is presented in 
relation to the strategic aims of the government. Chapter Six presents key findings 
from the mixed method survey in the coffee sector. It discusses the characteristics of 
large-scale domestic plantation owners, including their patterns of capital 
accumulation, and their control over, and access to, land and labour. Chapter Seven 
presents evidence on patterns of capital accumulation in the flower sector. This 
accumulation is positioned within the context of international flower markets and 
the industrial policy regime put in place to support the sector in Ethiopia. Chapter 
Eight compares accumulation patterns in both sectors and summarises the main 
findings. 
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Now that we have considered the forcible creation of a class of free and 
landless proletarians, the bloody discipline that turned them into wage-
labourers, the disgraceful proceedings of the state that employed police 
methods to accelerate the accumulation of capital by increasing the degree 
of exploitation of labour, the question remains: where did the capitalists 
originally spring from? 
  Karl Marx (1990, orig. 1867:  905)  
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Chapter one 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Agrarian change and capitalist development 
Ever since its birth as a discipline after the Second World War, development 
economics has been concerned with the relationship between agrarian development 
and economic development. The ways in which this relationship has been studied 
and conceptualised have, however, changed dramatically over the years. A greater 
emphasis on microeconomic issues and less interest in social relations, in particular 
in the sphere of production, have led to a narrowing of our understanding of 
processes of agrarian change. Early development economists explored the inter-
sectoral nature of economic development and viewed agriculture as a provider of 
cheap wage goods (primarily food), a source of investible funds for industrial 
development, a pool of labour supply, and at the same time a market for capital and 
consumption goods (Lewis 1954; Johnston and Mellor 1961; Hirschman 1988, orig. 
1958). At the heart of these ideas lay models and stylised facts about structural 
transformation, whereby the relative importance of agriculture in an industrialising 
economy was expected to decline even as agricultural output and productivity 
increased (see Johnston 1970 for a review of the early literature). Implicit in many of 
these models was the notion that ‘traditional’ agriculture was backward – even 
irrational – and would have to give way to ‘modern’ mechanised farms. 
This focus on inter-sectoral dynamics and macroeconomic development was slowly 
displaced as the intellectual fashion swung towards neoclassical economics, with its 
emphasis on methodological individualism. The neoclassical hegemony over 
development economics brought with it not only a change in method and an 
increasing focus on microeconomic problems, but also a fundamental and long-
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lasting shift in ideas about how agrarian development should proceed1. Beginning 
with Schultz's (1983, orig. 1964) landmark study, researchers swung their attention 
towards small farms, which came to be viewed as the (potential) agents of agrarian 
change and development, due to their apparently superior efficiency. This 
increasingly exclusive focus on small producers came at the expense of the study of 
agrarian capital accumulation, which was no longer viewed as important. New 
economic models instead sought to describe the production and consumption 
behaviour of individual farming households2. Productive linkages between sectors 
became less important than individual choice behaviour in frameworks of 
constrained optimisation (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986)3. Mainstream agrarian 
political economy focused increasingly on documenting and explaining the 
deleterious effects of agrarian policies on small producers (see Binswanger and 
Deininger 1997 for a review).  
While research into agriculture was pushed out of the economic mainstream in the 
era of structural adjustment programmes, the focus on small farms in both research 
and policy proved enduring. In a review of 50 years of agrarian policy debates, Ellis 
and Biggs note that “[i]n retrospect, it is evident that one major body of thought, 
albeit with plenty of side excursions and add-ons, has dominated the landscape of 
rural development thinking throughout the last half-century. This is the 
‘agricultural growth based on small-farm efficiency’ paradigm” (2001: 440). In part 
this is surely related to the politically attractive notion that small farms can deliver 
both efficiency and equity. The ‘small farm paradigm’ is by no means limited to 
mainstream economists. Small farms are seen as the most viable development path 
                                                     
1 Economic enquiries also became increasingly detached from both social and historical 
context, as a result of the methodological choices made by neoclassical theorists, see 
Milonakis and Fine (2008) . 
2  This modelling approach eradicates structural differences between different types of 
production units, and the social relations between them, by viewing all producers as sharing 
a single production function. 
3 The inter-sectoral terms of trade between agriculture and other sectors continued to be a 
subject of intense debate, albeit outside of the mainstream of agricultural economics. Bates 
(1981) and Lipton (1978) pioneered the notion that development was being held back by the 
extraction of surpluses from the agricultural sector. For a critical review of this literature, see 
Corbridge and Jones (2004). 
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by advocates of Chayanovian models (van der Ploeg 2010, 2013), food sovereignty 
(Altieri 2009) and the ‘peasant way’ as a radical alternative to contemporary 
capitalism (McMichael 1997, 2008)4. 
After many years of intellectual and financial neglect, the publication of the 2008 
World Development Report (World Bank 2007) put agriculture, and with it agrarian 
development issues, firmly back on the agenda of mainstream development 
research5. The report, which retained the microeconomic focus of earlier research, 
stressed the large number of people dependent on incomes from agriculture 
globally, and presented a series of policy frameworks, aimed in particular at 
smallholder producers, for whom several ‘solutions’ were proposed. According to 
the World Bank, small producers should be integrated into global value chains, 
supply labour to large-scale producers, or seek to sustain themselves through 
nonfarm incomes. While this renewed interest in agrarian development was 
certainly welcome, the report itself was received less well. Critics accused the report 
of oversimplifying processes of agrarian change (Akram-Lodhi 2008), and of 
painting overly optimistic ‘win-win’ scenarios with regard to the integration of 
small producers into global value chains (Oya 2009)6. While solutions to problems 
of agrarian development thus remained elusive, the fresh interest in agrarian 
change stimulated debate on whether the focus on small farms, to the exclusion of 
all other producers may have been counter-productive. Recently, two leading 
development economists, Collier and Dercon (2014) have questioned the evidence 
for the supposed superior efficiency of small farms and called for a more diversified 
approach that includes supporting larger production units7. 
                                                     
4 For critical engagements with such ‘neopopulist’ tendencies from a Marxist perspective see 
Bernstein (2014), Kitching (1982) and Patnaik (1979). 
5 For a review of the recent economic literature on agriculture, see Dethier and Effenberger 
(2012) 
6  On the difficulties of value chain integration for poor producers and the challenges 
inherent in different types of value chains, see Gibbon and Ponte (2005), as well as 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2015). 
7 Advocates of the sustainable livelihoods approach have also begun to criticise the small 
farm paradigm on grounds that the rural poor are not, in fact, primarily farmers (Ellis and 
Biggs 2001). Marxist agrarian political economy has long argued that the ‘homogeneous 
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However, theorising about – and empirical research into – the role and importance 
of agriculture and agrarian change in wider economic development processes had 
continued to thrive outside of the mainstream. A wide array of thinkers, broadly 
inspired by Marxist formulations of the agrarian question (see Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay 2010 for an overview), have built up a rich and varied literature examining, 
inter alia, how, and with what consequences, capitalism develops in rural areas. In 
other words, this agrarian political economy is interested in how a country goes 
from having the vast majority of its population toiling in the agricultural sector to 
the employment profiles more commonly associated with industrialised economies 
– and asks what the determinants and developmental consequences of such 
agrarian transitions are (Byres 1995) 8 . Historically, agrarian transitions have 
involved the emergence of both capitalist farmers and wider capitalist social 
relations in rural areas (Byres 1996; Brenner 1995; Brenner 2001). 
The approach to political economy based on the agrarian question is concerned in 
particular with the effects emergent agrarian capitalists have on the development of 
productive forces and their contribution to processes of industrialisation and, hence, 
structural transformation (Bernstein 1996, see also Chapter Two). At the same time, 
this theoretical framework allows for the contingency inherent in changing 
combinations of internal and external influences in particular historical settings. 
Studying agrarian capital accumulation in concrete historical contexts thus provides 
vital insight into the trajectories of production, productivity and labour markets in 
rural areas, and allows us to connect these to wider patterns of economic 
development. My study on the emergence of agrarian capitalists in Ethiopia 
therefore seeks to provide the kind of in-depth, conceptually informed and 
historically grounded empirical analysis necessary to help understand processes of 
agrarian capital accumulation. 
                                                                                                                                                      
peasantry’ is a myth, and that the rural poor survive in large parts through wage labour 
(Bernstein 2010) 
8 The breadths of interests featured in the literature around the agrarian question are in their 
entirety beyond the scope and intention of this thesis. The parts of the literature most 
directly relevant to the emergence of agrarian capital are reviewed in Chapter Two. 
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A second important set of questions – which are intimately related to capitalist 
development, but as yet have had little to say about agrarian change – concern the 
application of industrial policy by the state9. After a long hiatus, industrial policy is 
once again considered a viable development strategy, even within the economic 
mainstream (Stiglitz, Lin, and Monga 2013). Debates on how and where such 
industrial policies can be effective often employ sector-wide approaches to research, 
and frequently fail to investigate concrete processes of capital accumulation (these 
debates are reviewed in Chapter Two). Taking a broader political economy 
perspective – which focuses not only on capital accumulation, but also on state 
power and its contestation – can help illuminate why states put in place certain 
policy regimes and provide a more differentiated analysis of their impacts. I thus 
address the problem of industrial policy in agrarian development through an 
analysis of elite strategies, the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by emerging capitalists, 
and the concrete historical developments in my chosen case – Ethiopia. 
1.2 Research question and themes 
Accordingly, the central research question pursued in this thesis is: 
To what degree and how is a class of capitalist accumulators emerging in the 
contemporary Ethiopian coffee and floriculture sectors? 
Such a broad question must be broken down into empirically manageable themes in 
order to be addressed. More specifically, the main empirical chapters thus focus on 
the following aspects of the central research question.  
Who are the accumulators? Of particular importance here is the origin of agrarian 
capital in the coffee and cut flower sectors, as this provides an insight into long-
term processes of rural change. Directly related are questions around the relative 
importance of differentiation among domestic agrarian producers and foreign 
capital in the processes of accumulation. A process of agrarian transition dominated 
                                                     
9  The term ‘industrial policy’ in its contemporary sense refers to targeted government 
policies aimed at moving the economy towards greater productivity. While industrial 
policies are frequently applied to the manufacturing sector, they are also used to support the 
development of agriculture and service, as well as research and innovation more widely. 
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by domestic capital is likely both to look very different and lead to different 
outcomes than a process through which an external group of accumulators manages 
to dominate the sector.  
The process of capital accumulation: a key concern of the project is to understand 
the processes which lead to the emergence of qualitatively different types of 
accumulators. It is therefore important to empirically identify the actual methods 
and strategies for accumulation used by (different types of) agrarian capitalists. 
These will in turn be influenced by drivers of and opportunities for accumulation. 
In the case of domestic capitalists in particular, the importance of ‘straddling’ as an 
accumulation strategy – see Cowen (1972), as discussed in Leys (1978) – must be 
evaluated, given the prominence of this accumulation method in other contexts, in 
particular in Kitching (1982). Crucially though, opportunities for accumulation are 
not only to be located in the spheres of production and exchange in the market, but 
must also be sought in the interaction with political elites and with wider 
government strategies and priorities (see below). Moreover, a study of agrarian 
capitalism must appreciate that physical capital may take the form of plants and 
trees - Austin (2005) speaks of forest capital, see also Hill (1970). 
Labour mobilisation and the conditions of labour: labour and labour mobilisation 
are of both great theoretical and practical importance. In classical Marxist political 
economy the capitalist accumulates through the appropriation of surplus value via 
the exploitation of labourers within the wage relationship (Marx 1992, Chs. 6, 7 & 9). 
Moreover, many field studies have pointed to the centrality of labour markets in 
capital accumulation (Oya and Pontara 2015, for empirical cases see Austin 2005 
and Müller 2011). Successful and reliable labour mobilisation is a key requirement 
of doing business in rural areas. Equally important is to ask how labour conditions 
differ across sectors and types of accumulators. The answer to this question may 
yield insights into the future direction of economic development in Ethiopia. 
The role of the state: The literature on the agrarian question, as well as many of the 
empirical field studies on capitalism in Africa, stress the importance of state 
institutions in defining the contours of accumulation by either creating or closing 
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off opportunities for accumulation (Byres 1996). With regard to agrarian capital 
accumulation the key question is how important the state is as a nurturing agent. 
The strategic orientation and priorities of the state apparatus, which is not confined 
to the government but extends to the administration and is far from uniform, need 
to be understood. And relatedly, the thesis examines how these aims and priorities 
have been (and have not been) translated into concrete industrial policy and 
regulation, how these have been contested, and what the actual effects of policies 
have been. The contrast between the levels of state support offered to the two 
sectors under study is stark and its origins and consequences must be explained.  
These questions are examined through in-depth fieldwork in Ethiopia, which 
combines quantitative and qualitative data in order to be able to trace processes of 
accumulation and their complex webs of internal and external determinants. The 
details of the empirical approach are presented in Chapter Three. 
1.3 The case study 
Contemporary Ethiopia is in many ways an ideal case study to examine ideas about 
agrarian change. It has, in recent years, seen extremely rapid growth, with the 
structure of the economy slowly shifting away from agriculture (Martins 2014)10. A 
rapid industrialisation drive is underway (albeit from a very low starting point), 
fuelled by public investment and an unprecedented inflow of foreign capital (see 
Chapter Four). Ethiopia’s industrialisation programme is driven by a state that 
consciously describes itself as ‘developmental’ and follows a clearly articulated 
strategy of state-led development, which includes the application of selective 
industrial policies (Abebe and Schaefer 2015; Altenburg 2010; Oqubay 2015). At the 
same time, Ethiopia remains an overwhelmingly agrarian country, with agriculture 
representing over 70% of total employment and over 44% of value added in GDP in 
2013 (World Bank 2016). An agrarian economy experiencing rapid growth under the 
aegis of a ‘strong’ state provides a ‘hard’ test both for differing notions on the 
                                                     
10 As Martins also points out though, this fledgling structural transformation has not yet had 
a significant impact on employment and occupation patterns. 
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development of agrarian capital, and for the ability of historical political economy to 
illuminate how and why industrial policies are enacted.  
I chose two sectors, which share both similarities and differences in order to analyse 
the effects of these on patterns of agrarian capital accumulation, namely coffee and 
floriculture. Both sectors are dynamic, in the sense of having experienced recent 
growth, and share an orientation towards exports. But they differ significantly in 
the structure of export markets, the technical parameters of production, capital 
intensity, and their local histories. They have also been treated very differently by 
the Ethiopian state. 
1.4 Argument and main findings 
The central empirical finding is that agrarian capital accumulation is indeed 
occurring in Ethiopia – however, these processes take very different forms and have 
very different outcomes in the two sectors under consideration. In the coffee sector, 
domestic capital accumulation has allowed a new class of domestic capitalists to 
emerge, some of whom are showing themselves to be very dynamic accumulators. 
In the flower sector, capital accumulation has been extremely rapid, but mostly 
driven by foreign capital. Domestic capital has been markedly less successful. 
Moreover, the domestic accumulators in coffee and flowers are qualitatively 
different, due in part to the very different capital requirements across the sectors. 
The complex determinants and particulars of these accumulation processes are 
explored and analysed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
Domestic capital accumulation has thus not occurred in the sector most favoured by 
direct and indirect government support, but rather in a sector that has suffered from 
‘benign neglect’. The targeted and consistent industrial policy, which did lead to 
very high growth rates in the flower sector, was rather less successful in supporting 
domestic capital accumulation. I argue that this differential success is partly 
explicable through comparing the sectors in terms of market discipline, knowledge 
requirements and cost structures (see Chapter Eight). However, to understand the 
accumulation processes underway in the coffee sector requires uncovering the 
legacies of Ethiopia’s turbulent political history. 
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Many studies look at why and under what circumstances industrial policy is 
successful or fails (for Ethiopia, see for instance Oqubay 2015) 11 . An equally 
important, but much less frequently asked question is how do states – once they 
have committed themselves to a selective industrial policy regime – choose which 
sectors to support? I contend that the different levels of support given to the two 
sectors can be explained with reference to the medium-term strategic goals of 
Ethiopia’s political elite – development at speed and hence the need for foreign 
exchange. Such an explanation must be based on a careful analysis of Ethiopia’s 
political economy. This political nature of industrial policy is too often missing from 
the discourse12. Taking such political aims seriously, we see that in the flower sector 
the level of accumulation by domestic capital is not a relevant measure of success 
for the government, which is interested mostly in generating forex. Foreign 
exchange was earned not just through the actual sales proceeds of the flowers but 
also through the transportation ‘costs’ which accrue to the national champion – 
Ethiopian Airlines. The opportunity to strengthen the national carrier was a 
welcome addition to this strategy. By contrast, in coffee targeted policy was simply 
not necessary to the same extent to ensure and control forex flows. Here a donor-
financed project offered the perfect opportunity to lessen the market power of a few 
large exporting companies and put in place a system to allow for the tracking of 
sales, and therefore exports. In terms of production the sector was left largely to 
fend for itself, while the privatisation of valuable state assets was seemingly used as 
an opportunity for patronage. 
1.5 Contribution to social science 
Original contribution of this thesis is two-fold in that it makes both empirical and 
theoretical points. The balance is, however, tilted towards empirical exploration and 
analysis, which constitutes the bulk of the material presented here. Empirically, this 
thesis provides new primary data on agrarian capital accumulation in Africa – a 
topic that is widely agreed to be of vital importance, but on which there is a still a 
                                                     
11 Or, relatedly, what kind of state is able to pursue a successful industrial policy regime, see 
for instance Kohli (2004) and Khan (2010). 
12 This tendency is especially pronounced in the economic literature, which often operates at 
a very high level of abstraction. 
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dearth of in-depth research. More concretely, this is the first study of contemporary 
domestic capital accumulation amongst large-scale producers in Ethiopia’s coffee 
sector13. I combine quantitative and qualitative data to provide the first mapping 
and analysis of large-scale private coffee plantations, and of the capitalists that own 
them. The data on this previously unstudied category of producers is embedded in 
a detailed historical analysis of both the internal and external factors influencing the 
emergence of large-scale capitalist producers in the sector, that is, Ethiopia’s 
particular political economy and the structure and operation of the world market 
for coffee.  
Similarly, this thesis provides a new and original analysis of existing data for 
Ethiopia’s flower sector, by focusing on patterns for domestic capital accumulation. 
The existing quantitative data is complemented by new qualitative data on the 
sector’s capitalists. While the sector has received a lot of attention from researchers, 
studies almost always focus on the sector in aggregate, without paying attention to 
the heterogeneity among different producers, and foreign and domestic producers 
in particular. As in the coffee sector, both internal and external factors that influence 
the pattern of accumulation are included in the analysis. 
On the theoretical level, the thesis presents an argument both for the continued 
usefulness and vitality of the agrarian question in its classical formulation, as well 
as for the use of historical political economy as a framework in investigating 
concrete instances of capitalist development and the application of industrial policy. 
Historical political economy is able to describe the open-ended and contingent 
nature of capitalist development, without having to resort to extra-theoretical 
‘crutches’ at crucial explanatory junctures – a weakness of institutional theories I 
explore in Chapter Two. In turn, as I show in Chapters Four and Eight, the decision 
how and where to apply industrial policies is ultimately political and thus must be 
derived from the particular political economy of the country in question – with a 
particular emphasis on elite strategies and their contestation. 
                                                     
13  There are historical precedents to today’s private coffee plantations during the late 
imperial era, which have been studied in the past. This history of private accumulation in 
Ethiopia’s coffee sector is the topic of Chapter Five. 
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1.6 Lacunae 
Before moving on I should briefly touch upon what is not said. On account of the 
need for focus, there are a number of points that are not included. First, I do not 
discuss, apart from a few fleeting references, the external factor in Ethiopian politics, 
neither regionally or extra-regionally. While a fuller treatment of Ethiopia’s 
complex international relations would no doubt explode the confines of this thesis, I 
have my doubts as to whether it would add much insight into the decisions of the 
state in terms of economic strategy, beyond the freedom to deal with internal 
dissent and the effects on government revenue allocation, which I discuss in 
Chapter Four. I do discuss the influence of world markets and value chains for 
coffee and flowers. 
Second, I do not explore the roles of ethnicity or party membership in accumulation 
processes. Whether and how these play a role is an issue of substantial complexity 
that would have required a refocusing of the entire project. Moreover, I found early 
on in the fieldwork process that questions about political allegiance tended to make 
respondents uneasy and could even end interviews. I decided therefore that 
pursuing this additional angle, though intrinsically interesting and important, was 
not worth the sacrifice. 
1.7 Nomenclature 
This study necessarily contains both Amharic terms and place names. The Amharic 
language has no fixed transliteration into the Latin alphabet. I have used consistent 
transliterations of Amharic names and terms, which are calibrated to the English-
speakers. Also, Amharic knows no surnames in the Western sense. I have stuck to 
the international convention by citing Ethiopian authors by their father’s name, 
while Ethiopians named in the text are referred to by their first names, as is 
common in Ethiopia. 
1.8 The structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two reviews the most 
widely used theories of capitalist development, including formulations of the 
agrarian question, to clarify the conceptual framework for the enquiry. Chapter 
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Three then discusses the methodological bases for the empirical work. In Chapter 
Four I present a historical overview of Ethiopia’s political economy and establish 
the strategic priorities of the country’s governing elites. Chapter Five is an in-depth 
study of the global coffee market and the growth and regulation of the sector within 
Ethiopia. I give particular emphasis to the development of agrarian capital in the 
coffee sector across three very different political regimes. Chapter Six then presents 
the qualitative and quantitative data on Ethiopia’s new coffee capitalists. As 
floriculture is used mostly as a comparator case, the analysis of the global market, 
historical overview of the sector’s development in Ethiopia and discussion of 
accumulation patterns are concentrated in Chapter Seven. Finally, Chapter Eight 
analyses the differences between accumulators and industrial policy regimes in 
both sectors, sums up the key findings and sets out avenues for future research. 
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Chapter two 
 
Framing agrarian change and 
capitalist development 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview and discussion of the most relevant literature on 
the development of capitalism, and of agrarian capitalism in poor countries in 
particular. The aim is twofold: on the one hand to engage critically with prevalent 
theories of capitalist development, so as to arrive at a justification for the choice of 
my own preferred framework – historical political economy (see also Chapter 
Three); on the other hand to analyse the empirical literature on capitalist 
accumulation, especially with respect to domestic capitalists in Africa.  
Such a review must necessarily be selective. I focus only on those theoretical 
approaches that are deemed the most prevalent in contemporary discourses on 
(agrarian) development, and that have the most salience for the Ethiopian case. The 
most widely used framework to discuss capitalist development today are various 
branches of institutional theory. The ‘new institutionalism’ has provided a 
framework for interpreting the historical development of capitalism and in 
particular for the different trajectories it has taken in different societies1 . New 
institutional economics (NIE) is probably the most influential extension of the 
neoclassical paradigm in development economics. Its focus on the economic logic of 
institutions has been applied to agrarian issues, in particular the functioning of 
agricultural markets and the incentives facing smallholder producers (Poulton et al. 
1998). Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) suggest that applications for NIE in agrarian 
                                                     
1 For reviews of these and other forms of institutional theory see for instance Hall and 
Taylor (1996) and Evans (2005). 
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settings include investigations into contract farming and vertical linkages more 
broadly, cooperative structure, grades and standards, the behaviour of traders and 
issues around access to credit.  
A related approach focuses on the role of the state in capitalist development. 
Despite having very different intellectual roots to NIE, it shares its focus on the 
functioning of institutions. This developmental state theory is of particular interest 
to any study of Ethiopia, as many of its precepts have been taken by the 
government of Ethiopia in formulating its development strategy (see Chapter Four).  
2.2 New institutional economics 
2.2.1 The origins of new institutional economics 
New institutional economics grew out of dissatisfaction with the theoretical 
apparatus of neoclassical economics, in particular with its inability to provide a 
theory capable of explaining economic change. Neoclassical economics had 
established itself as the most influential school of thought within economics during 
the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, however, theoretical innovation became 
inevitable due to the failure of neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes to 
deliver their core promises of faster growth and poverty reduction (see for instance 
Easterly 2000) and the visible success of state-centric models of economic 
development in East Asia – both making ‘paradigm maintenance’ increasingly 
challenging (Wade 1996)2. Political economy played a large role in the success or 
failure of ‘reform’ programmes (from the narrow point of view of the international 
financial institutions, Dollar and Svensson 1998) and the rise of the East Asian tigers 
required a theory that could encompass both the state and political economy in a 
more productive way than the ossified rent-seeking paradigm (based on Krueger 
1974). 
                                                     
2 Neo-liberalism is a policy paradigm based on a particular (and extreme) interpretation of 
neoclassical theory. Neoclassical models do not have to yield neo-liberal policy advice, but 
in many cases lend themselves readily to the production of such policy recommendations 
(Solow 2008; see also Harvey 2011 for a critique of neo-liberalism as a political project). 
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New institutional economics (NIE), as it became known, was perfectly suited to 
fulfilling this role. Its founders were critical enough of existing economic theory to 
propose important changes, especially in introducing meso-level analysis and a new 
treatment of economic development. The leading proponent Douglass North was 
scathing about the shortcomings of the neoclassical paradigm: “We live in a world 
of dynamic economic change, but the theory we employ to understand our world is 
static. Moreover, the theory we employ is frictionless. There are no institutions, no 
government; in short, transaction costs are zero.” (2003: 1). At the same time, this 
theoretical innovation, while jettisoning some of the assumptions underlying 
neoclassical modelling, is best understood as an extension of that theoretical 
apparatus. As the introduction to a core text in the field states: “[U]nlike the old 
institutionalists, NIE does not abandon neoclassical theory. While new 
institutionalists reject neoclassical assumptions of perfect information and 
instrumental rationality, they accept orthodox assumptions of scarcity and 
competition. Both Arrow and Williamson have attributed the rising influence of 
NIE to its acceptance of the successful core of neoclassical economics” (Menard and 
Shirley 2005: 2). The choice theory at the centre of neoclassical thinking is retained, 
while instrumental rationality is cast aside (North 1995). NIE thus remains firmly 
rooted in methodological individualism, even as it shifts the main analytical focus 
to institutions. As we shall see, institutions are seen as the emergent result of 
purposive individual human action aimed at realising self-interested goals, usually 
monetary gain. The genius of the founders of NIE consists in having developed a 
form of historical social theory, based around the analysis of institutions, that uses 
the language and core assumptions of neoclassical economics and which is therefore 
acceptable to economists both intellectually and politically. The success of new 
institutional economics is a symptom of the extreme impoverishment of ‘pure’ 
neoclassical theory, which meant that the re-introduction of basic social scientific 
concepts such as uncertainty (rather than risk), opportunistic behaviour, the 
unequal distribution of rights and the evolution of systems through historical time 
could be hailed as major intellectual breakthroughs. 
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So what are the main theoretical contributions of NIE and how useful are they in 
explaining processes of economic development and specifically agrarian change? 
NIE departs from its neoclassical progenitor in two key ways. It roundly rejects the 
neoclassical assumptions about frictionless economic interaction between 
individuals and it reintroduces real historical time (rather than comparative statics) 
into the analysis of economies. However, the resulting intellectual framework, 
collectively known as NIE, is not a unified whole.  The introduction of new concepts 
into the body of neoclassical theory has led to the development of two quite distinct 
strands of thought within NIE, one concerned with contracts and managerial 
governance and the other with the development of institutions and their role in 
explaining (differential outcomes in) economic history (Menard and Shirley 2014). 
Both of these have their origin in the rejection of frictionless economic interaction. 
The starting point for understanding the critique of frictionless interaction is 
Coase’s paper on the theory of the firm. Coase (1937) posed the disarmingly simple 
question of why firms exist (in capitalist economies) in the first place. In an efficient 
market, coordination via the price mechanism, i.e. market transaction, should be 
superior to coordination via hierarchy and organisation. Coase, however, argued 
that firms exist because transaction in the market is costly and therefore not 
necessarily superior to the hierarchically organised transactions within a firm. For 
economic transactions to take place in the market, prices have to be discovered, 
contracts have to be negotiated and agreements must subsequently be monitored 
and enforced. In contemporary parlance, transaction costs are the result of imperfect 
information, meaning the common situation in which information held by economic 
agents is both incomplete and asymmetrically distributed (North 1995). Moreover, 
these transaction costs not only affect the production decisions of individual firms, 
but the entire economy and are crucial determinants of what is produced and what 
is not. The key insight is that in the presence of transaction costs the structure of 
property rights is important3 (Coase 2005). 
                                                     
3  Older neoclassical models had shown that initial endowments and property rights 
structures do not matter and that, given efficient markets, an allocatively efficient 
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The implications of this insight are wide-ranging. As far as the current discussion is 
concerned, the less important of these is the field of transaction cost economics 
(TCE), which is concerned with the distribution of economic activity across several 
possible modes of economic governance, including markets, firms and government 
agencies as a result of such costs (Williamson 1973; Williamson 2005). While such 
ideas have been influential in certain areas of economics as well as in law, it is the 
other branch of NIE, based on North’s ideas on institutions that has most impacted 
development theory. 
2.2.2 Institutional development and change 
For North, transaction costs hold a much wider significance: they are – albeit 
indirectly – the key to understanding what causes differences in economic 
development between societies and ultimately to building a general theory of 
history. Transaction costs and the uncertainty they entail, which North defines 
much less legalistically than Williamson, could be so high as to make exchange 
unprofitable. Such exchange would then not take place, thus placing stark limits on 
the Smithian model of economic development, where the division of labour is 
confined by the size of the market. In response, all human societies have evolved 
institutions. These “are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange. Together 
with the technology employed they determine the costs of transacting (and 
producing)” (North 1995: 50). But not all institutions are equally supportive of 
exchange and some are directly inimical to furthering ever more complex economic 
interaction, i.e. economic development. For North, the reason human societies are 
richer or poorer lies not in capital accumulation, saving rates or population growth 
(as earlier development theory had held, see Harrod 1939 and Solow 1956) nor in 
the degree to which efficient markets allow for a Hayekian diffusion of information 
through society (as in neoclassical theory, see also Hayek 1945). According to North, 
these are mere symptoms and their root cause is the effectiveness of institutions in 
providing individuals with incentives to self-betterment and innovation. 
                                                                                                                                                      
equilibrium can always be attained regardless of the property right structure (this is the 
somewhat-misnamed Coase theorem). 
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Institutions therefore “are the underlying determinants of economic performance” 
(North 1994: 359). 
For North “institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are 
composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal 
constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct), 
and the enforcement characteristics of both. Organisations are the players: groups of 
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives." (North 1995: 54; see 
also North 1990). Institutions are thus mechanisms to define, impose and enforce 
property rights. For North, economic development is the process of evolving ever 
larger and more elaborate institutions to help control and absorb the growing 
transaction costs implicit in the move from simple, small-scale, local and 
personalised interaction in ‘tribal’ societies to the complex, large-scale, international 
and impersonal interactions that characterise industrialised societies. So while 
transaction costs in economies with sophisticated divisions of labour are very high, 
these societies have also evolved institutional matrices which reduce the uncertainty 
of interaction and provide incentives for continuous improvement (North 1995). 
While North certainly envisages a hierarchical ordering of different human 
societies, it would be wrong to interpret teleology into his ideas. There is no 
automatism in institutional development, nor is there any suggestion that evolved 
institutions will necessarily be economically efficient. Inefficient institutions can 
persist for long period of time and, as a result, “[e]conomic history is an endless 
depressing tale of miscalculation, leading to famine, starvation, deceit and warfare, 
death, economic stagnation and decline, and indeed, the disappearance of whole 
civilizations” (North 2003: 13). 
The key issue is then how institutions change over time. North’s position on this 
issue has evolved, from an earlier focus on shifts in relative prices as key drivers, to 
a later focus on mental models and learning – signifying a movement away from 
neoclassical ideas (Menard and Shirley 2014). Institutions develop over time 
through the purposive actions of individuals and organisations, seeking to better 
31 
 
their own position in conditions of scarcity and competition. As noted, NIE posits 
that humans face fundamental uncertainty in their actions. Their behaviour 
therefore depends on perceived payoffs. Competition forces organisations (and the 
individuals that constitute them) to constantly invest in new skills and new 
knowledge, and the types of skills and knowledge they gain will in turn alter their 
perceptions of possible payoffs. This changes their choices of actions over time and 
leads to institutional change (North 2005). However, not everyone’s perceptions 
count. Institutions change when those “with the bargaining power to create new 
rules” seek change (North 1995: 50) 4. In turn the institutional matrix determines the 
incentive structure which relates particular types of skills and knowledge to 
perceived payoffs. As institutions change, so do perceived payoffs, leading those 
with power to recalibrate their actions, resulting in further institutional change. 
Economic development occurs when the incentive structure, as determined by the 
institutional matrix, provides (perceived) incentives for organisations to engage in 
productivity-raising activities.  
North places great emphasis on the importance of perceptions of reality, as these 
influence the perception of payoffs individuals expect from their actions. 
Perceptions of reality – belief systems – depend on how individuals process and use 
information, that is, they are in part culturally derived and in part depend on 
learning (North 2005). Belief systems do not have to be ‘correct’ in their assessment 
of reality and history shows that humans often make ‘wrong’ decisions (North 
2003). Perceptions and beliefs are updated after any action taken by organisations 
which induces change in the institutional matrix. These actions are limited both by 
perceptions of what is achievable, and by the accumulated historical weight of 
formal and informal rules (and their degree of enforcement). In this way, existing 
institutions act as strong constraints on the range of options available to actors. The 
result is a system of incremental change in a largely path-dependent system. North 
does allow for the possibility of sudden and wide-ranging, even revolutionary, 
institutional transformation, although the mechanisms behind such changes are 
                                                     
4 North also calls these power elites “economic and political entrepreneurs” and makes clear 
that institutions are created to serve their interests (2005: 25). 
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poorly articulated and largely rely on extra-theoretical explanations, such as an 
irreducible mismatch between the aspirations of powerful groups (see North 2003).  
2.2.3 Institutions, economic growth and econometrics 
The rise of NIE coincided with innovations in the theories used by economists to 
explain economic growth at country level, and theories of economic growth were to 
play a large part in the newly-found popularity of institutional thinking. Growth 
theory had long been plagued by the irksome fact that, up to the late 1980s, the most 
common growth models, based ultimately on the accumulation of capital and 
labour with diminishing returns to scale, were not capable of explaining most of the 
economic growth observed in the world. In the late 1980s and early 1990s a new 
type of growth model emerged which sought to explain growth through the 
accumulation of both physical capital and ‘human capital’ – the latter often broadly 
defined to include skills and knowledge (Romer 1990; Romer 1994). Knowledge has 
positive spillovers, allowing model builders to relax the assumption of diminishing 
returns. These simple models led to a vast number of empirical studies seeking to 
find the combinations of variables which would unlock the secrets to creating 
growth. Researchers, starting with Barro (1991), used cross-country regressions to 
estimate the effects of different vectors of variables on growth rates of per capita 
GDP (see Temple 1999 for an overview). While the results of such exercises are now 
generally seen as inconclusive, not least due to pervasive oversimplification of the 
problem and a host of econometric issues (Kenny and Williams 2001), policy and 
institutional differences emerged as a strong candidate to explain differences in 
growth between countries (Easterly and Levine 2001). 
A widely-cited cross-country study by Knack and Keefer (1995) on the importance 
of property rights for economic growth kicked off a large literature, which 
incorporated institutional variables into growth regressions, claiming that these 
were better suited to explaining growth than specifications relying solely on 
proximate factors such as human capital formation. The basic intuition is that many 
of the factors that determine investment, productivity and economic growth are 
contingent on the institutional environment of a country. For a summary and 
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critique of these approaches see Glaeser et al. (2004), while Besley and Mueller 
(2015) and Bates and Block (2013) provide recent examples of the resilience of such 
methods in political economy research.  
Regression analysis by its very nature can only work with numerical values. For 
institutions to be incorporated into such analyses they first have to be ‘translated’ 
by creating numerical proxies to (hopefully) capture the institutional matrix of a 
particular place at a particular time. This is achieved either through the use of 
dummy variables, for instance to signify that a peaceful transfer of power has 
recently occurred, or through the construction of indexes, of which the Polity IV 
autocracy index is just one of the more prominent examples5. New data sets of 
institutional variables are constantly being created (see for instance Beck et al. 2001). 
Compressing something as complex as an institutional matrix into a numerical 
format of course implies a drastic degree of abstraction and reduction, that lies at 
odds with the more detailed and case-based historical approach employed by North 
himself. The econometric approach to institutional analysis, whose technical 
sophistication belies its conceptual simplicity, has in fact been reproached by 
proponents of NIE as being overly focused on formal institutions (with informal 
institutions proxied – if at all – by social capital, as this is supposedly more easily 
measured) and generally lacking the historical realism of case study approaches 
(Menard and Shirley 2014).  
2.2.4 Historical approaches to institutions and economic 
growth 
Such approaches are ill-suited to explaining how in a particular country at a 
particular time new forms of capital emerge and how to trace out the pathways of 
this emergence. There are, however, other forms of institutional analysis which 
explicitly seek to map out the development of institutions over time and to 
demonstrate how complex combinations of institutions, both inside and outside the 
                                                     
5 The Polity IV dataset contains information on 167 countries from 1800 to the present. 
Countries are ranked on a scale from -10 to +10 for their degree of autocracy. The index 
“consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, 
constraints on executive authority and political competition”. See 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html for details. 
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state, interact with economic outcomes. I will confine myself to two of the most 
prominent examples, namely the ideas developed by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson in a series of influential papers, and North’s notion of social orders. 
For Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, institutions are, as the title of one of their 
papers puts it, the fundamental cause of long-run growth, and – by extension –also 
the fundamental cause of the persistence of poverty. Their works build on a 
sophisticated and dynamic conceptual model, which is developed through, and 
illuminated by, in-depth historical studies covering long time periods and a wide 
variety of geographical settings. This long time horizon sets them apart from much 
of the literature, which focused mostly on the post-colonial period (Austin 2008). 
The basic theory, as laid out in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004), is 
premised on a distinction between economic and political institutions, both of 
which are endogenous to the theory and are socially determined (albeit, as in North, 
not by the whole society). Economic institutions are the proximate determinants of 
economic performance as they provide the incentive structure that guides 
investment and production. ‘Good’ institutions, i.e. ones that promote economic 
development, are defined as “those that provide security of property rights and 
relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society” 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004: 9) 6 . Establishing inclusive political 
institutions moreover requires a degree of political centralisation (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2013).  
However, institutions also determine the distribution of income in society and as 
such are also the cause of what Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson call ‘conflicts of 
interest’. Economic institutions are determined by political institutions. Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson make a distinction between de jure political power, which is 
directly given by political institutions, and de facto political power, which may be 
the result of actions such as lobbying or public pressure. The latter form of political 
                                                     
6 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson acknowledge that different institutions may produce 
growth in different settings at different times, and they directly address the danger of falling 
into tautology inherent in defining those institutions that actually produce growth as those 
that are good for growth. It is not clear though that they do not entirely escape this trap. 
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power is therefore largely determined by the distribution of income. Those wielding 
political power will seek to create economic institutions to their own advantage and 
will seek to craft political institutions that allow them to maintain their grip on 
power. As both political institutions and the distribution of income generally 
change only slowly, institutional systems tend to exhibit ‘persistence’ through time. 
Change comes from “shocks”, in later work also called critical junctures, “including 
changes in technologies and the international environment, that modify the balance 
of (de facto) political power in society and can lead to major changes in political 
institutions and therefore in economic institutions and economic growth” 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004: 6). While their commitment to including 
historical contingency is to be welcomed, this notion of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, as 
in North’s NIE, is a major weakness of the theory, which has to fall back on extra-
theoretical explanations for institutional changes that are not incremental. 
Thus, the question is, why do not all countries adopt ‘good’ institutions, i.e. what 
drives institutional differences across countries. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
give a clear answer. Institutions are the results of social conflict over the distribution 
of resources: “which economic institutions arise depends on who has political power 
to create or block different economic institutions. Since political institutions play a 
central role in the allocation of such power they will be an intimate part of a social 
conflict theory of economic institutions” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004: 
37, my emphasis) 7 . This is a major advance over the voluntarism implicit in 
neoclassical theory. There is also no suggestion that the resulting institutional 
matrix should be economically efficient, rather it is likely to simply be effective in 
ensuring that powerful elite groups receive an inflated share of resources. More 
efficient institutions will be blocked by those seeking to retain economic returns 
and/or political power. As institutional change tends to be slow once an 
institutional matrix is in place, historical changes in economic and political 
                                                     
7 There is some acknowledgement (albeit confined to a single paragraph) that the conflictual 
nature of social income distribution has long been discussed by both Marxists and 
dependency theorists. Tellingly though, Marxist historians are discussed only in relation to 
pre-capitalist forms of class society and there is no mention of Marxist ideas on exploitation 
under capitalism. 
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institutions can have very long running effects (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2001).  
However, unlike Marxist theorists, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson refuse to 
systematise these distributional conflicts in society, that is, they stringently avoid the 
incorporation of social class into their analysis (see Section  2.4). Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson have also been accused of the undue ‘compression of history’, by 
basing their analysis on two data points several centuries apart, thus tending to 
ignore the complex patterns of historical events that occur between their chosen 
data points. Moreover, for Africa in particular their historical ‘data’ appears to 
incorporate a series of misinterpretations and heroic assumptions (Austin 2008).   
Institutional work in economics, through reincorporating politics directly into 
economic analysis, has profound policy implications, for if politics is a determinant 
factor (for good or for bad) in economic outcomes, then economic policy becomes 
vitally important in a far deeper sense than the old mantra of ‘getting the prices 
right’. The discussions around the ‘African experience’ can serve as an illustrative 
example. Motivated in part by regression work (such as Collier and Gunning 1999) 
and in part by more detailed case study work, the low quality of (political and 
economic) institutions was blamed for many of the continent’s economic problems 
(see Ndulu et al. 2008 for an overview). Often the proposed solutions fall broadly in 
the area of good governance, which had been pushed by the international financial 
institutions since the late 1980s (World Bank 1992; World Bank 2001; see Kiely 1998 
for a critical summary). The currently dominant discourse on institutions argues 
that “institutions that maximize market freedom and most strongly protect private 
property rights are the best for economic development” (H.-J. Chang 2011: 475).  
To give a concrete example, in their influential book-length extension of the 
argument discussed above, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) return to the interaction 
of political and economic institutions. They offer a distinction between ‘extractive’ 
and ‘inclusive’ political and economic institutions and analyse their interactions – 
helpfully illustrated by way of a 2x2 matrix. As above, inclusive institutions are 
broadly defined as those that allow for economic choice, in the narrow sense 
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familiar from microeconomic theory, while inclusive political institutions are ones 
which widen access to decision making. Formal democracy appears to be a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for inclusive political institutions. Rich 
countries are uncritically declared to have evolved both political and economic 
institutions which are inclusive and therefore offer the right kinds of incentives to 
all social actors to drive innovation and economic growth. While the concept of 
inclusive institutions remains somewhat nebulous in the text, it is not an unfair 
reading to suggest that the authors would like to see poor countries moving 
towards an institutional matrix that broadly emulates Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Leaving aside the questionable ‘inclusiveness’ of both economic and political 
institutions in rich capitalist economies8, Acemoglu and Robinson brush over the 
fact that a very different institutional setup, namely the so-called developmental 
state, has historically shown itself capable of driving sustained economic growth 
(see Section  2.3). Acemoglu and Robinson’s 2x2 matrix does allow for growth under 
extractive political institutions, of which China might be an example. They point to 
the demise of the Soviet Union as illustration that such a combination is not 
sustainable. While they may or may not be proved right over a long time horizon, 
this does not diminish the argument that such states appear capable of long periods 
of sustained growth. I return to this point below.  
2.2.5 Social orders and capitalist development 
The most ambitious take on the importance of institutions comes from North 
himself. In North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) the authors modestly propose 
nothing less than ‘a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human 
history’, which is the book’s subtitle. North and his co-authors seek to provide an 
explanation for the wealth and poverty of human societies from pre-history to the 
present. The key concept, ‘social orders’, “are characterised by the way societies 
craft institutions that support the existence of specific forms of human organisation, 
                                                     
8 See for instance Piketty and Saez (2001) on income inequality and Gilens (2012) on the 
influence of moneyed elites on political decision making in the US. Acemoglu and Robinson 
also gloss over the interventionist military and economic history of some of the Western 
(and other) states. In the light of their own argument one would have expected a more 
critical treatment of the connections between the maintenance of extractive political 
institutions and external assistance – military and otherwise. 
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the way societies limit or open access to those organisations, and through the 
incentives created by the pattern of organisation. These characteristics of social 
orders are also intimately related to how societies limit and control violence” 
(North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 1f). In other words, social orders are “ways of 
organizing societies that are self-sustaining and internally consistent” (North et al. 
2007: 3), i.e. stable equilibria with well-aligned incentives for governing elites. The 
framework thus places the use of power, and in particular violence, and the role of 
social, political and economic elites at the centre of the analysis. 
For North et al. only three social orders have existed in the history of humanity: the 
‘primitive’ state where humans lived as hunters and gatherers, the ‘natural state’, 
which describes most of human history after the spread of agriculture and ‘open 
access orders’, by which North et al. mean rich capitalist societies. Natural states 
“manage the problem of violence by forming a dominant coalition that limits access 
to valuable resources – land, labour, and capital – or access to and control of 
valuable activities – such as trade, worship and education – to elite groups.”  
(North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 31). In natural states access to elite positions is 
personal, that is tied to individual identity, and violence is controlled when elites 
form coalitions to manage the distribution of resources amongst themselves and 
maintain the status quo: “Powerful individuals possess privileges and rents, and 
since violence threatens or reduces those rents, the risk of losing the rents can make 
it in the interests of powerful individuals and groups to cooperate with the coalition 
in power rather than to fight”(North et al. 2007: 3). Such states can be ‘fragile’, and 
hence unable to sustain such a ruling elite coalition, while ‘basic’ and ‘mature’ 
natural states are stable institutional frameworks. By contrast, an open access order 
is one in which elite positions are (theoretically) open to all. Peace is ensured 
through a ‘double balance’ between political and economic incentives, whereby 
widely held beliefs about equality, open elections, and the potential costs of limiting 
access combine to ensure the maintenance of the existing social order. Open access 
orders create continuity through ‘perpetually lived organisations’ (i.e. corporations 
and the state).  
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Societies transition from natural states to open access orders by first transforming 
intra-elite relations from personal to impersonal and then spreading such relations 
throughout society. Three ‘doorstop conditions’ are necessary for such a transition 
to occur: the rule of law for elites, the creation of the aforementioned perpetually 
lived organisations and the consolidation of control over the military (see North, 
Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 151). Open access orders also feature ‘open access 
markets’, which are characterised by Schumpeterian competition and serve to 
spread the gains from productive innovations through society at large.  
A main weakness of new institutional analysis has been its limited ability to say 
anything about contemporary capitalist development9. The broad historical canvas 
painted by Acemoglu et al. does not feature a discussion of advanced capitalist 
economies beyond the observation that they have both inclusive political and 
economic institutions, and hence does not lend itself to a comparative analysis of 
such societies. At the same time, their theory is silent on how societies lacking these 
institutions do change over shorter and more contemporary time horizons. That is, 
their aforementioned compression of history (Austin 2008) blinds their theoretical 
edifice to how contemporary capitalism is developing in contemporary poor 
countries. Similarly, North et al.’s conception of social orders essentially terminates 
the analysis when a society becomes an open access order. In the case of Britain this 
apparently occurred at some point in the 19th century. Beyond a broad description 
of the internal logic of the incentive systems inherent in open access orders, the 
theoretical apparatus has no concepts to discuss further developments within an 
open access order, and hence fails as a theory of capitalism. 
For low- and middle-income countries, however, North et al. (2007) attempt to 
tackle this problem head on. As these countries have (by definition) limited access 
order, development interventions fail because they threaten to disturb the rent 
creation and allocation processes that benefit the powerful. However, these 
                                                     
9 That is, if we abstract from what Streeck (2009) calls ‘variable sociology’. Examples are – 
from very different methodological stances – Hall and Soskice (2001) and Besley and 
Mueller (2015), both of which are concerned with the impact of institutions on economic 
development. But these approaches share a refusal to posit, or even draw upon, a general 
theory of capitalist development. 
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processes are also the foundation of stability in such a social order. Institutions in 
(apparently all) limited access orders function differently to those in open access 
orders, being incapable of performing their functions without drawing on personal 
relationships. To explain differences between states, North et al. have to revert back 
to the effects of technology and the international state system – essentially extra-
theoretical explanations that stand outside of their framework, which is focused 
very much on the internal logic of institutional development. This framework has 
been applied to problems of political economy in a number of different countries, 
although the focus here is on elite coalitions and the inhibition of violence, rather 
than on the emergence of dynamic capitalist accumulators, see North et al. (2012). 
2.2.6 Weaknesses of new institutional analysis 
Khan (2010) has welcomed the social orders, which are similar to his own notion of 
political settlements, as a necessary additional theoretical level to explain 
differences in the performance of institutions across countries. However, he also 
criticised the notion of power that underlies the ideas of social orders and NIE more 
widely, by pointing out that elites are also subject to contestation ‘from below’. The 
ability of social groups to determine an institutional frame will depend in part also 
on their ability to enforce an institutional setup. 
The NIE approach and the historical institutionalism as practised by Acemoglu et 
al. are of limited use to an investigation into concrete processes of agrarian capital 
accumulation. Questions of capital accumulation are largely eschewed by the 
theory, as successful and ongoing capital accumulation is the logical outcome of 
providing the ‘right’ institutional setting. Once such an institutional matrix is in 
place, it will – almost by definition – provide individuals with incentives to 
accumulate as well as the means to do so. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, 
this formulation loses sight of the substantial complexity underlying both the 
creation of particular institutions and their (planned and unplanned) socio-
economic effects.  
More fundamentally, despite its apparent historicity, the new institutional analysis, 
including the evolution of social orders, remains at its core curiously ahistorical. It 
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replaces historical analysis with a schematic overview of selected historical episodes 
which are supposed to document the ‘progression’ through the – unashamedly 
hierarchical – ladder of social orders, devoid of the social conflicts that often drove 
these developments. Tellingly, the discussion of the British transition to an open 
access order is confined to a brief enumeration of acts of parliament with no 
mention of the struggles that surrounded their passing (North, Wallis, and 
Weingast 2009). History then ‘ends’ for a particular society when it becomes an 
open access order. While social orders are thus a corrective to the theoretical edifice 
of NIE at the microeconomic level, the theory operates at too high a level of 
abstraction to be able to explain specifically capitalist development. Unlike Khan’s 
own ideas, the theoretical apparatus of social orders is also not able to specify under 
which circumstances states in ‘limited access orders’ will be able to successfully 
drive development (see Khan 1995). We turn now to a set of theories that strive to 
do just that. 
2.3 The developmental state approach 
A second broad branch of institutional theory concerns the state as an actor in the 
context of economic development and of late industrialisation in particular. These 
theories were developed amidst a renewed interest in the state as both a research 
subject and as an important actor in its own right amongst institutional sociologists 
from the late 1970s onwards (see Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). In a 
programmatic statement setting out the new research agenda, Skocpol (1985: 6) 
criticised extant sociology as overly ‘society-centric’, and instead proposed to view 
states as actors possessing “true autonomy” 10 . For Skocpol recognition of this 
autonomy results in a dual role for the modern state, which should be reflected in 
research: “On the one hand, states may be viewed as organizations through which 
official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realizing them more or less 
effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings. On the 
other hand, states may be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of 
                                                     
10 See Cammack (1989) for critique from a Marxist perspective, which accuses Skocpol of 
intellectual dishonesty in her treatment of (neo-)Marxist theories of the state. Cammack puts 
this down to a desire to avoid having to take notions of class seriously. 
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organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all 
groups and classes in society.” (1985: 28).  
Ideas of autonomous state action were also applied to questions of economic 
development. Rather than diffuse notions of ‘good institutions’ focused on private 
property rights and their enforceability, such theories seek to understand, through 
the study of concrete historical cases, how some states manage to successfully drive 
programmes of (late) industrial development at the national level. The central issue 
is how some countries manage to become ‘developmental states’, i.e. states capable 
of engendering sustained capitalist development through structural change and 
increases in labour productivity11.  
Advocates of state-directed development were – and largely are – united in their 
rejection of the free market policy recommendations. During the 1980s and into the 
1990s the economic mainstream was dominated by an extreme form of free market 
ideology. Collectively termed the ‘Washington consensus’, a policy package 
emphasising free trade, deregulation, privatisation and fiscal ‘discipline’ (which 
often meant austerity) was supposed to be the key to long-term economic 
prosperity, and was presented as the only policy option (Williamson 1993). Through 
structural adjustment programmes, making loans to heavily indebted countries 
conditional upon adopting ‘good’ policies, the international financial institutions 
imposed ‘reforms’ on low- and middle-income countries (Collier and Gunning 
1999b; Mosley and Toye 1988). State-centric theories of development thus generated 
heated debates, and developing countries were implored to “get the prices right” by 
not intervening in the functioning of markets and relying instead on the price 
mechanism to allocate capital and drive development (Lal 1983: 170). 
Theories of the state as a decisive actor in economic development go back at least to 
Friedrich List (2012, orig. 1841), for whom an active government policy was 
indispensable to the successful development of the Nationalökonomie in the 
                                                     
11 The developmental state approach thus combines strands of structuralist economics, ‘old 
institutionalism’ and elements of Marxist political economy. 
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particular case of Germany, which was a late industrialiser compared to the UK12. 
The mechanics of late industrialisation were much later taken up again by 
Gerschenkron (1962), who argued that successful European late developers had 
benefited from government policies that helped mobilise capital for industrial 
investment. Late industrialisers had not developed the same institutions as already 
industrialised countries and their industrialisation process would thus differ. For 
Gerschenkron the key concept is ‘relative backwardness’, that is, the distance of a 
late industrialiser from the technological frontier. The greater this relative 
backwardness, the greater the presumed need to industrialise13. For Gerschenkron 
‘backwardness’ was an opportunity: late industrialisers could grow more rapidly by 
importing capital and technology. 
The rapid industrialisation of the East Asian economies provided the blueprint for 
the modern development state. The term was coined by Johnson (1982) in his 
seminal study of the role played by the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
Japan’s industrial growth. Japan’s successful push for industrialisation was led by 
(but not exclusively due to) the state, which harnessed the market mechanism for 
national economic development. As Japan industrialised and began exiting simpler, 
more labour-intensive branches of industry, Japanese capital, in search of lower 
labour costs, began flowing to other countries in the region. This regional division 
of labour is known as the ‘flying geese paradigm’ (Cumings 1984; Kasahara 2013)14. 
Among the beneficiaries of these capital flows were the so-called Asian tiger 
economies – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – all of which 
managed to become high-income countries by sustaining extremely high growth 
rates between the 1960s and the 1990s. These states emulated key elements of the 
Japanese developmental state (Johnson 1999). 
                                                     
12 Although possibly the first infant industry protection programme by a state was launched 
by the British prime minister Roger Walpole, who was heavily influenced by the writings of 
Alexander Hamilton, as early as 1721 (H.-J. Chang 2009).  
13 For a critical take on the validity of this assumption, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
14 For a contemporary reformulation of the paradigm with China as a growth pole and sub-
Saharan Africa as a (potential) beneficiary, see Lin (2011). 
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Classic studies on South Korea (Amsden 1992) and Taiwan (Wade 2004) 
demonstrated not only that activist government policy had been decisive in creating 
successful industrial development, but also showed the mechanisms by which the 
state had forced the creation of a dynamic domestic class of capitalists15. Central in 
all cases was a strategic alliance between a dedicated and competent government 
bureaucracy and the domestic capitalist class. Crucially, the state bureaucracy had 
to act in the long-term strategic interest of the capitalist class as a whole, rather than 
bowing to the more myopic desires of particular companies or factions of capital. 
While the state supported the capitalists in its accumulation of both wealth and 
capital, such support was conditional upon the adherence of the capitalist class to a 
national development strategy based upon continual improvements in productivity 
and export performance. Amsden (2003), for instance, stressed how governments of 
successful late industrialisers, in East Asia and beyond, had subjected companies to 
‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ – subsidies conditional upon company performance 
– to force them to become more productive. Evans (1995) describes how 
government bureaucracies must be both ‘embedded’ in the private sector to be able 
to monitor performance and solve problems, but must maintain ‘autonomy’ from 
factional capitalist interest to be able to discipline firms. Comparing the growth 
experiences of a number of countries with that of South Korea, Kohli (2004: 10) 
argued that only “cohesive capitalist states”, i.e. states that combine “centralised 
and purposive authority structures that often penetrate deep into society” with “a 
close alliance with producer or capitalist groups”, have been capable of maintaining 
high levels of economic growth over long periods of time. 
2.3.1 Industrial policy in poor countries 
A common feature of all developmental states is their use of industrial policy, 
which may be described as “restructuring policies in favour of more dynamic 
activities” (Rodrik 2004: 2), i.e. policies that accelerate the structural transformation 
of the economy. Broadly conceived, this covers “policies affecting ‘infant industry’ 
support of various kinds, but also trade policies, science and technology policies, 
public procurement, policies affecting foreign direct investment, intellectual 
                                                     
15 See Öniş (1991) for an early review and synthesis of key texts. 
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property rights, and the allocation of financial resources” (Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz 
2009: 1f). Proponents of industrial policy differ in their reasons for supporting such 
policies and there is a range of opinions about how far state intervention should go. 
While economists associated more closely with the neoclassical paradigm believe 
that such policies should be confined to overcoming market failures (e.g. Rodrik 
2004; Rodrik 2008), or believe that industrial policy regime must be carefully 
aligned with a country’s comparative advantage (Lin and Monga 2010; Lin 2012), 
others insist that comparative advantage must be actively created through policy 
measures that defy comparative advantage (e.g H.-J. Chang, in Lin and Chang 
2009). Still others argue that the special nature of knowledge and its importance in 
creating competitive firms justify industrial policy measures (Cimoli, Dosi, and 
Stiglitz 2009; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2015). Most of the debate around the use of 
industrial policy has specifically been around the use of ‘selective’ industrial policy, 
i.e. “policy that deliberately favours particular industries over others, against 
market signals, usually (but not necessarily) to enhance efficiency and promote 
productivity growth” (H.-J. Chang 2009: 2). However, detractors of industrial policy 
question both the theoretical case for having governments make selective 
interventions in the economy and their capacity to do so effectively (Pack and Saggi 
2006). 
Still, given the apparent successes of industrial policy in furthering growth in East 
Asia, the use of such policies in countries currently seeking to industrialise has been 
widely advocated (Altenburg 2011; Dinh et al. 2012; Edigheji 2010; Khan 2004; 
Newman et al. 2016; Oqubay 2015; Stiglitz et al. 2013; Stiglitz, Lin, and Patel 2013; 
UNCTAD and UNIDO 2011; Wade 2010; Weiss 2011). However, opponents of the 
use of industrial policy have argued that, while possibly desirable in the abstract, 
the successful implementation requires conditions that are allegedly just not given 
in many African countries. The supposed lack of economic growth in ‘Africa’ is 
blamed variously on a combination of bad economic policies and geographical 
factors (Sachs and Warner 1997) or the continent’s multi-ethnic states (Easterly and 
Levine 1997), but most seriously on the absence of ‘good governance’ – in particular 
a disciplined and committed government and civil service. This concern is related to 
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the ‘good governance’ agenda put forward by the international financial institutions 
as a corrective to the policies that were seen as holding back growth in Africa 
(World Bank 1992; World Bank 2001; for critical engagements with the concept see 
Kiely 1998, Mkandawire 2007, and the collection in Noman et al. 2012). It also 
mirrors Acemoglu et al.’s ‘extractive institutions’ (see above). In the absence of such 
governance, selective industrial policy, which gives government officials power 
over how firms make money, would simply be an invitation to rent seeking and 
corruption. 
The strongest statement of this supposed pathology of African states is the neo-
Weberian notion that they are ‘neopatrimonial’ in nature, that is, they are a mere 
front to a system of private networks and relationships (Chabal and Daloz 2010), or 
are undermined by the use of public office for private purposes (Erdmann and 
Engel 2007). Critics of the concept of neopatrimonialism have pointed out that not 
only has this concept been stretched to explain an unfeasibly wide variety of state 
behaviour (Mkandawire 2001), but also that the requirements for industrial policy 
have been overstated (H.-J. Chang 2009). Historically, the industrialised states of the 
global north have successful  deployed industrial policies while lacking anything 
that could have been described as ‘good governance’ (H.-J. Chang 2002).  
Another approach to countering the supposed impossibility of successful industrial 
policy in ‘Africa’ is to critically examine the relationships between rents and 
economic development. The creation of rents is an integral part of economic 
development – the point is to differentiate between rents that are growth-
enhancing, i.e. those that support innovation and the move into higher productivity 
activities, and those that are not (Khan 2000; Khan 2006; see also Rodrik 2008)16. 
Based on this more sophisticated understanding of the role of rents, and an analysis 
of state-society relations, Kelsall (2013) has argued that states that manage to 
centralise the rent creation process and are ruled by elites with long time horizons 
can achieve high rates of economic growth and are thus ‘developmental 
                                                     
16 Khan does not argue that rents are socially costless, but rather that the social costs of rents 
have to be offset against their productive effects. 
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neopatrimonal states’. These ideas have gone a long way to restoring confidence 
that African states are not universally incapable of implementing effective industrial 
policy. In Chapter Four I examine how such a regime has been established in 
Ethiopia. 
2.3.2 Limits of state-centric theories 
While there is much to learn from developmental state theory, in particular about 
how capitalist development can be achieved in practice, the notion of the unified 
developmental state has been criticised from a number of angles. For Jessop (2001)  
state-centric theorising underplays the complexity of state-society relations by in 
effect positing the state as a unified actor; a concern that is echoed for East Asia by 
Moon and Prasad (1994)17. In a similar vein, Whitfield and Buur (2014) argue that a 
coalition between ruling elites and capitalists is not enough. Such a coalition must 
be buttressed by mutual (political and economic) interests, as well as being capable 
of creating ‘pockets of efficiency’ within the state bureaucracy. The interests of elites 
have to be understood in the context of their own political aims (see also Whitfield 
et al. 2015). Fine (2013), who divides the literature on developmental state into an 
economic and a political school, criticises the former for not specifying the 
circumstances under which productivity-enhancing industrial policies are – or are 
not adopted, and warns that the latter school tends to oversimplify the issue of elite 
interests by replacing the complex contradictions of capitalist social relations with 
binaries such as ‘financial’ vs ‘industrial’ capital in analysing state autonomy. These 
points are well taken, and I retain the necessity to focus on elite interests in the 
analysis in the following chapters. 
However, even these more complex formulations lack a crucial ingredient in their 
view of the state: room for relational agency outside of the immediate elite. A richer 
theory of the state is provided for instance by Jessop (1990, 2016). Drawing on 
Poulantzas and Gramsci, he proposes a ‘strategic-relational approach’ to 
understanding the state: “Instead of looking at the state as a substantial, unified 
thing or unitary subject, the [strategic-relational approach] widens its focus, so as to 
                                                     
17 Moon and Prasad also emphasise how states have to learn to conduct effective industrial 
policy and that such learning will come, in part, from failure. 
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capture not just the state apparatus but the exercise and effects of state power as a 
contingent expression of a changing balance of forces that seek to advance their 
respective interests inside, through, and against the state system” (Jessop 2016: 54, 
original emphasis). The focus here is on the social basis of the state (and its 
contestation by various groups), as well as on the state project and attempts to 
establish a hegemonic vision of the state. Such a formulation opens up room for 
social struggles and the role played by economic and political domination in 
processes of differential accumulation. It is also particularly useful in the Ethiopian 
context, where political elites appear to have a distinct state project – rapid 
structural change – and are actively seeking to provide the hegemonic ideological 
vision to carry this through (Weis 2016, see also Chapter Four). 
2.4 Historical political economy 
Beyond the criticisms already made, institutional analysis suffers from two major 
shortcomings with regard to the aims of this thesis: a concentration on ‘leaders’ 
(broadly defined) as sole decisive actors, and an inability to view capitalism as a 
specific and distinct politico-economic system with particular political 
consequences. Both new institutional analysis and developmental state theory are 
elite-based theories of development (see also Selwyn 2015). Where the new 
institutionalists are (at the macroeconomic level) concerned with intra-elite 
bargaining, the focus of the developmental state theorists is on the decision- making 
processes and managerial capabilities of narrow technocratic elites, who alone are 
imbued with the ability to transform their societies. This lacuna is critical, because it 
underplays the role of conflict and contradiction in both the historical origin of 
capitalism as a system and its contemporary development. While both Acemoglu et 
al. and North et al. explicitly deal with violence and conflict, both ignore the class 
character of capitalist societies and steadfastly refuse to see distributional conflicts, 
even in pre-capitalist societies, in systematic (i.e. class) terms. Similarly, 
developmental state theorists are largely silent on the role of (organised) labour and 
class conflict in shaping industrial development (by contrast, see D. Chang 2009 on 
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labour repression in South Korea)18. The specific contours of capitalist development 
cannot, however, be explained without reference to the role of class struggle. Even 
in such a supposedly staid and stable state such as Germany, with its famously 
corporatist union structure, radical labour movements significantly influenced the 
form and nature of industrial development during the post-war boom (Birke 2007; 
for a study with a longer time horizon, see Roth 1974)19. 
None of the institutional theoretical systems outlined discuss capitalist 
development as the development of capitalism, that is, as the development of a 
system of social and productive relations qualitatively different to all other forms of 
social and economic organisation. They are incapable of explaining the differentia 
specifica of capitalism as a system (see Teschke 2014). We must therefore look to 
theories which seek to incorporate considerations of social change and of power 
relations in systems of production. 
2.4.1 The development of capitalism 
The development of the modern capitalist system has long been described and 
analysed by economic historians. A prevalent manner of explaining the spread of 
capitalism is by reference to market competition, which compels producers to 
constantly innovate and lower the cost of production. Wood refers to such 
explanations collectively as the “commercialisation model” (2002a: 11). While this 
correctly identifies the engine of capitalist growth, such an explanation assumes 
that which is to be explained. As Brenner (1977) has argued, market competition is 
effective in raising labour productivity only in the context of existing capitalist 
relations, that is, when both the means of production and labour power have 
become commodities in themselves (on this process see also Polanyi 2001). For 
Brenner such theories view capitalism as simply a quantitative expansion of market 
systems, which in themselves are ancient. The commercialisation models a process 
of ‘Smithian’ growth, which followed almost naturally, once ‘fetters’ to the 
expansion of markets were overcome and the increasing size of the emerging world 
                                                     
18 A partial exception is Kohli (2004) who lists systematic labour repression as a necessary 
feature of a developmental state. 
19 On labour struggles globally, see Silver (2003). 
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market allowed for an ever more refined social division of labour. These ideas tend 
to highlight the importance of urban trading centres and the spread of global trade 
as catalysts of economic development (see for instance Wallerstein 2004).  
Such approaches all rely on the implicit idea of ‘progress’ towards capitalism. Only 
in Europe were these ‘fetters’ overcome, possibly through some uniquely 
Promethean quality of European culture (à la Landes 1999). Contemporary Marxist 
writing has comprehensively broken with both this conception of ‘progress’ – 
whether based on an inexorable march through a logical succession of modes of 
production, or rooted in some notion of European superiority – and with ideas of 
historical necessity in the emergence of capitalism (Comninel 2013). Instead the 
birth of capitalism is to be found in the contingent outcome of class struggle in an 
otherwise unassuming corner of Europe – England – in the early modern period 
(Brenner 1995). 
According to Brenner (1977), markets, export surges in mass produced commodities 
and long-distance trading are all phenomena which occur and reoccur throughout 
history. But they led to a sustained and systematic increase in per capita labour 
productivity only in the context of capitalist social relations – and it is these that 
must be explained. Brenner’s project is concerned with explaining how such 
capitalist relations developed out of the pre-capitalist European feudal system.  This 
is because markets are not automatic engines of productivity improvement. For 
markets to act as engines of productivity growth, accumulation through innovation 
has to be enforced – and this requires specifically capitalist social relations of 
production, whereby producers are forced to rely on the market to secure their own 
reproduction. In other words, the market has ceased to be an opportunity and has 
instead become an imperative (Wood 2002a, 2002b). 
The market imperative under capitalist relations of production is based on a unique 
and specific set of class relations – in particular absolute private property in the 
means of production, including land, and ‘free’ wage workers. Workers are ‘free’ in 
Marx’s ironic formulation, in a very narrowly defined sense: “The capital-relation 
presupposes a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the 
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conditions for the realisation of their labour.” (Marx 1990: 874). “The workers are 
therefore free from, unencumbered by, any means of production”, while the 
capitalist class monopolises ownership of the means of production (Marx 1990: 874). 
Workers, stripped of the ability to produce their own subsistence, are compelled to 
sell their labour power to the owners of the means of production. The historical 
process which produced this set of class relations, which is unique to capitalism, is 
one of violent class conflict. As Marx put it: “These newly freed men [the workers] 
became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means 
of production, and all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal 
arrangements. And this history, the history of their expropriation, is written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.” (1990: 875). 
In parallel, the dominant class of expropriators has lost its historical ability to use 
extra-economic means of coercion, such as violence, as a primary method of value 
extraction, which had prevailed under feudalism. In a system of free wage labour, 
there are political limits to increasing the extraction of surplus by simply expanding 
the working day or increasing the intensity of work20. Instead, the dominant class, 
compelled to compete in the market, must continuously increase the extracted 
surplus by increasing the productivity of labour. That is, exploiters must use 
(primarily) economic means of resource extraction. A failure to do so will lead to 
them being undercut by more efficient producers and being forced to exit the 
market. 
Capitalism is thus characterised by a separation of the political and economic 
spheres, which is both novel and unique: “the social functions of production and 
distribution, surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of social 
labour are, so to speak, privatized and they are achieved by ‘non-authoritative’, 
non-political means. In other words, the social allocation of resources and labour 
does not, on the whole, take place by means of political direction, communal 
deliberation, hereditary duty, custom, or religious obligation, but rather through the 
                                                     
20 Although both mechanisms are still active in capitalist production. But they are not 
sufficient to ensure survival in the market. 
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mechanisms of commodity exchange” (Wood 1981: 81). At the same time, this 
‘private’ appropriation relies on political power – and coercion – to maintain the 
prevailing social property relations. Where the economic and political functions of 
exploitation and surplus appropriation were combined in the lord under feudalism, 
capitalists have ceded this political power, and the costly responsibility that comes 
with it, to the state21. 
2.4.2 The agrarian roots of capitalism 
Such a conception allows a break with “one of the most well-established 
conventions of Western culture” (Wood 2002a: 68), namely that capitalism is a 
product of the city, the urban trading centre which formed the core of European 
cultural life. In fact, as Brenner (1977, 1995) shows, capitalist tendencies first 
emerged in the English countryside in the 16th century, where a triangular class 
structure of feudal lord, capitalist landlord and tenant farmer emerged, bringing for 
the first time a whole society under the market imperative and therefore producing 
the novel incentive structure which would later drive the industrial revolution. And 
contrary to the commercialization model, it is not the English trading system which 
drove capitalism, but rather the specific capitalist form taken by English agriculture 
transformed the trading system by creating the first true home market (Wood 
2002a)22. 
The capitalist structure of English agriculture created the investment capital later 
used in commercial agriculture and industry, through the expropriation of common 
land known as the enclosure movement. By stripping peasants of their access to 
common land, that is, to the means of production and therefore subsistence, it 
created an impoverished mass of workers, who were forced to sell their labour 
power as a commodity. Concentrating workers without access to the means of 
subsistence in the growing urban centres also creating political pressure and 
effective demand for a home market well supplied with cheap staples and 
                                                     
21 On the particular ‘relative autonomy’ of capitalist states see Wood (1981) and Poulantzas 
(2014). 
22 Brenner acknowledges the importance of the British merchants, but sees their role as a 
necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism, rather than as a driving force (Brenner 
1993) 
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consumer goods. This class structure was the outcome of class struggle in the 
English countryside. In other parts of Europe similar struggles had different 
outcomes which meant that this particular class structure emerged only much later 
(Brenner 1995)23. For Brenner (1977) the role of the state was decisive in securing the 
victory of landed classes against serious and organised resistance in the 
countryside. However, a central aspect of Polanyi's work (2001) has been to show 
how the English crown also played a moderating role in the enclosure process, 
which helped mediate the social effects of making ‘fictitious commodities’ of both 
land and labour.  
The form of Marxist political economy pioneered by Brenner and Wood, collectively 
sometimes referred to as ‘political Marxism’, places class struggle at the centre of 
history, sees a clear distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies 
(especially in how accumulation is organised), and provides an essentially 
‘internalist’ explanation for the rise of capitalism in Europe. Especially the latter two 
have proved controversial and have been criticised from a number of angles. Their 
theory has been described as over-reliant on the notion of wage labour and as 
Eurocentric. Rioux (2013) charges that the insistence that capitalism is characterised 
by economic surplus extraction makes the theory blind to the violent and coercive 
forms of surplus extraction, such as slavery and colonialism, that are also part of the 
history of capitalism, and in some forms also continue until today. A similar 
critique is put forward by Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015), who also note that 
colonial relations and slavery are seen not as constitutive of capitalist development, 
but rather have to be defined as non-capitalist to maintain the sharp distinction 
between different modes of production24. For them this reliance on wage-labour 
produces an analysis that denies the role of extra-European societies in the 
                                                     
23  Brenner’s intervention, which picked up themes from the earlier ‘transition debate’ 
between Dobb and Sweezy (see Hilton 1982), was deeply controversial and sparked intense 
debate. Central contributions to the debate, as well as some related interventions, are 
collected in Aston and Philpin (1995). 
24 Anievas and Nisancioglu instead suggest that an updated form of Trotzky’s notion of 
‘uneven and combined development’ is better suited to building a theory that overcomes the 
nation state as the unit of analysis and does more than rely on ‘the international’ as an ad 
hoc theoretical ‘fix’. For a comparison of uneven and combined development with state-
theoretic approaches, see Selwyn (2014). 
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emergence of capitalism, and downplays the importance of inter-societal conflict. 
Moreover, political Marxism apparently locates technological dynamism and 
innovation only in capitalist systems and therefore fails to recognise the significance 
of extra-European knowledge and technologies in the origin of capitalism. The 
technological dynamism of pre-capitalist societies has also been noted by Pomeranz 
(2000), who argues that areas of Asia were broadly comparable with dynamic areas 
of Europe prior to the industrial revolution25. 
These criticisms are both well-made and at the same time somewhat unfair. For 
political Marxists the central criterion for the existence of capitalism is not the 
existence of wage labour, but rather the market compulsion of both workers and 
producers which produces the incentive systems at the heart of capitalism, and its 
emergence through class struggle. This does not have to mean that other forms of 
exploitation played no role in the emergence and subsequent development of 
capitalism, simply that they were not sufficient by themselves to bring about 
capitalist development. Such a formulation should be flexible enough to 
accommodate the role of both economic and extra-economic coercion in both 
historical and contemporary capitalism.  
Political Marxism’s main strength is its insistence on historical contingency, as a 
result of social (class) struggles, whose outcomes are not pre-determined. At the 
same time such struggles are situated within a theoretical framework that is capable 
of explaining the salient features and ‘stylised facts’ of capitalist development. The 
emergence of capitalism was neither a teleological necessity that occurred wherever 
fetters to markets were relaxed, nor a conscious ideological project fought for by 
dominant classes, but rather the highly contingent outcome of class struggles at a 
certain historical conjuncture shaped by its very specific social and political context. 
Thus, the detailed questions to be investigated are how and why capitalism emerges 
within a given rural setting. What determines its contours, who are its contesting 
                                                     
25 For Pomeranz the industrial revolution is then the result of ‘coal and colonies’, through 
which (parts of) Europe were able to overcome the limits on supplies of energy and arable 
land (and hence food) that caused Asian societies to decline over the 19th century. However, 
Maddison (2003: 2408ff) is highly critical of Pomeranz’s data. Also see Brenner and Isett 
(2002) for a critical engagement with Pomeranz. 
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classes and what results may we expect from its further development? In short, we 
must analyse the political economy of agrarian change, long known to the social 
sciences as the agrarian question. 
2.5 The agrarian question 
The agrarian question (henceforth: AQ) is concerned with the complex 
interconnections between wider socio-economic developments (that is, capitalism as 
a system) and changes in the agrarian sector in particular. A central concern is rural 
transformation, which Byres describes as “those changes in the countryside of a poor 
country necessary to the development of capitalism and its ultimate dominance in a 
particular national social formation” (Byres 1996: 27). To understand why and how 
the political economy perspective of the AQ remains an important mode of enquiry 
today we must sketch the development of the agrarian question to its contemporary 
forms. 
2.5.1 The history of the agrarian question 
Henry Bernstein has shown that the meaning of the agrarian question can be 
usefully broken down into different problematics (Bernstein 1996; Bernstein 2006; 
Bernstein 2009a; see also Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010). 
Bernstein builds on the three problems identified by Byres, namely those of politics 
(going back to Engels), production (based on Kautsky and Lenin) and accumulation 
(which has its origins in Preobrazhensky).  
The intellectual origins of the AQ can be found in Marx’s Capital (1990, orig. 1867), 
where he describes the process of transition to capitalism in England, which Marx 
sees at the ideal type of capitalist development26. Using Marx as a starting point, 
Friedrich Engels (1972, orig. 1894), writing in the context of the Reformismusstreit in 
the German social-democratic workers’ party, expanded the AQ into the political 
realm by contemplating the role of rural populations in the struggle for socialism. 
The modern usage of the term agrarian question, however, goes back to Karl 
Kautsky and his book Die Agrarfrage (Engels instead spoke of the Bauernfrage, the 
                                                     
26 On the importance of the agrarian question for Marx and Lenin, respectively, see also 
Hammen (1972) and Guha (1977). 
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question of the farmers). In great statistical detail Kautsky (1972, orig. 1902) 
analysed the development of capitalism in German agriculture. He distinguished 
between capitalists proper, whom he credits with the development of productive 
forces in agriculture, primarily through the use of machinery, and what he calls 
small farms (Kleinbetriebe), whose survival he attributes to overwork and under-
consumption by the entire household27. Similarly, Lenin (1964, orig. 1899) sought to 
show that the growth of agrarian capitalism in Russia was manifesting itself in the 
formation of classes in the countryside through a process of rural differentiation. 
Instead of the homogeneous agrarian community at the heart of agrarian populist 
analysis, Lenin, in a pioneering use of survey and census data, postulated an 
agrarian population split into exploiters and exploited28. The exploiters were for 
him successful accumulators, while the exploited landless were poor workers and 
small farmers incapable of reproducing themselves through farming alone and 
therefore reliant on wage labour. Sitting between these, Lenin identified a stratum 
of middle peasants, whom he saw as a transitional category. In his formulation, 
accumulators are hirers of labour, while workers are forced to sell their labour 
power to ensure their own reproduction. The middle peasants rely both on family 
labour and hired labour and are sometimes capable of producing an investible 
surplus. Both Kautsky and Lenin were thus concerned with the development of 
rural capitalism, the distinctive forms it takes and the forces that inhibit or further 
its development (T. J Byres 1996). The Soviet economist Preobrazhensky, following 
the Russian revolution, was concerned with the development of Soviet industry in 
the context of late development in a hostile (capitalist) environment. In the 1920s he 
advocated a number of measures to enable ‘Soviet primitive accumulation’. While 
Lenin had envisaged the growth of the home market as a vehicle of transformation, 
Preobrazhensky was concerned with the appropriation of agricultural surplus to 
finance investment in industry via taxation and the manipulation of inter-sectoral 
terms of trade (Erlich 1950).  
                                                     
27 For the classic treatment of the ‘peasant’ household, analogous perhaps to Kautsky’s 
Kleinbetriebe, see Chayanov (1986). See also van der Ploeg (2013) for a contemporary 
restatement of Chayanov’s ideas. 
28 On agrarian populism see also Bernstein (2009b) and Kitching (1982). 
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2.5.2 Paths of transition 
A breakthrough in the study of the AQ came with the seminal work of Terence 
Byres (1996). Concerned about the often teleological nature in which ideas of 
agrarian transition were applied, he stressed the diversity in historical outcomes as 
well as the multiplicity in transition paths resulting from the great variety of 
conditions both within and between states. These factors led to diverse class 
structures, relations of production and relations between the two, which resulted in 
very different historical outcomes. Like Brenner, Byres sees the outcomes of class 
conflicts as a decisive element in determining patterns of capitalist development. 
Critically incorporating the work of Lenin, Byres identifies three main paths for the 
agrarian transition, namely those taken by England, Prussia and the USA. Byres 
stresses in his analysis that these paths should be considered descriptive 
characterizations, rather than prescriptive models seeking to impose teleology onto 
the transition prospects of contemporary poor countries – a point taken up again in 
the next chapter. While, following Lenin and Marx, the English case is seen as 
special, Byres views the transition paths of Prussia and the USA as being of greater 
potential significance for contemporary poor countries. 
In Prussia, whose path Byres, after Lenin, calls ‘capitalism from above’ is unique in 
that it was the landlords themselves who became capitalist farmers. The agrarian 
transition in Prussia was controlled by the landlords, rather than being the result of 
rural differentiation. The existing landlord class acting for its own benefit came to 
slowly adopt more capitalist features on its vast estates situated east of the river 
Elbe. Lenin described this path as reactionary, as the landlords were able, for a long 
time, to preserve semi-feudal features resulting in their own enrichment and the 
continued impoverishment of the peasantry. This also meant that the transition 
occurred only slowly, as the home market was limited by widespread rural poverty, 
preventing a more rapid development of advanced means of production.  
In contrast to this stands the US path, where the expanding Western frontier (on 
land violently taken from the indigenous population) made large amounts of arable 
land available to settler-farmers. Furthermore, the US lacked pre-existing feudal 
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structures29. As a result, the US witnessed a process of rural differentiation, during 
the course of which richer peasants became capitalist farmers, and a clear capital–
wage labour relation emerged. Successful subsistence farmers became petty 
commodity producers, and later developed into capitalist farmers, who employed 
wage labour and marketed all or most of their produce30. The role of labour hiring is 
crucial to this process. Lenin described this path as progressive in two key ways. 
First, it provided an incentive structure for the rapid development of rural 
productive forces; and second, it created a large and growing home market that 
allowed for increases in the use of agricultural inputs and rising rural consumption. 
Moreover, if, as Berry suggests, the agrarian question in Africa “turns on labour 
rather than land” (1993: 102) due to the relative abundance of land in many African 
countries, then the American path may be the most relevant for approximating an 
agrarian transition in Africa.   
Following Byres (1996) we can thus identify two general areas of enquiry which are 
important to an understanding of agrarian transition: class and the state. In the area 
of class there are four main themes which are of concern for the classical AQ. First, 
the prominence of class analysis and the study of class formation; second, the 
importance of the process of differentiation of the peasantry; third, the role of class 
struggle in shaping the outcome of the agrarian transition and lastly, the world-
historical conjuncture in which the transition takes place. In the analysis of the 
                                                     
29 I leave aside the slave economy of the southern states, which Byres analyses in great 
detail. See also Post (2011). 
30 Bernstein, thinking of the African context in particular, offers a useful definition of petty 
commodity producers, which emphasises how the usual Marxist two-class dichotomy can 
break down in the countryside. “Petty commodity production in capitalism is a form of 
small-scale enterprise constituted by its distinctive combination of the class places of the 
essential social relation between capital and wage-labour. Petty commodity producers 
are capitalists and workers at the same time: capitalists because they own or have access to 
means of production, workers because they use their own labour. In short, they are 
capitalists who employ (hence exploit) themselves. Peasants become petty commodity 
producers in this sense when they are unable to reproduce themselves outside the relations 
and processes of capitalist commodity production, when the latter come to constitute the 
conditions of existence of peasant farming and are internalised in its organisation and 
activity.” (Bernstein 2004: 129) 
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influence of the state we must examine state interventions in the transition process 
and its role in mediating the outcomes of this transition. 
2.5.3 Contemporary agrarian questions 
Researchers working on these various aspects of the agrarian question have 
generated a rich empirical and conceptual literature, which has sought to identify 
different ‘moments’ of rural transformations in a wide variety of spaces and 
societies, including links to globalisation and transnational corporations 
(Friedmann 1993; McMichael 1997a; McMichael 2009), gender (O’Laughlin 2009) 
and peasant resistance (Kay 1997). While an important aspect of research on the 
agrarian question has been on the role or ‘fate’ of the peasantry in agrarian 
transitions (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009), I will focus mainly on contributions 
looking at processes of agrarian capital accumulation. Thinking on the agrarian 
question has developed through the interaction of empirical findings and 
conceptual innovations. A particularly productive strand of this literature has come 
from India (Breman 1989; Das 2001; Friese 1990; Ghose 1979; Harriss-White 1979; 
Harriss-White, Mishra, and Upadhyay 2009; Lerche 1998; Som 2005). A long-
running debate with regard to the agrarian question in India has been around the 
concept of ‘mode of productions’ and its usefulness and applicability in India. 
Researchers disagreed on whether capitalist relations of production were dominant 
in Indian agriculture, by what empirical yardsticks such dominance could be 
established, and what the history of colonialism and pre-capitalist relations of 
production meant for contemporary capitalist development (Patnaik 1986; see also 
the collection of important contributions to the debate in Patnaik 1990). An 
important outcome of the debate was that the presence of wage-labour alone is 
insufficient to identify capitalist tendencies, but that the move towards intensified 
commodity to production (using wage labour), was indeed significant in this regard 
(Thorner 1982a; Thorner 1982b). 
The most empirically useful intervention in theorising about contemporary forms of 
agrarian change in the context of the agrarian question comes again from Bernstein. 
In a synthesis of the literature on the topic he arrives at four questions that should 
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be of central importance to any empirical project in the field. He argues for a focus 
on the social relations of property, the division of labour, the distribution of income, 
and the social relations of consumption, reproduction and accumulation. In other 
words: “Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do with 
it?” (Bernstein 2010: 22). 
Within agrarian political economy, the relevance of these historical experiences, and 
of historically-rooted formulations of the agrarian question more generally, for 
contemporary ‘developing countries’ has been questioned, however. McMichael 
(1997), for instance, argues that the impact of globalisation on the agro-food system 
has invalidated earlier conceptions of the agrarian question, with their assumption 
that ‘peasant’ production would disappear in the face of rural capitalist 
development. Instead, the world-historical issue of importance is now the defence 
of rural communities and their food producing systems against the pressures 
exerted by globalised agro-industrial capital31. Globalisation is also the entry point 
for a very different critique by Bernstein (1996, 2006, 2009). Bernstein argues the 
agrarian question of capital, meaning both the development of productive forces in 
agriculture and the contribution of agriculture to non-agrarian capital 
accumulation, is no longer relevant. Consequently, capitalist development no 
longer requires a capitalist transformation of the countryside to proceed, as it has 
access to other (external) sources of finance. For Bernstein (2016) the classical 
formulation of the agrarian question in which a ‘successful’ agrarian transition led 
to capitalist development relied on external factors, such as colonial plunder, which 
are not given anymore32. What remains is the agrarian question of (different classes 
of) labour, i.e. the struggles of poor people in the countryside to make a living33. 
                                                     
31  This argument relies on the notion of different and sequential ‘food regimes’, see 
Friedmann (1993) and McMichael (2009a). 
32 Bernstein also warns that the original formulation of the agrarian question was in effect a 
‘closed economy’ model. This warning against methodological nationalism, i.e. "the 
conception of historical development in the ontological singular" (Teschke 2014: 24), is well 
taken. For a detailed treatment of ‘external’ inputs into capitalist development, see Anievas 
and Nisancioglu (2015). 
33 On the definition of classes of labour, see Bernstein (2010). 
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These interventions have sparked a lively debate. Byres (forthcoming) has robustly 
defended the continued importance of investigating agrarian transitions, saying 
that Bernstein relies too heavily on theoretically-derived answers to questions that 
are intrinsically empirical. On the other hand, Lerche (2013), after a careful review 
of the evidence, concludes that the agrarian transition has indeed been ‘bypassed’ in 
India, partly as a result of globalisation. For sub-Saharan Africa, which encompasses 
dozens of countries and a huge variety of social systems and agro-ecological zones, 
however, the situation is much less clear. Oya (2013) contends that the focus should 
be on the emergence (or not) of domestic agrarian capitalists, and that this question 
is ultimately empirical34. At the same time he stresses the lack of relevant studies. 
Whether or not the emergence of domestic agrarian capitalists will result in agrarian 
transitions in the classical sense in the long term remains to be seen – and will 
depend on the contingent combination of internal and external factors in different 
locations. As Bernstein himself concedes: "However my thesis does not claim that 
the end of the agrarian question/agrarian transition for global capital means the end 
of the development of capitalism in agriculture, in all its substantive diversity, 
including the (further) development of (indigenous) classes of agrarian capital, nor 
then of the contradictions of class formation in the countryside and beyond" 
(Bernstein 2016: 80). With these questions and qualifications in mind we can now 
turn to agrarian capital accumulation in Africa. 
2.6 Capitalism and accumulation in Africa 
While researchers interested in the agrarian question have also generated a large 
literature on Africa (e.g. Becker 1990; Cliffe 1977; Kevane 1996; Mafeje 2003; 
Mamdani 1987; Müller 2011; Murray 1989; Oya 2007; Toit 1994), the development of 
capitalism on the continent is of course a much broader topic. This section will 
briefly – and necessarily quite superficially – review the history of capitalism in 
Africa before moving into debates on the effects of the spread of capitalism and the 
lessons to be drawn from them35. It presents a review of field studies on domestic 
                                                     
34 A notion Byres (forthcoming) emphatically agrees with. 
35 For a magisterial treatment of African history, see Fage with Tordoff (2002) 
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African – rather than European – accumulation, and agrarian accumulation in 
particular. 
2.6.1 The development of capitalism in Africa 
The first developments of capitalism in Africa began before the onset of the colonial 
period, in particular in those parts of the continent that had trade links to the wider 
world. These “few elements” were, however, “confined almost entirely to 
commerce, crafts and the towns, except in the south” (Iliffe 1983: 23). A variety of 
reasons help explain the low incidence of capitalist development. Sender and Smith 
(1986) argue that pre-capitalist African elites controlled commodity production by 
(more or less) coercive means, including intra-familial exploitation and slave labour. 
Capitalist social relations were therefore slow to develop. Iliffe places more 
emphasis on the amount of freely available land and the slave economy as barriers 
to moving towards capitalist production systems, as well as political barriers put in 
place by pre-capitalist social systems (1983). Even where production for export 
markets was common, wage labour was rare. In pre-colonial Asante, for instance, 
the wide availability of land raised the reservation wage of (potential) wage 
labourers so high that only coerced labour was economically viable (Austin 2005). 
More immediately, capitalist forms of production, based on more recognisably 
capitalist social relations, began to take shape after the colonial conquest, beginning 
in earnest with the ‘scramble for Africa’ in 1879 (Freund 1998). These developed a 
wide array of forms in different parts of Africa, depending on pre-existing social 
forms and their adaptation to the particular context of colonial government. Austin 
(2016) offers a distinction between ‘settler’ colonies, where most land was reserved 
for European farmers, ‘peasant’ colonies, where African farmers retained most of 
the land and ‘plantation’ colonies, where large areas were given over to European 
plantations but the rest remained in African hands. As we shall see below, even 
where capitalist relations did develop, these took new forms that required 
theoretical accommodation. Moreover, their spread was slow. 
The colonial period itself was marked by a deep paradox, which Berry has aptly 
described as “hegemony on a shoestring” (Berry 1993: 22). Colonial states were 
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interested in surplus extraction but unwilling to invest (much) in their colonies36. 
This underinvestment damaged prospects for the development of national 
capitalism. Colonial administrations were wary of African competition to their own 
powerful trading companies and oftentimes actively discouraged African 
capitalists, in particular in settler colonies (Kennedy 1988). Even the great Marxist 
defender of imperialism as a progressive historical force, Warren, concedes that 
colonial administrations acted as a brake on diversification out of primary 
production (1980: 151f). Administrations faced the dilemma of having to encourage 
Africans to become involved in labour and commodity markets, without allowing 
them to reap too much of the surplus in these markets. Nonetheless, the colonial 
enterprises sought to expand commercial agriculture and the export trade, 
providing incentives for Africans to seek expanded access to land, labour and 
capital (Berry 1993).  
Responding to such incentives, some African capitalists began to move into 
agriculture in the early colonial period (see Section  2.6.3). Labour mobilization 
changed with increasing commercialisation, although these changes were slow and 
uneven, depending in part on the character of pre-capitalist societal norms (Ilffe, 
1983). Pre-capitalist systems of labour mobilization were employed by capitalists in 
the absence of developed labour markets. This includes labour demanded by 
colonial administration which was often mobilized in coordination with traditional 
elites (Sender & Smith, 1986). Sender and Smith (1986: 46) also point out that “the 
remarkable ability of African pre-capitalist social organisations to continue to 
reproduce themselves with their own limited means of production […] allowed 
them to resist, for very long periods, attempts to restrict their alternatives to wage 
labour and capitalist labour discipline”. By the late colonial period, however, labour 
markets were becoming more widespread. 
Nonetheless, African capitalism had failed to produce either widespread 
commercial agriculture or industrialization by the end of the colonial period. De-
                                                     
36 They were, however, forced to put in place some basic infrastructure in the hope that this 
would enable the transfer of goods (Fage with Tordoff 2002: 393ff). 
64 
 
colonization only marginally improved the situation, as neither the newly 
independent governments, often of ‘socialist’ or economically nationalist 
persuasions, nor the ex-colonizers, were especially willing to lend support to 
African capitalists. While Keynesian ideas and newly available funds increased 
state intervention, some have argued this tended to increase state influence more 
than raise productive output (Kennedy 1988). Nonetheless, growth seems to have 
been especially strong in many African countries between the 1950s and the 1970s 
(Jerven 2015)37. 
2.6.2 Domestic capital accumulation: the Kenya debate 
In a review of the literature on African capitalists, Leys (1994) points to the relative 
absence of any research concerned with African capitalists qua capitalists, prior to 
the so-called Kenya debate, which took place in the 1970s and 1980s around the 
question of the impact of capitalism on the rural population of Kenya38. These 
debates were primarily between the then-dominant dependentista school and (more 
orthodox) Marxist positions, and was, although this was not acknowledged enough 
at the time, partially about the political implications of these positions (Kitching 
1985a; Leys 1996). According to dependency theory, rich metropolitan countries in 
the core of the global capitalist system employ a combination of economic and 
political power to exploit poorer, peripheral countries, which remain 
underdeveloped precisely due to their inclusion into global trade flows 
characterized by unequal exchange (Lubeck 1986; for a strident critique see Brenner 
1977) 39 . Thinkers influenced by ideas of dependentista argued that successful 
capitalist development in Kenya would not be possible due to its position in the 
periphery, which produced a backward state serving the interests of a small elite 
and a bourgeoisie dependent on foreign capital (i.e. compradors). Marxists on the 
other hand tended to argue that capitalism was a world-historical process that 
                                                     
37 Jerven (2013) also points out that this is probably the period for which the best data is 
available. 
38 For overviews of the debates see for instance Himbara (1993), Kitching (1985) and Orvis 
(1993). Notable contributions include Beckman (1980), Cowen (1981), Freund (1985), 
Kaplinsky (1980), Kitching (1985b) and Leys (1978). 
39 For the related, but less pessimistic notion of world systems theory see, for instance, 
Wallerstein (2004) and Arrighi (2010). 
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would spread to all areas and ultimately drive industrial development. They 
pointed to the differentiation of the peasantry as a sign of an emerging capitalist 
class in the countryside (Leys 1996). 
There were two main themes to the debate (Oya 2004): first, an investigation into 
the possibility of successful industrial development via an analysis of the role of the 
domestic capitalist class and its interaction with the state and foreign capital. 
Second, debates around the concept of modes of production and whether or not 
Kenya could be seen as the product of a particular mode of production, or rather a 
particular articulation of (pre-capitalist and capitalist) modes of production. I 
confine myself to a discussion of the former issue; for the latter – rather stale – 
debate see for instance Freund (1985). 
The problem of the nature of the Kenyan bourgeoisie, in particular whether or not it 
was dependent on foreign capital (and therefore, by assumption, unable to drive 
domestic accumulation processes), was an early focus of the debate. Leys, who was 
later to change positions in the debate, made an early argument framed in 
dependentista concepts, purporting to show the Kenyan bourgeoisie was in league 
with foreign capital and contributing to the continued impoverishment of Kenya’s 
rural dwellers by keeping them locked in a process of peasantization (Leys 1975; 
Orvis 1993). 
Cowen (1981) challenged this view by analysing ‘peasant production’ itself, 
showing that there was in fact a contradictory process of class formation going on, 
driven by the spread of commodity production. Accumulators made heavy use of 
‘straddling’, i.e. the use of money from their own wage labour, to secure initial 
capital. While commodity production was not universal, a discernible middle 
peasantry was emerging. For Cowen though this would not lead to successful 
development as the growth of middle peasant production, and the associated 
additional income accruing to them, was actually impeding capitalist accumulation 
by lowering (reservation) wages, thereby undermining incentives to develop more 
capital intense production systems. 
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There were two problems with these arguments which led to the inconclusiveness 
of the debate. First, the use of evidence was highly problematic (Kitching 1985b; 
Orvis 1993). Much emphasis was put on cross-sectional data. Such synchronic data 
is ill suited to assessing processes of social change over time (see also the discussion 
in the next chapter). The same data was thus able to support both sides of the 
debate. Moreover, as Leys (1994) makes clear, the research questions pursued, such 
as whether or not the Kenyan bourgeoisie was dependent or not, were not the most 
relevant. The focus should be on the necessary conditions for successful capitalist 
growth, whether the relations of production were moving in that direction and 
what policies could be applied to support development.  
What is needed is thus localized empirical analysis of specific social systems of 
production viewed within their particular historical context. The Kenya debate was 
important in moving the study of agrarian political economy towards the more 
fruitful path of exploring particular systems of production through in-depth field 
studies, a heritage that continues to be of great benefit. Moreover, it has clearly 
shown the fallacy of attempting to analyse long-term processes of change through 
synchronic data alone. Both of these ideas are reflected in the research design of this 
study. 
2.6.3 Field studies in domestic accumulation 
How then has agrarian accumulation proceeded in areas where domestic capitalists 
have successfully established themselves? Any answer must proceed from data 
delivered by detailed empirical field studies. For reasons of space, I focus here only 
on a selection of classic studies, selected for their thematic and/or methodological 
innovations. Drawing on Austin (2005), Berry (1993), Hill (1970) and Kitching (1980) 
as seminal examples of such studies, we can identify key themes in tracing rural 
accumulation and agrarian capital in Africa. Chapter Three, which picks up on the 
methodological implications of some of the points made below, also incorporates a 
detailed study and follow up by Oya (see 2002, 2004, 2007). Other insightful studies 
on African capitalists are collected in Berman and Leys (1994). 
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First, it is important to establish the roots and processes of accumulation in 
agriculture. In other words, who are the accumulators and how do they gain control 
over productive investible funds? Hill (1970) identifies complex networks of 
migration which allowed farmers to move to then uncultivated parts of Ghana to 
use family labour and complex credit relationships to establish commercial farming 
enterprises, meaning that initial accumulation was able to proceed without 
widespread dispossession, or indeed much initial capital. In settler colonies, 
however, dispossession was vital to establishing settler agriculture while educated 
Africans used proceeds from jobs in the colonial administration to set up farms. As 
Cowen (1981) did later, Hill (1970) found that straddling was an important aspect of 
accumulation. Increasing commercialisation of agriculture deepened rural 
differentiation, especially in areas suffering land shortages (Berry, 1993). Austin 
(2005) in particular stresses the early beginnings of accumulation, which he dates 
back the period before 1807 in the case of Ghana. He shows how the changing 
nature of property rights, regimes and the varying scarcity of factors of production 
(mostly land and labour) exert influence on the process of accumulation. 
Kitching, drawing on an explicitly Marxist theoretical framework, analyses the 
emergence of a class of African capitalist farmers in Kenya, a settler colony where 
African production was long confined to ‘reserves’ 40 . This class of successful 
capitalists emerged through a process of increasing social stratification, i.e. ‘from 
below’, as some farmer owners were able to access additional funds – in the context 
of the spread of monetised relationships and increasingly generalised commodity 
production - and invest these in more land, as well as in hiring labour to work the 
land. He identifies ‘straddling’ – “the use of off-farm income to expand 
landholdings and commercialise agriculture” (Kitching 1982: 3, see also 451f). The 
primary source of such off-farm income was public sector employment, or, as 
Kitching puts it, the state wage bill. The use of proceeds from wage labour as 
investment funds has theoretical implications: the employed farm owner is at the 
                                                     
40 In fact, Kitching conceived the book in large part as a contribution to Marxist theory and 
the book offers subtle considerations of a variety of Marxist concepts, couched in a trenchant 
critique of structuralist Marxism. 
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same time himself an employer, and therefore an exploiter of wage labour – a petit 
bourgeois. The classical Marxist class division into bourgeois and proletariat thus 
breaks down in developing countries41. Kitching suggests identifying exploitation 
by people’s ability to accumulate, both in the sphere of production and in the 
sphere of circulation. Access to and control over the state thus becomes important to 
ensure access to capital (from wages) for use in investment and thus accumulation. 
By the 1950s at least four types of producer households could be found, 
differentiated by their level of access to non-farm income, the male migration 
patterns that resulted from this employment, the sexual division of labour and the 
sale or purchase of labour power. This process of stratification and class formation 
led to a stark increase in landlessness, which Kitching (along with rapid population 
growth and slow formal sector job growth) identifies as the source of Kenya’s 
‘informal sector’, which by the 1970s was substantial. 
Secondly, there is the question of labour mobilization and control over land. Both 
Berry (1993) and Hill (1970) stress the importance of kinship and social networks. 
For Berry in particular these networks of social obligation, kinship and tradition are 
the primary vehicle through which farmers, and aspiring accumulators, access both 
land and labour. Commercialisation can thus proceed without the formation of 
social classes in a Marxists sense42, seen to be more important in accessing land 
rather than labour. Hiring of labour is also dependent on the returns offered by 
different farming systems, with annual crop systems on small farms least likely to 
hire labour. However, Berry shows that rural differentiation not only determines 
the likelihood of hiring labour power, but also introduces a functional difference. 
Straddling amongst different sources of income is widespread amongst rural 
households but differs in relation to its place in household reproduction. For poor 
households it is an essential means of survival, while for richer households it is 
used as a tool to expand reproduction and increase income.  
                                                     
41 For a similar attempt to accommodate seeming contradictions for rich capitalist countries, 
see Wright (1997) and his notion of ‘contradictory class locations’ 
42 For a critique of Berry’s conception of Marxists analytical categories and the related 
shortcomings of her analysis, see Bernstein (2004). 
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While most authors document the halting and uneven, yet inexorable, spread of 
wage labour relation (see Sender & Smith 1986), Austin (2005) documents how 
wage labour arose in Ghana following the decline in slavery and ‘pawning’ of 
workers at the beginning of the 20th century, only to then be largely replaced in key 
areas by sharecropping. Using a framework based on evolutionary rational choice 
theory, but informed by a much wider set of theoretical perspectives, Austin charts 
developments in factor markets in the Asante kingdom (and later Ghana), uniquely 
covering both the pre-colonial and the colonial periods43. As Austin insists, factor 
markets have existed in Asante for a long time and the aim of his study is thus not 
to show how markets emerged or developed, but rather to analyse the impact of 
changing property rights regimes on the content of these markets. Asante became a 
key part of the Ghanaian cocoa export economy through the initiative of 
entrepreneurial domestic accumulators, who unleashed an unprecedented cocoa 
boom, making Ghana the largest exporter by the 1920s. Austin demonstrates how 
the specific institutional forms taken on by factor markets evolved as both internal 
and external events – in particular the arrival of cocoa plants and the concomitant 
development of a world market for cocoa, and the slowly enforced ban on slave 
trading and then slavery – impacted the relative value of land, labour and capital 
(in the form of cocoa trees)44. In a clear warning against deterministic ideas about 
rural transitions, he shows how towards the middle of the 20th century wage labour 
became supplanted by sharecropping systems, due to the bargaining power of 
labourers not completely separated from the means of production.    
The focus here on how (emerging) capitalists avail themselves of workers should 
not obscure the importance of also examining the labour relations from the point of 
view of the worker, though this is largely outside the scope of this thesis. Labour 
                                                     
43 The use of rational choice theory in the African context was pioneered by Bates in his 
study of how power influenced the distribution of agricultural surpluses and the 
implications this had for agricultural development (see Bates 2005). 
44 For Austin, this analysis also shows up the limits of the NIE approach. He cautions that 
“property rights affect economic outcomes not only through their effects on incentives but 
also through their implications for the distribution of power: in the sense of confirming if 
not determining who would be the principals, who the agents, and what the (im)balance of 
bargaining power would be” (2005: 451). 
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relations in agriculture have been explored both in contemporary Africa (e.g. for 
Kenya in Gibbon and Riisgaard 2014; Riisgaard and Gibbon 2014) and in contexts as 
diverse as Brazil (Selwyn 2012), Colombia (London 1997; Ortiz 1999), Costa Rica 
(Luetchford 2008), India (Besky 2013), and the US (Wells 1996), to name a few 
examples. A good overview of the history of labour organisation in Africa can be 
found in Freund (1988).  
2.7 Themes in the Literature 
Across all of the surveyed relevant literature a number of consistent themes emerge. 
Processes of social change need a long time horizon to be analysed, are 
indeterminate in their outcomes, and any analysis must happen within a concrete 
historical context. In depth field studies appear as the ideal medium.  Such studies 
must then focus on the origins of capital and the means by which it can engage in 
expanded reproduction. Capital can originate ‘from above’ or ‘from below’ via a 
process of differentiation, or may indeed be fed from both sources.  
State action or inaction is central to understanding patterns of accumulation (or 
their absence). Insights from the developmental state literature about the conditions 
under which state action can be effective in driving capitalist accumulation are 
insufficient to explaining agrarian capital accumulation though. As Chapters Five 
and Six will demonstrate, even in a ‘developmental’ state, agrarian capital 
accumulation can take place largely outside of the control of government elites. 
For individual capitalists, success is driven by the choice of relevant strategies of 
accumulation, which includes tactical and strategic investment decisions in 
response to changes in the socio-economic or legislative context. A detailed 
understanding of agrarian transition processes must therefore incorporate a close 
analysis of individual trajectories of accumulation, without losing sight of wider 
social structures and conflicted arenas in which such processes take place. In this 
context, labour mobilization can act as a major constraint to accumulation, and 
conflicts between capital and labour can be an important feature in explaining 
socio-economic development. The next chapter discusses how these insights can be 
operationalised in the context of a concrete empirical project. 
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Chapter three 
 
Research design, methodology and 
data 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The validity and reliability of empirical work cannot be readily assessed without a 
clear understanding of the methodological choices that were made in assembling 
and analysing the data. Accordingly, this chapter lays out the methodological 
foundations of the thesis. It begins with a discussion of the thematic research areas 
that arise out of the central research question, followed by a description of the 
research design chosen, in this case a contrastive case study analysed using the 
theoretical and empirical tools of historical political economy.  
Combining a small-scale quantitative survey with large amounts of qualitative data, 
while adopting an asymmetric research design is perhaps an unusual approach to 
empirical work. These choices are therefore explained and their consequences 
elaborated in the following sections1. The data for this study was collected during 
in-depth fieldwork in Ethiopia, and the precise ‘mechanics’ of the empirical work, 
including its structure and the approach taken towards identifying and selecting 
respondents are discussed in some detail. This serves to convey the care and 
deliberation that were required, and to illustrate the difficulties encountered in 
collecting data, something which will be of use to other researchers as well. The 
discussion then moves on to outline my approach to interviewing and data analysis, 
before concluding with a discussion of the limitations of the methodological 
approach chosen. 
                                                     
1  The design is asymmetric in that the coffee sector is given greater weight than the 
floriculture sector. 
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3.2 Central research question 
As laid out in the introduction to this thesis, the central research question pursued 
here is:  
To what degree and how is a class of capitalist accumulators emerging in the 
contemporary Ethiopian coffee and floriculture sectors? 
While the thesis examines both foreign and domestic accumulators, the focus of 
most of the empirical work presented here is on the latter. Such a focus on domestic 
capitalists not only makes sense given the theoretical and empirical debates around 
the continued relevance of the agrarian question examined in the previous chapter, 
but also because domestic accumulators are likely to play a strategic role in the 
ongoing transformation of Ethiopia’s agrarian sector. 
The central research question is deliberately cast wide, and to be operationalised it 
must be broken down into empirically manageable sub-themes. These four themes 
have already been laid out in detail in Chapter One and thus need only be briefly 
restated here, where they are rephrased as questions. They emerge directly out of 
the research themes identified in the literature. Comparisons are made in cross-
section across the two cases chosen – coffee and floriculture – as well as, especially 
in the case of coffee, longitudinally. The coffee case is treated in more historical 
detail, as both private and government-owned coffee plantations have a long 
history in Ethiopia. This history is vital to understanding the current interaction 
between government policy and private accumulation patterns, whereas 
floriculture is a very contemporary phenomenon. Also, as we shall see in the 
following chapters, domestic accumulation has been much more important in the 
coffee sector. The sub-themes are:  
1. Who are the accumulators?  
2. How does the process of capital accumulation proceed?  
3. What is the role of labour mobilisation and how are the conditions of 
labour?  
4. What is the role of state in nurturing capital accumulation?  
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3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Causation, deduction and induction 
A basic principle of the study of development is or should be that the research 
question pursued dictates the methods of inquiry. As laid out in Chapter 2, there is 
a rich literature on agrarian transformations and the development of agrarian 
capitalism in a wide variety of social formations, both historical and contemporary. 
The study of capital accumulation, and its interaction with state structure and 
action, is a complex undertaking that requires a close examination of historical 
processes. The aim of such examination is not to produce generalised abstractions in 
the form of supposedly immutable ‘laws’, but rather to provide a rich description of 
socio-economic change processes, and to proceed from there to an explanation of the 
processes themselves2. Explanation requires the researcher not only to focus on 
causal effects, such as are often the result of statistical analysis, but also to 
determine the underlying causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007). In other words, an 
explanation focused on causes must seek the processes that produce phenomena 
(Shaffer 2015). 
This study uses the lens of historical political economy as the most appropriate 
framework for studying the concrete historical processes through which new 
groupings of agrarian accumulators emerge, and uses the coffee and floriculture 
sectors of Ethiopia as case studies. The theoretical underpinnings of historical 
political economy, and the lessons taken from the application of such methods to 
other contexts, serve as a useful guide in formulating research questions and, more 
generally, in focusing the eye of the researcher on the most likely drivers and 
problems. However, given the idiosyncratic nature of processes of agrarian change, 
theoretical models developed for other times and other social formations are likely 
to offer at best a rough guide to problems or structures that may be involved. A 
good example of such an approach is Byres’ (1996) work on trajectories of agrarian 
change. Using a comparative case study approach to historical political economy, 
                                                     
2 This is not to imply that commonalities in structures cannot be identified. Indeed they can 
and should. 
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Byres analyses the processes of agrarian transitions in different countries to derive 
broad commonalities across cases. However, Byres emphasises that these should 
not be viewed as ideal types and that each case must be analysed and explained in 
terms of its own complex internal dynamics. This lesson is well taken, and this 
study accordingly adopts a broadly inductive approach, in that hypotheses and 
inferences are drawn out of observations (Bryman 2012). The aim is not to test 
existing hypotheses. However, the construction of hypotheses and theoretical 
conceptions through inductive reasoning should not be confused with a-theoretical 
data mining. Nor is it directly comparable to the structured and iterative 
approaches to theory building of grounded theory, which is also inductive in 
nature. An inductive approach can, and in most cases should, proceed from general 
theoretical concepts, for instance an insistence on the importance of the study of the 
states and classes in understanding socio-economic change – as emphasised by 
Byres. The researcher must necessarily have a Weltanschauung, which in itself will 
influence the research questions one seeks to answer. At the same time, however, 
there must be enough flexibility in these theoretical precepts to accommodate the 
complexities of the question under study, without dictating or pre-empting results. 
More concretely, the general mode of inference used in this study is that of 
‘retroduction’, by which “events are explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them” (Sayer 1984: 97). 
As stated above, the specific ‘lens onto the world’ employed in this study is that of 
historical political economy. The focus therefore lies on an examination of the 
development of agrarian capitalism as a socioeconomic system with historically 
specific relations of production, exchange and reproduction. Underlying these are 
sets of property relations, which tend towards – but do not necessarily converge on 
pure forms of – a class division in the ownership of the means of production. 
Understanding farm owners not simply as ‘large farmers’ or as ‘entrepreneurs’, but 
specifically as capitalists forces us to view their accumulation of capital as a social 
process, based on the appropriation of surplus value through the exploitation of 
wage labour in the production and sale of commodities, and the reinvestment of 
this surplus into new capital. This process, so theory and history teach us, is 
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inherently conflictual and prone to producing contradictions. But while the 
production and appropriation of surplus value from wage labour is the primary 
means through which accumulation occurs, what needs to be explained is how the 
individual capitalist comes into the position of commanding control (if not always 
legal ownership) over the means of production. This in turn requires a 
historicisation of the accumulation processes, paying special attention to the 
development of Ethiopia’s class structure, of rural class relations and of the 
relations between the Ethiopian state and (factions of) capital. At the same time, the 
specificities and idiosyncrasies of both sectors, in terms of their relations to 
international value chains and foreign capital, their technical productive 
requirements and their local histories will be illuminated. 
3.3.2 Comparative-historical case studies and case 
selection 
A useful method for examining the interconnection between these strands of 
analysis is the comparative-historical case study. A case study may be defined as 
“an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases), for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (the population of cases)” 
(Gerring 2007: 37). They are particularly powerful in gaining insights when used in 
situations where hypotheses are to be established, rather than tested, where the 
population of cases is heterogeneous and where the focus of understanding is on 
causal mechanisms, and less on causal effects. In other words: “case studies enjoy a 
natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature” (Gerring 2007: 39). As this 
study deals primarily with a hitherto practically unstudied population, namely 
capitalist coffee plantation owners in Ethiopia, an exploratory research design is the 
most appropriate.  
Case study research can be conducted in a number of ways. This study seeks to 
understand agrarian accumulation processes and their complex interdependencies 
with state action. Two sectors, coffee and flowers were chosen as cases because they 
had both seen recent spurts of private investment in production and both have a 
heavy export orientation (albeit much larger in the case of cut flowers). Both are 
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strategically important to the Ethiopian state, the coffee sector as one of the largest 
foreign exchange earners in the country, and the floriculture sector as both a visible 
sign of economic success and as a blueprint for the expansion of high-tech 
agriculture3. There are, however, crucial differences that make for an interesting 
contrast. Both sectors have been subjected to detailed regulatory regimes. But while 
the producers in the coffee sector have received comparatively little direct support, 
the floriculture sector has been a ‘darling’ of the federal government. A second 
difference concerns the origins of investors in both sectors. Whereas investment in 
the coffee sector is by law open only to Ethiopians and the Ethiopian diaspora, the 
floriculture sector has been dominated by foreign capital. These differences and 
their implications for accumulation in both sectors are the subject of Chapter Eight.  
As capital accumulation is a socioeconomic process, there is temporal variation 
within each case. These developments will help us understand how accumulation 
strategies play out and how capitalists, workers and the state react to changing 
circumstances. At the same time the contrast between the two cases can be used to 
illustrate differences in accumulation strategies rooted in markets for and value 
chains of the commodities produced, the technical parameters of the production 
itself and the variation in state support across sectors. The study therefore employs 
a two-case comparative-historical study design (Gerring 2007: 28). This mixture of 
synchronic and diachronic analysis has been gainfully employed in studies of 
accumulation processes in other contexts, see for instance (Oya 2007)4. 
3.3.3 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis for this study is the individual capitalist. The aim is not to 
define the structures of emergent class relations in rural Ethiopia, nor to elaborate 
the class position of the new coffee capitalists (along the lines of Wright 1997), but 
rather to illuminate the real historical processes by which a new agrarian class comes 
into being and – crucially – the role played by state action in these developments. 
The individual is important because it is the actions of individuals in the context of 
                                                     
3 Of course the floriculture sector is also an important contributor of foreign exchange. 
4  Broadly speaking, synchronic analysis looks at the differences across cases, while 
diachronic analysis looks at change over time both within and across cases. 
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a structured economic and socio-political environment, i.e. their constrained 
agency, which determines outcomes. However, unlike studies built on 
methodological individualism, historical political economy views these structures 
as the direct result of a socio-economic system based on generalised commodity 
production and market compulsion (Wood 2002). 
A crucial structural constraint that acts upon individual capitalists is the relational 
agency they enjoy vis-à-vis power centres such as the state, but also opposed 
economic interests – workers in the case of a capitalist. However, individual 
capitalists also face pressures from competing capitalists, both from other producers 
and from companies higher up in the value chain. Another important factor to 
consider is whether and to what degree individual capitalists come together to act 
collectively. A focus on relational agency and real historical processes militates 
against a simplistic ‘reading off’ of socio-economic developments from the 
(supposed) structures of classes, and avoids seeking to locate the final cause for 
concrete historical processes in an abstract notion of class contradiction. In 
discussing a more helpful definition of class, Wood picks up Thompson’s notion of 
class as a ‘structured process’ and insists that “any definition of class must invite, 
not foreclose, the investigation of process” (2007: 98). To conduct an analysis of class 
and state that emphasises individual agency while not losing sight of the systemic 
constraints to such agency, we must avoid ‘historical formalism’ (Banaji 2012) and 
employ a critical disposition towards the actions of governments with a focus on the 
unforeseen reactions and subversions which state action generates (see also Scott 
2014). In particular this means focusing on the rule-breaking behaviour by 
capitalists (Streeck 2009). 
3.3.4 Scope and time horizon 
On one level, the time horizon covered in the study is both simply and narrowly 
defined by the relatively young age of both floriculture and the contemporary 
capitalist coffee plantation sector in Ethiopia. At the same time, the tracing of stories 
or trajectories of accumulation means that the time horizon reaches back into the 
childhood of current capitalists, and even into the lives of their parents (Oya 2007). 
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In the coffee sector in particular there are important antecedents to the current 
plantations that can only be fully understood in the context of Ethiopia’s imperial 
expansion at the end of the 19th century and its subsequent first experiments with 
domestic capitalism – Ethiopia’s first, albeit partial and disrupted, agrarian 
transition. Thus while the synchronic elements of the inquiry are firmly focused on 
contemporary Ethiopia, and mostly on developments that have occurred since the 
millennium, the diachronic elements reach much further into Ethiopia’s history. 
While imposing a temporal cut-off is often necessary to provide a practical and 
meaningful boundary to a study, historical political economy must be willing to 
trace the roots of current developments as far back as the causal chain meaningfully 
carries5. 
The scope of the inquiry was also restricted in two other ways, pertaining 
specifically to the coffee sector. As the focus of the study was on the dynamics of 
capital accumulation that led to the formation of new coffee plantations, the 
concurrent privatisation of the existing large state-owned plantations is treated only 
peripherally and only in so far as it gives insights into sector-wide dynamics and 
government strategy. Similarly, farms that were not – at least in principle – eligible 
for official ‘investor’ status (i.e. those smaller than 30ha in size) were excluded. This 
leads to a systematic underappreciation of ‘accumulation from below’ and of 
differentiation amongst ‘small’ producers (see for instance Petit 2007 for a 
discussion of evidence of such differentiation). While these topics are much-
deserving of research, they could not be adequately treated within the logistical 
confines of this study. 
3.4 Structuring the empirical work 
This thesis is based on fieldwork in Ethiopia, conducted between October 2012 and 
September 2013. While the study makes extensive use of the existing literature, as 
well as secondary data and available datasets, the core of the empirical material was 
collected by  me. Having just one year during which to conduct field research, and 
                                                     
5 Meaningfully is the operative term here. The search for truly contingent first causes is – in 
my view –in many cases a fool’s errand. 
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working subject to the constraints detailed below, meant that tough choices had to 
be made about how to structure the research in the field. In particular, I chose to 
adopt an asymmetric research design with respect to my cases. 
3.4.1 Comparative case study research in practice 
The decision to adopt an asymmetric research design, which favours the coffee case 
over the floriculture case, was made early in the fieldwork process. It was driven by 
the realisation of the size and explosive growth of the private coffee plantation 
sector. As the emergence of agrarian capitalism in the coffee sector had not been 
documented, it made sense to focus more on developments in that sector and 
employ floriculture as an analytical contrast. While many aspects of the Ethiopian 
economy and socio-political systems are comparatively ‘under-researched’, the 
spectacular growth of the floriculture sector has attracted a lot of attention. Whether 
due to its relative proximity to the capital or to the early and continuous 
involvement of foreign donors and capitalists, the sector has been highly visible in 
national and international media and has garnered the interest of researchers in 
Ethiopia and beyond. By contrast, Ethiopia’s coffee sector has long suffered from a 
dearth of both research and policy attention. Most of the research covering the 
Ethiopian coffee sector comes from the natural sciences, and what little research is 
available in the social sciences deals almost exclusively with only one type of 
producer – the smallholder farmer – to the near-complete exclusion of capitalists 
proper. A symmetrical treatment of both sectors would have necessarily resulted in 
a more superficial treatment of the coffee sector.  
Given these differences, the approach to researching accumulation processes in both 
sectors has to differ, and accordingly different approaches were chosen for the use 
of existing data, the construction of a sampling frame, the sampling method, and 
interview types. It therefore makes sense to discuss the approaches to both sectors 
separately.  
3.4.2 Constraints to fieldwork 
However, before moving on to these topics, some remarks about general constraints 
to the fieldwork are in order. Methodological choices have to be made within the 
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constraints of time and resources. I will highlight only the two most limiting 
constraints, namely the state administration and transport. 
3.4.2.1 Administrative constraints  
Ethiopia has no formal system of research visas or permits. In principle, research 
can be undertaken by anyone who legally entered the country. However, police 
have been known to harass researchers and it is safer to seek the approval of 
authorities before conducting field research. Permission to conduct fieldwork, in the 
form of a signed and stamped letter indicating official support, must be sought from 
a substantial, and at times slow-moving, government bureaucracy at federal level. 
Even with such permissions, research projects can be endangered by official and 
semi-official interference (see for instance Cramer et al. 2016). Subsequently, lower 
tiers of public administration at zone and woreda levels must be informed about the 
details of the proposed research in their particular areas, whereby letters from 
higher authorities are presented and written authorisation is in turn sought.  
However, this ‘march through the institutions’ does have hidden benefits. While 
this process is very time-consuming, it also offers the opportunity to conduct 
informal interviews with a plethora of officials at various levels. Moreover, such 
letters of support are vital to getting any information at all from government offices 
and are also very helpful in gaining access to private companies and the civil society 
organisations. 
3.4.2.2 Logistical constraints 
One of the most binding constraints on my fieldwork was the issue of transport. 
Courtesy of a high import tax, cars are expensive in Ethiopia, both to buy and to 
rent. Funding for fieldwork was very limited and was mostly used to pay for a 
research assistant. Almost all travel for fieldwork was therefore undertaken using 
public transport. From time to time it was possible for me to travel with an 
international NGO, Technoserve, which is active in the coffee sector. Similarly, 
some of the visits to flower farms were undertaken by accompanying staff from the 
sector’s trade association EHPEA. 
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The consequences of transport constraints differed for the two sectors under study. 
As Ethiopia’s floriculture farms are almost all clustered in the vicinity of Addis 
Ababa, reaching these farms was generally not a problem. Moreover, the vast 
majority of farms have offices within Addis Ababa itself and the sector’s capitalists 
generally preferred to meet in the city. The situation was very different in the coffee 
sector. Because of insufficient transport connections in many of the coffee growing 
areas, much time was spent travelling to and from interview sites.  
During the initial research phase farm visits were essential to building an 
understanding of production and labour processes and to gaining a direct 
impression of working and living conditions. While flower farms are easily 
accessible, coffee farms are generally located in the forest, often kilometres from the 
nearest road. Frequently, they are connected to roads only by rough dirt tracks. In 
fact, several of the capitalists I interviewed complained that their farms were so 
remote and difficult to reach they had to transport their coffee to the nearest road 
using donkeys. My ability to access farms usually depended on being able to 
negotiate transport with the farm owner. In the interest of maximising the number 
of interviews, most meetings with respondents were therefore scheduled in 
administrative centres whenever possible, as these have better access to public 
transport. Some interviews were also held in Addis Ababa, which many of the 
coffee capitalists visit frequently. 
3.5 Sampling and representativeness 
3.5.1 Sampling and sampling frames 
As discussed above, the research into the two sectors covered is purposefully 
asymmetric and different data sources are used for the two sectors. However, it is 
worth highlighting the commonality in the approaches to both sectors, in particular 
in terms of the sampling methodology. In both cases respondents were chosen from 
a carefully constructed sampling frame. A complete sampling frame is a necessary 
condition for constructing an analytically relevant sample, otherwise an informed 
judgement about the inclusion or exclusion of particular cases is not possible. In 
both the coffee and floriculture sectors, samples were therefore purposively selected 
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from complete sampling frames so as to exemplify the salient features of 
accumulators in each sector as fully as possible. 
3.5.2 Representativeness and analytical relevance 
As the sampling methods employed in this study depart from the usual standards 
employed in quantitative work, which commonly use probabilistic sampling, a few 
words on the difference between the statistical representativeness and what might 
be termed analytical relevance are in order. When undertaking a statistically 
representative survey, a complete sampling frame is the necessary basis for 
sampling. By randomly selecting a sufficiently large sample from a complete 
sampling frame, researchers can – if certain conditions are met and appropriate 
methods for estimating effects and standard errors are used – make meaningful 
inferences from the chosen sample to the wider population under investigation 
(Deaton 1997). As explained above, the samples in each sector were chosen 
specifically to capture important cases of domestic accumulation in both sectors. A 
simple random sampling procedure would have missed many of these cases due to 
their relatively small numerical weight in the universe of possible cases. Moreover, 
many studies that claim to use statistically representative samples in fact do not 
expend enough effort on constructing the sampling frame and therefore work with 
biased samples. 
In theory, the careful use of stratification could have produced samples that are 
both analytically relevant, in the sense of capturing important cases, and statistically 
representative. Sample stratification works by separating the sampling frame into 
strata according to variables of interest, and then randomly sampling from within 
each stratum. Oversampling of certain strata can be used to ensure the inclusion of 
particular cases. The representativeness of the sample is restored by weighting each 
case, usually by the inverse of their probability of inclusion (De Vaus 2004). 
However, this was impractical here. First, stratification is, as just explained, a two-
step procedure which requires much information about the sampling frame before 
the sample is taken. Such information was available for the floriculture sector, but 
not for coffee, where, as explained below, the construction of a sampling frame was 
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an ongoing process. Second, such an approach only makes sense if the goal is to 
conduct data analysis using inferential statistics, which was not the case here. 
A distinction must be made at this point between data covering the coffee sector 
and data about floriculture. Given the impossibility of first constructing such a 
complete sampling frame of coffee plantations, i.e. conducting a census to collect 
the information necessary for appropriate stratification, and then conducting the 
survey itself within the logistical confines of a PhD thesis, a random approach to 
sampling was consciously rejected in favour of purposive sampling methods. I 
judged it more important to use the limited resources at my disposal to construct a 
sample that contains key cases and is therefore analytically relevant for the purpose 
of providing both a description of, and an explanation for, the accumulation 
processes occurring. I contend that the resulting samples across both sectors, as well 
as the resulting data, are of far higher quality than could have been achieved – 
within the constraints of time and money – by relying on probabilistic sampling 
methods and incomplete or unreliable sampling frames. The lack of statistical 
representativeness is more than made up for by the care taken in constructing the 
sampling frame and the in-depth process of data collection. Thus, while conclusions 
can be drawn from my findings about developments in the coffee plantation sector 
as a whole, no attempt at statistical inference on the basis of my quantitative data is 
made. To do so would be methodologically indefensible. Descriptive statistics, by 
contrast, only relate to the characteristics of the sample at hand; they do not claim to 
provide information about the wider population, but also do not require a 
probabilistic approach to sampling, and are therefore appropriate for the analysis of 
my survey data covering the coffee sector. In the floriculture sector, the quantitative 
analysis is based on a quasi-census of flower farms, obviating the need for 
inferential sampling with respect to quantitative data for that case. From this 
sampling frame I carefully selected both foreign and domestic capitalists. The 
sample for qualitative interviews was chosen purposively, as is common in 
qualitative research (Flick 2014). 
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3.6 Sample construction in coffee 
3.6.1 Availability of data 
A key challenge in the construction of a sampling frame of coffee capitalists in 
Ethiopia was the lack of existing research on which to build. I was not able to find 
even a single piece of academic writing on the contemporary capitalist coffee 
plantations being established in Ethiopia’s coffee lands 6 . To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to tackle this subject using primary data. 
The situation is only slightly better when it comes to official Ethiopian data. Official 
surveys covering large-scale ‘commercial’ farms have been carried out by the 
Ethiopian government’s Central Statistical Agency (CSA), but these are not 
designed to cover the coffee sector. A further source of official information comes 
from the investment licences issued to each new investment project undertaken in 
the country. However, the use of investment licences has two major drawbacks. 
First, investment licences are not active projects. A prospective capitalist may very 
well be issued an investment licence, but never undertake any investment. Some 
studies do use investment licences to gauge investment volumes in Ethiopia, even 
while acknowledging the weakness of this approach (such as Baumgartner et al. 
2015 for instance), but this is likely to result in a significant overestimation of the 
number of active investment projects. Second, in  theory, licence databases are 
updated regularly at all levels and contain information as to whether projects have 
actually been implemented, but in practice the data on implementation status of 
licensed projects is woefully inadequate. This was confirmed time and again by 
government officials at all levels, and is not limited to the coffee sector. 
For both sectors I was, however, able to draw on the rich datasets provided by the 
fair trade, employment and poverty reduction (FTEPR) project. This SOAS-led 
project has compiled a wealth of information on the characteristics of the labour 
forces in both sectors and on their wage and non-wage working conditions. 
                                                     
6  Apart from one study on land use on the Kaffa forest area, which remarks on the 
phenomenon in passing (El Ouaamari and Cochet 2014). 
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3.6.2 Constructing the sampling frame 
The approach taken to constructing a sampling frame for the coffee plantation 
sector was thus multi-pronged and iterative, and relied heavily on the triangulation 
and cross-checking of data from a variety of sources. The most important of these, 
which are discussed in turn below, were: membership lists of sectoral associations 
and trade bodies, official administrative records, and information provided by key 
informants and survey respondents. Extensive scoping was undertaken to collect 
the data needed for the sampling frame, but also to identify and hold initial 
interviews with key informants and to observe the growing, processing and trading 
of coffee. These scoping trips were also used to collect the necessary administrative 
authorisations. 
3.6.2.1 Initial sampling frame and study areas 
The relatively young Ethiopian Coffee Growers, Producers and Exporters’ 
Association (ECGPEA), only in operation since late 2008, was specifically founded – 
at the request of the Ethiopian government – to act as an interlocutor with officials 
on behalf of the new breed of coffee capitalists. The association was therefore the 
ideal body to use as a starting point and provided a list of its members. It is, 
however, a very small organisation, operating at the time of research out of a small 
office temporarily donated by the Ministry of Agriculture and with full-time staff 
limited to the director, his assistant and two further clerical staff. Many, but by no 
means all, of the plantation capitalists were ECGPEA members at the time of 
research, and membership was biased towards those with the greatest interest in 
exporting. A full list of all association members was made available at the start of 
the fieldwork and subsequently updated. 
The other business association operating in the sector, the Ethiopian Coffee 
Exporters’ Association (ECEA), refused to provide me with any information, which 
illustrates how sensitive many forms of research are in Ethiopia7. They also  went so 
far to as refuse me access to a list of the association’s members, despite the fact that 
lists of ECEA members were contained in annual reports, which were freely 
                                                     
7  Individual staff members were more forthcoming and unofficially provided some 
information on the largest exporters directly involved in production.  
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available on the association’s website. The ECEA membership lists, though, were 
less useful for the construction of the sampling frame, as the membership consists 
mostly of companies that buy, process and then export coffee, rather than of 
plantations which export their coffee directly.  
Official government records, the single most important input into the sampling 
frame, were arduous to collect and also had to be used and interpreted with great 
care. Ethiopia’s coffee sector has suffered from years of relative administrative 
neglect, compounded by a dispersion of regulatory authority across various 
branches and layers of government. As a result, the state of official records for the 
sector is particularly dire8. Obtaining information required moving through the 
hierarchy of the administration from the top downwards and seeking written 
authorisation to conduct research and collect data at each step.  
Despite the problems outlined above, investment licences are a useful starting point 
in constructing a sampling frame of coffee plantations, as most of the coffee 
capitalists are contained within those records9 . However, the records are both 
incomplete, i.e. do not contain all plantations, and not up-to-date, in that they 
contain large numbers of projects that were never actualised. Moreover, information 
on land holdings, employment and start-up capital was more often than not wildly 
inaccurate and registered contact details of investors were often incorrect. These 
records could consequently serve only as one input into the sampling frame and all 
information in government records was carefully checked and cross-referenced. The 
licence information was taken from different government levels, allowing me to 
cross-reference these records against one another, as well as against other data 
sources. In this way, missing entries could be added and inactive projects could be 
eliminated from the sampling frame.  
                                                     
8 An exception to this is data concerned directly with exports, which is held by both the 
Ministry of Trade and the Ethiopian Customs and Revenue Authority (ECRA). This 
information is of much better quality as it is needed for the control of foreign exchange. 
While neither the ministry nor ECRA was willing to grant me access to this data, Minten et 
al. (2014) were able to access these datasets and their analyses have been used as 
background information. 
9 Investment licences for coffee growing are only granted to plantations at least 30ha in size. 
As farms below this threshold were excluded from the study this did not present a problem. 
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Initially, investment licence data was taken from the Ethiopian Investment 
Commission (formerly Ethiopian Investment Agency – EIA) in Addis Ababa. The 
EIC shared its entire database of investment licences for the coffee sector, which 
includes coffee plantations, processors (akrabe), roasters, exporters and domestic 
wholesalers. This database was of extremely low quality, rendering it all but 
useless. The EIC was fully aware of the weaknesses of their database and officials 
there recommended relying on contacts provided by ECGPEA. The database did, 
however, confirm that very few coffee plantations had been licensed outside of 
Oromia and SNNPR. 
The next, time-consuming, step was to seek investment licence data from the 
investment bureaus of Oromia region and SNNPR. It took several weeks and 
multiple visits to finally obtain the data. The initial analysis of this data, which was 
of better quality than that held at federal level, was useful in roughly determining 
the geographical distribution of private coffee plantations. For Oromia the database 
showed by far the largest concentrations of plantations in Jimma zone, with smaller 
numbers active in Illubabor and Guji zones and a handful of cases in West Wellega 
and Kellem Wellega 10 . The SNNPR data showed that the greatest number of 
plantations was located in Kaffa zone, followed by Bench Maji and Shaka zone. The 
lists showed that there were no licensed plantations at all in Gedeo zone (which 
contains the famed Jirgacheffe area) and just one in Sidama zone – two of the most 
productive coffee growing areas in the country. This absence of plantations was 
confirmed by collecting investment licence information from the zonal investment 
offices of both zones. 
By combining the official records with the membership lists of the sectoral 
associations and cross-referencing against information obtained from key informant 
interviews during scoping trips it was now possible to assemble an initial version of 
the sampling frame. This contained all licensed plantations over 30ha in size. This 
was used to define a geographical scope for the study that was both analytically 
satisfying and achievable. It was immediately clear that a focus of the research 
                                                     
10 Please see the maps in Annex III.2 
88 
 
would have to be on the major concentrations of private plantations in Jimma and 
Kaffa zones. The initial idea was to include two other areas containing large 
numbers of plantations, namely Bench Maji and Sheka zones, along with a selection 
of plantations from ‘frontier’ areas characterised by small numbers of farms and 
long transport routes to population centres. While areas with many farms are 
analytically relevant as they are the most dynamic areas, the ‘frontier’ areas are 
important because they allow for an assessment of the importance of transport links 
and spillover effects amongst plantations for business success. 
This plan was, however, amended after a further scoping trip encompassing Bonga, 
the administrative centre of Kaffa zone and Jimma town. Data collected in Jimma 
revealed a remarkable clustering of plantations within a single woreda of Jimma 
zone – Limmu Kossa woreda. More time was therefore spent exploring this cluster 
and its dynamics, at the expense of one of the other targeted areas, implying either 
Bench Maji or Sheka zone. Logistically, it made sense to retain Bench Maji, and 
Sheka zone was therefore excluded from the investigation. West Wellega and 
Kellem Wellega were chosen as ‘frontier’ zones, where there had been less 
investment activity. Both Illubabor and Guji zones were also excluded, in order to 
concentrate research efforts in the main clusters in Jimma and Kaffa. The final list of 
chosen research areas is presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 - List of main coffee research areas 
Zone Region Administrative centre 
Jimma Oromia Jimma (town) 
Kaffa SNNP Bonga 
Bench Maji SNNP Mizan Teferi 
West Wellega Oromia Gimbi 
Kellem Wellega Oromia Dembi Dolo 
 
3.6.2.2 Final sampling frame 
As I visited each zone to conduct interviews, the sampling frame for that zone was 
compiled by taking data from the zonal investment office and cross-referencing this 
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with the information already in hand from higher level administrative records, key 
informant interviews, casual interviews and membership lists. Given the analytical 
importance of the cluster in Limmu Kossa woreda, data was also taken from that 
woreda’s investment bureau. As interviews with plantation owners commenced in 
each zone, the sampling frames for each zone were completed by through 
snowballing, which is a good way of understanding relationships among capitalists. 
While the records kept at zonal level were much more reliable than those kept at 
regional or federal levels, this process of snowballing proved vital to filling in gaps 
in the sampling frame. The sampling frame for each area was only considered 
complete once snowballing among respondents produced no new names. In fact it 
was through snowballing that the whole issue of illegal plantations in Jimma zone, 
discussed at length in Chapter Six was discovered at all. 
3.6.3 Sample selection in coffee 
The final sample was purposefully selected from the completed sampling frames in 
each area. As the properties of the final sample are laid out in Chapter 6, a few notes 
on the selection criteria used will suffice here. The geographical boundaries of the 
research area have already been discussed above and respondents from all selected 
areas were included. Care was taken to cover the most dynamic capitalists, 
identified not through the size of their land holding but by their reputation for high 
quality, rapid growth and export success, although there was an overlap with the 
size of land holdings. To explore a stark contrast and make sure relevant categories 
are not missed out even if they may not represent a large proportion of total output 
from the capitalist sector in coffee, small plantations at the bottom end of the size 
distribution were also selected. Also, both fully domestic investors and those of 
diaspora origin were included. A conscious effort was made to interview female 
plantation owners. However, at the time of research there were very few women 
who owned coffee plantations and only two were willing to participate in the study. 
The most important element was the oversampling of farms from the Limu Kossa 
woreda, where a network of local investors had emerged. The most striking aspect of 
the Limu Kossa cluster is the prevalence of illegal land grabbing in the area, 
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whereby plantations were established illegally and capitalists then sought to have 
them retrospectively licensed and legalised. Lastly, a number of the country’s 
largest coffee exporters, who had begun a process of vertical integration down the 
value chain by involving themselves directly in coffee growing, were selected and 
interviewed11. 
3.7 Sample construction in floriculture 
3.7.1 Availability of data 
Unlike the coffee capitalists, the Ethiopian floriculture sector has received a lot of 
attention from both domestic and international researchers, meaning that there was 
a substantial body of evidence to draw on before beginning my own research. This 
included both academic and grey literature and covered a wide variety of aspects, 
from the international market environment to domestic policies and their effects, as 
well as labour issues and environmental concerns. In addition there was a plethora 
of news reports to draw on. 
Crucially from my perspective, the available research included a high quality 
dataset on the sector, collected during several rounds of quasi-census of flower 
farms as part of a cooperation agreement between the National Graduate Institute 
for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and the main government economic research 
institute in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI). This 
largely obviated the need for quantitative data collection on my part. Moreover, the 
lesser relative weight given to floriculture, which serves mostly as a comparator for 
the more in-depth study of the coffee plantations, combined with the available 
research meant that a smaller sample of respondents was sufficient to obtain the 
information necessary to build a comprehensive picture of the sectoral dynamics.   
3.7.2 Constructing the sampling frame 
Access to the EDRI’s data was difficult to negotiate and my research had to proceed 
for some time without access to the bulk of this data. Without access to the quasi-
census it was necessary for me to construct my own sampling frame. As in the 
                                                     
11 The involvement of exports in the coffee plantation sector is discussed in Chapter Six 
91 
 
coffee sector a membership list of the sector’s business association, the Ethiopia 
Horticulture Producers’ and Exporters’ Association (EHPEA) was used. Unlike its 
counterpart in the coffee sector, EHPEA is a well-funded organisation and almost 
all flower farms in Ethiopia were members of the association at the time of research, 
so the association’s membership list came close to a complete listing of active firms. 
This information was confirmed in a series of interviews with domestic and foreign 
members of the association’s board, all of whom were themselves farm owners. 
The official records held by the main government agency responsible for the sector, 
the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) were used as a second 
source of information. The EHDA keeps records on all firms active in the 
floriculture sector in Ethiopia and the difference in data quality compared to the 
coffee sector is striking. Neither cross-referencing with other information sources 
nor subsequent snowballing from respondents in the sector identified missing 
companies. Entries on some farms were not up to date in terms of ownership, but 
all farms were accounted for.  
Only after the sampling frame had been completed and interviews had begun was I 
able to negotiate access to the EDRI’s dataset. The dataset comprised data from four 
rounds of a quasi-census on flower farms. The questionnaire included sections on 
land and land development, production and inputs, sales, labour and labour force 
stratification and ownership structures. It is a quasi-census because all farms were 
targeted at each round of data collection, but not all farms agreed to take part in the 
survey. The non-response rate was small, however, and the largest and most 
dynamic producers were included in all rounds. This dataset was, and remains, the 
best data available on the Ethiopian floriculture sector. 
3.7.3 Sample selection in floriculture 
Paralleling the coffee case, the final sample is described in Chapter 7. Suffice to say 
here that the sample selection in floriculture was conducted using the following 
criteria. The sample was purposefully skewed towards domestic investors, in line 
with the key concerns of this study. Of course, leading foreign investors were also 
interviewed, as their contribution is vital to gain an understanding of the sector. 
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Moreover, foreign capitalists in the sector typically had experience with floriculture 
in other countries and so were able to provide a comparative international 
perspective.  
To understand the origins and growth of the sector, early investors into the sector 
were included in the selection. As the sector has seen high rates of firm failure and 
exit, especially amongst domestic investors, capitalists no longer active in the sector 
were sought out and interviewed. One factor for differential performance among 
firms also has to do with farm location. The cut flower farms are for the most part 
situated in the vicinity of Addis Ababa, where they are grouped together in clusters 
with differing altitudes and soil characteristics. Farms from different clusters were 
thus selected so as not to bias the resulting data. 
As in the coffee sector, every effort was made to contact female capitalists, and I 
was able to interview two women. Lastly, while production systems were quite 
uniform across the sector – although they varied in sophistication – one foreign 
capitalist was included on account of having a very different approach to 
production, which manages to be very profitable with a much lower capital 
investment per ha (see Chapter Seven for details). 
3.8 Interviews and interview technique 
As mentioned above, research tools should be appropriate to the research questions 
pursued and should be able to generate the kinds of data necessary to answer those 
questions as fully as possible. For this reason different types of interviews were 
used across the two cases and for different types of respondents ‘within’ each case. 
The number and distribution of interviews are given in Table 3.2. While 
quantitative research can in theory continue until the entire population of 
respondents has been interviewed, qualitative research normally works with much 
smaller sample sizes and ceases when a “point of meaning saturation” (Gaskell 
2000: 43) has been reached. While the aim of qualitative research in this project was 
more focused on establishing concrete historical developments and causal 
mechanisms and therefore strove for comparatively large number of respondents, 
such a saturation point was nonetheless reached in both cases.  
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Table 3.2 - Overview of formal interviews 
Sector Respondent type Number 
Coffee Large-scale farmers 46 
Coffee  Medium-scale farmers 1 
Coffee Vertically integrated large-scale farmers 8 
Coffee Traders and exporters 3 
Coffee International buyers 2 
Coffee Business association staff 1 
Coffee Cooperative staff 4 
Both Government officials (incl. DBE, ECX and SOE staff) 11 
Flowers Flower farmers and farm managers 13 
Flowers Lobbying staff 3 
3.8.1 Interview technique 
Most interviews where held in Amharic so as not to impede the ability of 
respondents to express themselves as fully as possible12. I employed an Ethiopian 
research assistant to translate during the interview process. This had the advantage 
of allowing me to immediately ask follow-up and probing questions, and to deviate 
from the interview guide to pursue analytically interesting directions as and when 
these came up (Helfferich 2005; Gaskell 2000). My knowledge of Amharic, while 
relatively basic, allowed me to understand enough of the answers given by 
respondents to check my assistant’s translations for omissions. 
With few exceptions, the interviews were not recorded, so as to put respondents at 
ease to discuss potentially sensitive topics. I took extensive notes during all 
interviews, and checked these with my research assistant as soon after the interview 
as possible to eliminate errors and add any omitted information. 
3.8.2 Interviews in the coffee sector 
The research in the coffee sector comprised four different types of interviews, with 
the choice of interview type dependent on the category of respondent being 
interviewed. The most important category of respondents were the coffee capitalists 
themselves. They were – whenever possible – interviewed using a combination of 
two different interview types: a structured questionnaire aimed at collecting 
                                                     
12 Non-Ethiopian respondents were interviewed in English and some Ethiopian respondents 
chose to be interviewed in English. 
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quantitative data and a semi-structured qualitative interview, which sought to 
establish their personal trajectories of accumulation. The latter approach is drawn 
from the technique of collecting ‘life histories’  adapted in this case to focus more on 
the business and accumulation histories of respondents (Francis 1992). These 
interview sections – broadly narrative in structure  - serve in particular to build up 
knowledge about developments through time, both about the personal business 
histories of respondents and also about the changing socio-economic circumstances 
around them (Jovchelovitch and Bauer 2000). They add a crucial diachronic 
dimension to the cross-sectional data collected through the quantitative instrument. 
Some of the capitalists refused ‘formal’ questionnaire-based interviews and in these 
cases only the semi-structured qualitative interview schedule was applied. 
Quantitative data was collected to serve as an initial mapping of an effectively un-
researched phenomenon in Ethiopia, and to help build profiles of the coffee 
capitalists. To the best of my knowledge, this survey is the first to systematically 
collect data on this new breed of agrarian capitalist. The data was collected using a 
structured questionnaire comprising sections on demographic information, land 
holdings, capital investments and vertical integration, production levels and 
processes, labour deployment and wages, marketing channels, sales volumes and 
prices, profits and losses, risk management, and non-plantation investments. The 
questionnaire was designed so that answers could be cross-checked, with important 
pieces of information asked for repeatedly in different ways across the 
questionnaire. The lengthy questionnaire also served as a useful ‘anchoring device’ 
to keep respondents in the interview. Once respondents had agreed to the 
questionnaire interview almost all felt obliged to stay until the questionnaire was 
completed, which allowed me to weave the qualitative component into the 
interview, i.e. to work through the semi-structured interview schedule while 
ostensibly filling in the questionnaire, which proved the most successful technique. 
Key informants with specialised knowledge of the sector, including government 
officials at various levels, staff of the commodity exchange and government 
research institutes, coffee traders (both domestic and foreign) and NGO staff were 
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interviewed using a semi-structured interview schedule, which differed according 
to their area of expertise. These were vital to an understanding of the complex 
commercial and regulatory interactions and market structures in the coffee sector 
both in Ethiopia and globally, but also to gain deeper insights into technical issues 
around growing techniques, as well as harvesting, processing and grading 
practices, and their relationship to coffee quality. Finally, unstructured and informal 
interviews were held, whenever the opportunity arose, with local market traders, 
agricultural workers, farmers, cooperative staff and others with localised 
knowledge such as small business owners and local NGO field staff. Such 
interviews provided valuable local information and helped build a more complete 
sampling frame. In addition to interviews, I also observed a two-day export training 
held by ECGPEA and a one-day agronomic training session provided to NGO field 
staff by TechnoServe. 
3.8.3 Interviews in the floriculture sector 
With high-quality quantitative data already available for the floriculture sector, I 
conducted only semi-structured qualitative interviews with respondents in the 
sector. A single interview schedule was used for all of the flower sectors capitalists, 
which as in the case of coffee focused heavily on their personal business histories, as 
well as eliciting information about the impact of foreign direct investment and 
government policies on the sector. 
Here too, I used different schedules for key informant interviews, depending on the 
expertise of the respondent. Respondents for such interviews were selected to 
provide background information on the technical aspects of the production and 
transport processes, capital equipment, but also the labour process and labour 
recruitment. Key informant interviews were also held with government officials, 
EHPEA staff and consultants, farm managers and technical staff on flower farms.  
3.9 Research ethics 
The fieldwork for this thesis was approved by the research ethics committee at 
SOAS, University of London, prior to the commencement of fieldwork. The ethics 
committee recommended that particular care be taken in the handling of personal 
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and business sensitive data. Accordingly, all electronic data was encrypted and has 
not been shared. Notebooks containing interview transcripts and field notes were at 
all times either carried on my person or were securely stored in locked containers or 
cupboards. 
Only respondents who have given full and informed consent were interviewed for 
this study. All respondents were informed about the nature and aims of my 
research project in their own language and were made aware that the final research 
results would become part of the public domain. However, all respondents were 
assured of the complete anonymity of their answers, and all information derived 
from interviews has been presented in such a way as to make attribution to specific 
individuals impossible. All respondents in are referred to only by their code 
throughout this study to. Please see Annex III.1 for the list of codes. 
3.10 Data analysis 
3.10.1 Quantitative data analysis 
As discussed above, the quantitative data for the coffee and floriculture sectors 
were collected in very different ways. Accordingly, they have been analysed 
differently. The quantitative data for the coffee sector was not collected using a 
randomised sampling method, and therefore cannot be used to make statistical 
inferences about the wider population outside of the sample. Descriptive statistics 
can, however, legitimately be used to describe the sample. The data was entered, 
checked and cleaned by myself and descriptive statistics were calculated using 
Microsoft Excel 2010 and Stata 12. Relationships between variables were established 
through cross-tabulation and appropriate graphing techniques. 
Data for the floriculture sector was based on a quasi-census which eliminates the 
need for inferential statistics as the population of (almost) all flower farms was 
directly observed. The data was provided by EDRI in Addis Ababa and GRIPS in 
Tokyo. The data had been checked and cleaned by EDRI researchers during data 
entry, but I undertook additional cleaning and eliminated a number of errors. As 
above, data analysis made extensive use of cross-tabulations and graphing. The 
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floriculture data was cleaned and analysed using Stata 12, all graphs were made 
using Microsoft Excel 2010. 
3.10.2 Qualitative data analysis 
Qualitative data analysis did not differ across the two sectors. All qualitative 
interviews were analysed based on extensive notes I made during the interviews. 
As my goal was mostly to understand socio-economic processes of accumulation, 
rather than the construction of a capitalist identity among my respondents, a 
verbatim transcription of the interviews was usually not necessary. An exception 
was made for particularly illuminating or striking statements, which I did record 
verbatim (albeit in translation). I subsequently entered all interview and field notes 
into a word processor to allow for secure storage and easier subsequent coding. 
During this transcription process I again checked for errors and inconsistencies. 
All transcripts were then personally coded by me using spreadsheets. The coding 
was done thematically (Gibbs 2008) with an emphasis on material change. 
Information was combined in spreadsheets to allow for cross-case comparisons. 
This approach also made a synthesis of quantitative and qualitative data easier, as 
quantitative data could easily be added to the coded information. During the write-
up process I nonetheless kept referring back to the electronic transcripts to make 
sure that statements and pieces of information appeared in the correct context. 
3.11 Weaknesses and limitations 
There are two main weaknesses that result from the methodological choices I have 
made in structuring and conducting the research. The first concerns the external 
validity of my findings. While much of the empirical material assembled addresses  
issues affecting the whole of the coffee and flower sectors, the sampling techniques 
used do not allow for the generalisation of statements across the sectors in a formal 
manner. As I have argued above, my findings are nonetheless relevant for and able 
to describe processes of capital accumulation in both sectors, but the quantitative 
data assembled here cannot be taken as a representative reflection of the state of all 
accumulators in the coffee sector. However, I took great care to interview the most 
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relevant respondents and am confident to have captured the most dynamic 
accumulators. 
The second limitation concerns the sample sizes achieved. Choosing a contrastive 
research design with two sectors, one of which is dispersed over a large 
geographical area, necessarily meant that only a smaller number of interviews could 
be held. I did not have the funds to hire more research assistants, nor would it have 
been appropriate to have research assistants conduct in-depth semi-structured 
interviews. However, a state of meaning saturation was achieved in both sectors. A 
fuller quantitative investigation of the coffee plantation sector in Ethiopia remains 
as an interesting topic for future research. 
3.12 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the research design and methods of empirical 
enquiry and analysis this study is based on. I have further discussed the structure of 
the field research, as well as the challenges in obtaining the necessary data. The 
practicalities of concurrently conducting a small survey on a previously untargeted 
population and doing in-depth qualitative work in two sectors were explained in 
detail. Finally, I have laid open the limitations of my research as I understand them. 
It is now time to delve into the empirical material. The next chapter introduces 
Ethiopia as a polity and economy. As well as presenting basic economic data, it 
focuses on the nature of the Ethiopian state, and the political economy of its 
economic policies. Chapter Five introduces the coffee sector, first at global level and 
then with specific reference to Ethiopia, and charts the development of the sector’s 
capitalists through Ethiopia’s turbulent history. In Chapter Six, we take up the case 
of Ethiopia’s coffee plantation capitalists, before moving to the comparator case, 
floriculture, in Chapter Seven. 
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Annex III.1 
 
List of interviews 
 
Code Function or position Sector 
Date of first 
interview 
CE Coffee exporter Coffee 08/03/2013 
CB1 Coffee buyer Coffee 01/11/2012 
CB2 Coffee buyer Coffee 12/02/2015 
CELF1 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 02/09/2013 
CELF2 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 05/09/2013 
CELF3 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 17/09/2013 
CELF4 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 04/09/2013 
CELF5 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 23/05/2013 
CELF6 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 24/08/2013 
CELF7 Coffee exporter & large coffee farmer Coffee 20/09/2013 
ALF Akrabe & large coffee farmer Coffee 09/11/2012 
AK1 Large Akrabe Coffee 23/02/2013 
AK2 Large Akrabe Coffee 08/02/2013 
LCF1 Large coffee farmer Coffee 14/02/2013 
LCF2 Large coffee farmer Coffee 06/09/2013 
LCF3 Large coffee farmer Coffee 14/02/2013 
LCF4 Large coffee farmer Coffee 08/08/2013 
LCF5 Large coffee farmer Coffee 06/02/2013 
LCF6 Large coffee farmer Coffee 02/02/2013 
LCF7 Large coffee farmer Coffee 29/03/2013 
LCF8 Large coffee farmer Coffee 03/02/2013 
LCF9 Large coffee farmer Coffee 26/04/2013 
LCF10 Large coffee farmer Coffee 31/03/2013 
LCF11 Large coffee farmer Coffee 16/08/2013 
LCF12 Large coffee farmer Coffee 22/05/2013 
LCF13 Large coffee farmer Coffee 07/04/2013 
LCF14 Large coffee farmer Coffee 09/04/2013 
LCF15 Large coffee farmer Coffee 22/02/2013 
LCF16 Large coffee farmer Coffee 06/02/2013 
LCF17 Large coffee farmer Coffee 09/02/2013 
LCF18 Large coffee farmer Coffee 13/08/2013 
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LCF19 Large coffee farmer Coffee 23/01/2012 
LCF20 Large coffee farmer Coffee 11/08/2013 
LCF21 Large coffee farmer Coffee 24/06/2014 
LCF22 Large coffee farmer Coffee 25/04/2013 
LCF23 Large coffee farmer Coffee 07/08/2013 
LCF24 Large coffee farmer Coffee 01/04/2013 
LCF25 Large coffee farmer Coffee 25/02/2013 
LCF26 Large coffee farmer Coffee 03/08/2013 
LCF27 Large coffee farmer Coffee 10/08/2013 
LCF28 Large coffee farmer Coffee 16/02/2013 
LCF29 Large coffee farmer Coffee 30/03/2013 
LCF30 Large coffee farmer Coffee 20/02/2013 
LCF31 Large coffee farmer Coffee 07/09/2013 
LCF32 Large coffee farmer Coffee 04/04/2013 
LCF33 Large coffee farmer Coffee 02/04/2013 
LCF34 Large coffee farmer Coffee 06/04/2013 
LCF35 Large coffee farmer Coffee 03/08/2013 
LCF36 Large coffee farmer Coffee 10/04/2013 
LCF37 Large coffee farmer Coffee 05/09/2013 
LCF38 Large coffee farmer Coffee 19/09/2013 
LCF39 Large coffee farmer Coffee 08/05/2013 
LCF40 Large coffee farmer Coffee 16/09/2013 
LCF41 Large coffee farmer Coffee 15/08/2013 
LCF42 Large coffee farmer Coffee 01/02/2013 
LCF43 Large coffee farmer Coffee 29/01/2013 
LCF44 Large coffee farmer Coffee 04/11/2012 
LCF45 Large coffee farmer Coffee 31/08/2013 
LCF46 Large coffee farmer Coffee 01/03/2013 
LCF47 Large coffee farmer Coffee 04/11/2012 
MCF Medium coffee farmer Coffee 08/02/2013 
NGO Agronomic NGO, senior official Coffee 31/10/2012 
CC1 Coffee cooperative - representative Coffee 21/02/2013 
CC2 Coffee cooperative - representative Coffee 21/02/2013 
CC3 Coffee cooperative - representative Coffee 21/02/2013 
CC4 Coffee cooperative - representative Coffee 01/08/2013 
FFM1 Flower farm, senior manager Flowers 30/05/2013 
FFM2 Flower farm, senior manager Flowers 30/05/2013 
FFM3 Flower farm, senior manager Coffee 19/06/2013 
FF1 Flower farmer Flowers 26/06/2013 
FF2 Flower farmer Flowers 10/05/2013 
FF3 Flower farmer Flowers 30/05/2013 
FF4 Flower farmer Flowers 19/06/2013 
FF5 Flower farmer Flowers 31/05/2013 
FF6 Flower farmer Flowers 18/06/2013 
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FF7 Flower farmer Flowers 14/06/2013 
FF8 Former flower farmer Flowers 18/06/2013 
FF9 Flower farmer Flowers 17/06/2013 
FF10 Former flower farmer Flowers 08/06/2013 
FF11 Flower farmer Flowers 04/12/2012 
FF12 Flower farmer Flowers 17/12/2012 
FF13 Flower farmer Flowers 13/06/2013 
EG1 Ministry of Agriculture, Director Coffee 12/06/2013 
EG2 Ethiopian Coffee Plantation Dev. Enterprise, Head Coffee 21/08/2013 
EG3 Limmu Kossa state coffee farm, senior manager Coffee 02/08/2013 
EG4 Jimma Agricultural Research Institute, Head Coffee 05/08/2013 
EG5 Jimma Zone Land Administration Office, senior official Coffee 09/08/2013 
EG6 K/Wollega Zone Investment Bureau, senior official Coffee 25/02/2013 
EG7 Jimma Zone Investment Bureau, former senior official Coffee 31/03/2013 
EG8 Kaffa Zone Investment Bureau, senior officials Coffee 05/04/2013 
EG9 Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, CEO Coffee 25/06/2013 
EG10 Ethiopian Horticultural Development Agency, Head Flowers 24/04/2013 
CL ECGPEA, Head Coffee 19/10/2012 
FL EHPEA, President & members of board Flowers 29/04/2013 
DBE1 DBE Jimma Branch, senior official Coffee 13/08/2013 
DBE2 Development Bank of Ethiopia, Director Flowers 23/04/2013 
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Annex III.2 
 
Maps of Ethiopia 
Map 1 – Physical (Source: CIA Maps) 
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Map 2 – Administrative regions and zones (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 
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Chapter four 
 
The political economy of agrarian 
change in Ethiopia: a historical 
perspective 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Ethiopia is a large and complicated country, deeply divided by lines of ethnicity, 
language, culture, geography and class. Today, even as the country struggles to 
manage the strains of undergoing extraordinarily rapid economic and social 
change, it is still affected by the legacy of its turbulent history. Now, as in the past, 
all efforts at economic development are tightly controlled by the country’s narrow 
elites. And yet they have always also been subject to contestation from below. 
Situated at the heart of the volatile Horn of Africa, in Ethiopia state building has 
always been a violent process. These state building efforts have had a profound 
influence on the possibilities for – and contours of – agrarian development. 
Therefore the changing political economy of agrarian property relations in Ethiopia 
across the three very different political regimes that have characterised it since the 
late 19th century: the imperial regime (Section 4.2), the military Derg dictatorship 
(Section 4.3) and the current EPRDF regime (Section 4.4) will be discussed. Further, 
this chapter demonstrates how the actions of the state have always exerted a 
profound influence on the possibilities for agrarian accumulation. At the same time 
it will highlight how processes of agrarian accumulation have been marked by a 
degree of contingency throughout and have often emerged as unintended 
consequences of government action. To substantiate this argument I have to go into 
considerable detail about wider political and economic developments. Changes in 
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Ethiopia’s agrarian structures cannot be understood outside of this context. In order 
not to clutter the text with unnecessary statistical detail, key economic data on 
Ethiopia under the EPRDF are presented in an annex to this chapter.  
We do not have to reach too far back into history to find the roots of present-day 
agrarian developments. While Ethiopia’s national myth paints the picture of an 
ancient society, its roots planted in time immemorial, the country in its 
contemporary form is actually a thoroughly modern creation and the state-building 
project is far from complete. For centuries the north of Ethiopia had been ruled by 
an exploitative quasi-feudal empire that presided over extreme inequality and 
economic stagnation. When the ruling elites of the old Amharan empire set out to 
conquer their neighbours to the south, east and west in the late 19th century, they 
established the borders of the modern state. In the conquered areas, which 
contained dozens of distinct ethnic groupings, a system of class domination 
stratified along ethnic lines was put in place. As Ethiopia entered the modern age, 
the quasi-feudal relations of the past started to give way to capitalist social relations 
when the first commercial farms were established in the heavily exploited south. 
However, the late and limited embracing of capitalism by the imperial elites only 
exacerbated the existing ethnicised class divisions and helped fuel the revolution 
that swept away the old order in 1974.  
The military dictatorship that replaced the imperial system enacted a radical land 
reform and imposed a command economy that inhibited the development of 
capitalism for a decade and a half. The self-styled socialist dictatorship was unable 
to resolve the fundamental contradictions of poverty, stagnation and Amhara 
domination though. It consequently fell victim to its own venal brutality and was 
overthrown by a peasant-based ethnic insurgency, led by a disciplined guerrilla 
group from Tigay in the north. The new government sought to unite the country’s 
varied ethnic groups by offering a new and more inclusive national identity. Driven 
by the desire to transform Ethiopia economically, it has opened the country once 
more to capitalist development, but has sought to maintain control over this volatile 
process by dominating the political space. When its authoritarian rule ran into crisis 
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in 2005 it sought to restore its legitimacy by positioning itself as the sole guarantor 
of rapid economic development. The political imperatives of this process continue 
to determine the contours of agrarian capitalism in Ethiopia today and have led to 
the emergence of a dynamic class of accumulators in the countryside.  
4.2 State building, land ownership and agrarian 
capital in the imperial era 
The modern Ethiopian state is the product of the aggressively expanding imperial 
state of Abyssinia, historically centred on the Christian Amhara and Tigre 
populations living in the northern highlands of what are now Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
though dominated for much of its existence by Amhara nobles (Henze 2004). By the 
late 19th century, the Ethiopian feudal state had achieved a high degree of 
centralisation under Emperor Menelik II, formerly king of the wealthy northern 
kingdom of Shewa, which stretched as far south as Addis Ababa. Moreover, the 
Ethiopian state had successfully defended itself against European imperialist 
aggression by defeating a major Italian invasion force at the battle of Adwa in 1896, 
which secured Ethiopia a high degree of independence – though this was eroded 
after the second World War – and became an important part of Ethiopian national 
pride (Zewde 2001). 
The Kingdom of Shewa had grown rich during the preceding period of civil war, 
which lasted roughly from the mid-18th to the mid-19th century – the so-called Era of 
Princes (zemene mesafint) – that followed the decline of the last central authority in 
Gonder. Shewa not only emerged relatively unscathed from the wars that had laid 
waste to much of northern Ethiopia, but also sat at the intersection of important 
trade routes for both exports and imports. The rise of Shewa was based to a large 
degree on the slave trade from the south, and, it is conjectured, to a lesser degree on 
the export of coffee, although the historical record is far from clear on this (Aregay 
1988). 
As King of Shewa, Menelik had invested heavily into arming his military, which he 
dispatched south to conquer the highland peripheries and the lowlands beyond. His 
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conquest of the south was designed to give him the economic basis and military 
prestige necessary to become the next emperor of Ethiopia, an ambition Menelik 
achieved after the death of his predecessor Yohannes in 1889. At the same time, 
southward expansion was seen as a practical necessity. Livestock disease had killed 
the majority of all cattle and failing rains severely damaged crops between 1888 and 
1892. Mass starvation caused an untold number of deaths and the fertile lands of the 
south were seen as part of the solution (Zewde 2001; Markakis 2011). Both highland 
and lowland peripheries were populated by Cushitic and Nilotic peoples, who were 
either Muslim, as in the case of many Oromo, or followed older, more local 
religions. The highland periphery contained a number of small independent 
kingdoms and principalities, the majority of whom were Oromo1. That is, they were 
both ethnically and religiously distinct from the predominantly Christian Amhara 
(and Tigre) Abyssinian empire in the north. The expansion of the empire southward 
and the imposition of a quasi-feudal and highly exploitative landholding system 
there planted the seed of destruction for the imperial order through the intersection 
of class and ethnic identities it created – a legacy that haunts the Ethiopian polity to 
this day (Markakis 2011). 
Owing partly to Menelik II’s obsession with modern Western weaponry and 
especially rifles and cannon2, a desire aided by Shewa’s central position in the trade 
routes of the Abyssinian state, his armies had no equal in Ethiopia (Lewis 2001; 
Pausewang 1983). The military machine he built was able to inflict a crushing defeat 
onto an invading Italian army at the Battle of Adwa, Tigray in 1896; a rare instance 
of large-scale military victory of an African against a European army during the era 
of European colonial conquest (Pakenham 2010). By the end of the 19th century, the 
independent kingdoms in the highland peripheries of the south had either 
submitted to Northern rule or been destroyed (Markakis 2011).  
                                                     
1 Often referred to as ‘galla’ in older texts. This term is today considered derogatory. 
2 Which, amongst many other sources, he bought from the French poet Artur Rimbaud, who 
after scandal and the bigotry of the times forced him to leave Paris, eventually settled in 
Harar in Eastern Ethiopia, where, in between expeditions deep into the deserts of the 
Danakil depression, he sold weaponry to Menelik II. 
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4.2.1 Imperial expansion and rural class structure 
The system of land use and of land rights instituted in the southern highland 
periphery after the conquest was very different to that of the Northern empire, and 
laid the foundations for the growth of a very different agrarian structure of class 
relations3. While the land tenure of the north ensured that land was to some degree 
held communally amongst the peasantry, with nobility and crown entitled to taxes 
and labour services, the tenure system established in the south laid the foundations 
for the eventual emergence of rural capitalist enterprises based on large-scale 
private land holdings. Some of these holdings were to become the first coffee 
plantations in the country (see Chapter Five)4.  
In the north of the country, the rights and obligations of the peasants vis-à-vis each 
other and the feudal lords5 were regulated by the ancient, yet evolving, rist-gult 
system. At the core of the Abyssinian empire, a sophisticated class society had 
evolved over the centuries. Intense cultivation of the northern highland plateau 
with ox-drawn ploughs allowed – regular famines notwithstanding – the peasantry 
to produce a surplus that supported both church and aristocracy, who extracted the 
bulk of this surplus from the peasantry using mostly administrative means, such as 
taxes and unpaid labour (Markakis and Ayele 1978). The rist-gult system of land 
ownership, which largely remained in place until the Ethiopian revolution swept 
away the imperial system, defined the relative rights and obligations of lords and 
peasants: the right to extract rent, tithe and labour service on the one hand and the 
right to land on the other. In the northern Ethiopian highlands society placed a high 
                                                     
3 In the following I ignore the substantial landholdings of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church; 
the structure and development of which is not of particular importance to the formation of 
capitalism in the south of Ethiopia. 
4 This overview of land tenure systems draws heavily on Pausewang (1983), who focuses on 
the political economy of the different tenure systems. The imperial land tenure systems were 
very complex and I necessarily gloss over a lot of subtleties here. See also Pankhurst's very 
detailed economic history (1968) and the literature review by Cohen (1974).  
5 The term ‘feudal’ is used here simply as a convenient shorthand for the imperial system in 
Ethiopia during the 19th and 20th centuries and is not meant to imply the existence in 
Ethiopia of a ‘feudal mode of production’, nor is it supposed to imply the existence of one 
single and uniform system of organising production throughout the country. For the 
problems and weaknesses of definitions of modes of production, see Banaji (2010), especially 
chapters two and three. 
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cultural value on farming and the worldview of the peasantry was built on the 
assumption that the cultivation of land is the ultimate sign of the value of an 
individual, both morally and economically. Under a complex mixture of individual 
and group rights, every member of a given community could claim a parcel of land. 
Each peasant who held land was responsible for tax and tithe payments on that 
land, which were paid in kind until well into the 20th century, as well as for the 
provision of labour services to the gult lord. The individual taxpayer, the gabbar, 
considered himself a holder of secure land rights vis-à-vis the nobility. The nobility 
depended on the passive acquiescence of peasants to their exploitation and 
generally sought to ensure some level of legitimacy, which limited the amount of 
deprivations visited upon the gabbar (Markakis 2011). Moreover, gult lords also 
shared  a common ethnicity and culture with the peasantry, and the lower ranks of 
the aristocracy were themselves rather poor. These factors reduced the social 
distance between the landlord and peasant classes in the north of the empire 
(Markakis and Ayele 1978). 
On the other side of the system, in the north stood the gultegna - lords who had been 
granted gult. Such rights meant administrative responsibility, including the duty to 
collect taxes and tributes on behalf of the emperor, over a certain geographical area. 
The gultegna collected payments from the rist-holding peasants in the area, 
delivered part to the crown and kept part of the proceeds for his or her own use. 
The gult lords relied on social prestige and their official position to justify their 
status as lords. The land rights of the peasantry tended to be largely unaffected by 
the frequent rotation of nobles and were subject to implicit community controls. 
The outcome of this system was a comparatively static system of exploitation in 
which the historically evolved and highly valued land rights of an individualistic 
peasantry militated against the formation of large land holdings. The system led to 
an ever greater fragmentation of land holdings. The resulting encroachment of 
farmers into any available land on the northern plateau brought ever more marginal 
land under cultivation. As accumulation of land to any significant degree was all 
but impossible for the peasantry and the ruling class of lords was not willing to take 
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the political risk of expropriating peasants en masse, and anyway displayed no 
interest in agrarian ventures (or any other form of productive activity), the rist-gult 
system provided no basis for the emergence of a class of agrarian capitalists. Land 
holding patterns in the north therefore remained relatively unchanged for centuries, 
despite the wars, famines and other deprivations visited upon the peasantry 
(Markakis and Ayele 1978).  
Where the system in the north had grown into a delicate, if very lopsided, balance 
between the lords, the peasantry and the church, the land tenure system in the 
south was a direct outcome of the economic and political needs of the centralised 
Abyssinian state and its ruling class in the wake of its conquest of the south in the 
late 19th century. The southern highland periphery was extremely fertile, offered 
ample land, and was suitable for the collection or production of tradable goods, not 
least coffee and ivory. The northern Abyssinians were also enthusiastic slave 
traders, and slaves were taken from amongst the conquered peoples of the south 
with alacrity. The conquests were aimed at establishing an expanded economic 
base, first to secure Menelik’s ascent from the Shewan to the imperial throne and 
later to fill the coffers of the imperial treasury. The economic exploitation of the 
south became a top priority for Ethiopia’s imperial rulers: “[c]ontrolling the 
periphery, exploiting its resources and binding it closer to the centre preoccupied 
the imperial regime throughout its reign. It shaped nearly all the important policies 
it formulated and consumed most of its energy and resources, economic, military 
and political. By contrast, the Abyssinian provinces in the north were ignored and 
stagnated as a result” (Markakis 2011: 131). But to be able to exploit the lands they 
had to be pacified and administered as cheaply as possible. The gult system that 
emerged in the south was meant to fulfil the twin aims of political oppression and 
surplus extraction. It inadvertently laid the foundations for the emergence of the 
first agrarian capitalists in the late imperial era, but also provided the basis for 
many of the grievances that were to fuel to Ethiopian revolution of 1974. 
Following the military conquest of the south, the imperial state immediately seized 
two-thirds of all land (Markakis and Ayele 1978). Out of this land, hereditary gult 
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rights of varying size were given to the commanders of Menelik’s campaigns, as 
well as to simple soldiers and settlers from the north, predominantly but not 
exclusively Amhara. As in the north, gult rights gave the lord the right to collect 
taxes and tithes from the inhabitants of the assigned area, the bulk of which was 
supposed to be passed on and up the hierarchy of the imperial state until it reached 
the imperial treasury in Addis Ababa. The new lords, however, were not only 
administrators but also an occupying military force. As both the economic and 
politico-military aspects of the exploitation of the south were directly financed 
through the taxes and tithes paid by the inhabitants of the southern provinces, the 
gult in the southern periphery was extremely cost-effective for the imperial centre 
(Markakis 2011). 
The gult allocations could be of substantial size. Each gult allocation contained the 
farmsteads and families of local inhabitants. Their number depended on the size of 
the land and local population density. The smallest unit given out was normally one 
gasha, the size of which depended partly on the number of inhabitants it contained, 
but was generally considered to be around 40ha (while peasant holdings in the 
northern provinces were frequently around 1ha in size) (Rahmato 2009). The land 
itself was initially of limited value to the northerners; it required human labour to 
produce anything. Each of the new lords from the north was thus given control over 
both land and people, and charged with the exploitation of their labour and 
resources. 
The armed men from the north, known as neftegna6, based their rule, quite literally, 
on the barrel of the gun. This freed them from the need to maintain ‘reasonable’ 
community ties, as in the north. Neftegna soon became a by-word for cruelty and 
brutality. The dizzying variety of established social orders in the multi-ethnic south 
were overthrown and subverted, and customary systems of land ownership were 
replaced with a centralised system of surplus appropriation, designed to serve the 
interests of the imperial centre. However, the neftegna understood that they could 
not rule alone. In the time-honoured tradition of empire-builders everywhere they 
                                                     
6 Lit.: gun man; from neft, meaning gun, rifle or musket (Leslau 1976: 118) 
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therefore bent the social systems they encountered to their needs by co-opting 
existing elites, often granting them arbitrary powers they did not previously 
possess. These tamed elites, the ballabat, served as arbiters between the local 
populace and the neftegna, who held themselves to be superior in terms of both class 
and ethnicity (Markakis 2011). 
4.2.2 The birth of agrarian capitalism 
In the final years of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century European 
imperialism, and the spread of global capitalism that followed in its wake, dragged 
Ethiopia from the relative isolation it had enjoyed for centuries. Greater integration 
into global circuits of capital ushered in a period of social, political and economic 
changes that led to the first instances of domestic capitalist development in the 
country. The internal contradictions of the decrepit imperial regime meant that the 
economic fortunes of the northern and southern provinces sharply diverged in this 
period. While the northern provinces began a long era of slow economic decline 
caused by a mixture of land fragmentation, soil overexploitation and deforestation 
(Baqala 1995), the much less densely populated and fertile lands of the southern 
highlands witnessed the first instances of capitalist agriculture in Ethiopia. Here the 
development of first de facto and then de jure private property in land, a novelty in 
Ethiopia, allowed for land to be rented by those seeking to invest on it to make a 
profit – the first capitalist farmers. 
Better transport links encouraged foreign investment and the southern highland 
periphery became the centre of Ethiopia’s fledgling manufacturing sector (Markakis 
2011; Pankhurst 1968), which brought with it labour migrations from the north. 
There are many reasons for this development: the north, along with other areas in 
the south, lacked a land ‘frontier’ to allow for larger holdings necessary for 
capitalist agriculture. Meanwhile in the south the neftegna and also many ballabat – 
unwelcome in the countryside – congregated in newly founded garrison towns that 
became centres of trade and manufacturing, at least compared to the more or less 
complete lack of urbanisation in the north.  
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One of the more immediate reasons for the (gradual) change in the land tenure 
system in the southern highlands was economic, and closely tied to the class 
interests of the ruling elites. Beginning in the early 20th century, declining terms of 
trade meant that more and more exports were necessary to finance the foreign 
luxury goods coveted by the imperial elite, while the greater integration of 
Abyssinia into the global economy brought with it increasing foreign investment. 
Both served to slowly change the nature of land ownership in Ethiopia. In the south, 
where old communal relations had been destroyed and reordered, this process was 
far easier. The southern highland periphery also held greater promise for 
commercial agriculture. The elite’s need to increase surplus extraction meant they 
had to increase exports and generate greater revenues from their lands to finance 
rising import bills. 
Most of the new gult lords of the south held their vast lands in absentia and in many 
cases left the administration of their holdings to hired agents (Markakis and Ayele 
1978). This absentee ownership and arms-length management encouraged the 
renting of land to those who offered to provide better returns. The (slow and 
uneven) rise of commercial agriculture, which required the ability to lease out land 
to capitalist farmers, gradually led the gultegna to view themselves as landlords and 
their peasants as tenants – forms of property relations which had not previously 
existed in Ethiopia (Pausewang 1983).  
These forms of property relations were formalised during the rule of Haile Selassie 
I., who ruled Ethiopia as regent from 1916-1930 and as emperor from 1930. He came 
to the throne at the end of a protracted series of complicated machinations and 
intrigues that began with Menelik’s death in 1913. He survived the invasion and 
occupation of Ethiopia by fascist Italy in 1934 and was reinstated to the throne after 
the defeat of the fascists in 1941. He ruled Ethiopia until the revolution in 1974 and 
was murdered in unclear circumstances by revolutionaries in 1975.  
Beginning during his regency under Empress Zewditu, the first female head of state 
in modern Ethiopian history, Haile Selassie aimed to build on the centralised state 
created by Menelik, and on the first fitful steps towards modernisation taken during 
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Menelik’s rule, to transform Ethiopia into a modern nation-state (Marcus 2002). He 
used the modernisation of the Ethiopian state apparatus to create a degree of 
centralisation that had been hitherto unknown. The aim was to ensure the 
continuation of the imperial system under his own absolute authority (Markakis 
2011). The process has been fittingly described as ‘authoritarian modernisation’ 
(Tareke 2009). Where Menelik’s inspiration had come from Zarist Russia, Japan – a 
rising non-Western power – was the new model for Ethiopia’s elites (Clapham 
2006). Haile Selassie undertook the creation of a modern civil service and fostered 
the growth of an administrative elite composed of young intellectuals (Zewde 2002). 
He also abolished slavery (though not until 1942, by which time it had become 
thoroughly unfashionable globally) and made attempts to modernise the economy, 
encouraging foreign investment, banking and the acquisition of new technologies. 
However, up until the Italian invasion in 1936 these development efforts were 
anaemic and remained focused mostly on Addis Ababa and parts of the southern 
highland periphery, which housed most of the new foreign-owned manufacturing 
sector (Pankhurst 1968).  
A more serious modernisation drive began after the emperor’s restauration, 
following the defeat of the fascist occupation force by British troops and Ethiopian 
partisans in 1941. Haile Selassie began giving away lands in the southern highland 
periphery to loyal nobles. A series of decrees over the following years gradually 
clarified the status of large landholdings as private property. In 1966 feudal land 
rights were formally abolished and replaced by tax registration and absolute private 
property in land, a move which was anticipated by many land owners, who 
managed to register the land they possessed as their property (Pausewang 1983). 
Throughout the imperial period the state paid little heed to agriculture and even 
less so to ‘peasant’ agriculture, focusing instead on providing funds for defence and 
industrial development. From 1957 onwards a series of strategic five-year plans 
aimed to drive the economy forward. Tellingly though, the first of these plans 
contained no real agricultural strategy. The second and third plans, beginning in 
1962 and 1967 respectively, provided more concrete plans for interventions in 
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agriculture. In the second plan more than half of the planned funding was allocated 
to support large-scale farms – doubtless due to the influence of the large landlords 
in the nobility. The third plan was similarly titled toward large-scale farming 
(Adams 1970). The state not only created the property relations necessary for the 
growth of capitalist large-scale farms, but also supported them financially. 
The supposed modernisation and rationalisation of land ownership under Haile 
Selassie, which had made the growth of agrarian capital possible, had unintended 
effects though. The multiple layers of gult rights granted to the old and new 
aristocracy in the highland periphery had served, to some degree, to mystify 
property relations in land. As the gult lords needed the peasantry to stay on the 
land and work it to produce a surplus, evictions were rare even in the south, while 
the ownership of the land by the gult lords was hidden by the veil of feudal state-
vassal relations. However, the shift to more clearly identifiable private property 
rights in land changed this dramatically. So, “when the haze [of feudal land rights] 
was swept aside by economic and political currents in the period following the 
Second World War, it revealed the stark fact of irreparable loss of possession and 
the reduction of the southern peasantry to tenancy” (Markakis and Ayele 1978: 26). 
This change in land rights was necessitated by the arrival of capitalism and the 
perceived need of the landlord class to be able to rent out their land and evict 
peasants to make room for the more profitable ventures that now became possible, 
such as large-scale capitalist agriculture. Thus, “[…] the appearance of capitalism 
quickly polarised the society [in the highland periphery] and dissolved traditional 
disguises, thereby revealing the objective situation of the tenant” (Markakis and 
Ayele 1978: 28).   
4.3 The Derg, the end of capitalism and civil war 
The Ethiopian revolution put a harsh – and in many cases bloody – end to the 
capitalist experiment. Imperial misrule, inequality, oppression and the inability of 
the feudal elite to create a modern society had angered urban Ethiopia in particular 
and a radical student movement had arisen in the capital, demanding change. 
When large rural areas fell into famine in 1973 and the government responded by 
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trying to cover up the crisis, revolution was in the air (Markakis and Ayele 1978; 
Markakis 2011).  
Ethiopia’s limited capitalist development meant that both the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat were tiny and of little consequence. The spark for revolution came 
instead from a military mutiny in a remote outpost in 1974, that rapidly spread 
through the armed forces. The student radicals, who had kept the resistance to the 
imperial regime alive in the face of harsh repression, now took to the streets, where 
they were joined by teachers, taxi-drivers and other groups. The imperial regime, 
undefended by its own military, fell with relative ease. However, the revolution 
lacked a coherent organisation. The military, which had been cautious throughout, 
now moved rapidly to fill the power vacuum at the centre of the state left by the 
crumbling away of the imperial system. Adapting the Marxist rhetoric of the 
student movement, the soldiers under the leadership of a coordinating committee 
(derg in Amharic) 7 , took control of the country. What followed was an 
extraordinarily violent struggle for power both within the military and between the 
soldiers and the Marxist student radicals. The students lacked both organisation 
and arms, and the military, which unleashed a campaign of relentless terror against 
any perceived opposition, inevitably prevailed. By 1977 the Derg had managed to 
replace the absolutism of the emperor with an even more totalitarian military 
dictatorship, led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had secured his rule 
through a series of bloody purges (Tareke 2009). 
4.3.1 Land to the tiller and the end of tenancy 
The most salient aspect of the revolution with regard to agrarian development, and 
the one with the most long-lasting consequences, was the enactment of radical land 
reform. Under pressure from student radicals, who had formed the intellectual 
backbone of the revolution, and keen to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
overwhelmingly rural populace, in March 1975 the Derg regime issued the 
‘proclamation for the nationalisation of rural land’. This was a truly revolutionary 
                                                     
7  Sometimes also spelt dergue, this was the popular name for the Provisional Military 
Administrative Council (PMAC). 
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act that instantly and permanently destroyed the social, political and economic 
foundations of the imperial regime. It also upended the link between class and 
ethnicity which had been a hallmark of the imperial regime (Markakis 2011). The 
proclamation declared all rural land the collective property of ‘the Ethiopian 
people’. It outlawed all forms of tenancy and rental payments on land. Land sales, 
mortgages or other transfers were banned. Nor could land any longer be cultivated 
through the use of hired labour. Instead, true to the slogan they adopted from the 
radical student movement ‘meret le arashu’ (land to the tiller), the Derg decreed that 
land should go into the possession (but not ownership) of whoever had been 
cultivating it before the revolution, provided that the area did not exceed 10ha. 
Anyone who had owned more than 10ha was considered a ‘landlord’ and was 
banned from participation in the new peasant associations (kebele) that were being 
set up everywhere (Pausewang 1983). The landlords’ possessions, mostly but not 
exclusively in the south, were expropriated and nationalised 8 . With private 
ownership of land, land rental and wage labour all banned, the land reform 
dismantled the basis for capitalist agriculture. State ownership of all land has since 
been a key feature of Ethiopian agriculture and political economy. The implications 
of this for the Ethiopian coffee sector are discussed in Chapter Five. 
Overall, the Derg period was a disaster for Ethiopia, which suffered civil war, 
famine and mass starvation, and was left economically debilitated by the time the 
EPDRF defeated the Derg’s army in 1991. John Markakis has probably penned the 
most erudite summary of Mengistu Haile Mariam and his ‘socialist’ military 
dictatorship. Of Mengistu, he says: “[h]is recklessness and ruthlessness were 
responsible for a series of ill-fated, blood-stained schemes, whose wreckage 
comprises the forlorn record of this regime.” (Markakis 2011: 169). 
The dictatorial attitude and extremely violent methods of the Derg, along with its 
insistence on having ‘solved’ the question of national Ethiopian identity by 
substituting it for a class identity through broad based educational programmes 
(Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003), fuelled resistance. One the eve of the revolution the 
                                                     
8 Tenancy in the northern provinces had been relatively rare, see Baqala (1995: 113ff). 
118 
 
student movement had been split between those who viewed class oppression as 
the primary evil in Ethiopia and those who insisted that the subjugation of ethnic 
minorities by the Amhara-dominated centre had to be solved first (Tareke 2009). 
Eritrean nationalists had been fighting for independence from the Ethiopian state 
since the 1960s, and after the revolution ethno-nationalist Tigrayan students took 
the battle to the rural north. 
4.3.2 The TPLF, peasant war and the fall of the Derg 
The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was founded in 1975 as an ethno-
nationalist resistance movement committed to overthrowing the Derg regime by 
force of arms. Unlike the ill-fated student radicals who – having identified the urban 
proletariat as the agents of history – attempted to build a revolutionary force in the 
cities and were rapidly wiped out, the TPFL opted for a guerrilla war in the 
countryside. Together with the fighters of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF), with whom they formed a strategic alliance, they ultimately prevailed 
against the Derg, who at the time commanded the largest military force in Africa, 
when their combined forces took Addis Ababa in 1991. The TPLF went on to form 
the backbone of the EPRDF coalition, which still rules Ethiopia today (Markakis 
2011). 
More important for the discussion at hand than the history of the TPFL’s struggle 
itself (see for instance Berhe 2008; Hammond 1999; Markakis 2011; Tareke 2009; 
Young 1997) is the type of organisation that emerged from that struggle, its 
ideological orientation and the basis of its claim to political legitimacy. The TPFL 
was formed by a tiny group of student radicals who took up arms and headed for 
the rugged mountain terrain of Tigray to begin their armed struggle in 1974 (Berhe 
2004)9. Using Marxist theories of revolutionary guerrilla war, the TPLF were able to 
overcome regional rivals and build a successful and highly disciplined fighting 
force with next to no outside support. Key to their success was their ability to 
ground their movement in the villages of Tigray through mass associations, village-
levels councils and a highly effective internal organisation that included 
                                                     
9 Though the TPLF was not formally founded until 1975. 
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departments for political education, economic affairs and mobilisation. The TPLF 
enjoyed broad and deep popular support (Young 1997). 
Leadership of the front rested with a politburo drawn from a central committee. The 
front adopted the principle of ‘democratic centralism’, meaning that decisions were 
vigorously debated, but once agreed had to be followed by all with no further 
discussion and no tolerance of dissent. This political culture, extremely well-
adapted to the needs of a guerrilla group, quite possibly lies at the centre of the 
deep intolerance for dissenting opinions that pervades Ethiopia today. The party 
saw itself as a vanguard, whose role was not to only to fight and win the armed 
struggle, but also to unite and educate ‘the people’ in preparation for a better 
society. Despite the front’s collegiate style of leadership, one of the TPLF’s leading 
theoreticians, Meles Zenawi, slowly managed to manoeuvre himself into a position 
of primus inter pares (Berhe 2008). Once it became clear that military victory was 
both possible and imminent, the TPLF decided that it could not rule Ethiopia in the 
name of Tigray alone. In the dying days of the struggle the TPLF therefore founded 
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EDPRF) 10 . The new 
coalition consisted of the TPLF, an old ally from the struggle (the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement, ANDM, formerly the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Party) 
and a party founded by TPLF prisoners of war to represent the Oromo people (the 
Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, OPDO) (Aalen 2002). The EPRDF 
achieved total victory over the Derg in 1991. A fourth member, the Southern 
Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM), completed the coalition in 1992.  
4.4 The EPRDF and state-directed development 
The victorious EPRDF set out to rebuild the Ethiopian state anew. A transitional 
conference was called in 1991 (see Vaughan 1994 for a detailed account), setting in 
motion a transition process that culminated in the election of a constitutional 
assembly in 1994 and the adoption of a new constitution in 1995. The Derg’s 
military machinery was dismantled and the EPDRF’s forces became Ethiopia’s new 
military. Following a referendum in 1993, Eritrea was allowed to peacefully secede, 
                                                     
10 More commonly known in Ethiopia by its Amharic acronym ehadik. 
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once again severing Ethiopia’s link to the sea. While the transition process involved 
a wide variety of voices, the leadership clearly rested with the TPFL and Meles 
Zenawi was made head of the transitional government in 1994, before later 
becoming Ethiopia’s first prime minister.  The dominance of the TPLF was assured 
by the resounding military victory it had achieved, and the party was in no mood to 
share power. The entire transition process, including the formation of political 
parties, was tightly controlled by the EPRDF throughout (Abbink 1995). And, as 
mentioned above, the  TPLF’s partners in the EPDRF were largely its own creations. 
A partial exception to this is the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), 
which was formed out of a war-time ally of the TPLF and has over time become the 
second most powerful of the EDPRF’s coalition members, supplying key members 
of the governing elite (Markakis 2011). 
 The TPLF had long viewed the centralised notion of Ethiopian nationality, which in 
practice had meant the dominance of the centre over the periphery (including 
Tigray), as one of the central contradictions of the Ethiopian polity. To simplify 
somewhat, where the Derg had sought to create social peace by ‘solving’ the land 
question, the TPFL instead focused on the ‘national question’, that is, the 
discrimination of ethnic and national groups (Clapham 2009). In other words, 
where the Derg had sought to create national unity by fashioning a shared class 
identity, the TPLF wanted to produce unity by broadening out the notion of 
Ethiopian nationality to encompass all of the different ethnic and national groups in 
the state territory (Markakis 2011). The TPLF believed that both democracy and the 
lasting integrity of the Ethiopian polity and state could only be guaranteed through 
a recognition of the group rights of the various ethnic and sub-national groups in 
the country – a policy they referred to as ethnic federalism (Abbink 1995). The 
constitution which emerged from the transition period in 1995 therefore defined the 
new state as a federal republic, consisting of (initially 12, later nine) regional states 
and two federal cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa)11. The regional states were, 
with the exception of the multinational SNNPR, supposed to contain one large 
                                                     
11 The regions (kilil), consist of zones, which in turn are made up of woredas. The lowest level 
of the administration is the kebele. 
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ethnic group each and so to reflect the ethnic make-up of the country, with smaller 
ethnic groups granted their own administrative areas (zones or special woredas) 
within the regions. However, the data upon which such decisions were based was 
both outdated and incomplete, and conflicts soon emerged (Markakis 2011, see also 
Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003 for a detailed overview of the administrative structure 
of the state). Each region was given its own parliament and became in theory self-
governing in a number of important respects. The Ethiopian constitution framed the 
federation as a voluntary union and – controversially – included the right for 
groups to secede12.  
The constitution not only guaranteed group rights but also enshrined a wide-
variety of human and democratic rights at an individual level. It formally 
introduced a multi-party electoral system in a country that has never had multiple 
political parties, allowed for the formation of a relatively free press and committed 
the country to a market based economy. Crucially, the new government finally 
brought peace to the war-ravaged country. It also began the reintegration of 
Ethiopia into the ‘international community’, having consulted the US even before 
gaining power. Given the geopolitical constellation after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, Ethiopia’s new leaders were under no illusions about their options in terms 
of the broad direction of economic policy and the TPLF quickly embraced a move 
towards a market economy, although it remained deeply suspicious of economic 
liberalism (Clapham 2009) and sought to balance its outward embrace of liberalism 
with a continued commitment to mass economic development (Weis 2016). As 
Meles apparently later put it: “For the first ten years after we took over we were 
bewildered by the changes. The New World Order was very visible and especially 
so in this part of the world. The prospect of an independent line appeared very 
bleak. So we fought a rearguard action not to privatize too much” (Zenawi, cited in: 
de Waal 2013: XX). Quite apart from geostrategic considerations, the supposed 
‘command economy’ of the Derg was by 1990 in such a state of disarray that 
                                                     
12 “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession.” (Constitution of the FDRE, Art 39, §1). 
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effective government control over the economy was in any case no longer possible 
(Chole 2004). 
Democratic pretensions and the federal system notwithstanding, the state the 
EPRDF built was to become one the most centralised and powerful states in 
Ethiopian history (Abbink 2011b). In a sense this is not surprising. In Markakis’ 
(2011) analysis, the EPRDF regime is but the latest attempt at state-building in the 
country (after the empire and Derg), and like its predecessors the regime is faced 
with dissent in the periphery and – increasingly – in the Oromo centre. An ethnic 
federalism which co-opts local elites but lacks in real democratic roots has shown 
itself incapable of resolving these grievances (see for instance ICG 2009) and the 
state once again comes to rely on violence and coercion to maintain the integrity of 
the polity. As is shown below, the reaction of the EPRDF state to political crises has 
indeed been a strengthening of the centre and a fortification of its own rule. 
4.4.1 Ethiopia’s developmental state 
Economic development in Ethiopia thus continues to be an elite-led process and 
shifts in economic policies can only be understood by looking at how elite 
perspectives on the relative importance and most appropriate instruments of 
economic growth and development have evolved over time.  This analysis is 
complicated on the one hand by the shifting boundaries between party and state, 
and on the other hand by the waxing and waning of the relative importance and 
authority of party and state structures with regard to one another. Moreover, we 
must contend with shifting political weights of parties within the ruling coalition 
where the power of the TPFL has generally been decisive but far from absolute. 
And lastly power at the very top has shifted from rule by committee to personal 
rule to what has been described as a more collegiate approach to ruling. So while 
the EPRDF seemingly dominates Ethiopian politics completely, its leadership is – as 
we shall see – by no means monolithic and even authoritarian governments have to 
respond to popular pressures.  
In political terms the rule of the EPRDF can be usefully subdivided into three 
periods: the period of state reformation beginning with the conquest of power in 
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1991 and ending in a leadership crisis in the heart of the TPFL in 2001, the period up 
to and including the 2005 election and the brutal crackdown that followed, and 
finally the restoration of authority up to the 2010 election, which heralded the 
decisive end of the government’s brief flirtation with greater openness (Vaughan 
2011). In terms of economic strategy a decisive break can be identified with the 
embrace of a developmental state strategy after 2001, a project which was deepened 
and accelerated after 2005 (Weis 2016). 
During its first decade in power, the EPRDF leadership faced the challenge of 
having to manage the transition from the Derg’s disastrous economic inheritance to 
a far more liberal market economy, while at same time seeking to maintain its own 
power. A major focus was placed on building up the EPRDF’s constituent parts in 
the parts of Ethiopia it had not hitherto controlled. In parallel a concerted effort was 
undertaken to bring the Derg’s civil service fully under its control (Vaughan 2011). 
The party’s economic components were registered as private companies – the so-
called endowment companies – during the mid-1990s. Substantial liberalisation of 
the economy did occur, although the government maintained control over strategic 
sectors and companies (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011). At the same time efforts 
were undertaken to devolve real administrative powers to the regions and to sub-
regional entities, and the various ethnic and other groups in these areas were (in 
many but not all cases) able to enjoy unprecedented involvement in their own 
administrative structure. Real decision making power, however, often remained at 
the centre (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). 
In 1998 a bloody war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as longstanding 
tensions escalated into armed conflict13. The war precipitated a crisis within the 
central committee of the TPLF, bringing to a head longstanding disputes between 
the circle of leaders around Meles who were engaged in leading the federal state in 
Addis Ababa and the TPLF’s regional leadership in the Tigrayan regional capital of 
Mekelle, which was more engaged in leading the party. The war had strengthened 
                                                     
13 The war itself, its complex causes, its diplomatic aftermath, and the ongoing cold war it 
initiated are not of direct concern to the argument at hand, but further discussion can be 
found in Gilkes and Plaut (1999), Negash and Tronvoll (2001), Steves (2003) and Plant (2001). 
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the latter faction as the war effort itself was directed more from Mekelle than from 
Addis Ababa. (Weis 2016). This faction had wanted to continue the war, while 
Meles had sought peace when Ethiopia was militarily at an advantage. Meles lost a 
vote for peace in the TPLF’s central committee, which drew the battle lines between 
Meles’ supporters and a dissenting faction. Meles engaged in a series of political 
manoeuvres that culminated in the split of the central committee “in acrimony” in 
2001 (Tadesse and Young 2003: 389)14. 
The outcome of this inner-party conflict was a triumph for Meles, who emerged as 
the unchallenged leader and proceeded to purge dissenters from the TPFL, the 
EPRDF and the army15. There was an important shift of power from the party to the 
state apparatus as Meles consolidated power within his own person and 
empowered the prime minister’s office at the expense of the party headquarters in 
Mekelle (Vaughan 2011). Efforts were undertaken to create a clearer distinction 
between the state apparatus and the party (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). This laid a 
critical organisational foundation for the change in economic strategy that was to 
follow. Importantly, while Meles certainly enjoyed unprecedented power, Ethiopia 
did not descend into a one-man dictatorship. The party remained an essential tool 
of governance, and party elites continued to exert real influence, albeit only under 
Meles’ leadership. Party elites were thus able to orchestrate a smooth transfer of 
power after Meles’ death, and have seemingly reverted back to a more collegiate 
form of leadership. 
A perhaps even more important outcome of the split in the TPLF was, however, the 
ideological shift which Meles imposed. After 2001 Meles was powerful enough to 
use the following party congresses to commit both the TPLF and the EPDRF to a 
new policy of supporting capitalist development, based directly on his own ideas 
about the political economy of economic development. Tadesse and Young (2003: 
392) are worth quoting in full:  
                                                     
14 The dissenters later spoke with regret of the decision to entrust Meles with the leadership 
of both party and state after 1991 on the mistaken assumption that “he could be handled”, 
i.e. that his power could be curtailed by collegiate leadership of the party (Tadesse and 
Young 2003: 395). 
15 This was framed as a necessary renewal (tehadso) of the party. 
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“[T]hese meetings served to shift the ruling party away from its 
longstanding radicalism in at least two critical areas. First, it was resolved 
that the EPRDF, in origin a coalition of peasants, workers and revolutionary 
intelligentsia, would now open its ranks to the national bourgeoisie. Second, 
it was decided that the country would be integrated into the global 
economy. In a related move, the EPRDF endorsed a clear statement in favour 
of capitalism, thereby resolving abiding tension and confusion within the 
movement. Thus it would appear that while the TPLF crisis did not begin 
with serious ideological concerns, it did produce a significant shift in the 
ideological orientation of the party. The leadership claimed – with some 
justification – that it had brought clarity and unity of purpose to the EPRDF. 
Until this time, it was said, politics dictated everything. Afterwards 
everything would be dictated by the economy, or at least argued from that 
premise.” 
Meles’ ideas about how to achieve economic development would now become the 
foundation of a bold new vision of economic transformation through capital 
accumulation, guided and goaded by an interventionist state. His views on 
economic theory and practice in a poor country were an amalgamation of heterodox 
economic ideas about developmental states (see also Chapter Two), his own views 
on rent-seekers (kiray sebsabe, lit.: rent collector) and EPRDF dogmas about 
‘revolutionary democracy’ (abyotawi demokrasi) (Weis 2016). Meles agreed with the 
developmental state theorists that industrialisation had to be the ultimate means of 
economic transformation, but he believed that in a poor country such as Ethiopia 
prospective capitalists could not be relied upon to drive productive investment, as it 
would always be easier for them to engage in low-risk, but highly profitable, 
activities in trade and services – what Meles called rent-seeking. Instead, as in South 
Korea or Taiwan, the state would have to step in to build technological capacities 
(de Waal 2013).  
Moreover, the Ethiopian context, marked by a mostly rural population and wide-
spread poverty, presented particular challenges which necessitated an adaptation of 
the developmental state model. First, the initial basis of economic transformation 
would have to be agriculture, where initiatives to raise the productivity of farming 
would provide the material and fiscal basis for a process of industrialisation. 
Second, the country would have to use its sparse resources carefully and focus on 
labour-intensive industrial sectors that utilised agricultural inputs, in order to  
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maximise linkage effects. Combining both agricultural and industrial development 
in this way is the basis of the notion of agricultural development-led 
industrialisation (ADLI). These ideas were formalised in 2002 in a new rural 
development strategy (MOFED 2003) and – for the first time in Ethiopia’s history – 
in an industrial development strategy (MOFED 2002a), the latter of which also 
made clear that industrial development should target exports and be led by the 
government, while the contribution of foreign investors would be welcomed. 
Similar points are also made, albeit in more guarded language, in the country’s 
poverty reduction strategy paper of the same year (MOFED 2002b). The conceptual 
foundations for Ethiopia’s developmental state were laid. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, developmental states have often been established by 
authoritarian regimes and Meles made clear that he saw the creation of a successful 
developmental state in Ethiopia first and foremost as a political project to which a 
Western-style democracy would be ill-suited (Weis 2016).  Instead Meles drew upon 
the EPRDF’s concept of ‘revolutionary democracy’, which is defined as a system 
based on (ethnic) group rights and the direct involvement of ‘the people’ in the 
process of governing – in supposed opposition to Western liberal democracy  (Bach 
2011). By forming a ‘developmental coalition’ with the rural population and parts of 
the urban proletariat and lower bourgeoisie, the developmental state could assure 
policy continuity across several electoral cycles (Weis 2016), thus creating the basis 
for rent centralisation and a long-horizon strategic outlook (Kelsall 2013). The 
‘democratic’ element comes not through free elections and a representative 
democracy, but through the direct participation of ‘the masses’ in the process of 
development, in a way reminiscent of the TPLF’s mass mobilisation during the 
struggle (see Young 1997). This concept was pragmatically employed to explain the 
(renewed) necessity of a vanguard party achieving hegemonic status in the state 
(Bach 2011). 
Bit by bit Ethiopia now put in place an activist industrial policy and the state 
structures necessary to implement it. The specific policy measures have been 
reviewed elsewhere (see for instance Abebe and Schaefer 2015; Altenburg 2010; 
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Gebreyesus 2013; Gebreyesus 2014; Oqubay 2015) and are also taken up across the 
next chapters, so it is more important here to lay out broad contours and 
implications. The state apparatus was brought into line through a major civil service 
reform undertaken by the newly founded ministry of capacity building (Vaughan 
2011). The reform, which extended through all levels of the civil service, was highly 
centralised and focused both on capacitating and politicising the civil service 
(World Bank 2013). The party-linked endowment companies were given a new lease 
of life, placed under tighter management and made one of the centre-pieces of the 
new economic strategy (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011). At the same time 
privatisations were halted and in sectors seen as politically important or strategic 
(such as sugar or fertilizer for instance) state-owned enterprises and the public 
administration acted in concert to push out private companies. In political terms 
private sector capital thus played almost no role in the design of the developmental 
state, whose focus was firmly on state-owned and state-linked enterprises and the 
rural sector (Weis 2016)16.  
FDI flows, which had begun to accelerate at the end of the 1990s, further increased 
(UNCTAD 1999; UNCTAD 2005), and foreign investment played an important part 
in the establishment of many of Ethiopia’s leading private sector industrial 
companies (Sutton and Kellow 2010). The new policy also saw the beginnings of 
large-scale private capital investment in agriculture – a point I return to in detail in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Both of the latter two trends were, however, sharply 
accelerated after 2005. 
4.4.2 Crisis and renewal of the developmental state 
A fundamental reorientation of economic strategy and of the developmental state, 
as well as of wider state-society relations, occurred after the election crisis of 2005. 
The election of 2005 had been marked by an unprecedented degree of openness and 
contestation. However, irregularities and delays in vote counting sparked 
opposition protest once the EPRDF was declared to have won. The election results 
                                                     
16 An exemption to this is the MIDROC Group (see Sutton and Kellow 2010), which enjoys 
close links to Ethiopia’s political elite. 
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were close, with a greatly reduced share of votes for the EPRDF especially in urban 
areas, where the opposition won most seats. Opposition leaders refused to accept 
the election results and called for mass demonstrations (Carter Center 2005). The 
regime accused the opposition of trying to engineer a coup d'état and reacted with a 
brutal crackdown: security forces fired live ammunition at protestors, killing dozens 
(and possibly many more) in the streets of Addis Ababa – the numbers are heavily 
disputed. A wave of arrests and arbitrary detentions followed, which swept up 
most of the opposition leaders, as well as tens of thousands of others. The EPRDF 
returned to government (Abbink 2006; BBC News 2006).  
The election and its aftermath damaged Ethiopia’s international standing and 
exposed the insecurity of the EPRDF’s rule – the ‘developmental collation’ had very 
nearly failed. The reaction of the regime was threefold: a closing down of the 
political space and return to a much more authoritarian rule (Lovise Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2009), a concerted effort to both expand the party and to make the 
developmental state a hegemonic project in society as well as the state (Weis 2016), 
and, relatedly, a marked acceleration of capitalist development. Economic and 
social development now became the primary sources of legitimacy of the regime, 
which proudly pointed to the recent acceleration in GDP growth (Hagmann and 
Abbink 2011, see Annex IV). 
On the political level the regime appears to have concluded that the democratic 
experiment it had undertaken in the run-up to the 2005 elections had run out of 
control and needed to be closed down. Over the next few years there was a decisive 
crackdown on opposition parties, the media and the judiciary, which left the 
country without a credible legal political opposition17. Critical voices in politics, the 
media and civil society were progressively silenced through repressive new laws 
and  an increase in prosecutions (Lovise Aalen and Tronvoll 2009), including 
accusations of terrorism against journalists (BBC News 2014). 
                                                     
17  There continue to be outlawed groups fighting armed insurgencies in parts of the 
periphery. 
129 
 
The party was vastly expanded, including by forced conscription, and grew from 
700,000 members in 2007 to 6.5m members in 2012. Direct political control over 
society was extended downward through a reinvigoration of the kebele system, as 
well as various sub-kebele entities, which ostensibly all serve to further 
development. Noteworthy in this respect are the limat budin (development team; 
collectively they form the ‘development army’) and the and-le-amist (one-for-five) 
system, which extends down to household level18. The civil service was subjected to 
multiple waves of ‘political training’ to hammer home the new ideology of rapid 
growth. At the same time an immense propaganda drive was initiated to convince 
the populace of the virtues of the EPRDF’s development drive. A national flag day 
was instituted, and the Ethiopian millennium in 2007 was used to launch the so-
called ‘Ethiopian renaissance’, which promised rapid economic growth and benefits 
for all. Development was redefined as a collective national endeavour. Limat 
(development) and mega-projects, in particular the vast ‘Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam’ in Benishangul-Gumuz, became central to government 
propaganda (Hagmann and Abbink 2011; Vaughan 2011; Weis 2016).  
Inner city youths, who had been active participants of the 2005 demonstrations, 
were targeted by mobilisation and development programmes, which included the 
expansion of networks of street-level spies and informers (Di Nunzio 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, the EPRDF swept the woreda and kebele elections in 2008, in part 
because the number of elected posts had been increased to around 3.5m and the 
already decimated opposition could not begin to field the necessary number of 
candidates (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). In the 2010 elections, the EPRDF and its 
affiliates won 99.8% of the available seats, delivering a powerful demonstration of 
the party’s now unassailable position and its capacity for mass mobilisation 
(Tronvoll 2010) 19 . However, dissent was suppressed and dissipated, but not 
                                                     
18 Under the and-le-amist system one ‘model’ household is supposed to lead and inspire five 
others to take up the challenge of national economic development. 
19 It is, however, also possible that this very Soviet-style result was simply a political error, 
the result of overreach and hubris, or possibly even an accidental outcome produced by 
overzealous party organisers at all levels. 
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extinguished (Di Nunzio 2014), and the government is now forced to consistently 
deliver on its economic promises to ‘make up’ for the lack of political freedom. 
This political imperative explains the shift in economic strategy that occurred after 
2005. This shift combined two elements: first, a strengthening of the state’s and 
party’s direct productive capabilities, via state-owned enterprises and the 
endowment companies, designed  primarily to drive technological capacity 
building, especially in industry and other strategic sectors. Weis (2016) has aptly 
described this renewed developmental state as a ‘vanguard capitalist state’. 
Running a vanguard capitalist state requires huge amounts of funding, not only to 
finance the politically important mega-projects, but also to sustain a growing public 
sector and build the infrastructural backbone of an industrial economy. Second, 
there has been an acceleration and expansion of the push for foreign direct 
investment (see Annex IV) and – to a more limited extent – for domestic capital 
investment. 
The shift in Ethiopia’s economic strategy is illustrated by the difference in tone 
between the two five-year strategic plans promulgated since 2005, the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), which covered 
the years 2005 to 2010, and the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) for the years 
2011 to 201520. PASDEP, which was largely written before 2005, for instance lists “a 
massive push to accelerate growth” amongst its key targets, but goes on to explain 
that these should be achieved through the “commercialisation of agriculture and the 
accelerating private sector development”, while no mention is made of state-owned 
enterprises (MOFED 2005: 46). The GTP on the other hand clearly states that one of 
its key objectives is to “establish favourable conditions for sustainable state building 
through the creation of a stable democratic and developmental state”(MOFED 2010: 
7). After 2010 a raft of new public enterprises were created (Weis 2016) and the GTP 
for the first time makes clear that “state enterprises will increase investment either 
jointly with private sector or alone in strategic areas where there is a clear market 
                                                     
20 A second Growth and Transformation Plan is due to be published in 2016. 
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gap or insufficient private investment flowing to the strategic industries” (MOFED 
2010: 29).  
Chief among the state-owned enterprises is the Metal and Engineering Corporation 
(METEC), which had capital of around US$1bn when it was founded in 2010 and 
had some 14,000 employees by 2014 (Weis 2016). METEC is a military-run company 
that began with the production of military hardware, but is increasingly focused on 
technology-heavy civilian sectors such as power equipment, vehicle assembly, spare 
parts manufacturing and plastics. A number of companies that were in the process 
of being privatised were transferred to the corporation instead and METEC ran a 
total of 75 factories in Ethiopia in 2013. The company is also heavily involved in key 
public works, serving as the main electro-mechanical contractor for the Renaissance 
Dam. It actively seeks engagements with foreign companies to facilitate technology 
transfer and expand its own technological capabilities (Davison 2013). By 2015 
METEC had over 16,000 employees (Worku 2015). It is supposed to be a driving 
force for Ethiopia’s industrialisation, and the main government English-language 
newspaper, the Ethiopian Herold, has rather fittingly described METEC as a 
“centrepiece for Ethiopia’s industrial sector” (Gebrehiwot 2015), which “has been 
playing a key role for industrial transformation of the country” (Worku 2015). In 
other words, METEC is a classical national champion21. 
While the GTP still notes that, with respect to industry “private sector is considered 
as the engine for the sector’s development” (MOFED 2010: 29), there is seemingly a 
contradiction between expanding the state sector and furthering private sector 
investment at the same time. In the simplistic terms of state-vs-market analysis it 
would seem that an increased productive role for the state would ‘crowd out’ 
investment by private capital, especially as the amount of credit the domestic 
financial sector can extend is limited and foreign exchange is in even shorter supply. 
And indeed there is some truth in this, even though this contradiction dissolves 
upon closer inspection. The solution chosen by the EPDRF – and this is apparently 
                                                     
21  The other national champion is Ethiopian Airlines. But whereas METEC’s role is in 
technological development and in saving foreign exchange through ISI, Ethiopian Airlines is 
the main earner of foreign exchange in the country (World Bank 2014).  
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not uncontroversial within the party22 – was to try to import as much capital from 
abroad as possible. Whereas the PASDEP, apart from a single reference to 
“exploiting the potentials and opportunities of regional and global economic 
integration” (MOFED 2005: 151), had made almost no reference to FDI, the GTP lists 
support for foreign investment as important strategies for both industry and 
agriculture (MOFED 2010: 26, 29). 
Foreign capital flowing into Ethiopia comes from four sources: remittances, FDI, 
loans and aid. The main source of remittances is of course the Ethiopian diaspora, 
who have special legal status in Ethiopia. A charm offensive was unleashed on the 
diaspora after 2007, who then began to return in greater numbers to take advantage 
of investment opportunities and special privileges granted by the government (see 
Chapter Six). Gross financial flows from the diaspora to Ethiopia have been 
estimated at up to US$20bn (Lefort 2015) – a figure that seems impossibly high in an 
economy where total GDP is around US$60bn. Whatever the actual level though, 
the vast majority of these funds are used for consumption and are not directly 
available for investment. 
Much more important in terms of direct flows into the productive sector has been 
the growth in foreign direct investment, which reached a cumulative level of 
US$7.26bn in 2014 (see Annex IV). FDI has been actively courted by the Ethiopian 
government, and the government has offered a plethora of incentives to foreign 
investors, founded supporting institutions, directly provided inputs and invested 
heavily in the necessary infrastructure (Oqubay 2015). A good example of such 
support is provided by FDI in the floriculture sector, which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven. The most recent example of this strategy is the construction of large 
industrial parks, financed through loans from donors and foreign banks and 
Ethiopia’s first ever international bond offering (Davison 2015).  
There has also been a significant expansion of credit from abroad. The most 
important source here has been China. Ethiopia is second largest recipient of 
Chinese loans after Angola, and accounts for 14% of all Chinese loans to African 
                                                     
22 Personal communication with a well-placed expert. 
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countries since 2000. Between 2000 and 2014 the Ethiopian government and its 
state-owned enterprises received over US$12.3bn in loans from China, of which the 
Exim Bank alone provided over US$7bn (Hwang, Brautigam, and Eom 2016). Most 
of this money flows into the construction of infrastructure projects, including the 
aforementioned business park, which are a key element in the government’s growth 
strategy23.   
Ethiopia has also benefited from large inflows of foreign aid, in the form of grants 
and concessional loans, from both bi- and multilateral donors. Since the EPRDF 
took power, aid has provided an average of 28% of government spending, although 
there has been substantial short-term variation and a number of structural breaks 
(Mascagni 2014b). As aid flows mostly into social sectors, the Ethiopian government 
uses aid money strategically to relieve itself (to a degree) from financing social 
programmes and instead free up funds to pursue its industrialisation and 
investment drive (Furtado and Smith 2009). Econometric testing confirms that aid to 
Ethiopia does not displace tax income, but rather tends to raise it (Mascagni 2014a), 
showing that the government treats these income sources as complementary. 
Ethiopia enjoys a special relationship with western donors, especially the US and 
UK, due to its strategic importance as hegemon in an unstable region and its status 
as an ally in the ‘war on terror’ (Feyissa 2011; for the wider regional context see De 
Waal 2015). Its perceived geostrategic weight provides the Ethiopian government 
with substantial lee-way in its relations with donors, allowing it the fiscal space to 
pursue its own economic agenda, while having donors finance large amounts of 
social expenditure.  This is  evidenced, for instance, by the rapid resumption of aid 
to Ethiopia under the mantle of the Protection of Basic Services programme after the 
post-election crackdown in 2005 (Lefort 2012, 2015). 
From the Ethiopian governing elite’s perspective, foreign funds, and FDI in 
particular, solve several problems at once. On the one hand, they provide a level of 
job creation that would be impossible to achieve by relying on domestic sources 
                                                     
23 This money is lent to Ethiopia, but is in practice used to pay for projects constructed by 
Chinese companies. So while these funds do support infrastructure development on a 
massive scale, the Ethiopian government is not free to disperse these funds as it pleases. 
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alone. According to the Ethiopian investment commission, foreign companies had 
created over 100,000 permanent manufacturing jobs in Ethiopia by 2014 (EIC 
2015)24. Jobs are a vital ingredient to social peace in Ethiopia where unemployment 
is already high. On the other hand, they help raise economic growth, even in the 
face of relatively weaker domestic investment. A crucial ingredient in this is also the 
rapid expansion of basic infrastructure enabled by Chinese loans. Moreover, the 
flipside of this is that FDI allows for economic development to proceed at speed, 
while slowing the growth of a class of domestic capitalists that could threaten the 
political supremacy of the regime. Limited supplies of both credit and foreign 
exchange also make it easier to control domestic capitalists. This supposed 
antipathy to private sector growth should not be overstated. The Ethiopian 
government has been actively seeking to develop the domestic private sector, albeit 
to a lesser degree than it has been pushing the state-owned and party–linked sectors 
and foreign capital. The point is that the Ethiopian government does not appear to 
view private capital as either the primary engine of growth (statements to the 
contrary in the GTP notwithstanding), nor would it find such a situation politically 
desirable in the short term.  
4.4.3 The developmental state, land and agrarian capital 
The adoption and adaption of the developmental state has had direct and far-
reaching effects on Ethiopia’s agricultural sector. As has been made clear in the 
above chapter, land ownership has always been a deeply political issue in Ethiopia. 
The EPRDF government, with its roots in a peasant army, had long held that a close 
partnership with, and control over, the smallholder farmers was essential to 
maintaining political supremacy (Rahmato 2009). A relatively homogeneous mass 
of smallholders was seen as the backbone of the developmental coalition so 
essential to the maintenance of revolutionary democracy (Weis 2016). The state had 
therefore put in place a variety of measures to limit accumulation and 
                                                     
24 Due to the weak monitoring capabilities of the EIC this figure is unlikely to be very 
reliable. 
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differentiation in the countryside, not least by maintaining state ownership of all 
land25.   
After 2002, however, the government began opening up agricultural land for 
investment. Where previous agricultural policy had focused mainly on smallholder 
agriculture, the 2002 poverty reduction strategy paper made clear that the 
government was no longer relying solely on smallholder farmers to drive 
agricultural transformation: “[T]he government has already recognized the key role 
that the non-peasant private sector is expected to play in directly taking part in 
agricultural production, agricultural marketing and processing agricultural 
products. The government will make every effort to enhance and buttress the 
contribution private sector (domestic and foreign) will make to agricultural 
development endeavours. The federal government, in collaboration with regions, 
will work hard to allocate land for commercial farming, make sure that there are 
adequate infrastructure facilities, and streamline and make efficient land lease 
procedures for entrepreneurs who wish to set up large-scale commercial farms. For 
those who want to rent land from farmers and take part in agricultural activities, 
the federal government, again in collaboration with the regions, will work out an 
efficient arrangement, which will safeguard the interests of all parties concerned” 
(MOFED 2002b: 37). 
While some private coffee plantations (and other commercial agricultural ventures) 
were founded at the time, it was the floriculture sector that pioneered private 
capital investment in Ethiopian agriculture – see the discussions in Chapter Six and 
Seven. The successes achieved in floriculture appear to have motivated the 
government to help expand the activities of agrarian capitalists. Regional 
government were instructed to open additional land to investors after the Ethiopian 
millennium in 2007, which unleashed a land rush in the country’s coffee lands (see 
below and Chapter Six). In 2010 the GTP devoted a whole section to private 
                                                     
25 These measures served only to slow, rather than prevent, differentiation, which is a fact of 
life in rural Ethiopia (see for instance Petit 2007; Taffesse, Dorosh, and Asrat 2012). The 
government acknowledged this reality by attempting to politically co-opt larger 
‘smallholders’ (Lefort 2012).  
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investment in agriculture, which explicitly referenced the “policy success […] 
registered in the floriculture sub-sector” (MOFED 2010: 24f). The GTP went on to 
promise that “in the coming five years efforts will be made to make a meaningful 
change in terms of the private investment role in agriculture”, and that “efforts will 
be made to make [sure] the private investor gets government services in an efficient 
way”(MOFED 2010: 25, 26). Investment projects were to be tailored to the different 
population densities found across Ethiopia: high-value crops – such as cut flowers – 
on relatively limited amounts of land in the densely populated highlands and large-
scale expansive projects in the less densely populated lowlands. Here foreign 
investors were to play an important role.  
Ethiopia’s shift towards making room for agrarian capital is due to the resource 
requirements of running its remodelled developmental state, especially in terms of 
foreign exchange (Lavers 2012). The GTP is clear that the output produced by 
private capitalist farms, both small and large, is not for domestic consumption, but 
must neither be exported nor used as inputs to industry (MOFED 2010: 25f). As the 
need to generate foreign exchange seems to have overruled all other concerns, huge 
tracts of land in Ethiopia were cleared for investment (Abbink 2011a; Rahmato 
2011).  
How much land was actually transferred is a matter of some controversy, but these 
discussions have become part of a global debate around large-scale land leases – 
popularly referred to as land grabs. A major concern is that large-scale land leases 
in developing countries are taken out by large foreign agricultural concerns, who 
aim to produce food for export back to their ‘home’ countries, while leaving local 
communities to suffer the consequences. Such leases are typically granted in poor 
countries, often by governments perceived to be either vulnerable, corrupt, or 
simply not interested in the socio-economic effects of such deals on local 
communities, who suffer the loss of land (Daniel and Mittal 2009; Pearce 2012). 
However, as Cotula et al. (2014) point out, the evidence base for claims about both 
the extent of large-scale land leases and the effects of land grabs on local 
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communities is still weak, with few methodologically sound evaluations having 
been undertaken – owing partly to the fact that the phenomenon is relatively recent. 
Ethiopia has been a particular focus of such debates due to the enthusiasm with 
which the government has been leasing out land for large-scale commercial 
agriculture as part of its official development strategy (Lavers 2012). The main focus 
of inquiry has been on the fertile lowlands of Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, 
where small, large and some truly huge concessions have been made26. Unlike in the 
highlands where land tenure is considered politically sensitive, in the lowlands 
these land leases often appear to result in the dispossession of locals (Makki and 
Geisler 2011). Unsurprisingly, given the harshly authoritarian nature of the 
Ethiopian regime, as well as its earnest belief that it offers the only viable 
development path for the country, many of these leases have been accompanied by 
reports of human rights violations, including intimidation by ‘security’ forces, 
arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, rape and murder (HRW 2012; Oakland Institute 
2015). Following mounting evidence of abuses, as well as court cases brought by 
former residents of the Gambella region, DFID has recently withdrawn all support 
for the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) programme in Ethiopia, following 
allegations that funds from the programme were financing human rights violations 
(Jones and Anderson 2015). First attempts to systematically evaluate the impact of 
lowland land leases in Gambella and Borena have also found that local farmers 
were more likely to suffer greater losses than gains from large leases (Baumgartner 
et al. 2015; Shete and Rutten 2015). 
Possibly because of these startling developments, much less consideration has been 
given to land leases by Ethiopian capitalists. Even a cursory evaluation of the 
evidence shows that the vast majority of land has in fact gone to domestic27 rather 
than foreign capitalists. This is often not recognised due to the use of unreliable and 
                                                     
26 Including the famous and ill-fated 100,00ha lease to Indian agro-business giant Karaturi, 
who failed to develop large parts of the land it leased, ran into financial trouble (Fikade 
2014) and subsequently had their lease terminated by the Ethiopian government (Fikade 
2016).  
27 Domestic capitalists refers here to Ethiopian nationals and to returning members of the 
Ethiopian diaspora. 
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misleading data sources. Baumgartner et al. (2015: 177f) for instance report that 
while domestic capitalists represent some 80% of the requests for investment land in 
Ethiopia, the majority of land is actually requested by foreign capitalists, as they 
apply for much larger tracts. This information is, however, taken from the EIA 
database of investment applications, and, as the authors freely acknowledge, does 
not represent how much land was actually transferred28. According to Baumgartner 
et al. applications for land peaked in 2008, when foreign investors alone apparently 
applied for over 1.8m hectares.  
A more informative approach is taken by Ali, Deininger, and Harris (2015), who 
rely on data from various rounds of the CSA’s commercial farm survey, which 
allows them to assess how much land was actually transferred to investors and 
subsequently ‘developed’. They calculate that between 1991 and 2014 a total 1.33m 
hectares have been officially transferred to a total of 6,612 commercial farms active 
in 2014, giving a mean farms size of around 200ha, though there are large variations 
both between and within regions (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2015: 8)29. Of these 
farms 93% are held by private capitalists. In terms of magnitude these figures are 
much closer to the amount of land the Ethiopian government claims has been 
identified for investment in commercial agriculture, namely 3.5m hectares (EG1), 
and also with the 3.3m hectares slated for transfer during the GTP period (MOFED 
2010b). 
The commercial farm sector is predominantly in Ethiopian hands. According to 
2013 CSA data on official holdings, there are 6,287 Ethiopian-owned commercial 
farms covering a total of around 1.1m hectares, while 134 foreign-owned farms hold 
just over 112,000 hectares and 36 joint venture farms, co-owned by foreign and 
domestic capitalists, have control over approx. 18,000 hectares. Foreign farms are, 
on average, much bigger, with mean land holdings of 841ha, against 173ha on 
Ethiopian-owned farms (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2015: 15).  
                                                     
28 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the weaknesses of this database 
29 Some commercial farms, notably the state coffee farms, were created before 1991. 
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These figures indicate that the land policies of the EPRDF have allowed for the 
creation of a substantial class of domestic agrarian capitalists in Ethiopia. Official 
land acquisitions peaked between 2007 and 2013 and this period accounts for the 
majority of new farm establishments: 56% of land transfers to commercial farms 
occurred after 2002 and 39% after 2007 (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2015: 16). Clearly, 
this is the direct result of the strategic reorientation of the developmental state and 
the increased need to raise revenues – and especially foreign exchange – from 
agriculture. As Chapter Six will show, this period coincides precisely with the boom 
in coffee investments. It is important to note the somewhat unplanned nature of this 
process of class creation though.  
While the federal government certainly set the broad contours of land policy and – 
as noted – directly controls all concessions in the lowland periphery and all that are 
larger than 5,000ha elsewhere in the country, 96% of land transfers (accounting for 
77% of the area transferred) were either negotiated at woreda or kebele level, or were 
entirely private transactions (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2015: 9). Almost three 
quarters of the land transferred went to farms less than 500ha in size and some 35% 
of the land is on farms less than 100ha in size, indicating that medium-sized 
capitalists play an important role in this sector (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2015: 16). 
Moreover, commercial farms as a whole have been able to expand beyond their 
official land allocations to a total of 1.77m hectares between 1991 and 2014, that is, 
they now cover around 440,000ha more than they were officially allocated30. A large 
majority, some 86%, of commercial farms are smaller than 500ha, and it is these 
farms in particular that have expanded past their initial land allocation (Ali, 
Deininger, and Harris 2015: 10f)31. We are dealing here with the “anarchism of the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur and the animal spirit of Keynesian capitalist 
predator”32, who “routinely subvert extant social order in rational-egoistic pursuit 
of economic gain” (Streeck 2009: 4)33. These capitalists are the subject of Chapter Six, 
                                                     
30 Although some of this difference is undoubtedly due to measurement error. 
31 By contrast, farms larger than 500ha typically use less land than they have been allocated. 
32 Not to mention the ruthlessly exploitative behaviour of the Marxian capitalist.  
33 Streeck is referring to post-reunification Germany. 
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which discusses accumulation in the coffee sector, and Chapter Seven, which deals 
with the rather better behaved actors in floriculture.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the evolution of the Ethiopian state and has 
demonstrated how the actions of the state, and in particular the strategies pursued 
by its ruling elites, have structured the contours of agrarian capital accumulation. 
Efforts at state building, mostly via the centralisation of power, have been the key 
influence here. As has been shown, the actions of past regimes continue to influence 
Ethiopian politics today.  
Under the imperial regime the emergence of different agrarian class relations in the 
north and south as a direct result of imperial aggression allowed capitalist 
agriculture to emerge in the south, albeit slowly and fitfully. This first capitalist 
experiment still has important ramifications today, which are dealt with in the 
following chapter. The revolution that ended the imperial regime nationalised all 
land in Ethiopia – a powerful level of control that the current regime has used to 
drive its own vision of Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Lastly, and most 
importantly, the chapter has demonstrated that the recent emergence of a new class 
of agrarian accumulators is the direct result of the need of the current Ethiopian 
state for revenue generation. In order to maintain its own power, the EPDRF regime 
has wedded itself to a vision of rapid economic and social transformation from 
which it cannot back down without significant political consequences. The EPRDF 
state thus has to find the funds necessary to ensure that its particular vision of state-
directed development continues to drive high rates of economic expansion. 
Capitalist agriculture has become a tool of the developmental state. 
At the same time though, the state lacks the capacity to control capitalist 
development at the local level, especially outside of the core areas of the country. 
The development of contemporary agrarian capitalism has therefore also been 
heavily influenced by the agency of capitalists vis-à-vis the federal state. The agency 
of the capitalists in turn is limited by the relational agency of their large workforces 
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and by the structure of the markets they serve. In the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis the accumulation behaviour of capitalists in the coffee and later the 
floriculture sector will be analysed against the background laid out above. Before 
we turn to the coffee capitalists themselves though, in Chapter Five the political and 
economic evolution of the coffee sector, both internationally and in Ethiopia will be 
examined. In this context particular emphasis is placed on the state’s need to control 
the revenues from this strategic sector, and on the regulation of the sector by the 
state that resulted from this need. 
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Annex IV.1  
 
Ethiopia’s economic performance 
under the EPRDF 
 
Before delving into the EPRDF’s economic record a note of caution is in order. 
Economic data for Ethiopia is contested and should be read with care. IMF staff 
frequently estimate lower rates of GDP growth than the Ethiopian government, 
calling implied productivity growth rates in official data ‘implausible’ (IMF 2012: 20). 
More disturbingly, the level of agricultural output – a key component of Ethiopia’s 
GDP – have been called into question (Dercon and Vargas Hill 2009). The head of a 
leading Ethiopia-based research institute also confirmed in personal communication 
that independent survey work suggests that official growth rates for agriculture are 
broadly correct, but that output levels are vastly overstated (Lefort 2013 reports 
similar conversations). With this in mind we can now turn to the data.   
In economic terms, the EPRDF period has been largely successful, though profound 
weaknesses remain. Having inherited an extremely weak economy, destroyed by 
war and ravaged by the famine of 1985, the government has succeeded in stabilising 
the economy and generating economic growth, in particular after it switched 
economic strategies from 2002 onwards. According to official data per real capita 
GDP has expanded from around $117 in 1981 to over $315 in 2014, while aggregate 
GDP grew from around $5bn to some $30bn over the same period (in constant 2005 
USD, see Figure IV.1)1.  
                                                     
1 GDP is higher if expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, which better reflects 
people’s ability to purchase commodities locally. However, PPP figures are based on 
intermittent surveys and are not suitable for the construction of annual time series (even 
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Figure IV.1 - Real GDP and real GDP per capita 1981-2014 (Source: World Bank WDI database)
 
Growth has been driven mostly government investment (World Bank 2015a), and 
the country has sustained a rate of gross fixed capital formation of over 20% of GDP 
since 2000 (NBE 2015b). Despite the country’s industrial growth strategy, 
agriculture and services continue to dominate the economy and the contribution of 
manufacturing to structural change has been limited (World Bank 2014). While the 
contribution of the industrial sector as a whole to GDP has increased from 9.7% in 
1999/00 to 14.2% in 2013/14, almost all of that growth occurred only after 2010, with 
the contribution of industry hardly rising for a decade prior to that (NBE 2015b). 
The manufacturing sector used to be the single largest recipient of investments in 
the country (taking in over 22% of investment in 2009/10, NBE 2011), but now only 
accounts for 9.2% of invested funds, with the lion share feeding the ongoing 
construction boom instead 2 . The national bank estimates the contribution of 
manufacturing to GDP growth at just 4.4% in 2013/14 (NBE 2015a).  
                                                                                                                                                      
though this is often done). In PPP terms Ethiopia’s per capita GDP was $1,214 in 2011, the 
last available year (World Bank 2015b).  
2 Construction accounted for just 14.2% of investment in 2009/10 (NBE 2011), a figure that 
had risen to a staggering 49.9% by 2013/14. Sadly, the data does not allow for a 
quantification of the share of public infrastructure in this figure. 
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As shown by Figure IV.2, the EPRDF era has been marked by high but uneven 
annual GDP growth. The economy remained in recession in the immediate 
aftermath of the civil war and growth was highly volatile during the EPRDF’s first 
decade in power, with further recessions in 1998 and 2003. However, beginning in 
2004 the economy has been successfully put onto a high growth path with growth 
rates above 10% in most years since. Figure IV.2 also clearly shows a declining trend 
in GDP growth, with the rate of expansion dipping to 8.6% in 2015. 
Figure IV.2 – Real GDP growth 1991-2015 (Source: IMF WEO database) 
While the government’s growth strategy continues to fuel investment and 
manufacturing growth is picking up, much of the growth is either debt-financed or 
uses foreign capital, raising issues about the sustainability of growth in the event of 
a global slowdown or serious domestic political crisis. Growth continues to be 
driven by the public sector. The share of state-owned enterprises in the domestic 
credit stock rose from 21% in 2007/08 to 62% in 2013/14, while that of the private 
sector contracted from 37% to 28% (World Bank 2015a). This has resulted in a 
pronounced credit-squeeze for private capital, made worse by the country’s 
perennial foreign exchange shortage, which in turn is due to a sizeable current 
account deficit (IMF 2015b).  
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The government therefore continues to rely on both foreign credit and foreign direct 
investment to maintain high levels of investment. The vast majority of external debt 
is either public or publically guaranteed (IMF 2015b). The growth in foreign direct 
investment has been spectacular, albeit from a very low starting point. FDI stocks in 
Ethiopia have increased from $165m in 1995 to $7.2bn in 2014, of which $1.2bn came 
in 2014 alone (UNCTAD 2015). As shown in Figure IV.3, annual FDI flows have 
been volatile and declined markedly during the global financial crisis. They have 
however been rising most years since 2008, and have accelerated especially sharply 
since 2012. On average FDI stocks have expanded at a rate of over 16% since 2000. 
Figure IV.3 – Nominal FDI stock and flows 1992-2014 (in million US$) (Source: Ethiopian 
Investment Commission) 
 
Growth in FDI is a direct outcome of the government’s new economic strategy and 
it is therefore not surprising that the surge is both recent and highly concentrated in 
manufacturing. According to official Ethiopian data, 60% of all FDI received 
between 1992 and 2015 went into the manufacturing sector, while 17% flowed into 
agriculture and much smaller amounts into a variety of other sectors. More than 
half of all FDI received since 1992 arrived after 2010 and 95% came after 2006 (EIC 
2015). 
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Economic growth has been accompanied by substantial reductions in the relative 
numbers of poor people, i.e. the poverty rate. At the same time the incomes of the 
poorest appear to have stagnated. Both un- and underemployment remain high and 
the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty and deprivation, i.e. the 
poverty headcount, has remained stable at around 25 million (UNDP 2015). 
Reductions in poverty have seemingly been accompanied by rising inequality, 
though inequality remains relatively low for the country as a whole by international 
standards, and there is substantial disagreement on the data. According to the a 
new composite dataset, Ethiopia’s Gini coefficient fell from 0.4 in 1995 to 0.28 in 
2000, before rising back to 0.33 in 2011, the last year for which data is available3. 
Other data, however, has the overall Gini coefficient starting a much lower level 
and remaining relatively stable, with an increase from 0.29 in 1995 to 0.3 in 2004 
(Dercon, Hoddinott, and Woldehanna 2008). According to these estimates the Gini 
for urban areas increased from 0.34 to 0.44 over the same period, with the coefficient 
for Addis Ababa rising from 0.35 to 0.46. Authorities insist that urban inequality fell 
between 2004 and 2010, but concede that it has risen since (IMF 2015a). Economic 
growth has created a new class of increasingly wealthy capitalists and the number 
of dollar millionaires in the country has doubled between 2007 and 2013 (Smith 
2013). Measures of overall inequality are held down by the relatively more equal 
distribution of income – at very low levels – in rural areas. Also, the Gini coefficient, 
by construction, at present measures only relative, rather than absolute, income 
inequality (Ravallion 2016). And the Gini coefficient of income of course does not 
take account of the distribution of wealth. No data is available for the latter, but a 
rapidly increasing concentration of wealth in the country seem likely4. 
 
                                                     
3 These Ginis are taken from Branko L. Milanovic, All the Ginis Dataset, World Bank Group, 
which calculated composite coefficients from five different datasets. See: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/all-the-ginis. 
4 This is based on anecdotal evidence, but is very much the consensus view amongst all the 
economists and other specialists I spoke to in Ethiopia and is also increasingly visible in 
Addis Ababa and other large cities. 
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Chapter five 
 
The politics of coffee production and 
the role of the state 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background on the coffee sector in Ethiopia and in other 
coffee growing countries. The purpose is two-fold: first, based on the analysis in the 
previous chapter, to trace the role the Ethiopian state has played in the 
development of the sector over time, and second to account for the circumstances 
which allowed a dynamic class of large-scale capitalists to emerge in the Ethiopian 
coffee sector after the turn of the millennium.  
To understand the opportunities and constraints facing the various actors, which 
include the private capitalists engaged in production, processing and trade, I 
examine the changing distribution of power over revenue appropriation in the 
sector, both domestically and internationally, as well as looking into the part played 
by the state. As the last chapter has shown, such an inquiry has to proceed 
historically. The analysis shows that the structure of the coffee sector, from imperial 
times to the present day, is shaped by continuous effort by Ethiopian government 
elites to centralise and manage the flows of foreign exchange the sector generates. 
While Ethiopian official rhetoric and policy documents stress the need to maximise 
the output of the sector, the imperative of maximising government control over 
foreign exchange flows from the sector is not necessarily compatible with 
maximising the profitability or output of the sector as a whole, and the ensuing 
conflicts continue until today. Together with international market conditions, over 
which Ethiopia has only negligible influence, this provides the framework within 
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which all other actors manoeuvre to ensure their own economic and political 
reproduction.  
In the imperial era and during the Derg, the state relied on direct surplus 
appropriation through export taxes and price setting via a state marketing board. 
Under the current regime, however, the control of foreign exchange flows is more 
important than the tax income itself. Given Ethiopia’s large and growing trade 
deficit (World Bank 2014), control over foreign exchange flows is a vital necessity 
for the government, as it seeks to finance public investment projects, which rely 
heavily on imported inputs. As illustrated in the last chapter, rapid and continuous 
economic growth, as well as the completion of prestigious mega-projects, have 
become essential elements of the government’s claim to legitimacy. For the EPRDF’s 
developmental state the generation and control of foreign exchange have become 
issues of political survival. 
To understand the current Ethiopian coffee sector and in particular its capitalist 
plantations, the legacies of previous regimes and their influence on the possibilities 
for accumulation today must be examined. This chapter therefore describes the 
organisation of production under the imperial regime up to 1974, the military Derg 
regime from 1975 up until 1991 and lastly under the incumbent EPRDF regime since 
then. For each of these periods I identify how the production and sale of coffee was 
organised and the ownership relations in terms of land and capital. 
 Despite its economic backwardness and relative stagnation overall, the imperial 
regime saw the rise of a group of large-scale capitalist coffee farmers. They 
foreshadowed the current rise of private capitalist coffee plantations in a variety of 
ways. These early capitalist experiments fell victim to the Ethiopian revolution and 
the subsequent land reform in 1975, which nationalised many of the large coffee 
estates, concentrating them into huge state farms, and broke up others to 
redistribute the land to the ‘peasant associations’, or kebele (Pausewang 1983). The 
revolutionary government expelled all private capital from the production process 
of coffee, and restricted it to strictly circumscribed roles in coffee processing and 
export, where some private capitalists were allowed to maintain small companies 
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on the margins of the trade (ICO 2000a). This allowed private capital to survive, but 
prevented accumulation. The fall of the Derg and the coming of the EPRDF regime 
in 1991 signalled the beginning of a state retreat from the processing and later even 
production of coffee. It is only comparatively recently that private capitalists have 
once again moved into coffee growing. At the same time, the EDRDF government, 
after nearly two decades of neglect, suddenly began a thorough restructuring of the 
Ethiopian coffee sector, imposing an entirely new regulatory regime. While they are 
ostensibly based on free-market dogma, I argue that the regulatory changes were 
motivated primarily by the need for government control. The EPRDF regime 
therefore reverts to the standard position of all Ethiopian governments in modern 
times, which is to seek to regulate the revenues gained, in this case from coffee 
exports. Ethiopia’s first commodity exchange, introduced as a mandatory hub for 
the coffee sector under the EPRDF, is the most advanced example yet of a 
monitoring and control system for the sector. At the same time a confluence of 
external and internal factors opened up a window of opportunity for private capital 
to expand once more into coffee production. 
I begin the chapter with a discussion of the global coffee trade and an explanation of 
how the current value chain has emerged historically (Section 5.2). This section also 
explores the implications of the chain structure for producers in Ethiopia. Next I 
turn to the history of the Ethiopian coffee sector (Section 5.3) and the importance of 
its legacies for understanding current patterns of accumulation. The political 
economy of the contemporary Ethiopian coffee sector is analysed in Section 5.4, and 
the implications of the current regulatory regime for private capital accumulation 
are explored in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 The history and structure of the global coffee 
trade 
5.2.1 From bean to brew 
Before discussing the structure and price setting mechanisms of the coffee sector I 
briefly lay out some of the specificities of coffee as a product, as these are important 
for  understanding what follows. Compared to many other ‘commodities’, coffee is 
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a highly differentiated product, with widely differing origins and processing 
methods producing huge variations in availability, quality, marketing 
opportunities, and hence, prices. For producers of quality coffees, such as those 
produced by many Ethiopian farmers, the niche markets for ‘specialty coffee’ that 
exist alongside and within the ‘world market’ present a lucrative opportunity. 
However, even for producers of high quality coffee, specialty coffee represents only 
part of their output and we must understand both the ‘normal’ and the specialty 
coffee markets to make sense of the possibilities for capital accumulation in 
Ethiopia’s coffee sector. 
The perennial tree shrubs from which coffee is harvested are native to the tropics. 
The coffee we drink comes from two different members of the coffea family: coffea 
arabica, or Arabica coffee, and coffea canephora, better known as Robusta. Roughly 
70% of all coffee grown and traded is Arabica coffee and many high quality coffees 
or coffee blends are pure Arabica. Robusta coffee is widely considered to have an 
unpleasant flavour and is therefore mostly used as a cheap filler for blends or in 
instant coffees.  
The best Arabica coffees are grown in high altitude areas of the tropics that have 
abundant rainfall. In Ethiopia the ideal altitude range is from about 1,500m to about 
1,800m (Dubale 1994, various interviews). The relatively lower temperatures found 
at altitudes above 1,500m serve to slow the development of the coffee beans, 
allowing a fuller flavour to develop. A similar effect is achieved by raising the 
coffee trees in the shade of other tree species. The quality of coffee beans also 
depends on the varieties of coffee that are grown. The viability of varieties depends 
on local microclimates and soil conditions, and national networks of research and 
extension services are often crucial to developing new varieties. Almost all coffee in 
Ethiopia is grown under shade and much of it at very high altitudes. Together with 
the locally available varieties of the plant and the favourable soil and climactic 
conditions, this explains the – at least potentially – very high quality of many 
Ethiopian coffees. 
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Coffee beans must be carefully harvested and processed before they can be sold, 
and these processes are key determinants of coffee quality (coffee quality is 
discussed below and in more detail in Annex V.1). Ethiopia has a single annual 
coffee harvest and almost all Ethiopian coffee is harvested between September and 
January. When producing high-quality coffees the aim is to harvest only the ripest – 
that is the reddest – cherries. The highest quality of coffee is achieved by selecting, 
by hand and on a daily basis, only those cherries that are ripe on that particular 
day1. Lower quality coffees are harvested by ‘stripping’ the branches of all cherries 
at once, thereby mixing ripe and unripe cherries together. In some countries, such 
as Brazil, this process has been largely mechanised, but Ethiopian coffees are 
exclusively hand-picked. 
5.2.2 A history of coffee market regulations and prices 
The possibilities for capital accumulation in the Ethiopian coffee sector are the 
outcome of a long and complex interplay of domestic and international factors. The 
Ethiopian coffee market is small compared to the world market for coffee (see 
Section  5.2.3). The structure and regulation of the Ethiopian coffee market can 
therefore in many ways only react to changes in the structure of power of the global 
coffee value chains. Therefore, before delving more deeply into the Ethiopian coffee 
market and its idiosyncrasies, we need to examine the global value chains for coffee 
and the structure of the world market for coffee. The brief discussion that follows, 
while providing an overview, will necessarily sidestep complexities that are not 
relevant in this context.   
Coffee is by value one of the most important legally traded goods globally, with 
exports in 2009/10 valued at US$15.4bn. In the same year the coffee sector in 
producing countries alone was estimated to be employing around 26 million people 
(ICO 2014). Compared to many other ‘commodities’,  the global value chain for 
coffee is relatively simple, as “the central fact continues to be that over 90 percent of 
all coffee is exported by relatively poor tropical countries, and a similar percentage 
                                                     
1 This makes the labour process and labour mobilisation vital to the production of high 
quality coffee. Both are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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is imported by rich, temperate countries” (Topik 2003: 22)2. The  structure of the 
coffee supply chain is straightforward (ITC 2011)3 : coffee is grown in tropical 
countries, mostly by smallholder farmers, but also on plantations of various sizes. It 
is processed into green (i.e. unroasted) coffee, graded and packed either by 
producing country exporters or by consuming country importers, depending on the 
country in question. In Ethiopia, all coffee is by law exported by domestically-
owned firms. Leaving aside instant coffee, almost all coffee is exported from 
producing countries as green coffee. Past the green bean stage, almost all other steps 
in creating the final product bought by consumers (notably blending, roasting, 
packaging and distribution) occur in consuming countries. The coffee is purchased 
either by international trading houses (or by roasters directly) and is imported into 
consuming countries. The imported coffee is sold to roasters, who prepare it for the 
wholesale and retail markets.  
The current coffee market is the outcome of a slow process of ‘commodification’4. 
While coffee had long been grown (or collected), including for commercial 
purposes, by small farmers in Ethiopia and Yemen, the Dutch in the late 17th 
century were probably the first instance of merchant capital organising the 
production of coffee when they introduced it to their colony in Java. In the early 18th 
century it spread from there to the Americas. European powers had little success in 
coffee production in their colonies and by the end of the 18th century the 
independent states of the Americas were supplying the majority of the world’s 
coffee. In the 19th century Brazil began its dramatic rise to become the world’s 
largest producer. Vast plantations tended by slaves, built on stolen forest land and 
connected by a growing network of railways drove a breathless expansion of coffee 
production. From independence in 1822 until the end of the century Brazil’s 
production expanded seventy-five-fold. By 1906 Brazil produced six times more 
                                                     
2 I use the term commodity (Ware) in the Marxist sense of describing a good produced for 
sale in the market, and ‘commodity’ to refer to an undifferentiated mass product, generally 
sold in bulk. 
3 The production and sale of instant coffee follows a slightly different supply chain, but 
Ethiopia does not currently produce any. 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, this brief history of the early coffee trade draws heavily on 
Topik's (2003) excellent account. 
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coffee than the rest of the world combined. Brazil has dominated the world coffee 
trade ever since, although its share of the market has fallen.  
The modern coffee market was born in the late 19th century. Steam shipping 
reduced transport costs and further expanded production. Falling prices made 
coffee affordable to working class people in the global north and coffee became a 
mass beverage. A telegraph line connecting South America to New York and 
London, then the centre of global finance, was completed in 1870. Suddenly market 
participants could almost simultaneously access similar information on prices, 
weather conditions in producing countries and stock levels. The foundation of the 
New York coffee exchange in 1882 provided a global marketplace for the trade. The 
exchange slowly completed the ‘commodification’ of coffee by hastening the 
introduction of standardised grades and contracts. 
Coffee prices in the emerging world market of the late 19th and early 20th century 
were extremely volatile. Much of this volatility is driven by the so-called tree price 
cycle (Talbot 2004). The cycle is driven by the mechanisms of supply adjustments in 
the coffee market, driven in part by plant physiology and in part by the reactions of 
growers to price changes. Coffee trees have two important characteristics in this 
respect: first, individual trees have a two-year yield cycle, meaning that a large 
harvest is likely to be followed by a smaller one, which is a source of natural 
volatility. And second, it takes three to four years after planting to bring a coffee 
tree into production, which introduces substantial lags into the supply adjustment. 
To simplify somewhat, a typical cycle may develop as follows (see Talbot 2004 for 
more details): a weather event causes a sharp contraction in coffee production, 
leading to rising coffee prices as demand remains relatively unchanged5. Higher 
prices encourage increased planting of trees. As the newly planted trees take several 
years to produce any coffee, prices remain high for some time, during which further 
planting takes place. As the production begins to expand, the scale of excess 
capacity, compared to relatively flat demand, becomes clear. Prices begin to fall. A 
                                                     
5 Not only is coffee demand at consumer level relatively inelastic (caffeine is addictive after 
all), but price movements are not always passed on to consumers by roasters, either to reap 
extra profits or to protect their market share. 
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fall in coffee prices leads growers to either curtail their labour input or, in the 
extreme case, uproot their coffee trees and plant other crops. In the case of 
smallholders this can be accompanied by significant hardship, and the reduction in 
labour inputs hits wage labourers in both large and small operations. In both the 
upward and downward part of the cycle, prices will ‘overshoot’ due to these lags in 
supply adjustment. Talbot (2004) identifies a number of such cycles throughout the 
19th and 20th century, while Gilbert (2005) finds an irregular 11-year cycle in coffee 
prices. 
As producing countries became more dependent on coffee, this volatility, paired 
with low coffee prices, fuelled popular unrest in poor producing countries. But 
especially in parts of Latin America the coffee trade had provided the material basis 
for the rise of powerful oligarchies, who had a vested interest in stability (Paige 
1999). A first international coffee agreement, covering the producing states of Latin 
America and the United States as the main consumer, was implemented in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. Export and import quotas led to a doubling 
of coffee prices (Talbot 2004). The United States ensured that a comprehensive 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA), aimed at establishing an effective price floor 
for coffee, was finally signed in 1962 (see also Bates 1997). The agreement assigned 
export quotas to all major coffee producers, which would come into effect if coffee 
prices fell below the price floor. It also established the International Coffee 
Organisation (ICO), in which both producers and consumers were represented, to 
monitor and administer the agreement. Originally signed for a five-year period, the 
ICA was renewed, with minor adjustments, three times before the quota system 
was allowed to lapse in 1989. The agreement was relatively successful in curtailing 
the chronic oversupply of coffee in world markets (Talbot 2004), resulting in higher 
overall prices levels (Gilbert 2005). Measured effects of the ICA on price volatility 
appear to depend on the periodization of the analysis. Gilbert (2005) finds no 
evidence of significant differences in volatility in international coffee prices when 
comparing the period from 1962 to 1989 to the post-ICA period, while Akiyama and 
Varangis (1990) maintain that the agreement did stabilise prices between 1980 and 
1989. In many ways the debate around volatility is somewhat beside the point. 
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What matters more to producers is the price level, and here the effects lifting the 
ICA have been less ambiguous. 
The ICA was ultimately undermined by a combination of structural weaknesses 
internal to the agreement and the disappearance of communism as an immediate 
alternative to capitalism, which lessoned incentives in consuming countries, and the 
USA in particular, to support producer prices (Talbot 2004). On the side of 
producing countries, there was disagreement about the levels of export quotas, and 
some producing countries joined the US in withdrawing support for a renewal of 
the agreement. The era of market regulation came to an end in 1989 and the 
governance of the coffee chain, in which producing countries had played a 
powerful role, was rapidly taken over by large corporations. 
As a result, the global coffee market today is extremely concentrated, with a few 
large transnational enterprises controlling much of the import and roasting stages of 
the chain. This concentration began with the onset of globalisation in the 1970s and 
the liberalisation programmes that followed in the 1980s, and so in part preceded 
the demise of the ICA, but was then exacerbated by it. Talbot (2004) estimates that 
the four largest roasters, most of which are multi-commodity corporations, control 
around 60% of coffee sales in major consuming markets, while Panhuysen and 
Pierrot (2014) estimate the market share of the ten largest roasters at 40% of all 
coffee consumed worldwide. Coffee imports are dominated by international trading 
houses, of which the three largest alone are estimated to control 50% of the world’s 
trade in green coffee (Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014). 
As shown in Figure 5.1, coffee prices, which had begun to fall in the late 1980s, 
dropped precipitously after 1989, to reach their lowest point in over three decades 
in 1992. Gilbert (2005) has calculated that, excluding the price spike from 1976 to 
1979, coffee prices after 1989 were on average more than 50% lower than their pre-
1989 levels. The fall was caused by the lifting of ICA export quotas6. The quota 
system had led to the accumulation of large stocks in producing countries, which, 
                                                     
6 Gilbert explains this drop as the delayed adjustment of prices to productivity increases, 
which had been suppressed by the ICA. 
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due to falling prices, now suddenly flooded the market (Talbot 2004). The importers 
who bought these stocks were betting on rising prices in the future and so bid 
purchasing prices down to ensure their subsequent appreciation (Gilbert 2005). One 
result was the transfer of most of the world’s stocks of coffee from exporters to 
importers at rock bottom prices, which undermined the ability of producing 
countries to control prices (Daviron and Ponte 2005). The collapse in prices had 
devastating impacts on many direct producers. Farmers large and small were 
driven out of business, workers laid off and poverty increased in many places as a 
result (Gresser and Tickell 2002). 
Figure 5.1 - Real coffee price composites (in constant 2010 US$/kg), 1960-2014 (Source: World Bank 
‘pink sheet’ commodity markets dataset). 
 
At the same time, the price crash hurt importers, due to outstanding futures 
positions, large stocks bought at high prices before the crash or falling price-related 
commissions, and many importers left the coffee business. Roasting companies, 
who had already been consolidating due to competitive pressures in the larger 
consumer markets (Pendergrast 2010), were increasingly able to dictate terms even 
to the largest importers. Importers in turn were able to take over export companies 
in producing countries, where many markets had been liberalised in the era of 
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structural adjustment programmes (Talbot 2004). The increased concentration in the 
coffee chain is similar to the ‘cascade effect’ identified in other supply chains by 
Nolan, Zhang, and Liu (2008)7. At the same time, roasters concentrated more and 
more on their core businesses, leaving the sourcing and supply chain management 
operations to importers. Power in the coffee chain shifted from sellers in producing 
countries to buyers in consuming countries and within the purchasing segment of 
the chain, from importers to roasters (Daviron and Ponte 2005; Fitter and Kaplinsky 
2001). 
A second price collapse occurred in the year 2000. As shown in Figure 5.1, prices fell 
to levels nearly as low as in the early 1990s, precipitating another wave of 
impoverishment in producing countries (see also Varangis et al. 2003). Low prices 
benefited the large roasting companies, as falling green coffee prices are generally 
only partially passed on to consumers, if at all, and so contribute to higher profits 
(Talbot 1997, 2002). The impact on producers, large and small, was even more 
severe than the first crisis (Gresser and Tickell 2002). The results in producing 
countries were uprooted trees, abandoned farms and an increase in rural-urban 
migration as coffee producers sought alternatives. The damage to coffee production, 
especially in the higher-quality, but less mechanised Arabica segment, which has 
much higher unit labour costs than Robusta production, was sufficiently large to 
raise concerns about the feasibility of (socially and ecologically) sustainable coffee 
production in the future (ICO 2002).  
The reasons for the crisis are complex and there is substantial regional variation 
(Lewin, Giovannucci, and Varangis 2004), but the essence of the global situation is 
neatly encapsulated in the term ‘coffee paradox’ (Daviron and Ponte 2005). This 
refers to the simultaneous overproduction of coffee in general, which results in 
downward pressure on prices, and the simultaneous shortage of high-quality 
Arabica coffees in particular. The former is partly a result of an explosion of Robusta 
                                                     
7 The cascade effect described the tendency for increasing concentration among large firms 
at the top of a value chain to result in greater concentration in all lower segments of the 
value chain as well. This is partly because large firms increasingly come to depend on 
suppliers who are capable of operating at similar volume levels to themselves. 
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production (see Section  5.2.3) and of the relentless pursuit of market share through 
productivity increases in a market where quality and price expectations are largely 
set by a few large roasting companies with a direct interest in persistently low 
prices – precisely the failure of coordination the ICA had contained for so long. 
Though prices over the 2000s rose back to roughly their pre-1989 levels (see Figure 
5.1), the latest crisis is unlikely to have been the last and calls for a global and 
systemic solution are increasing (Vega, Rosenquist, and Collins 2003). 
Together with the uncertainty and volatility caused by natural events, the physical 
trade of coffee is also impacted by the operations of secondary markets and 
increasing speculation. Financial markets, finance capital and derivatives have 
become increasingly central to the operation of coffee markets (ITC 2011). There 
have been huge increases in coffee derivatives trading since the 1980s due to the 
increasingly sophisticated stock, margin and cash-flow management by coffee 
importers and roasters through complex hedging operations. Coffee futures are 
traded in international financial markets in New York for Arabica coffees and in 
London for Robusta coffees. In addition to supporting their physical trading 
activities, large importers and roasters began to generate speculative profits from 
trading coffee derivatives and these have become central elements of their business 
strategies (Talbot 2004). Fuelled by a wider boom in commodities derivatives, coffee 
markets have also attracted increasing numbers of pure speculators with no interest 
in physical coffee at all. While large corporations with ready access to both own 
capital and credit have been able to profit from these developments, the risks of 
speculation-driven volatility have accrued upstream in the value chain with direct 
producers (Newman 2009). 
Since the lapsing of the ICA, coffee prices have increasingly been driven by 
developments in the futures markets and spot prices for coffee tend to converge on 
prices for short-term futures (ITC 2011). However, not all coffees are directly 
tradeable as futures contracts, only so-called ‘deliverable growths’ are. Coffees are 
sold at prices set with reference to a particular futures price, the New York-C price 
(ICE 2015). Coffees not included in the ‘C’ contract are traded at differentials to the 
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base price of the contract (ITC 2011). ‘Deliverable growths’ have fixed differentials 
to the basic ‘C’ price while the differentials of other coffees, including Ethiopian 
coffees, fluctuate, but tend to be relatively stable in the short term. Ethiopian coffees 
tend to trade at differentials of about US$0.10-0.20 above the ‘C’ price (EG9). Mass 
market coffees are traded against standardised contracts and prices are based on 
quality grades. While most of the world’s coffee prices are determined in this way, 
price setting in the specialty coffee sector, to which we turn briefly in Section  5.2.4, 
functions quite differently.  
5.2.3 Major producers and consumers 
The global coffee market is dominated by very large producing and consuming 
countries. Figure 5.2 shows the production volumes for selected producing 
countries between 1961 and 2015 8 . The most noticeable feature is the 
aforementioned dominance of Brazil, where increased capital intensity and 
mechanisation have led to a sharp rise in output since the late 1990s. By 2014 Brazil 
was responsible for around 35% of global coffee production and around 31% of 
coffee exports (USDA 2015)9. Brazil also has some of the southern-most coffee 
plantations in the world, which makes them vulnerable to frosts and droughts, both 
of which can have devastating impacts on production in any given year. Because of 
the sheer size of Brazil as a producer, weather events there immediately impact 
global price levels. 
Equally noticeable is the growth of Vietnam into a major coffee producer, based on 
the clearing of vast areas of forest for smallholder-driven production of (very) low-
quality Robusta coffee10. Along with an expansion of Robusta production in Brazil, 
this led to a fall in the price of Robusta, a widening of price differentials to Arabica 
coffee, and also a drop in coffee prices more generally, as large roasters discovered 
new processing techniques allowing them to use greater quantities of low-quality 
Robusta coffees in their blends (Gilbert 2005; Wild 2005, see also Figure 5.1). Over 
                                                     
8 The standard unit of measurement in the international coffee trade is a 60kg sack, called a 
‘bag’. 
9 However, due to the size of its economy, Brazil is also one of the least coffee dependent 
producer countries, with coffee representing just 3% of Brazil’s total exports. 
10 See Giovannucci et al. (2004) for an overview. 
160 
 
the same period Ethiopian production has grown steadily, but at an unremarkable 
pace, and Ethiopia remains a relatively minor producing country, despite being the 
largest producer in Africa. Ethiopia’s 2015 production is estimated at about 6.35m 
bags of coffee or about 381m kilogrammes (see Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2 - Coffee production volumes for selected producers (in million 60kg-bags), crop years 
1961-2015 (Source: UDSA). 
 
Figure 5.3 gives analogous data for importing countries from 1990 to 2009. While 
globally imports continue to expand, demand growth has been slow in major 
consuming markets, such as Japan and the EU. The same has recently been true of 
the US, the second largest importer after the EU (USDA 2015). The growing 
difference between total global imports and imports by ICO members illustrates the 
growing importance of new consumer markets, in particular in Asia. Moreover, 
these overall import trends mask the rise of niche coffees, in particular the various 
ethical labels and specialty coffees. As is discussed below, this ‘latte revolution’ 
(Ponte 2002a) has opened up new opportunities for capital accumulation in 
producing countries. 
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Figure 5.3 - Coffee import volumes of main importing countries and regions (in million 60kg-bags), 
1990-2009 (Source: ICO) 
 
5.2.4 Coffee quality and specialty coffee 
The specialty coffee sector functions as a niche market within the global coffee 
trade, albeit one that is expanding rapidly and is a major source of dynamism for 
the industry as a whole (Daviron and Ponte 2005; Lewin, Giovannucci, and 
Varangis 2004). Specialty coffees are differentiated by careful selection and 
processing and are (mostly) of much higher quality than mass market coffee. These 
coffees are bought either by small importing companies and independent roasters, 
or by specialised trading arms of larger conglomerates. Most specialty coffee is sold 
as ‘single origin’, meaning that the precise growing and processing location, as well 
as the processing procedures used are of vital importance to buyers. These help 
supply the unique ‘narratives’ which, together with better taste and bolder flavour 
profiles, are used to justify premium prices to final consumers (more information on 
coffee quality and the specialty trade is provided in Annex V.1). 
Price setting in the specialty sector is akin to practices in, for example, the market 
for fine wines. Prices in the specialty trade are not normally set according to grades 
but are negotiated directly between buyer and seller. Buyers will often cultivate 
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long-term relationships with particular producers. Specialty buyers will in most 
cases insist on visiting the farm or cooperative where the coffee is produced and 
will taste all coffee prior to purchase. Even once a purchasing agreement is in place 
all deals are subject to approval of a final sample by the buyer. This gives buyers a 
lot of control over the quality of the coffee they buy. As the retail prices of specialty 
coffees are frequently multiples of that of mass market coffee, substantial price 
premiums can be achieved by growers capable of producing the highest quality 
coffees. As we shall see, Ethiopian growers are in principle very well placed to take 
advantage of these opportunities – this issue is also taken up again in Chapter Six. 
5.3 The history of regulation and accumulation in the 
Ethiopian coffee sector 
5.3.1 The role of coffee in Ethiopian economy 
Despite its relatively small share of coffee exports, Ethiopia plays a unique role in 
the global coffee industry. It is widely considered to be the genetic home of all 
Arabica coffees and the diversity of wild varieties found in its high-altitude cloud 
forests is unmatched anywhere else (Labouisse et al. 2008; Hein and Gatzweiler 
2006). Ethiopian coffees are also, at least when processed and stored correctly, some 
of the finest Arabica coffees in the world and are popular with roasters both for sale 
as single-origin coffees but also as an ingredient in blends to raise the overall 
flavour profile (CB1). Moreover, Ethiopia’s picturesque coffee culture provides a 
perfect backdrop for the images and narratives of charming and romantic 
’otherness’ so valued by coffee marketers. 
Within Ethiopia coffee plays a vital role in several respects. Firstly, many Ethiopians 
are heavy coffee drinkers, and in many parts of the country drinking coffee is 
woven deep into the fabric of everyday interactions. In the central highlands and 
most parts of the highland periphery, guests are received with several cups of 
coffee, always freshly roasted and prepared on the spot in an elaborate ritual that 
may feature scented grasses, frankincense and popcorn, and an inability to do so 
would be a source of shame for many households. In fact, coffee is so popular that 
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the domestic price of coffee often exceeds international prices, creating incentives 
for the smuggling of coffee into the domestic market.   
Secondly, coffee plays a very important macroeconomic role and is one of the main 
avenues through which Ethiopia earns the foreign exchange needed to finance the 
growing trade deficit, investment in infrastructure and on-going mega-projects. As 
noted in the last chapter, foreign exchange generation is vital to the economic 
strategy pursued by the EPRDF state. Coffee revenues thus play a strategic role in 
contemporary Ethiopia, and the effective control over income streams from coffee is 
an important political issue.  
Despite a fall in the value share of goods exports from over 34% in 2002/03 to just 
over 24% in 2012/13, coffee remains the most important item of merchandise export. 
However, it is not, as is often erroneously stated, the largest foreign exchange 
earner in the country – as also mentioned in Chapter Four, this is an honour which 
belongs to Ethiopian airlines (World Bank 2014: 34). The falling share of coffee in 
total goods exports is largely due to the rapid rise in the value of flori-and 
horticultural products, oil seed, and gold exported (World Bank 2014: 70).  
Despite this importance of coffee for foreign exchange earnings, the Ethiopian 
coffee sector is still largely characterised by great poverty, low yields and 
unnecessary loss of product quality through inappropriate harvesting and 
processing practices. This is puzzling, as Ethiopia is chronically short of foreign 
exchange, which is severely rationed and must be obtained from the NBE directly. 
Given the importance of foreign exchange not just for private sector companies, but 
for the completion of development programs upon which the ruling party has 
staked its claim to political legitimacy, it is surprising that the government showed 
very little interest in the sector until well into the 2000s. At this point, however, the 
government embarked on a series of major reforms, the aim of which was the 
complete control of the sector and associated resource flows. The next sections will 
show how the Ethiopian state has long depended on coffee revenues for its survival 
and how the need to control the sector is a historical constant, irrespective of the 
way in which social production and reproduction are organised. 
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5.3.2 The imperial regime and the first agrarian capitalists 
The southward expansion of the Ethiopian state in the late 19th century has already 
been chronicled in the last chapter and does not require repeating here. As 
discussed, the modernisation drive under Haile Selassie gradually created the 
conditions for agrarian capital to emerge. Particularly important in this regard was 
the slow conversion of quasi-feudal property relations into landlord-tenant relations 
in the fertile southern provinces, as feudal lords became private landlords.  
5.3.2.1 The failure of the first coffee plantations 
This is the context in which, beginning in the 1920s, private capitalist coffee farms 
were first established in Ethiopia. The discussion here will focus on the area around 
Jimma and Kaffa, then known collectively as Kaffa awraja (province), for which the 
evidence is the strongest. While research into many aspects of imperial-era 
agricultural development in Ethiopia must contend with a lack of reliable data 
(Rahmato 2009), the early history of capitalist coffee farming has suffered particular 
neglect. Very little was ever written on the topic and the following has been 
carefully assembled from the sparse information available. 
While coffee has been exported from Ethiopia since at least the 16th century (Aregay 
1988), if not much earlier (Topik 2003), purposive coffee cultivation, as distinct from 
the gathering of forest coffee, is probably much younger. In the Jimma area 
cultivation is said to date back to around the mid-19th century (Gemeda 1994), 
though the beginnings have also been placed as far back as the 1830s (Aregay 1988). 
What is more certain is that Ethiopia witnessed a coffee boom in the 1920s, driven 
by rising world market prices. Exports grew to significant levels (Berhe 2010). 
Feudal lords and the late King Abba Jiffar of Jimma encouraged the planting of 
coffee on their lands. Despite the fact that they used a mixture of (non-cash) wage 
labour and slavery, these lands were the first capitalist coffee plantations in 
Ethiopian history, their aim being the appropriation of surplus through the 
production and, in this case, export, of commodities 11 . However, the early 
plantations were generally run by absentee landlords with little interest in 
                                                     
11 See Banaji (2010) for discussion of why the presence of wage labour is not always a 
necessary condition for capitalist production. 
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agronomy (Gemeda 1994). Investments were minimal, and some of these 
‘plantations’ are perhaps better regarded as (barely) managed forests. Nonetheless, 
they served as important forerunners for the modern plantations that were to 
follow. The first plantation boom was to prove short-lived, as the depression in 
consuming countries in the 1930s drove down coffee prices. The invasion by fascist 
Italy in 1936 put an end to the experiment. 
5.3.2.2 Imperial modernisation and the new agrarian capitalists 
The second wave of coffee plantations has unfortunately also not received much 
interest from historians and there are very few writings on the topic. Due to the 
limited source material, the discussion here is limited again to the areas around 
Jimma and Bonga. The Jimma area was the most important centre of early capitalist 
coffee plantations, making it an appropriate example.  When the Development Bank 
of Ethiopia began giving out loans for coffee production in 1954, plantations 
received 33% of the disbursed monies, of which some 48% flowed to the Jimma area 
(Gemeda 1994). 
The rise of these early capitalist plantations is interesting for at least four reasons. 
First, they were responsible for a number of organisational innovations including 
the much more widespread use of wage labour and a reliance on modern 
agronomy. Second, the social origins of the capitalists and their means of 
accumulation foreshadow some of the aspects of contemporary accumulation in 
Ethiopian coffee farming in surprising ways. Third, the scale of their operations was 
completely unprecedented in the country and laid a lasting legacy in the area and 
beyond, not least in the form of Ethiopia’s – now once again privatised – state 
farms, which rank amongst the largest coffee plantations on in the world. And 
fourth, unlike now, the government of the day was an enthusiastic supporter of 
these farms.  
The first truly modern coffee plantations, using intensive planting and 
contemporary agronomic techniques, were founded in the 1950s, when a 
conjuncture of several factors meant that a new breed of capitalist farmers were able 
to access land, labour, investible funds and the necessary know-how. As slavery 
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had been abolished in 1942, surplus appropriation on these plantations proceeded 
through the exploitation of wage labour. Ethiopia’s growing integration into 
international trade flows provided this emergent class of capitalists with access to a 
reliable market for their produce, allowing them to complete the money-commodity 
cycle (Gemeda 1996; Pausewang 1983).  
As discussed in detail in the last chapter, the land tenure system had changed 
enough to allow for the rise of capitalist coffee farmers. The final crucial element, 
knowledge, was added when, beginning in 1945, international organisations, such 
as the UN and bilateral aid agencies, in particular USAID, began providing 
development aid to Ethiopia. While agriculture was sorely neglected by the 
imperial government and accounted for only eight percent of all foreign loans up to 
1974, USAID and the World Bank began funding agricultural development 
programmes in the 1950s (Bekele 1995). For the first time, these programmes 
introduced scientific management techniques of an appreciable scale. Donor funds 
also financed the creation  of two specialised agricultural universities, at Jimma in 
1952 and at Haramaya, just outside Harar, in 1954 (Rahmato 2009). Haramaya 
University became the nexus of the first agricultural extension service in the 
country, a role that was taken over by the newly formed Ministry of Agriculture in 
1963 (Berhanu and Poulton 2014). The new universities and the extension services 
trained agronomists, who were able to support the new capitalist farmers. A 
milestone was the formation of the Jimma Agricultural Research Institute (JARI) in 
1967. The institute conducted applied research on coffee cultivation and was key to 
introducing the new capitalists to scientific coffee farming methods – and it was to 
play a similar role again in the future (EG4). 
After the Second World War, Haile Selassie had opened the economy to foreign 
investment, leading to a – modest, but unprecedented – surge in capital inflows. For 
the first time in Ethiopian history,  something resembling a national economy was 
born, linking the southern periphery ever more closely to the centre, which 
depended more and more on the surplus produced there for its own survival 
(Markakis and Ayele 1978). These inflows led to new investments in roads in the 
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southern periphery and brought large numbers of migrant workers to the area 
(Gemeda 1994). While the financial flows were small in absolute terms, the 
monetised part of the Ethiopian economy was miniscule, with the results that by 
1968 "[a]lmost the whole export trade, and in particular that of coffee, hides and 
skins and cereals - the three major items which make up almost 75% of the whole 
trade of Ethiopia - are dominated by foreign investments" (Mohammed 1969: 57). In 
coffee, however, these foreign investments tended to be downstream of the 
production phase. The first plantations were mostly Ethiopian owned. 
Unless indicated otherwise, the discussion that follows relies heavily on the detailed 
historical work provided by Gemeda (1996). The plantation owners who established 
themselves in the areas around Jimma and Bonga came from two distinct social 
groups. They were either aristocrats, who had largely inherited their wealth, or self-
made men. Of the latter some accumulated capital working in the growing civil 
service or in the military, while others had made enough money to finance a 
plantation by trading in urban centres. Many farm owners who did not have access 
to aristocratic wealth and privilege remained so dependent on either wages or 
income from other business lines, even after founding their plantations, that they 
‘straddled’ jobs (see also the discussions in Chapter Two and Six). That is, they 
hired farm managers to allow them to tend to another job or business, usually 
located in an urban centre. Their accumulation was the product of the opportunities 
provided by the relatively rapid urbanisation and concomitant growth of the service 
sector in the highland periphery. 
The new farmers, whether of feudal origin or not, were the clearest example of 
modern capitalists yet seen in the Ethiopian coffee sector. They rented, or otherwise 
acquired, lands on which they employed wage labourers in the production of 
commodities with the aim of making a profit. They employed modern agronomic 
techniques, pruning and fertilizing their trees to increase yields, and organised 
workers into supervised work gangs to increase labour productivity. Their 
endeavours were also distinguished by their scale; their farms consisting of 
hundreds of hectares of coffee trees. Local landlords had also been attracted to 
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coffee farming, but they organised production very differently. As these balabat 
were related to the local population, they were able to recruit sharecroppers, who 
received half of the coffee harvest in return for their services. The new capitalists 
however, found this arrangement much too expensive and relied instead on 
migrant labour, which was cheaper. They often encouraged labour migration from 
the north, sometimes offering work on their plantations in lieu of labour duties up 
north (Wood 1983). 
The new coffee capitalists had an important and powerful ally in the governor of 
Kaffa awraja, Mesfin Sileshi, who ruled the province from 1945 to 1954. Himself an 
aristocrat, landlord, and large-scale coffee plantation owner, he enthusiastically 
supported the new coffee capitalists and helped them acquire land. The most 
common method of land acquisition was simply grabbing land illegally for one’s 
own use12. Mesfin supported such land grabs and also sold the new capitalists land 
from his own vast possessions. This combination of land sales to profitable 
capitalists and own-account large-scale coffee farming helped make Mesfin one of 
the wealthiest people in Ethiopia at the time, a position which underlines the vast 
riches that could be made through coffee plantations. Land grabbing and 
subsequent land leases to capitalist farmers proved a popular model, even for large 
capitalist farmers themselves. One of the aristocratic new farmers, Fitawari Gebre-
Kristos, the grandson of the general in Menelik’s army who conquered the area, 
converted his lands into a commercial coffee and maize farm in 1959/60 by means of 
a violent land grab that cleared it of tenants, and later rented hundreds of hectares 
of unused land out to two other capitalist coffee farmers (Matsumura 2003: 16f). 
Initially, these new large-scale farms were hugely successful and expanded rapidly. 
It is estimated that during the 1960s, 5% to 10% of Ethiopian coffee was produced 
by “modern or quasi-modern coffee plantations owned and managed by private 
entrepreneurs” (Rahmato 2009: 47). By the time they were swept away by the 
revolution and subsequent land reform in 1975, they covered more than 14,000ha 
                                                     
12 As discussed in the next chapter, this practice was also used in establishing some of the 
contemporary wave of large-scale capitalist coffee farms. 
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(Gemeda 1994). As Ethiopia at the time had relatively few landless inhabitants 
(Ghose 1985), and the highland periphery was not very densely populated, there 
was a perennial lack of workers, despite the mass involvement of the local 
peasantry as part-time wage workers on the plantations. In response, the federal 
government instituted a settlement scheme to bring migrant workers to the Jimma 
area in 1952 (Gemeda 1994). Farmers who agreed to settle in the Jimma were offered 
20ha of land to allow them to grow food for a growing population of local and 
migrant workers. Fitawari Gebre-Kristos reportedly employed some 400 migrant 
workers during the harvest season13. The living conditions of wage workers appear 
to have been dismal. A 1963 study of wage labourers on coffee plantations around 
Jimma found them to be severely malnourished and so prone to disease as to pose a 
health threat to the wider community (Giel and Vanluijk 1968).  
From 1954 loan financing for plantations was made available from the local branch 
of the DBE, completing the trinity of land, labour and capital, which the imperial 
government helped supply. The feudal lords slowly became capitalist farmers – a 
classic case of ‘capitalism from above’ (Byres 1996)14. 
5.3.2.3 The regulatory regime and the centralising state 
The imperial government, at both national and provincial levels, was thus directly 
involved in the formation of this new class of capitalist farmers. Along with the rise 
of the coffee capitalists, the late imperial era also witnessed increasing attempts to 
regulate the sale  and export of coffee. While coffee exports had received very little 
regulatory attention since the export boom of the 1920s, the government was driven 
to action when in 1952 Ethiopian coffee was dumped at New York harbour for 
failing to pass basic cleanliness inspections (Berhe 2010). However, the rise in 
regulation must also be seen in the wider context of state centralisation under Haile 
Selassie. The conquest of the south had shown how inadequate the established 
feudal system was for effectively governing (rather than just occupying) the south. 
                                                     
13 Though we do not know the size of his holdings. 
14  See Chapter Two for a discussion of Byres’ notion of ‘capitalism from above’ and 
‘capitalism from below’. How these notions map onto the Ethiopian coffee sector is 
examined in Chapter Six. 
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As at least a basic level of effective governance became more important due to the 
spread of capitalism, more and more of the administrative functions once fulfilled 
by the aristocracy were taken over by the central state. In turn this hastened the 
transformation of the southern aristocracy into a class of landlords who viewed 
their holdings as private property (Markakis and Ayele 1978). At the same time, the 
state began to build up its coercive power, creating a modern standing army, a 
police force and an increasingly professional bureaucracy. The revenues from coffee 
exports, which constituted over 50% of all foreign exchange in the 1950s and 1960s, 
were indispensable to this state building project (Love 2001). Coffee exports peaked 
at 64.8% of total export revenues in 1964 (CTDMA 1978: 28). It is therefore not 
surprising that the state began to regulate the coffee sector much more closely 
during this period.  
In response to the 1952 fiasco, the government banned the export of uncleaned 
coffee and empowered the Ministry of Commerce to licence and control coffee 
graders and the grading process. The famous coffee types Jimma, Lekempt (or 
Nekempt), Sidamo and Harar, as well as a 5-point grading scale were introduced in 
1955. The biggest push to control the sector came with the formation of the National 
Coffee Board (NCB) in 1957. The board had broad regulatory powers across the 
sector and set up the coffee auctions in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (the latter only 
for Harar coffee). The same piece of legislation introduced the first coffee export tax, 
increasing the stream of revenues from the sector to the central government. 
Regulation was further sharpened in 1965, when all export coffee was required to 
have a certificate of origin issued by the NCB prior to leaving the country (Berhe 
2010). 
It was in this period that the coffee licencing system was developed, which still 
exists today in a modified form (ICO 2000b; Petit 2007). Anyone involved in the 
coffee trade needed a licence and was only permitted to fulfil the particular function 
described by that licence. It was not possible to hold multiple licences. Sebsabe 
(collectors) were only allowed to buy coffee directly from farmers, usually at the 
farm gate – hence the name. They had to deliver the coffee to the akrabe (processors) 
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they worked for. The akrabe was only licensed to process the coffee and bring the 
beans to auction. Only licensed exporters were allowed to purchase coffee at the 
auction and the auction was the only place coffee could be traded. The movement of 
coffee through the country was controlled by means of road blocks and customs 
checks. The state thus benefited from coffee in the forms of direct taxes (on land, 
profits and exports), indirect taxes and licence fees. By 1969, coffee was generating 
6% of all tax revenue taken by the Ethiopian state (Love 2001). In part this system 
reflected the needs of the international coffee market, where, beginning in the USA, 
the rise of larger and larger roasting companies had driven a process of 
standardisation, which required higher levels of quality and consistency. But in part 
it was also driven by the difficulty of effectively raising direct taxes on the large 
mass of small farmers, who grew most of the coffee (Love 2001; Pendergrast 1999). 
5.3.2.4 Implications for capital accumulation today     
The legacy of the early capitalist plantations of the imperial era is important today 
in three respects. First, the establishment of large plantations set an important 
example. As the next chapter will demonstrate, several of Ethiopia’s current coffee 
capitalists were raised on or around these plantations. Some are the descendants of 
this landlord class, and farm ownership has been a lifelong ambition for them. 
Others worked on these farms in their youth or are the descendants of labourers 
who worked there. Large-scale coffee farming formed the cultural backdrop to their 
upbringing and is a frequently cited inspiration for aspiring to land ownership. 
Moreover, at least some of the plantations were examples for scientific management 
and modern agronomy, and the systems and skills developed there lived on in 
those who experienced them. The research institutions founded at the time still play 
an important role in supporting Ethiopia’s capitalist coffee farmers today. 
Second, the surge in production led by these farms cemented coffee as Ethiopia’s 
main ‘political’ crop, and controlling it became a key element of state revenue 
management, thus laying the foundations for the long and uneasy relationship 
between coffee wealth and state power (Love 2001). The control of coffee revenues 
has been vital to the economic strategy of every government since.  
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A third important aspect was the demand for wage labour and the large migrations 
it triggered. It is estimated that by the early 1970s around 50,000 migrant workers, 
mostly from modern-day Amhara and the northern part of SNNP, travelled to the 
coffee farms in search of jobs every year. This represents an estimated 5% to 10% of 
the entire population of the area (Wood 1983). It is difficult to know exactly how 
many labour migrants settled in the area and there are no reliable numbers for how 
many northern farmers the government resettled in the area, but it is clear that the 
population make-up of the area underwent dramatic change. Many of the current 
coffee capitalists are the children of migrants. Migration and the cash wages 
available to migrants created a dynamic environment in which (petty) accumulation 
and self-improvement became possible – for some. This was unusual in the rigid 
social hierarchies of imperial Ethiopia and the pathways of accumulation through 
straddling wage labour and trade was to be much imitated.  
5.3.3 Revolution and the end of the coffee capitalists 
As discussed in the last chapter, the imperial regime was broken by the revolution 
of 1974, which brought the military Derg government to power. The land reform in 
1975 marked the end of the capitalist plantations. The land reform and subsequent 
efforts at agricultural modernisation had a lasting impact on agrarian relations in 
Ethiopia. In legal terms, personal land ownership is still all but impossible in 
Ethiopia today, and the state farms that replaced some of the capitalist plantations 
of the imperial era still exist today and are an important source of knowledge, seeds 
and skilled manpower for the contemporary coffee capitalists. 
The land reform was not only revolutionary in its ambition and scope, it was also 
carried out with unsparing effectiveness. The new government dispatched student 
radicals to the countryside en masse as part of a zematcha (campaign) to educate and 
indoctrinate the peasantry, who had hardly played a role in the fall of the imperial 
regime, and to carry out the land reform. In Ethiopia’s highland periphery the 
grievances built up under the previous regime of ethnicised class domination meant 
that the immediate aftermath of the revolution was especially violent. In fearful 
anticipation of a backlash against their despotic rule, most landlords had vacated 
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their property and made for the relative safety of cities or their home areas in the 
north (Markakis and Ayele 1978; Pausewang 1983). One respondent, who was part 
of the zematcha in the Babu area, close to Limu Genet, recalls the conflicts with 
feudal landlords: “When we first came to take the land, they [the landlord’s men] 
shot at us. We went back and asked the soldiers for help. They sent a truck with 
soldiers to the land and I went with them. When we arrived they [the soldiers] shot 
some of the men. After that, the news spread and there was no more resistance. You 
see, the soldiers had machine guns. No one here had ever seen machine guns, and 
the landlords were very shocked” (LCF31). The zematcha in the Gumma area, which 
was to become part of the Limu Kossa state farm, is said to have killed seven 
landlords (Matsumura 2003: 18). 
5.3.3.1 The state coffee farms  
The other key aspect of the land reform, from the point of view of explaining 
contemporary accumulation patterns, was the formation of the gigantic state-owned 
coffee farms out of the holdings of the erstwhile coffee capitalists, along with the 
ambition to move to a more scientific form of agriculture. By pooling together the 
coffee estates of the large capitalists and adding surrounding suitable lands, the 
young revolutionary government created three giant coffee plantations: Limu 
Kossa, near Jimma, Tepi, in western Oromia close to the border with Gambella, and 
Bebeka, in Bench Maji zone at the south-westerly end of SNNPR. By the time the 
EPRDF began to privatise these in 2008, they had reached 11,000ha, 9,000ha and 
10,000ha in size respectively (EG2). Despite intense efforts to create showcases for 
the virtues of collectivist agriculture, the Derg’s state farms were run very 
inefficiently, had comparatively low levels of productivity, and hence made 
substantial losses and required heavy subsidies in order to survive (Griffin 1992). 
Despite heavy injections of inputs and funds, most state farms were still loss-
making by 1984 (Ghose 1985). Towards the end of the Derg period, the yields on 
state coffee farms were only about 260kg/ha, when the farms would have needed an 
estimated 450kg/ha to break even (Griffin 1992). However, after the fall of the Derg, 
the EPRDF government managed to successfully turn them into highly profitable 
ventures, while still under government ownership (EG2, EG3). 
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Table 5.1 - Ethiopian coffee export volume and nominal value, 1961-1976 (Source: CTDMA 1978). 
Year 
Volume  
(tons) 
Nominal value 
(ETB) 
Value per ton 
(ETB) 
1961 55,743 93,645 1,680 
1962 62,463 107,100 1,714 
1963 67,194 110,882 1,650 
1964 70,228 158,841 2,262 
1965 87,654 188,179 2,147 
1966 73,642 155,673 2,114 
1967 73,604 139,182 1,891 
1968 80,270 152,962 1,905 
1969 88,383 173,947 1,968 
1970 70,861 181,268 2,558 
1971 80,822 175,210 2,168 
1972 82,522 182,574 2,212 
1973 76,082 189,771 2,494 
1974 55,846 152,384 2,729 
1975 57,723 152,661 2,645 
1976 68,002 324,636 4,774 
 
Table 5.1 shows the nominal volume and value of Ethiopian coffee exports between 
1961 and 1976. The external environment was favourable, as evidenced by the 
increase of the unit value of coffee during most of that period. Nonetheless, coffee 
exports by volume peaked in 1969, and declined sharply during and immediately 
after the revolution. Some of this decline is attributable to coffee berry disease 
(CBD), a fungal infection of the coffee tree, which had arrived in Ethiopia in 1971 
and by 1974 had spread to all of the major coffee regions. But in large part it reflects 
a wider fall in smallholder production across all crops in the post-revolutionary 
period. This agrarian crisis was the result of the Derg’s disastrous agricultural 
policies (Chole 2004; Griffin 1992), which included forced mass resettlements in 
reaction to the devastating famine that began in 1982 (Keller 1992). The state farms, 
the formation of which was accelerated after 1979, are therefore best understood as 
a response to falling agricultural surpluses. 
5.3.3.2 The coffee chain under the DERG 
The Derg government not only restructured the production of coffee, but also 
changed the entire marketing chain. Increasing the extraction of revenues from the 
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sector required both a functional marketing system and effective mechanisms for 
surplus transfer. The government employed a combination of taxes and price 
setting to ensure such transfers. Immediately after the revolution, the government 
moved to strengthen its control over the sector, giving the National Coffee Board 
the authority to store and trade all coffee in the country as early as 1975 (Berhe 
2010). 
To allow the government to be directly involved with the production and sale of 
coffee, the NCB was replaced by the Coffee and Tea Development and Marketing 
Authority (CTDMA) in 1977/78, which later became a full ministry in 1979/80 (ICO 
2002). In 1978 the government created the Coffee Marketing Corporation (CMC), 
which was empowered to control the entire coffee marketing chain, and was given 
special purchasing rights. At the central auctions in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, 
the CMC was allowed to buy coffee up to a fixed quota limit, before other buyers 
were given a chance to purchase coffee. In this way the CMC bought up about 80% 
of Ethiopia’s coffee production and about 90% of all export coffee, with the 
remainder handled by private traders (Berhe 2010). Prices were in effect set by the 
CMC. Private traders were banned from trading washed coffee, meaning they had 
to contend themselves almost exclusively with low-quality coffee. According to the 
ICO only 14 private traders were still active in the Ethiopian coffee business by the 
end of the Derg regime (ICO 2000a). In the words of a leading coffee exporter, 
whose father was a coffee trader during the Derg: “They [the Derg] nearly killed the 
business” (CELF6).   
Unlike the EPRDF today, which is mostly interested in controlling the foreign 
exchange generated by the sector, the Derg sought to secure a direct transfer of 
resources from coffee growers and traders to the government. To achieve this they 
set coffee prices paid by the CMC low, and instituted a host of taxes on the sector. 
This transfer was vital to the economic survival of the government. Coffee taxes 
constituted around 30% of all government revenue in 1978 (Griffin 1992). 
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5.3.3.3 The legacy of the Derg 
As well as instituting the land reform that overthrew the feudal system, the Derg 
constructed the first truly modern state in Ethiopia and greatly expanded both its 
administrative and repressive capacities (Markakis 2011; Pausewang 1983). This 
also extended to the coffee sector, where a new licensing regime was instituted in 
1984. Licences were very expensive and were only issued for a single function at a 
time (Berhe 2010). At the same time the Derg hardly altered the structure of the 
lower end of the supply chain, with coffee going from farmer to the sebsabe to the 
akrabe to the auction (Love 2001). While the costs of licences were slashed later 
under the EPRDF, key aspects of the licensing system were kept in place (Petit 
2007). Apart from the land reform, the level of government control attained though 
increased licensing, along with the state farms, forms the most lasting legacy of the 
Derg in Ethiopia’s coffee sector. 
5.4 The contemporary Ethiopian coffee sector 
5.4.1 Coffee under the EPDRF 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the fall of the Derg and the subsequent take-over by 
the EPRDF in 1991 completely transformed economic policy in Ethiopia. While the 
state continued to play a major role in the economy, many markets were liberalised. 
In coffee, private actors were allowed much greater leeway, the state marketing 
board was disbanded, and the state ultimately withdrew from direct involvement in 
coffee production entirely. However, due to the economic importance of coffee as a 
source of livelihoods for small (and not-so-small) farmers, as a source of rural jobs 
and – most importantly as far as the federal government is concerned – as a source 
of foreign exchange, the sector remained tightly regulated.  
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, it is important to understand that from 
the government’s perspective what is imperative is the control over revenue flows, 
rather than the ownership for those funds. This is particularly true for foreign 
exchange. For instance, the government has recently privatised all of the state-
owned coffee farms, despite the fact that these were highly profitable (EG2). These 
farms are large and concentrated, and revenue control is not difficult to achieve, 
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hence the government was willing to give these over to – politically trustworthy – 
private sector actors15. On the other hand, the privatisation of the farms was a useful 
symbolic concession to the IFIs, who have long demanded a greater role for the 
private sector in Ethiopia. The plan to privatise the state farms was first published 
in a government strategic plan in 1997 (ICO 2000b). This was also the year that the 
government broke off relations with the IMF, after failing to reach an agreement 
and refusing to give in to pressure for faster and deeper neoliberal restructuring 
(Wade 2001). As the government wished, and still wishes, to maintain (partial, but 
substantial) direct ownership in sectors such as finance and telecommunications for 
strategic reasons, it was useful to find another sector to privatise. The regulatory 
reform the sector has seen since 1991 is best understood from this perspective. 
The regulatory regime facing the sector after 1991 can be divided into two distinct 
periods. The period up to 2008 saw efforts to liberalise the sector in line with the 
tenets of the - at least outwardly liberal – economic paradigms the government had 
committed itself to. The auction system at Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa was 
retained and continued to serve as the pivot of the sector. With the withdrawal of 
state agencies, private capital reasserted itself in coffee processing and the export 
trade and by the mid-1990s Ethiopia’s coffee auctions were once again dominated 
by private traders. The second period began in 2008 when new legislation suddenly 
forced all coffee trade in the country to use the recently established Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange (ECX) system, with far-reaching consequences for the sector. 
What is striking across both periods is the attention to detail in coffee regulation 
and its aggressive enforcement, coupled with the striking absence of any kind of 
strategic vision or growth policy for the sector16. 
  
                                                     
15 The holding company of the famously well-connected Ethiopia-born Saudi billionaire Al-
Amoudi, which is by far the largest private sector entity in Ethiopia, bought two of three 
farms; some 21,000ha in total. The other farm, around 9,000ha, went to a coffee exporter who 
had just publically made a very large donation towards the construction of the Renaissance 
Dam. Apparently, this latter farm was sold without any kind of competition or tender (EG2).  
16 Such a growth strategy has now been developed, but as of early 2016 had not yet been 
published. 
178 
 
5.4.2 1991-2008: a tightly regulated liberalisation 
The liberalisation of the coffee sector began under the Transitional Government in 
1992. Direct government control over much of the sector was relinquished in favour 
of a market system dominated by private capital17. While the state farms were kept 
under government control, these produced less than 5% of Ethiopia’s coffee during 
the 1990s and early 2000s (USAID 2010). Private capital was allowed to expand in or 
enter the areas of processing, trading, export and even (to a limited extent) the 
production of coffee. High licensing and licence renewal fees had served to keep all 
but a few traders out of the market, but these were cut in 1993. The new fee regime 
and the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the CMC’s quota privileges drew new 
participants into the market and by 2008 there were 104 active exporters (Berhe 
2010). With private traders now also allowed to trade washed coffee, private capital 
soon handled 85% of all coffee at the auction (ICO 2000a).  
The sector as a whole remained under tight control though and the movement of 
coffee in Ethiopia was, and still is, regulated by strict rules (Petit 2007). An ICO 
report on the regulation of the sector under the EPRDF states that: “[t]here is still 
hesitation within the government to allow the process of liberalisation to go too far. 
For example, the government wishes to avoid monopolies and is wary of vertical 
integration (such as allowing exporters to buy directly from farmers), since it 
believes that it could lead to a few major private power centres within the industry. 
Thus the liberalisation was only partial.” (ICO 2000b: 28).  
The rationale for the liberalisation of the market was to increase the share of the 
export price received by farmers, which would incentivise them to increase both 
output and productivity. Liberalisation was very much in line with the mainstream 
of development economics at the time and many producing countries opened up 
their coffee markets after 1991. A World Bank study of major coffee producing 
countries found that liberalisation of coffee markets did indeed raise the share of 
export prices received by direct producers in most countries (Krivonos 2004). In 
Ethiopia liberalisation increased the producers’ share of export (f.o.b.) prices from 
                                                     
17 While the regulatory minutiae of the liberalisation process are not directly relevant here, 
excellent overviews can be found in Berhe (2010) and Petit (2007).  
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an average of around 40% during the 1980s, to 60-70% by 1997, while export taxes 
fell from around 35% of the export price to just 6.5% (ICO 2000a). The export tax 
was scrapped completely in 2002 (Berhe 2010). But an analysis of price volatility in 
the Ethiopian coffee sector between 1992 and 2001 also found evidence for increased 
volatility and warned of detrimental impacts on small producers in particular 
(Gemech and Struthers 2007). A detailed analysis of Ethiopian price data from 1992 
to 2006 revealed that while auction prices were highly responsive to movements in 
world prices for coffee, these movements were only partially transmitted to 
producers. In particular, rising prices tended to benefit only auction traders, while 
falling prices were passed on to producers (Kuma et al. 2008). One reason for this 
was the growing concentration at the trading and export stage of the value chain, 
where traders acquired substantial market power (Alemu and Worako 2011). 
The auction system, though now open to private traders, was heavily controlled by 
direct government intervention. Throughout the 1990s a committee at the National 
Bank of Ethiopia set minimum export prices (Love 2001). But this direct control did 
little to increase the efficiency of the system. The auction was non-transparent in its 
operation and cheating was rife. Exporters who – routinely, but illegally – also 
worked as akrabe, used to buy their own coffees at the auction, often at inflated 
prices so as to discourage other buyers. Price fixing appears to have been the norm 
(Berhe 2010, CELF5, CE). Illegal as this practise was, it did allow exporters to obtain 
fully traceable coffee of known quality. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
rupture of this link between akrabe and exporter (who were often the same person) 
by the ECX was one of the key drivers of the move by exporters to establish private 
plantations (see also Section  5.5 and Chapter Six). 
The auction had other problems, too. The grading system was corrupt and 
dysfunctional, and payment defaults were common (CELF2). A report prepared 
prior to the introduction of the ECX lists a catalogue of issues: “warehousing 
problems, improper sampling and quality inspection, problems associated with 
brokers and suppliers, poor processing, high transportation costs, inadequate coffee 
market financing and unfair distribution of marketing margins.” (ECEA 2008: 9). It 
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was clear that a thorough reform was needed if the sector was to continue to 
provide large amounts of the country’s foreign exchange. 
5.4.3 After 2008: the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange 
system 
The regulatory landscape of the Ethiopian coffee was suddenly and radically 
altered in August 2008, when the Ethiopian government issued Proclamation 
602/2008, which forced the entire country’s coffee trade to be carried out through 
the ECX. The proclamation, along with two subsequent regulations, disbanded the 
coffee auctions in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, through which all coffee had 
flowed since 1967. Instead, the entire coffee trade of the country was now to use the 
newly established ECX, which had been set up earlier that year as a modern trading 
platform for certain agricultural commodities. It is organised around an open-
outcry auction in Addis Ababa, where buyers and sellers could trade ‘lots’ of 
commodities using standardised contracts and grades. The auction centre is 
supported by an efficient back-up office operation and IT system, which records all 
trades, disseminates prices and clears balances. The trading platform itself is built 
on a network of warehouses in the main agricultural production areas of the 
country, where producers and suppliers can safely deposit their goods against 
electronically-registered warehouse receipts. 
While the ECX is no doubt an impressive achievement, not least in logistical terms, 
it was not designed to channel the entire coffee trade of Ethiopia. In fact, its own 
management had not expected to have to deal with the coffee trade so early in the 
life of the exchange, and as a result the ECX was woefully underprepared on a 
number of fronts (Gebre-Madhin 2012). In particular it was “not ready” to handle 
all of the country’s coffee due to “shortages in terms of logistics and human 
resources” (EG9). The ECX as a trading mechanism is unsuited to the diverse needs 
of the various actors in Ethiopia’s coffee sector, and forcing all coffee through the 
ECX very nearly had disastrous consequences. The move primarily reflects the 
priorities of the Ethiopian government with regard to the coffee sector, namely to 
ensure the flow, growth and – importantly – complete control of the revenues 
generated by the sector. Somewhat ironically, it was the free market fantasies of 
181 
 
foreign-educated Ethiopian economists, enthusiastically supported by Western 
donors, which handed the Ethiopian government the perfect instrument to control 
these flows. 
The conceptual basis of the ECX as well as the details of its functional structure, are 
the subject of Annex V.2 and a brief description of the system will suffice here. 
Coffee is deposited into the ECX system by akrabe, cooperatives or private 
plantation owners at its regional warehouses (obviating the need for them to truck 
the coffee to Addis Ababa). The coffee is then graded by the ECX and a warehouse 
receipt is issued to the depositor to allow for later payment. On the trading floor in 
Addis Ababa registered buyers (or their agents) then bid for lots of coffee sold 
through standardised contracts. Coffee is bought anonymously, i.e. based only on 
the broad locality of origin and the assigned grade – the producer of the coffee is 
not disclosed. Once a particular lot has been bought the purchaser takes physical 
possession of the coffee and the producer of the coffee is paid electronically. The 
standardised contracts offered by the ECX, however, are not diverse enough to 
reflect the variety of different coffees produced in Ethiopia. Moreover, the ECX 
system severs the link between the processing station and the purchaser, and thus 
undermines the traceability that is an important feature of high-quality coffees. 
5.4.3.1 Killing the goose: specialty coffee and the ECX 
The introduction of the ECX into the Ethiopian coffee trading system was widely 
resented, both in Ethiopia and amongst foreign coffee buyers (CB1, CB2)18. The ECX 
was not only logistically ill-prepared for handling the nation’s coffee, as 
acknowledged by its founders (Gebre-Madhin 2012), which led to substantial delays 
in warehousing operations, but the very design of the exchange system made it 
fundamentally unsuitable for trading Ethiopia’s coffees. The ECX system was 
particularly damaging to the specialty coffee sector. Its grading system undermined 
the incentives to produce the highest quality coffees and the lack of traceability 
                                                     
18 Although many Ethiopian respondents were noticeably guarded in their criticism and 
some categorically refused to discuss downsides to the introduction of the ECX. This 
underlines the politically sensitive nature of the ECX and the importance ascribed to it by 
the Ethiopian state. 
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removed a key element for determining the value of such coffees in international 
markets (CB1)19. After a substantial backlash, the government relented in 2010 and 
allowed private capitalist farms and the cooperative unions to sell coffee directly to 
international buyers, but only after having their coffees graded and recorded by the 
ECX (LCF5, NGO).  
In the specialty coffee trade, traceability means that coffees have to be traceable 
back to the processing station at which they were produced. Plantations mostly 
possess their own processing stations, while smaller farms deliver their cherries to 
processing stations owned either by akrabe or the local primary cooperative. 
Without such traceability, specialty roasters find it more difficult to charge 
premium prices for their coffees (CB2, see also Section  5.2.4). These are worldwide 
standards that are rooted in the ‘symbolic value’ attributed to specialty coffees and 
are very difficult for individual producing countries to influence (Ponte 2002b; 
Daviron and Ponte 2005). Knowing where a coffee was produced also enables 
exporters and foreign buyers to establish direct business relations with producers. 
Through these they can provide the incentives for producers to increase or maintain 
the quality of their product.  
While the ECX trades a wide variety of different coffee contracts, differentiated by 
region of origin and quality grade (ECX 2010), this is not the same as traceability. 
The coffee contracts sold at the ECX only are differentiated to the level of the woreda 
of origin, not the processing station (of which there can be many in any one woreda), 
as demanded by specialty roasters. Even worse, the commingling system of 
warehouse storage at the ECX (which is described in Annex V.2), coupled with 
blind buying of anonymised lots based on standard contracts means that any 
purchased lot is likely to contain coffees from all over the woreda of origin. This 
means that coffees from single estates – highly valued amongst specialty roasters – 
cannot even be identified ex post (CE). 
                                                     
19 This is because the price differences in quality grades at the ECX are much smaller than 
the premium available for excellent quality coffee in international markets.  
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Figure 5.4 - Volume of Ethiopia coffee exports 1990-2011, in million kg  
(Source: ICO, linear trend fitted). 
 
The consequences of the loss of traceability were immediate. Figure 5.4 shows how 
the volume of Ethiopian coffee exports dropped significantly, by about 
70,000,000kg, in the year after the ECX was introduced. As the figure makes clear, 
this reduction was not driven by movements in international coffee prices. It stands 
to reason that it was the direct result of the logistical chaos and newly introduced 
trade restrictions that accompanied the introduction of the ECX. The only published 
study to date that tries to estimate the direct monetary impact of the introduction of 
the ECX lends empirical support to the notion that it was in fact the absence of 
traceability that was primarily responsible for the financial losses, and puts the 
impact at some US$280m between 2008 and 2012 (Leung 2014). An attempt to 
amend this issue by providing a specialty trading platform on the ECX failed and 
was abandoned (CB1, CB2). Efforts are now underway to ensure post-purchase 
traceability through barcode labels on each coffee bag. 
Why, then, did the government insist on pushing all the country’s coffee through 
the ECX system? One narrative is provided by the ECX’s founding CEO Gebre-
Madhin (2012), who recalls how the ECX, which had only been in operation since 
2007, immediately ran into trouble in 2008 as a result of the global food price crisis. 
At the time the exchange was only trading food grains and beans. As a result of 
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global market movements, prices were extremely volatile and subject to recurrent 
spikes. Traders withheld their produce from the exchange, bringing trading to a 
near halt. Coffee (along with sesame) had to be introduced as soon as possible to 
save the ECX, as both had “more assured market liquidity” (Gebre-Madhin 2012: 
13). The introduction of the ECX into the coffee sector is presented here as a 
technical decision taken in times of economic turbulence to rescue a flagship project 
of the government. 
It is more compelling, however, to view the snap introduction of the ECX as a 
political move by a government (understandably) obsessed with controlling the 
financial flows that form a key part of the resource base needed to secure the 
economic development it has become politically dependent on. The teething 
troubles of the ECX may have been a convenient cover to allow the government to 
drastically increase its control of the coffee sector. Several facts support this view. 
First, despite claims to the contrary by Gebre-Madhin (2012, 2009b), it is clear that 
the ECX had not been planned as the main, and possibly sole, trading mechanism 
for coffee in Ethiopia. The 2005 concept note, which outlines the operation of the 
exchange in great detail, does not mention coffee (Gebre-Madhin and Goggin 2005). 
A July 2008 report by the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Authority (ECEA), which 
regulates the ECX, deals specifically with coffee, obviously in preparation for its 
introduction to the exchange. But even at that point the exchange was not thought 
of as the only place where coffee should be traded: “The need to modernize the 
coffee marketing system in such a way that it becomes efficient, transparent, fair 
and internationally competent. This could help reduce coffee smuggling and 
contraband activities. On this line, if ECX is able to participate in facilitating coffee 
trading in Ethiopia while maintaining the existing inspection and auction centers, the 
suppliers or traders as well as exporters will have additional choice so reducing 
monopoly of only one center.” (ECEA 2008: XII, emphasis added). The Ethiopian civil 
service was assuming the ECX would be introduced alongside the existing auctions 
to provide additional choice to market participants. 
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The decision to force all coffee through the ECX system was apparently taken at the 
highest political level without prior consultation with the ECX management team. 
In a documentary film about the exchange she founded, Gebre-Madhin relates how 
she was called to a meeting with senior members of the cabinet, including the 
deputy prime minister, and recalls her shock and surprise at being asked to trade all 
of Ethiopia’s coffee (Mezlekia 2009). The thesis that coffee was pushed through the 
ECX primarily to support the political aims of the federal government with regard 
to a strategically important sector is also supported by the US Embassy in Addis 
Ababa, as was revealed in a particularly insightful WikiLeaks cable20. The opening 
line of the cable states that: “The government of Ethiopia (GoE) established a new 
coffee quality control and marketing law (amended August 25, 2008) in order to 
enhance its control of the domestic coffee sector and carve out a new strategy for 
increasing coffee exports” (WikiLeaks 2009, emphasis added) 21. The cable goes on to 
say that “[t]he GoE has taken the fractured coffee sector supply chain head-on 
because coffee is the backbone of the GoE's export-led growth strategy”.  
According to the cable, the government seeks to meet two closely related goals 
through the enforced use of the ECX: it hopes that increased efficiency will raise 
incomes along the supply chain, leading to more exports, and at the same time 
wants to ensure that a greater proportion of Ethiopia’s coffee production is 
exported, which necessitates control of the coffee through mandatory pre-sale 
warehousing. The new rules are accompanied by a strict enforcement regime: “[t]he 
GoE also hopes to deter traders and coffee sector participants from skirting the new 
law and role of the ECX by assessing heavy fines and threats of imprisonment”, 
meaning that traders face “much stricter penalties than in the past, such as up to ten 
years of imprisonment and USD 10,000 in fines for not abiding with the new 
regulations” (WikiLeaks 2009). While “[t]he GoE has only recently begun to pay 
close attention to the mechanics and potential of its coffee crop” it is clear that the 
                                                     
20 In 2010 WikiLeaks, an online whistleblowing platform, published more than a quarter of a 
million US diplomatic cables from around the world. Diplomatic cables contain 
correspondence between US embassies and the State Department in Washington, DC and 
were not intended for publication. 
21 This cable came to my attention through Mezlekia (2012). 
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goal is to compel the coffee sector towards greater efficiency by making it use a 
trading system that makes tracing coffee stocks, coffee quality and revenue flows 
trivially easy. Correspondingly, the export of coffee is rigorously enforced. In 2011, 
57 traders were banned from the ECX for ‘hoarding’ coffee (Araya 2011)22. The 
ultimate aim of such control is to maximise the flow of foreign exchange the sector 
generates. The government also still owns its own trading company, which is 
among the top ten Ethiopian coffee exporters (Jemaneh and Abdela 2016). 
Interestingly, a recent government-commissioned study recommended sweeping 
changes to the regulation of the coffee sector, including the introduction of a line 
ministry for coffee and changes to the ECX system to allow international buyers to 
purchase from farmers directly. The government accepted the findings of the study 
but rejected any changes to the ECX, citing concerns over quality and coffee prices 
(Abdu 2015). Given frequent complaints about the effects of the ECX on coffee 
quality (CB1, CELF5, NGO) and the fact that farmers selling directly into the 
specialty market can achieve substantially higher prices 23 , this claim is highly 
dubious. The view that the ECX is a poor vehicle for serving the Ethiopian coffee 
sector is also echoed by a former senior official of the exchange, EG9, who while in 
office said that it was his goal to get more cooperatives to export more of their 
coffee (“50 or 70%”) directly to foreign buyers, bypassing the ECX system. He made 
clear that in his opinion the ECX should exit the coffee sector in the medium term: 
”We have a lot of things to do. We are not a coffee business.” (EG9). 
                                                     
22 The traders had cancelled contracts with buyers during a period of rising coffee prices, 
hoping to benefit from higher prices. The government banned them from the exchange, 
confiscated their coffee and sold the coffee itself. The aim was to maintain the flow of 
foreign exchange. Most of the traders, which included some of the largest exporters, were 
later reinstated, as can be seen by comparing coffee export reports for 2012 and 2013 (Assefa 
2012; Assefa 2013). 
23 This is elaborated in the next chapter. Minten et al. (2014) find similar results from an 
analysis for trade data covering the entire Ethiopian coffee sector. 
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Figure 5.5 - Indices of real value and volume of Ethiopian coffee exports (2002=100), 2002-2013 
(Source: author's calculation from NBE quarterly and annual reports). 
 
In defence of the ECX, planners in Ethiopia’s policy point to the apparent successes 
in increasing coffee exports. But this success is largely driven by factors outside of 
their control. Figure 5.5 presents indices for the growth of Ethiopian coffee exports 
by both volume and value. While there has been a substantial growth in volume, 
increases in the value of the exported coffee have driven most of the expansion the 
sector has recently seen – and the latter is mostly due to rising international prices. 
Since 2002 the real value of coffee exported from Ethiopia has increased by around 
265%, while the volume of coffee grew by 57%. Figure 5.1 shows that the reference 
price for Arabica coffee rose in real terms from US$1.79/lb in 2002 to US$3.82/lb in 
2012, an increase of 213%24. Minten et al., using a different dataset and looking at the 
period between 2002 and 2013, reach the conclusion that: “[t]he change in the real 
value of exports is largely driven by the increasing international prices offered for 
Ethiopian coffee” (2014: 21). This reflects the wider rise in Arabica prices over the 
period so that: “[t]he increases in export values have largely been driven by 
                                                     
24 In addition, increased marketing efforts by leading global roasters (e.g. Starbucks) and the 
successful trademarking of some Ethiopian coffees (ARB 2011) are likely to have widened 
the differentials to the quoted Arabica reference price over the same period; see for instance 
Arslan and Reicher (2011). 
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increases in international coffee prices between 2003 and 2012” (Minten et al. 2014: 
26). Had the ECX not been introduced in a period of high and rising coffee prices, 
its effects may have been much harder to defend. 
The introduction of the ECX has damaged the Ethiopian coffee sector and a more 
severe fall in performance was only avoided because the government backed down 
on certain key areas of regulation, such as allowing direct exports. The damage 
wrought by the ECX was the unintended side effect of the government’s move to 
increase its control over revenue flows. The decision was seemingly not preceded 
by any real effort to understand how Ethiopian coffees are valued. Moreover, like 
most of the other reform efforts undertaken in the coffee sector, the ECX is also 
aimed solely at the marketing side of the sector, and ignores the problems on the 
production side, such as the extremely low productivity of smallholder producers 
(see Minten et al. 2015). The ECX system has, however, quite accidentally opened 
up new possibilities for private capital accumulation in Ethiopian coffee production. 
5.5 Current possibilities for private capital 
accumulation  
The regulatory innovations pursued by the Ethiopian state, and the current 
situation in international coffee markets, that is, the growing demand for high-
quality Arabica coffees and traceable specialty coffees, coupled with low domestic 
prices for land and labour, have produced a unique situation which favours the 
establishment and profitable operation of large-scale private coffee plantations in 
Ethiopia.  
In international coffee markets, rising Arabica prices have provided a favourable 
environment for the formation of new plantations. Figure 5.6 shows the 
development of the main ICO Arabica price index between 1990 and 2012. After the 
prices reached their lowest point at the end of the last coffee crisis in 2002, they 
began a steady rise that only ended in 2012. The next chapter will show that the vast 
majority of plantation investments fall into this period, that is, into a period of high 
and rising coffee prices. In fact, as shown in Section 5.2.2 the price levels attained in 
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2012 had last been reached in 1987, with a similar, but smaller, peak occurring in 
1997. Rising prices pulled investment into the sector and are a frequently cited 
motivation. 
Figure 5.6 - Colombian milds (Arabica) NY price index (LHS, 1990=100) and annual rate of change 
(RHS, in %), 1990-2012 (Source: author's calculation from ICO data) 
 
The actions of the Ethiopian government have benefited the coffee capitalists in two 
particular ways: the opening of land for investment made this accumulation path 
viable in the first place, and the introduction of the ECX unwittingly narrowed the 
supply of traceable specialty-grade coffee in Ethiopia. As we saw in the last chapter, 
the shift in economic strategy that occurred from 2001 onwards meant that the 
government, seeking to increase foreign exchange earnings through the export of 
agricultural goods, released more land for private investment. This trend 
accelerated after the Ethiopian millennium in 2007, which was imbued by the 
government with symbolic value as the start of the ‘Ethiopian renaissance’, and 
thus directly linked to the manufacture of hegemony for the developmental state 
project (see also Jessop 2016). It was thus politically important that 2007 be followed 
by accelerated economic development and the push for commercial agriculture was 
strengthened. As will be discussed in the next chapter, regional governments were 
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instructed to open land for investments and zonal authorities were given targets for 
providing land to investors. The result was a land rush for the coffee lands in the 
south, as capitalists scrambled to establish plantations. This window of opportunity 
was closed in many areas in 2012, as land outside of the lowlands became 
increasingly scarce and conflicts over land began to mount. The opening up of land 
for agricultural investment by private capitalists is thus an integral part of the 
creation of Ethiopia’s developmental state.  
At the same time, an unintended and unforeseen side effect of the introduction of 
the ECX was to strengthen the competitive position of coffee plantations vis-à-vis 
smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. As documented above, the ECX impaired the 
traceability of most Ethiopian coffee. In 2010 the government bowed to pressure 
from the coffee sector, both in Ethiopia and abroad, and lifted the ban on direct 
coffee exports for cooperative unions and all plantations. Both unions and 
plantations were now able to apply for an export licence and sell their coffee 
directly to foreign buyers (subject to prior grading by the ECX). Cooperatives and 
plantations were suddenly the only entities capable of supplying fully traceable 
coffee. 
Not surprisingly, both cooperatives and private plantations were able to command 
premiums for their coffee after the introduction of the ECX (Minten et al. 2014). 
Cooperatives can and do produce excellent coffee, and often win fine coffee 
competitions, both in Ethiopia and in other countries. Those cooperatives that 
export have in the last few years on average outperformed private plantations in 
terms of the prices they were able to command for coffee, even after controlling for 
certification (Minten et al. 2014). But especially in Ethiopia, where small farmers are 
often very poor, plantations seeking to produce specialty coffee are in many ways 
especially well placed to benefit from the new opportunities. As the next chapter 
will show, plantations have major advantages in terms of access to knowledge, 
seeds and labour – all of which are important for producing high quality coffee. 
Plantations, unlike cooperatives, also do not have to purchase the coffee they sell, 
and so are less subject to the cash constraints that often hobble the latter (NGO). 
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And where rural poverty is an impediment to cooperatives, one they are 
desperately seeking to overcome, plantation owners benefit from low wage costs. 
One might be tempted to argue that the introduction of the ECX and the problems it 
caused should have dampened the interest of capitalists to invest in coffee 
plantations. Instead, investment continued unabated after its introduction. The 
reason is simple. As I argue in the next chapter, for those capitalists already active 
in the coffee sector – akrabe and exporters – the ECX provided strong incentives to 
move into production in the coffee sector. Those capitalists that came from outside 
the coffee sector most probably did not understand enough about the intricacies of 
the coffee export trade to feel that the ECX threatened their interests, or had no wish 
to produce specialty coffee, in which case the introduction of the ECX does not 
matter much. 
In sum, the current opportunities for investment in coffee plantations, and for 
further accumulation on the basis of such plantations, came about through the 
confluence of government action and a favourable external market environment. As 
part of its drive to establish a development state, a desire rooted in the need for (at 
least a degree of) legitimacy and ultimately political survival, the government 
opened up land for investment and therefore made the emergence of coffee 
plantations in large numbers possible. The long history of both coffee production 
and of large coffee farms in the country ensured that that there were enough people 
who had the wish to grow coffee at scale and could access the knowledge necessary 
to do so. At the same time the regulatory changes in the coffee sector, which were 
not aimed at strengthening private capital, had the unintended consequence of 
strengthening the position of these plantations in the market. Or, to put it more 
precisely, the introduction of the ECX inadvertently offered opportunities for rapid 
accumulation to the most dynamic of the new capitalists. These same regulatory 
changes, as we shall see, also encouraged existing capitalists in the coffee sector to 
invest in plantations. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the evolution of the coffee market into its current form 
both internationally and in Ethiopia. Coffee is not a homogeneous ‘commodity’, but 
a highly differentiated product, and Ethiopian coffee in particular has the potential 
to command substantial price premiums.  
With regard to the Ethiopian coffee, I have made two main points. First, I have 
argued that the revenues associated with coffee production have been of central 
importance to the Ethiopian state and its political elites since at least the 1920s. 
Consequently, the Ethiopian state has always sought to regulate and control the 
sector, although this control has taken very different forms under successive 
governments. Second, I contended that the current accumulation in the coffee 
sector, by which I mean the growth of large-scale private coffee plantations, has 
deep historical roots which help us understand and illuminate current patterns. 
Haile Selassie’s imperial state, despite attempts at modernisation, lacked the 
administrative capacity to control the production stage of coffee to any real degree 
and satisfied itself with taxation. His regime also witnessed the first emergence of 
agrarian capitalism in the country, and the growth of the first modern coffee 
plantations after the Second World War. These plantations instituted wage labour 
on a large scale and used (some) modern agronomic techniques. The support 
institutions founded still exist today and migrations caused by the capitalists’ 
demand for workers reshaped the population around the largest concentrations of 
plantations, which are once again at the centre of agrarian capital accumulation. 
The Derg regime all but wiped out the capitalists. They built a much more 
centralised and powerful administrative machinery and greatly extended state 
control over the sector. For the first time, the state directly controlled and 
immediately involved itself in the production of coffee. While state ownership in 
land is surely the Derg’s most lasting legacy, some of the control systems instituted 
by the regime, notably the strict licensing system, remained in place. Moreover, the 
state farms founded to replace the plantations of imperial era capitalists, while 
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mismanaged and unproductive under the Derg, preserved knowledge about 
scientific farming methods and at least some of them went on to become examples 
of excellence in production. The next wave of coffee capitalists was then able to tap 
into the knowledge and skills thus preserved. 
The EPRDF substantially liberalised the coffee sector and over time dismantled 
many of the state institutions used to control the sector. Liberalisation was only ever 
partial though. After 2001 the change in economic strategy had profound effects on 
the coffee sector. On the one hand, the government, driven by the need to control 
the flow of revenues and in particular foreign exchange, moved to re-establish 
control over the sector. Paradoxically, this was achieved through the introduction of 
a commodity exchange, whose purpose was ostensibly to support the free market. 
On the other hand, at the same time the government’s new economic strategy led to 
a shift in its agricultural policy. Government at all levels became much more open 
to and supportive of large-scale private investment in agriculture. When land 
became available private capital flooded into new plantations. Unwittingly, the 
introduction of the ECX acted as a catalyst to this process. 
In the next chapter we turn to a detailed analysis of the new private coffee 
plantations and their emergence. I will discuss who was able to benefit from the 
new opportunities on offer and how they achieved this. In particular, I will show 
how the possibilities for accumulation emerge from the interaction of capitalist 
agency with the intended and unintended consequences of state action. By looking 
in depth at the operation of these new plantations I will also highlight the 
differences that exist between them. 
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Annex V.1  
  
Coffee processing and quality 
differentiation 
 
This annex gives a brief overview of the different possibilities that exist for 
processing coffee and how they are linked to coffee quality. It also provides some 
background information on the market for specialty coffee. 
After picking, the coffee bean first has to be processed into green coffee, the form 
the bean takes after it has been stripped out of the its surrounding fruit mucilage 
and several layers of skin and dried to a moisture content of around 11%. To then 
arrive at a palatable beverage the green beans must be roasted, ground and brewed1. 
There are two main ways of processing coffee from the cherry stage onward: the 
wet, washed or pulped process and the dry process, also referred to as natural or 
unwashed2. Both achieve a separation of the fruity mucilage of the cherry from the 
two coffee beans at the centre of each cherry. The older and less technically 
demanding of these is the dry process. After harvest, coffee cherries are simply laid 
out in the sun to dry, ideally on raised nets or beds to allow air to circulate, 
although poorer farmers may simply dry their coffee on the ground. In case of rain 
the coffee has to be covered to prevent it from getting wet. After about ten days, the 
cherry’s outer skin, mucilage and most inner skins have hardened into a dark black 
                                                     
1 The process for instant coffee includes additional steps, but as Ethiopia produces no instant 
coffee at present we will leave this aside. Another exception to the process outlined above is 
a tea – called kishir in Amharic – made from the husk of the coffee bean, usually brewed 
with milk, sugar and infused with spices, and widely drunk in parts of Ethiopia and the 
Middle East. This is a minor curiosity in the coffee trade though. 
2 Hybrid forms of the two processes, known as semi-washed, have become fashionable in 
the specialty coffee sector in recent years. The resulting coffees are often called ‘pulped 
naturals’ or ‘honey coffee’.   
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shell. This is removed in a mechanical hulling machine to yield green coffee. These 
beans are coated in a last fine layer of skin, the ‘silver skin’, which is polished off 
before export. Dry processed coffees are often characterised by a natural sweetness, 
as part of the sugars from the mucilage seep into the coffee beans during drying. 
However, the process is vulnerable to producing ‘off’ flavours in the final brewed 
coffee, mostly due to the growth of mould, and the results are less consistent than 
with wet processing. 
Washed coffees tend to fetch a premium in the market, as the resulting cup profile is 
generally cleaner. The wet process is more predictable, with less likelihood of 
producing unwanted flavour, but also requires substantially greater investment, 
more labour and an ample supply of fresh water. The exact details of the process 
vary, but generally the cherries are sorted, pulped in water, de-mulcified and, 
finally, dried. Sorting generally occurs in flotation tanks, where unripe cherries float 
on the surface of the water, while ripe cherries sink. Such sorting can also be used 
later in the process to separate heavier, higher-quality cherries from inferior ones. 
The cherries are then pulped in specialised machines which press the cherries 
through a screen that lets through the beans but holds back much of the mucilage. 
In poor countries such as Ethiopia, these machines must be imported and represent 
the majority of the capital invested in a washing station. The pulped beans are still 
coated with slimy mucilage, which must be removed. In Ethiopia, this is done 
through fermenting the beans in water for at least 24 hours to break down the 
sugars in the mucilage, and subsequently washing them in large quantities of fresh 
water, with workers using wooden implements to move the beans around. In other 
countries ‘washing machines’ may be used. After washing, the beans are dried to 
the desired moisture content, a process that takes around three days. The green 
coffee bean is surrounded by a dry white layer of skin, known as ‘parchment’. This 
is kept in place during storage but is removed prior to export. 
Coffee quality and speciality coffee 
As noted in the main chapter, coffee is a differentiated product, for which 
substantial niche markets exist. One of the most significant changes in the coffee 
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trade in recent decades has been the inexorable rise of speciality and certified 
coffees. What were once niche products, consumed mainly by ‘foodies’ and those 
concerned for the environment, have now become commonplace in the cafes and 
supermarket shelves of rich consumer countries. From an Ethiopian perspective the 
most important of these is the so-called specialty coffee sector3.  
Specialty coffee as an idea and as a movement originated in the USA in the late 
1970s, an era where price wars between large roasters had led to a degradation of 
the coffee available to consumers. Dissatisfied with the ‘commercial’ coffee on offer, 
small roasters began sourcing green beans to roast their own coffee4. Finding an 
eager following, initially mostly amongst the urban bohemians of the West Coast 
counterculture, they soon began importing coffee directly. The aim was to offer 
freshly roasted high-quality coffees, as well as to educate their customers about the 
complexities of their coffee choices. Consumers became increasingly sophisticated 
in their demands, and were willing to pay premium prices for high-quality coffees. 
Unlike mass market coffee, where consumers are attracted by low prices, ‘taste’ is 
the most important attribute in the specialty market, along with detailed 
information about origin and production processes. Also known as the ‘third wave’ 
                                                     
3 Specialty coffee is not the same thing as certified coffee. A specialty coffee may be certified, 
or not, and many certified coffees do not meet the quality requirements for specialty coffee. 
Certified coffees, which feature audit-backed standards and labelling systems to certify to 
the consumer that the coffee has been produced in accordance with certain economic, social 
or ecological minima, are of growing importance internationally (Panhuysen and Pierrot 
2014). Historically, they have played only a limited role in Ethiopia, but have been growing 
rapidly in recent years. For example, a 2004 estimate puts the share of certified organic 
coffee in Ethiopia at just 0.1% of total production, despite the fact that much Ethiopian coffee 
is ‘organic by default’ (Merkuria, Neuhoff, and Köpke 2004). Since then the proportion of all 
certified coffees (not just organic) has risen to around 16% in 2013 (Minten et al. 2014), and 
both capitalist plantations and cooperatives have sought various forms of certification. 
While certification has raised the export prices of certified Ethiopian coffee (Minten et al. 
2014), effects on farm incomes are less clear. Methodologically sound studies are scarce, but 
there appear to have been very limited effects on farm incomes for smallholders (e.g. Jena et 
al. 2012). The use of certification by private capitalists is discussed in the next chapter.  
4 In fact the distinction between the ‘commercial’ and the specialty sector is not always clear-
cut. Many ‘commercial’ roasters have begun offering specialty coffees alongside their lower 
quality products (Ponte 2002a; Daviron and Ponte 2005; Pendergrast 2010). And of course all 
specialty roasters are ‘commercial’ in the sense that they are profit-seeking capitalist 
enterprises. Conversely some ‘specialty’ roasters sell coffee that is expensive, but not of 
particularly high quality (CB2).  
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this growing movement led a renewal of the café culture in the US. Similar trends 
took place in Europe, although the average quality of coffee had been higher there 
(Pendergrast 2010; Wild 2005). Specialty roasters in US founded the Specialty Coffee 
Association of America (SCAA) in 1982, which has since played a leading role in 
setting standards for the sector (SCAA 2015). 
 Just as in ‘commercial’ sector, quality in the specialty trade has undergone a 
process of codification. While the assessment of coffee quality has a degree of 
subjectivity to it, the specialty trade has increasingly come to use the 100-point 
classification system developed by the SCAA for the assessment of coffees. Coffee is 
assessed for quality both as green coffee and as brewed coffee. Green coffee is 
sampled in units of 350g. These are assessed for ‘defects’, which cover a wide 
variety of imperfections in the bean, which are detrimental to the taste of brewed 
coffee. The sample is then roasted, ground, brewed and tasted (or ‘cupped’) using a 
standard protocol5. Coffee cupping has become an important profession, and a 
global standard for the training of cuppers (‘Q-graders’) has emerged. 
The quality of a given coffee depends on intrinsic both quality of the bean and on 
processing, including cleaning. Bean quality is in turn dependent on climate, soil 
attributes and the genetics of variety. Microclimates can have a noticeable impact on 
quality and it is common for farms producing specialty coffee to sort their coffees 
into ‘lots’ of different quality6. Whereas in the ‘commercial’ sector coffee is often 
bought based solely on the attributes of the contract (origin and grade), specialty 
coffee is generally purchased ‘subject to approval of sample’ and specialty buyers 
                                                     
5 Brewed coffees are assessed for fragrance/aroma, flavour, aftertaste, acidity, body, balance, 
sweetness, cleanness of ‘cup’, uniformity and defects. SCAA protocols for green and brewed 
grading are available on the SCAA website (see http://www.scaa.org/?page=resources). 
6 The taste of brewed coffee then of course depends on blending and roasting, as well as 
freshness and the competence of final preparation. The degree of roasting has a major 
influence on coffee taste. Even a medium roast already eliminates most of the specific ‘origin’ 
flavours of the coffee, with darker roasted coffees becoming less distinct, but imparting 
more of the traditional ‘coffee’ flavour. Roasting coffee darker can also hide the presence of 
‘defects’ in lower quality coffee. Both allow roasters, and large roasters in particular, to use 
blends with high quantities of low quality coffee as well as beans from many different 
origins and still mass-produce a predictable homogeneous product. Contrary to common 
assumption, coffee is a fresh product, which should be consumed no more than four weeks 
after roasting to preserve the flavour (Pendergrast 2010; Wild 2005; CB2). 
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will almost always insist on being able to sample and cup the coffee themselves, 
prior to purchase (Ponte 2002a; CB1, CB2). 
The price premiums available for very high-quality green coffee are substantial, and 
the highest quality green coffees can fetch multiples of the standard ‘C’ price (CB2). 
The ‘commercial’ sector values predictability and relies on blending to produce 
uniform coffees all year round, whereas the specialty sector generally looks for 
coffees that are high in acidity (which is considered a positive attribute). Specialty 
buyers are also interested in coffees with unusual taste profiles, such as natural (i.e. 
unwashed) coffees. An analysis of buying behaviour and prices at a leading 
specialty coffee auction, the Cup of Excellence, found that returns to increasing 
quality are very high, and that specialty buyers are willing to pay more for coffees 
offered in small lots and which are highly traceable (Wilson and Wilson 2014) 7. 
From the seller’s perspective, marketing to the specialty sector is not easy and 
requires significant investment in gaining knowledge of how such buyers evaluate 
and reward quality, not to mention the ability to produce high quality coffees in the 
first place. 
 
                                                     
7 See Ponte (2002a) for a detailed description of the Cup of Excellence. 
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Annex V.2 
 
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange 
(ECX) 
The conceptual basis of the ECX 
The ECX is the brainchild of a remarkable woman, Dr Eleni Gebre-Madhin, a US-
educated economist and expert in sub-Saharan African grain markets, who gave up 
her post at the World Bank to return to her native Ethiopia and lobby the 
government to open the country’s first commodity exchange. She managed to 
convince both the Ethiopian government and a critical mass of international donors 
of the merits of her idea and went on to become the first executive director of the 
newly-founded exchange in 2008. The intellectual origins of the exchange, as well 
the story of its birth, are recounted by the founder in her own words in Gebre-
Madhin (2012). The underlying notions are taken from new institutional economics 
(NIE), which has been explored in detail in Chapter Two, so that a brief restatement 
will suffice here. As elaborated in Chapter Two, NIE is – in part – a branch of 
economic theory that seeks to understand markets and the institutions that govern 
them through an analysis of transaction and contracting costs. The basic notions 
hark back to the original ideas of Coase (1937), who tried to understand why firms 
exist in capitalist market economies. His answer laid out, in plain English, the 
concept of transaction costs, viewed through the lens of marginal analysis1. The 
study of economic institutions was revived decades later as an extension of the neo-
classical theoretical apparatus and found perhaps its most influential guise in the 
seminal work of North (1990). In Chapter Two it was already noted that for North, 
institutions (the oft-cited ‘rules of the game’, encompassing formal and informal 
                                                     
1 While Coase’s work was discursively rich and made reference to Dobb, Kaldor, Keynes, 
Knight and Robinson, it is only really the concept of transaction costs that survived the 
translation into the more technical apparatus of mathematical modelling. 
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rules, as well as enforcement mechanisms) evolve to reduce transaction costs to 
allow for increasingly complex market exchange to take place. In the absence of 
such efficiency-enhancing institutions markets are likely to be restricted to fewer 
and more simple transactions, limiting overall economic development. A central 
aspect of North’s argument is that efficiency-enhancing institutions do not evolve 
automatically, and that, due to path dependency caused by a complex array of 
factors, highly inefficient institutions can persist for long periods of time.  
An implication of these ideas is that institutions can be created to solve 
informational asymmetries and reduce transaction and contracting costs2. In other 
words: "At its core, then, the problem of economic order can be conceived as 
essentially a coordination problem, depending integrally on both information and 
on the nature of contracts" (Gebre-Madhin and Goggin 2005: 4). This is an almost 
canonical statement of new institutionalist dogma. The irony is that a reading of 
Douglas North’s more recent work may have imparted a more critical, and, as is 
argued below, somewhat more relevant perspective on the functioning of economic 
institutions. In Violence and social order3 North and his co-authors argue that power is 
central to social and economic order and that the prosperity of a society is in large 
part determined by how mechanisms for the creation and distribution of rents – 
they refer to these as ‘access orders’ -  function (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). 
Moreover, for them power is not a diffuse concept, but rather is understood as the 
ability to coerce others. The nature of many economic institutions is thus 
determined by the outcomes of elite bargains (see also Chapter Two). It seems these 
insights were lost on the founders of the ECX. As Gebre-Madhin (2009) puts it: ”A 
market is above all a connection between humans, an exchange of goods and money 
that links two sides. The market is neutral as to who is on either side, it is the 
connection that counts”. 
In her work on grain markets in Ethiopia, Gebre-Madhin had observed that such 
markets were often extremely inefficient and failed in their basic function of 
                                                     
2 A very useful overview of the theory and implications of asymmetric information can be 
found in Stiglitz (2000). 
3 Rather heroically subtitled A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. 
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distributing food to where it was needed (Gebre-Madhin 2001; Gabre-Madhin et al. 
1999)4. Not only did a lack of infrastructure raise transport costs, but asymmetries of 
information between participants in the value chains, farmers and traders, allowed 
for unfair pricing practices (from the point of view of direct producers and smaller 
traders). The absence of uniform standards and measures meant that goods had to 
be weighed and repackaged at every step of every transaction, which cost both time 
and money, and, as contracts were either non-existent or not easily enforceable, 
trade was either limited to short-distances (Gebre-Madhin 2012) or occurred mostly 
in trust-based social networks, implying substantial screening costs and forgone 
trading opportunities (Fafchamps 2004). In short, what was missing was the 
institutional underpinnings that would allow markets to function as intended. 
Gebre-Madhin not only diagnosed the weaknesses of the Ethiopian grain marketing 
system, but also began proposing solutions. In 2002 she had the opportunity to 
present her ideas to leading Ethiopian government officials, including the prime 
minister. She argued that it was necessary to “[go] beyond infrastructure such as 
roads, [and] put in place the market institutions needed for quality grades and 
standards, warehouse receipts, market information, coordinated trading, payment 
systems, and contract enforcement. All of these  […] should be established in a 
holistic and integrated fashion, rather than in the piecemeal approach observed all 
over Africa in different donor interventions” (Gebre-Madhin 2012: 5). She 
concluded by proposing the creation of a commodity exchange in Ethiopia as ”[…] 
precisely the holistic platform that would integrate all of these elements” (Gebre-
Madhin 2012: 5).  
                                                     
4 But while rural markets in poor countries in general, and in Ethiopia in particular, of 
course have problems, not least related to transport, they can in fact operate quite effectively. 
For instance, in a major study on teff markets in Ethiopia Minton et al. (2013) found that not 
only is the share of final retail prices received by direct producers above 80% (much higher 
than in coffee), but it has also been growing over the past ten years. The share taken by 
traders is relatively modest. Given that these traders perform vital services, they actually 
operate very efficiently and are in many cases quite innocent of the charges compiled 
against them in public discourse, where they are stereotypically depicted as parasitical 
market manipulators. 
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As a future CEO of the ECX, Anteneh Assefa, was to state later, Ethiopia’s 
agricultural commodity markets suffered from a lack of both structure and order. 
Market structure referred to poor infrastructure and high transaction costs which 
led to fragmented markets. The lack of order manifested itself in loose overall 
market regulation, leaving many individual market actors only weakly regulated 
(Assefa 2013). A 2005 concept note for the exchange laid out how the future ECX, 
backed by state-of-the-art IT systems, could provide a trustworthy trading 
infrastructure, generate and distribute market information, screen and regulate 
participants, define standardised grades and contracts and enforce payments 
against such contracts. Such a ‘holistic’ system would allow for price discovery in a 
single integrated and efficient market (Gebre-Madhin and Goggin 2005).  
The ECX has been ‘sold’ as a mechanism of empowerment for small farmers, with 
Gebre-Madhin in particular waxing lyrical about the power of the (free, unfettered) 
market to deliver ‘happiness’ by offering ‘choice’ (Gebre-Madhin 2007b). This 
language all but disappeared after the ECX became mandatory for the coffee trade. 
A former senior official of the exchange claims that small farmers “are now getting 
better prices via bargaining power achieved through better information”. He cites 
the increase in the share of FOB price received by direct producers to 60% as 
evidence (EG9). This claim does not stand up to even superficial scrutiny5. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the increase in the average producers’ share of FOB 
prices was the result of a market liberalisation drive that preceded the foundation of 
the ECX. Unsurprisingly, the ECX has, without giving reasons, refused formal 
                                                     
5 Apart from offering a rather naïve view on the political economy of local coffee markets in 
rural areas, where the bargaining power of small farmers may be constrained by credit 
arrangements with coffee buyers (CC1, CC2, CC4), this opinion also neglects the fact that it 
is almost impossible for farmers to know the quality (grade) of the cherries they are selling – 
a key determinant of their market value. The grade depends partially on the intrinsic quality 
of the cherries, partly on the degree of purity and ripeness and partly on the way they are 
processed. The grade will not become clear until the processed coffee is brought to the ECX 
by the akrabe, long after the farmer has sold his cherries. It also appears that akrabe (or the 
sebsabe working for them) do not tend to engage in price negotiations at all, but rather set 
fixed prices with reference to the prices paid by local cooperatives and competing akrabe 
(AK2).  
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impact assessments of its work6, and researchers analysing the available evidence 
have found that the formation of the ECX has had no statistically significant impact 
on the producers’ price share (Jayne et al. 2014).  
Given that smallholders were supposed to be the main beneficiaries, the extremely 
low levels of participation by smallholder cooperatives in the exchange have been a 
source of embarrassment for both government and exchange officials. Cooperatives 
have been very difficult to attract to the exchange. Even when membership was 
offered  to them at highly subsidised rates, uptake was very low7. Reasons for this 
include the “lack of awareness” at the level of the cooperatives (EG9). 
The legal and functional structure of the ECX 
In 2005 the Ethiopian government accepted the findings of the concept note cited 
above and agreed to push ahead with the formation of the ECX. The project was 
able to attract US$29m in donor funding, with the US and Canada as well as the 
World Bank, IFAD and UNDP donating substantial sums. The money allowed the 
project team to hire an international group of experts to lead the development of the 
exchange (Gebre-Madhin 2012). The ECX was finally established in 2007, with 
Proclamation No. 550:2007 providing the legal foundation8. It was founded as a 
public-private ‘demutualised entity’, meaning that ownership, management and 
membership are separate by law. Its mission is “to transform the Ethiopian 
economy by becoming a global commodity market of choice” (ECX 2015). 
Proclamation No. 551/2007, issued the same year, established the Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange Authority (ECXA), which is part of the Ethiopian public 
administration and under the direct control of the Ministry of Agriculture, to 
provide oversight over the ECX. Direct control of the exchange is given over to an 
                                                     
6 Even though these were apparently offered free of charge by both IFPRI and Oxford 
University. 
7 The ECX opened 30 subsidised membership seats just for cooperatives and only 19 were 
taken up (EG9). 
8As Ethiopia uses the calendar of the Ethiopian Tewahedo Orthodox Church, this was the 
millennium in the local calendar. The date is significant because the government of Ethiopia 
had chosen the new millennium to proclaim the Ethiopian renaissance, which heralded a 
large push in investment and a new focus on economic growth.  
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11-member board of directors, of whom six (including the chairperson) are 
appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and the remainder are selected by 
members (ECX 2015). All are currently male. In the past some of these member 
appointments have been employees of state-owned enterprises of party-affiliated 
endowment companies, and hence of questionable independence from the 
government (Mezlekia 2009). The board of directors oversees the management team 
of the exchange, which in turn is led by the CEO. Eleni Gebre-Madhin was duly 
appointed as the first CEO, a position she held until late 2012 (Horn Affairs 2012). 
To be able to trade directly at the exchange, a membership is necessary and this 
must be acquired through a sealed bidding process. Memberships were initially 
sold to founding members for only around US$5,000, but prices for seats quickly 
reached several hundred thousand US$ (Gebre-Madhin 2012). There are different 
types of membership – members can either chose to trade only on their own account, 
or choose the more sought after, and therefore more expensive option of having a 
full trading account that allows them to trade also on behalf of others9. Membership 
is subject to strict rules: members must inter alia show that they have a net worth of 
at least ETB500,000 and up to ETB1m, depending on membership class. They must 
also, for the duration of their membership, deposit either ETB200,000 or ETB300,000 
with the ECX to be used as a guarantee for the daily settlements made by the 
exchange (ECX 2010: 18). Non-members have the option of trading through an ECX 
member with a full trading membership against payment of a fee. Many akrabe who 
do not sell enough coffee to warrant paying for a membership, or simply lack the 
funds to do so, use this latter method. The ECX member through whom trade is 
conducted is then generally referred to as an ‘agent’.   
                                                     
9 Own-account-only members are called ‘trading members’, while members who can trade 
on own-account and on behalf of others are called ‘intermediate members’. In addition there 
are also so-called ‘limited’ memberships, which are either buy-only or sell-only and limited 
to a single commodity. To add to the confusion buy-only members may also sell on the 
exchange, but only if their membership is for coffee only, i.e. if they are coffee exporters 
(ECX 2010: 15). 
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Functionally, the setup of the ECX is both simple and reasonably efficient. 
Suppliers10 deposit their wares in special ECX warehouses. These used to belong to 
an older warehousing initiative run by MoARD, but were taken over by the ECX 
(Coulter Consulting 2012). Warehouses are distributed across the areas where 
production of ECX-traded commodities takes place. Arriving goods are sampled, 
weighed and graded and the depositor is issued with a warehouse receipt, which is 
electronically logged. This decentralised system of safe storage relieves traders of 
much of the cost and risk of bringing goods to market. Prior to the ECX, akrabe had 
to bring their coffee all the way to Addis Ababa or Dire Dawa and faced the full risk 
of loss or damage, as well the transportation costs themselves. Payments are now 
guaranteed through the ECX settlement mechanism and are processed within 24 
hours. Previously akrabe faced a high risk of payment default. In this sense the ECX 
has been a boon to the akrabe. Exporters, on the other hand, now have to transport 
any coffee they purchase from the local ECX warehouse in the producing area to 
their own warehouses and export processing stations in Addis Ababa, meaning 
they now face the risks previously borne by the akrabe (CELF). 
Once goods are deposited in the warehouse and logged on the ECX’s system, they 
can be traded. ECX trading proceeds on the basis of standardised contracts, which 
in the case of coffee, state the geographic area of origin, the volume (which is fixed), 
the quality grade and the price. Trading itself is blind in that the buyer does not 
know whose coffee he or she is buying. Pricing proceeds entirely on the bases of 
origin and grade (EG9, CE). One reason for this is the ECX’s warehousing system in 
which deposited goods are ‘commingled’. The warehouses operate a first-in-first-
out system, which treats all coffees of the same grade and from the same area as 
completely equivalent (Coulter Consulting 2012). This means that coffees from 
different processing stations are mixed together in a single lot for sale and coffees 
cannot be traced back to their exact point of origin. In effect, the link between the 
processing station and the final product is severed. In practice this means that a 
direct trading relationship between akrabe and exporters is no longer possible11. The 
                                                     
10 The exchange currently trades coffee, sesame, haricot beans, maize and wheat. 
11 Enterprising processors and exporters have of course found ways around this. 
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blind trading is also supposed to make collusion between buyers and sellers 
difficult, or even impossible, and so allow for market prices to reflect supply and 
demand accurately. 
Trading takes place exclusively on the ECX’s physical trading floor in Addis Ababa, 
and operates through open out-cry auction. Prices are recorded electronically 
immediately after a deal is struck and are distributed in real-time via the ECX 
website, as texts to mobile phones and on a series of electronic display boards 
across the country (Alemu and Meijerink 2010). The ECX has an in-house settlement 
and clearing system that works directly with the banks of its members. All claims 
are settled within 24 hours and the ECX is understandably proud of never having 
had a default (ECX 2010c). The exchange wants to introduce a decentralised online-
trading system in addition to its physical trading floor, but as of the time writing 
this system had not yet been put in place (AllAfrica 2014). 
Given that the exchange was supposedly founded to increase the efficiency of 
Ethiopia’s coffee markets, it is striking that the ECX allows only spot trading. Future 
trading and options on futures are – for better or for worse – important parts of 
international coffee markets, allowing market participants to hedge their positions 
(ITC 2011; Talbot 2004). In fact, Gebre-Madhin herself believed futures trading to be 
of vital importance. As she states in a concept note written prior to the introduction 
of the ECX: “Can the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECEX) be successful in the 
sense that it attracts and retains significant market players, improves market 
performance, and expands the size and scope of the market without offering 
contracts for future delivery to its clients? The simple answer is No.” (Gebre-
Madhin 2007a: 1). The fact that such a simple instrument as a future contract was 
not introduced into the ECX is a further indication that the imperative of control (in 
this case over ‘speculators’) trumped any considerations of market efficiency in the 
eyes of the government. 
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Chapter six 
 
The new coffee capitalists 
  
6.1 Introduction 
The rapid emergence of large-scale agriculture financed and run by private capital 
is one of the most striking changes to have occurred in Ethiopia’s coffee sector since 
the end of the civil war in 1991. Huge areas are given over to private investors, who 
promise new capital, modern agronomic techniques and jobs. As the previous two 
chapters have demonstrated, the growth of agrarian capital was made possible by a 
silent and often hidden, but decisive, shift in government strategy, which seeks to 
increase agricultural exports to provide (part of) the funds needed to finance 
national development plans. 
In this chapter it will be shown  how the relatively sudden introduction of large-
scale capitalist agriculture has entailed the creation of a whole new class of agrarian 
capitalists, or rather it has enticed large numbers of capitalists to invest into 
agrarian production and offered those with sufficient funds the first opportunity to 
become capitalists. This resulted in land use changes on a massive scale, and has 
necessitated the mobilisation of a large – though mostly seasonal – labour force, 
both within Ethiopia’s coffee regions, and beyond, generating great migratory 
movements that travel with the harvest. As was argued in the last chapter, these 
patterns of capital accumulation have important historical antecedents and lineages. 
This chapter takes up the arguments made in the last chapter and connects 
contemporary accumulation processes to their historical roots, while investigating 
their implications for the present. 
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The discussion presented here orients itself along the central themes identified in 
Chapter Three – that is, the origins of accumulators, the processes of accumulation, 
the role of labour and the actions of the state – and provides answers with respect to 
Ethiopia’s new coffee capitalists. The sample of coffee capitalists examined in the 
quantitative survey is presented in Section 6.2. Thereafter, the analysis will proceed 
along the following questions: First, who is able to accumulate enough to enter the 
sector and what are their motivations for doing so (Section 6.3)? Second, how do 
prospective capitalists avail themselves of the most basic prerequisites for 
production – namely suitable land in sufficient quantities (Section 6.4)? Third, how 
do these farms, once established, fare in terms of production (Section 6.5) and 
labour mobilisation (Section 6.6)? Fourth, to what extent can the Ethiopian state be 
said to be nurturing private capitalist enterprise in the coffee sector? The previous 
chapter has already laid out the strategic orientation of the Ethiopian state with 
regard to the coffee sector, and I will here make reference to the intended and 
unintended consequences of state action throughout this chapter. Lastly, in Section 
6.7, the differences between the coffee capitalists will be explored with the aim of 
demonstrating how one subgroup of them has become especially successful 
accumulators. This has important policy implications for the whole coffee sector. 
In relation to state action it is important to investigate notions of state power and 
control. While the organisational capabilities of the Ethiopian government, and the 
level of control it is able to exert over the political process, seem either impressive or 
overbearing – depending on one’s vantage point – the reality on the ground is 
rather more complicated1. Here we encounter a state whose organs vie for control of 
basic resources, such as arable land, with a burgeoning and ever more self-confident 
class of new capitalists. The state administration is far from monolithic. Lower 
levels of administration are shown to be vulnerable to the lure of money, and in 
                                                     
1 This kind of nuance is difficult to capture for institutional theories of the kind Acemoglu et 
al. employ, in part due to their methodological commitment to regression analysis using 
cross-country data. 
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some areas government orders are openly defied and flaunted2 . The previous 
chapter showed how the Ethiopian state has taken strategic action to maintain its 
control over coffee revenues at national level; this chapter shows how, at local level, 
that control is much more patchy and contingent.  
The analysis here will focus – for the most part – only on those farms actually 
sampled rather than the entire sector, but it is to be recalled from Chapter Three that 
the sample has been carefully constructed as an analytically relevant representation 
of the sector. It is the first, and to date only, study of Ethiopia’s coffee plantation 
capitalists. Up to now we have had only the most perfunctory information about 
this diverse group of people, almost all of it from nationally representative farm 
surveys, which are designed to collect only very basic data on farm sizes and 
production, as well as a smattering of references to the activities of this group from 
studies dealing with other subjects (El Ouaamari and Cochet 2014)3.  
6.2 Sample characteristics 
Before heading into a discussion of accumulation pathways and an analysis of how 
the new coffee capitalists acquire and use the other main factors – land and labour – 
I will briefly lay out the main characteristics of the quantitative sample4. After 
discussing their basic demographic characteristics, including gender, age and 
educational attainment, I present their family background and land holdings. 
Plantation capitalists are, not surprisingly given Ethiopia’s overwhelmingly 
patriarchal society, mostly male, and older than the average. In fact, all but two of 
the respondents were male. Respondents were on average 48 years old, the 
youngest being 30 and the oldest 74 years of age at the time of research. They are 
                                                     
2 Jessop's (2016) strategic-relational approach to the state specifically points to this kind of 
contestation. See also Khan (2010)’s insistence on the importance of informal rules in 
defining the maintenance cost of an institutional structure. 
3 These surveys are also likely to miss out many key emerging capitalist farmers, due to their 
relatively limited number. 
4  As explained in Chapter Two, not all respondents were willing to submit to a full 
quantitative questionnaire as well as in-depth qualitative questions, nor was the quantitative 
questionnaire an appropriate tool for capturing the activities of all types of respondents. 
Therefore the summary of quantitative data presented here covers only that part of the 
sample that was interviewed using a structured questionnaire, i.e. 36 farmers. 
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much better educated than the norm, having on average completed secondary 
school, i.e. enjoyed 12 years of schooling. In comparison, according to the latest 
available Ethiopian census in 2007,  over half of the population had never attended 
school and of those who had over 70% had never gone beyond primary school (CSA 
2010). Figure 6.1 shows the educational attainment across the sample. Clearly, the 
new capitalists are part of the educational elite. Forty percent attended university, 
mostly in Ethiopia, and all but one of those that went to university completed at 
least an undergraduate degree. One had a Master’s degree and one had a PhD. Most 
did not, however, have degrees related to agriculture or plant science, preferring 
business degrees instead. Only around 28% did not complete secondary school, and 
of these only two did not complete primary school5. 
Figure 6.1 - Distribution of educational attainment (in %) (Source: own survey) 
 
Almost all, regardless of gender, were married, with only a few of the younger men 
as yet unmarried. Children were common, though almost all had fewer children 
than their parents, reflecting a generational difference in child preference. Across all 
                                                     
5 This is strikingly different to early research on capitalist farmers in India in the 1960s, 
where the first systematic study of the Punjab area found that almost 70% of large farmers 
were illiterate and less than 3% were educated up to college level (Rudra, Majid, and Talib 
1990: 20). While this of course also reflects lower levels of formal education generally 
compared to contemporary times, it also point clearly to the origins of many of Ethiopia’s 
coffee capitalists differ from non-agricultural elites, where higher education is more 
common. 
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educational backgrounds respondents invested in the education of their own 
children, and around half who had school age children were paying to have them 
privately educated6. Many took noticeable pride in detailing the educational and 
professional achievements of their offspring, with completed university degrees 
and entry into a recognised profession seemingly held in particularly high regard7. 
The capitalists come from a wide variety of family backgrounds, as shown in Figure 
6.28. About half of them come from farming families, albeit of dramatically different 
scales. While many come from small or medium farms (generally no larger than 
10ha), some of their fathers, those in the large scale farmer category below, had 
themselves been large-scale agrarian capitalists during the imperial period, and 
they had often grown coffee. Also, five of the capitalists are the descendants of old 
‘feudal’ landlords. Both of these findings indicate the importance of historical 
precedents to current accumulation patterns, as these capitalists frequently cite their 
family’s former glories as an inspiration to accumulate wealth themselves, and in 
particular to move into coffee. All in all, less than half of the coffee capitalists had 
any family history in coffee, but many come from families whose parents were 
involved in the production and/or sale of commodities. 
                                                     
6 Many state schools, especially secondary schools, are regarded as weak, and the situation is 
worse outside of big cities. 
7 Parents of medical doctors and engineers seemed especially proud. 
8 Similar findings are presented by Cheater in her study of agrarian change in the Msengezi 
region of Zimbabwe. She reports that the pioneer capitalist famers in the region “tended to 
be men of some education, retired teachers, policemen and church workers” (Cheater 1984: 
85). 
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Figure 6.2 - Main parental occupation of all sampled farmers (Source: own survey). 
 
In terms of geographic distribution, 21 of the capitalists had plantations in Oromia, 
of which 18 were in Jimma zone, two in Kelem Wellega and one in West Wellega.  
Of the 18 capitalists in Jimma zone, all but one were sited in Limu Kossa woreda. 
Another 15 capitalists have farms in SNNPR, of whom 12 were in Kafa and three in 
the Bench Maji zone. In addition to these plantations, six of the aforementioned 
capitalists also held second plantations.  
Figure 6.3 - Size distribution of coffee land holdings (in ha) in the sample (Source: own survey) 
 
Collectively, the capitalists interviewed by quantitative questionnaire claimed to 
hold 8,308ha of land, with an average size of 230ha, with a median holding of 
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152ha. Figure 6.3 presents the distribution of land holdings for those that completed 
the quantitative questionnaire. Another 3,632ha were held by the 13 capitalists 
interviewed through semi-structured qualitative interviews. The average land 
holding for this group is 279ha owing to the presence of large and very wealthy 
exporters in this group, while the vast majority of farms are smaller than 200ha.  
To arrive at an aggregate we must add the 11,000ha controlled by a particularly 
large capitalist who had just purchased one of the former state farms. In total the 
coffee capitalists interviewed claimed to control some 22,940ha. The figures for the 
sample are presented here, because Section 6.4, which deals with land acquisition, 
uses administrative data to try and present the situation beyond the confines of the 
sample chosen for interviews. First though it is important to analyse how capitalists 
came to be able to command the capital necessary to start plantations of this 
magnitude. 
6.3 Capital accumulation 
This section will begin with a discussion of how much capital is necessary to 
establish a coffee plantation. As we shall see, the amounts involved are relatively 
modest on a per hectare basis. Farms can be developed initially using a very ‘bare 
bones’ approach and more land equipment can be added when revenue from sales 
is available. I then concentrate on how the process of accumulation actually works 
and offer a heuristic typology of the accumulation pathways taken by the capitalists 
I examined. 
6.3.1 Capital requirements 
Ethiopia’s new coffee capitalists are a highly diverse group and there are 
substantive differences in how they achieved the accumulation of capital. The 
pathways developed below refer to the last step of accumulation; providing 
information on how some people were able to command sufficient capital to start a 
coffee plantation. Entry into large-scale plantation farming is more often than not 
the latest step in a long process of capital accumulation, where new businesses are 
opened or acquired, existing businesses are expanded, and older businesses, or the 
capital bound up in them, are sold to release funds for new investments. A second 
 214 
 
question is therefore: how did the future coffee capitalists become capitalists, 
regardless of sector, in the first place? These first instances of capital investment and 
accumulation are often made possible by recourse to loans from family or friends, 
or by savings from (relatively) well-paid salaried work. Ethiopia’s development 
bank will only lend to large-scale endeavours and its commercial banks require 
high levels of ‘hard’ collateral, such as buildings or cars, making them unsuitable 
for prospective capitalists seeking to finance their own business. Only once they are 
already established do Ethiopia’s capitalists gain access to Ethiopia’s banking 
system. Thus becoming even a small capitalist generally requires either a well-off 
family or social network, capable of providing seed funds and loans, or a high level 
of education to be able to access well-remunerated jobs. In Ethiopia, a high level of 
education in turn almost always implies a financially secure upbringing.  
To establish coffee plantations requires only modest sums per hectare, but 
establishing large farms requires correspondingly large capital outlays. Land has to 
be cleared and coffee trees planted, all of which require large amounts of – hard, 
physical – labour. This labour is provided almost exclusively by wage workers, who 
must of course be paid9. Planting also requires seedlings, meaning that seeds must 
be purchased and raised in a nursery. Farms in forest areas generally lack even the 
most basic of infrastructure, all of which has to be built and installed, including 
buildings, access ways, water, and electrical connections or generators. While, as is 
shown in greater detail below, planting can be undertaken in a sequential manner, 
the four-year lag between planting and the first harvest, during which regular 
weeding must be undertaken, means that prospective coffee capitalists need access 
to large amounts of cash in advance. 
A comprehensive breakdown of the costs of establishing a modern coffee plantation 
in Ethiopia has been produced by the main lobbying group for the coffee capitalists, 
                                                     
99 Some of the less cash-rich capitalists do employ family members, typically as supervisors 
or clerical workers, but the contribution of family labour to the overall labour input is 
marginal. This is very different, for instance, to the cocoa capitalists studied by Hill (1970), 
many of whom relied on family labour to establish their initial capital (i.e. cocoa trees). 
Austin (2005) notes how the first generation of cocoa farmers in Ghana had to rely on prior 
accumulation to be able to assemble workforce sufficient to establishing a cocoa farm. 
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ECGPEA. The document is exceptionally comprehensive. It details the labour 
requirements per hectare for even the most minute of tasks and provides lists of 
materials required. According to the document, a total of ETB44,791 per hectare 
were required in 2008 to bring in a first harvest (ECGPEA 2008). Adding inflation 
gives ETB95.571 per hectare, in 2012, which is close to the estimate of ETB105,000 
per hectare provided by the head of the association during an interview (CL)10.   
Comparing these estimates to the actual investments undertaken by the coffee 
capitalists is not straightforward. The data on actual investment costs was difficult 
to acquire, as many of the capitalists were unwilling to discuss investment 
volumes11. The findings presented here were carefully triangulated from interviews 
with the most consistent respondents 12 . Capitalists typically invest between 
ETB20,000 and ETB47,000 per hectare to bring a newly established land to its first 
harvest. Estimates are biased towards the upper limit and the median value is 
around ETB39,000 (approximately US$2,160) per hectare. The difference to 
ECGPEA’s figures is notable, but not large and readily explained. First, the figures 
on real investment do not include expenditure on transport vehicles or on 
processing equipment. Both of these are desirable but not essential to running a 
coffee plantation, and can be hired as needed. Second, the discrepancy shows that 
most Ethiopian coffee capitalists are capital constrained and cannot make the levels 
of investment that would be considered optimal for both productivity and quality. 
Lastly, the ECGPEA figures are possibly inflated for political reasons. The 
association produced this document in the hope that it would act as a baseline for 
banks looking to lend to coffee capitalists (CL), and the association therefore has 
every incentive to exaggerate cost estimates. 
My figures contrast sharply with official data. For instance, Deininger, Harris, and 
Ali (2015), using data from the CSA’s commercial farms surveys, report a mean per 
hectare investment of just ETB7,920 (Deininger, Harris, and Ali 2015: 17). I found 
                                                     
10 At the time of research 1US$ equalled approximately ETB18. 
11 This is normally something business people are proud of. 
12 Consistency was assessed through the use of cross-checking questions distributed across 
the quantitative questionnaire.  
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only two farms with comparably low levels of investment, one which had invested 
only ETB5,000 per hectare and another which claimed to have invested ETB8,500 
per hectare (LCF33, LCF14). Both are notable outliers compared to the rest of the 
sample. The main reason for the very low levels of investment in both cases was a 
severely limited access to capital, which meant that both capitalists relied on small 
workforces and neither farmer had any form of mechanisation. Donkeys were the 
exclusive form of transport in both instances, and both farms lacked basic 
infrastructure. As is shown in Section 6.5.1 this is quite atypical and far from 
representative for the sector as a whole. Deininger et al. report their figures without 
any attempt at explanation, so the reasons for the divergence of their findings can 
only be speculated upon. Underreporting of capital and other measures of business 
size appears to have long dogged the CSA’s commercial farm surveys, although the 
CSA considers the problem solved as a result of new data collection techniques 
(Beyene 2015). Given the data presented above, this conclusion appears somewhat 
premature. 
Access to credit appears to be an important, though not by itself a decisive element 
in allowing new coffee capitalists to access enough capital for investment. About 
53% of plantation capitalists have taken out loans to invest in their farms. However, 
in many instances the loans were used not to establish the plantation, but rather to 
expand the business once in operation, by spending money on developing new 
land, or by purchasing processing and transport equipment. On average, capitalists 
financed about 78% of the required initial capital for setting up plantations from 
their existing investments, i.e. through retained profits. Half of the capitalists claim 
to have financed all of their initial investments in this way, and over 72% say they 
generated at least half of the initial capital from existing businesses. The reasons for 
this ‘bootstrapping’ approach are clear: especially in the early days of the sector’s 
development, banks were simply unwilling to lend to coffee plantations. A majority 
of capitalists report applying for a loan but being turned down, while a significant 
minority did not even try applying for one, since, as they say, they knew the 
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application would be turned down13 . While the DBE, as the main provider of 
subsidised finance, had initially lent to coffee plantations as far back as 2002, it 
appears only few loans were actually made. Beginning in 2008 the DBE underwent 
a reform process (see also Chapter Seven), which refocused its lending towards 
‘commercial’ operations, unhelpfully defined as plantations larger than 150ha. 
Predictably, by 2013 the DBE had extended not one loan to plantations in the Jimma 
area, the largest concentration of coffee capitalists, since 2008 (DBE1, see also 
Section 6.4.2). With no leadership from the DBE, private commercial banks, rightly 
sceptical of their ability to correctly appraise the risks involved in the plantation 
business, would lend only against very high collateral, which had to be provided in 
physical assets. Faced with a lack of credit, many capitalists were forced to use a 
piecemeal approach to developing their plantations, with further investment made 
after each harvest cycle, often starting from surprisingly small planted areas14.  
6.3.2 A heuristic typology of coffee capitalists 
A typology can be a useful heuristic device in mapping the diversity of 
accumulation paths, showing who gets to accumulate, how they accumulate, and 
how they interact with state power in their endeavours. Such a typology of 
accumulation pathways is, however, no more than a tool of representation. 
Differences between categories are often a question of degree, and there are 
numerous cases of overlap, as will be discussed below. A typology should not be 
understood as a collection of ideal types, drawn up according to some theoretical 
premise, but rather as an aid in ordering a complicated empirical reality.  
The typology of coffee capitalists engaged in plantation agriculture offered here is 
the result of extensive and careful mixed methods fieldwork (see Chapter Three). In 
addition to the quantitative survey, which recorded a contemporaneous snapshot of 
the various variables of interest, in-depth semi-structured interviews were used to 
unearth the life and business histories of respondents. Beginning with their 
                                                     
13 A small minority pride themselves on not having used any credit. This sentiment is 
especially common in more remote areas. 
14  The credit that was obtained by farmers was built on collateral from previous 
accumulation, most frequently houses and cars. 
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geographic and family origins, respondents were invited to trace the development 
of their accumulation across all of the various activities they were engaged in. Great 
care was taken to understand the motivations behind business decisions, the nature, 
causes and consequences of shocks or windfalls, and the capitalists’ own evaluation 
of the changing external environment.  In the case of older respondents this latter 
included three very different governments and ways of ordering and organising 
production at the level of society as a whole. These life-business histories were then 
cross-referenced with data from the quantitative survey, with information from 
other respondents and with the published literature on historical developments in 
Ethiopia, both local and national. The outcome is a set of very detailed profiles that 
allow us to understand who these accumulators are and how they came to 
accumulate. 
The typology offered here maps and differentiates capitalists according to the main 
activity which allowed them to enter the coffee plantation business and is the basis 
for the detailed analyses of their command over capital, land and labour. That is, it 
is generally the last and most important area in which the capitalist was able to 
accumulate prior to entering the plantation business. The broad categorisation also 
allows some insight into likely command over local connections and knowledge, 
both of business in general and of coffee in particular. Table 6.1 presents the main 
categories of capitalists active in the Ethiopian coffee sector, along with some 
summary statistics that allow us to gauge the relative importance to the sector 
overall15. There are five main accumulation pathways, namely: merchant capital, 
employment (the capitalist used savings from a high paying job either in the public 
sector or the private sector, including NGOs), diaspora (meaning the money was 
accumulated abroad), family (the capital was injected by the capitalist’s own 
family), and farming. By far the largest group is merchant capital. Within this group 
we can identify akrabe (i.e. coffee processors), coffee exporters who moved into the 
plantation business, other traders, and business owners not involved in trade. 
                                                     
15 As has been mentioned several times, the sample was selected to be analytically relevant 
and is not statistically representative. 
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Table 6.1 - Categorisation of all sampled coffee capitalists (Source: own survey). 
Accumulation category 
Number of 
capitalists 
Percent of 
sample  
(%) 
Total land 
held  
(ha) 
Percent of 
total land held  
(%) 
Average land 
held per 
capitalist 
(ha) 
Average share 
of initial farm 
capital from 
own sources 
(%)* 
 
Share who 
have taken out 
loans for the 
farm  
(%)* 
Merchant capital 24 48 5,136 43 214 89 63 
of whom exporters 5 9.8 1,463 12.3 292 - - 
Employment 8 16 2,607 21.8 326 75 67 
Diaspora 7 14 1,801 15.1 258 73 25 
Family 7 14 1,414 11.8 202 63 25 
Farming 4 8 982 8.2 246 53 100 
Total 50 100 11,940 100 243 78 58 
NB: An asterisk (*) indicates that data were taken from the quantitative sample only. Exporters were not included in this sample. 
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The most important of these pathways – merchant capital – is discussed in detail in 
the following subsection. In classical Marxist parlance, merchant capital is often 
taken to denote ‘unproductive’ capital engaged solely in the sphere of circulation, 
rather than in production where value can be added. However, as Harriss-White 
(1979) points out, this is a fundamental misunderstanding. Many of the activities in 
which merchant capital is engaged –transport, sorting, processing, packaging – do 
directly add value to commodities. While other activities, such as storage for 
instance, may be inherently unproductive, but necessary for the functioning of 
markets. Harriss-White (2013) explores the dynamic aspects of merchant capital in 
the case of West Bengal, where traders have integrated activities up and down the 
value chain and are engaged in agro-processing, but not in direct production. The 
situation in the Ethiopian coffee sector is different. Here we have merchant capital, 
in the sense in which Harriss-White uses the term, moving into direct production. 
Within the merchant capital group we can distinguish those who came from within 
the coffee sector, namely akrabe and exporters, and those who came from outside the 
sector, mostly traders, but also owners of other businesses such as hotels. 
Across all types of accumulation pathways the stories of individual capitalists are 
often highly idiosyncratic and contingent upon specific local conditions at particular 
times. Certain generalisations can nonetheless be made about both push and pull 
factors that bring investors into the plantation business. What is immediately clear 
from the table is that not all of the coffee capitalists were capitalists prior to entering 
the sector. Some were able to accumulate sufficient funds through salaried 
employment for instance. It is also common to find examples of straddling, where 
salaried employment is maintained alongside business investments (see Kitching 
1982 for a detailed treatment of this phenomenon among Kenyan agrarian 
capitalists). Straddling amongst different types of business endeavours is also 
common, as has been found in many cases of rural accumulation. In the context of 
Senegal for instance, Baglioni (2015) finds that accumulators in farming straddle 
different ways of organising production in order to survive in a value chain 
increasingly subject to the demands of large buyers.  Also in Senegal, Oya (2007) 
demonstrates that substantial ‘accumulation from below’ has occurred among 
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groundnut farmers, whereby dynamic medium-scale farmers take advantage of 
new opportunities in changing market conditions and are able to accumulate. At the 
same time the possibilities for accumulation in agriculture attracted investors from 
outside the sector, some of whom finance their farms with savings from salaried 
employment or trade. 
The question is, then, what attracted capitalists from other business areas to large-
scale coffee farming? Two of the main strands that came out of the accumulation 
histories in terms of the hopes and motivations of Ethiopian coffee capitalists were, 
of course, the wish to make larger profits and the need for security of income in 
conjunction with the protection of already accumulated capital. While the particular 
political economy of Ethiopia can account for some of these motivations, such as the 
relative security from expropriation of investment lands over other types of assets, 
other reasons for the move into coffee farming specifically must be sought in the 
highly localised experiences of many capitalists on the one hand, as well as in 
developments in global coffee markets discussed in the last chapter on the other. 
6.3.3 Accumulation pathways 
Looking at the pathways documented in Table 6.1 it is immediately striking how 
few of the coffee capitalists accumulated in agriculture, and agricultural production 
in particular16. Most capitalists slowly accumulated wealth outside of agriculture 
and then took the opportunity to take a large amount of land in a single sweep, 
once they had sufficient capital and the route to investment land was opened by the 
government. Even amongst those that did accumulate in agriculture (mostly coffee 
farming), we rarely see a continuous process of slow expansion to the current farm 
size, but rather a qualitative ‘jump’ once they have sufficient funds to secure 
themselves land for investment. A key research finding is that the development of 
Ethiopia’s coffee plantations is not due to a process of differentiation and 
                                                     
16 This parallels findings from South Asia. In a study on specifically rural capitalists in the 
region Rutten (2003: 208) notes that many are engaged in agricultural production, but 
generally entered into agriculture only after having achieved some success in transport, 
agro-processing or industry. 
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accumulation amongst initially small-scale farmers17 . Most new capitalists also 
financed the lion’s share of their initial plantation investments themselves, which, 
as explained above, reflects the constrained nature of Ethiopia’s credit market. The 
only real exceptions to this are capitalists who finance their investments through 
savings from employment, who often founded plantations together with a wealthy 
partner, and those that accumulate in farming, who often take out loans against 
their existing land holdings. 
Within the merchant capital route, the two most important pathways to becoming a 
plantation capitalist in Ethiopia, namely starting as an akrabe or as a trader, are 
examined in detail below. Exporters are treated as a subgroup of akrabe, as they too 
have their roots in the coffee business and as we shall see have similar motivations 
for entering the plantation business. The constraints of space do not allow for a 
detailed exposition of the other accumulation paths or a foray into the highly varied 
accumulation experiences of more individual capitalists, as this would come at the 
cost of unduly limiting the discussion of how the new capitalists establish control 
over land and labour, as well as how they differ both from other coffee farmers and 
from one another. 
6.3.3.1 Akrabe and exporters 
Akrabe are coffee processors and wholesalers who possess their own processing 
stations. The owners are capitalists who rely exclusively on wage labour. An akrabe 
may own a wet mill, a dry mill or both, but large akrabe are these days more likely to 
own a wet mill. Under the Derg, Ethiopia produced hardly any washed coffee 
(Griffin 1992), but this began to change under the EPRDF regime. In the Jimma area 
for instance, the government began offering loans to existing and prospective akrabe 
to import and install wet mills (LCF4). A wet mill, with all necessary buildings and 
equipment, represents an investment volume of at least ETB1,000,000 and can reach 
                                                     
17 That is, the observed pattern is very different to Byres' (1996) ‘accumulation from below’. 
Nor is it compatible to his ‘accumulation’ from above, at least as expressed in the ‘Prussian 
path’ (see also Chapter Two). While the Ethiopian coffee capitalists entered into the sector 
with money, they were hardly part of any landholding elite. In the less precise formulation 
of the dichotomy by Mamdani (1987) ‘accumulation from below’ refers to any process 
mediated by market forces rather than extra-economic coercion. But, as this example shows, 
such a categorisation is too wide to provide much analytical insight in this context. 
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ETB2,000,000 and more18. Dry mills are generally cheaper. Another major difference 
is that a dry mill can operate for much of the calendar year, as farmers dry coffee on 
their own farms and sell it as and when they need cash, while a wet mill can only 
operate around the harvest period, when fresh cherries are available (LCF5).  
Most of the akrabe interviewed began their accumulation pathways outside of the 
coffee business, often in dry goods trading, local stores, or alcohol distribution. 
Entering the local coffee business as a dry-processing akrabe is relatively easy for a 
small capitalist. An aspiring akrabe seeking a government licence does not need his 
or her own huller, but only to be in possession of a warehouse of adequate quality 
and sufficient capital to purchase coffee. Coffee can be processed by renting time on 
other people’s hullers (LCF5). The first step of accumulation in the coffee business is 
usually in the form of purchasing a coffee huller. For further accumulation an akrabe 
has two options: either stay with dry processed coffee and invest in expanding the 
scale of operations and increasing the quality of the equipment, or move into wet 
processed coffee, which requires greater capital outlays and is more technically 
demanding. Washed coffee processing is also more labour intensive (AK2). As 
washed coffees tend to trade at a premium vis-à-vis naturals, this is nonetheless a 
worthwhile step. 
The business model of the akrabe is central to understanding why they would seek 
accumulation elsewhere. The akrabe buy coffee cherries in large quantities from 
farms within their licensed area. They can either purchase cherries directly from 
farmers, or rely on the services of sebsabe, who collect coffee on their behalf. Once 
the coffee is processed, the akrabe delivers it to the nearest ECX station for grading 
and warehousing. The akrabe must be cash rich enough to not only purchase large 
amounts of coffee for processing, but also to pay the sizeable workforces necessary 
to run large washing stations. A medium-sized processing station, capable of an 
annual output of over 600t of green coffee, will employ upwards of 200 seasonal 
workers for three to four months during the wet processing season, as well as at 
least a dozen permanent security and administrative staff (AK2). But processing 
                                                     
18 Smaller mills are available and are sometimes installed on plantations. 
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coffee takes some time and coffee prices may change. The akrabe therefore takes a 
calculated risk that the revenue achieved from selling the processed coffee is higher 
than the cost of the cherries, plus the cost of processing the coffee. The akrabe has a 
predicament if coffee prices decline before the processed coffee can be sold or if the 
price paid for the cherries was too high. The business is risky - all akrabe interviewed 
agree that it is possible to lose substantial amounts of money in a single season. 
For many akrabe the option of investing in coffee plantations arose just as increasing 
competitive pressures were emerging, endangering the viability of their business 
model. The profits akrabe are able to extract have historically relied on a steady 
supply of cheap cherries, provided by small-scale farmers with no outside options. 
Competition comes not only from the increasing number of akrabe in the business 
(LCF4, LCF5), but also from rising numbers of newly founded (or reformed) 
cooperatives, who often own their own processing equipment. The results have 
been higher cherry prices and lower profit margins19. “Up until 2010 the akrabe 
business [around Jimma] was very profitable, especially due to high international 
prices and low cherry prices. Now the akrabe business is loss-making” (CELF4). The 
danger of narrowing margins is exacerbated by the volatile nature of coffee prices. 
The same is not true for coffee farming, where the main cost is labour (see 
Section 0). In periods of low prices farmers can control costs by scaling back labour 
input into the farm20. “The akrabe business is not a secure business, having a farm 
secures income. This is due to price fluctuations which producers [farmers] can 
accommodate but akrabe cannot.” (LCF4). While lower labour inputs reduce the 
quality of the coffee, plantations will generally at least break even. Farming is 
regarded as a much less risky business, as cheap labour and practically free land 
have eliminated the downside risks: “In a plantation there is no risk as you have 
time and costs are adjustable. It is impossible to lose money on a farm […] farms 
                                                     
19 While cooperatives are not always able to match the cherry prices paid by cash-rich akrabe, 
the available anecdotal evidence suggests they have had a strong influence on cherry prices 
simply by providing farmers with options. 
20  This is an important point, a key differentiating factor to the flower business. The 
implications are explored in Chapter Eight. 
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start returns after six years. If you get to production earlier you will be more 
profitable” (CELF3). 
Apart from these push factors akrabe also enjoy a number of advantages, making 
coffee plantations as investment objects particularly interesting to them. First, akrabe 
are already familiar with the complexities of the coffee trade. They are often in close 
contact with local markets and aware of the differences in coffee type and quality 
(AK2, CELF). Before the ECX large akrabe often had direct contact with exporters 
and foreign buyers, giving them insight into the requirements of international 
markets, including the specialty coffee trade. Akrabe are already familiar with the 
production of high-quality coffee, and are much less likely to have to buy expensive 
expertise. Second, it is relatively easy for large akrabe to mobilise start-up capital 
necessary for coffee farming, given that they have already accumulated substantial 
amounts in the past, and frequently have capital assets from other businesses, 
houses, cars and, not least, their processing stations to offer as collateral. Some 
akrabe are very wealthy. The largest akrabe interviewed, who also worked as an 
exporter and had recently established a coffee plantation, owned 11 processing 
stations in as many woreda, with a combined annual processing capacity of 1,600t of 
washed coffee (CELF5). 
A similar move into direct production of coffee is evident amongst Ethiopia’s large 
coffee exporters. Some of these exporters run gigantic business operations. The 
largest exporter interviewed claimed annual coffee exports of up to 17,000t, making 
him the country’s third largest exporter (CELF5). As Ethiopia’s total coffee exports 
in 2011 were about 160,000t, this exporter alone accounted for almost 11% of exports 
that year. But even exporters who describe themselves as “medium-sized” will still 
export hundreds of tons of coffee each year, generating revenues in the range of 
millions of US dollars (CELF4). The exporters are presented in the same category as 
akrabe because many of them only became exporters on the back of their 
accumulation in the akrabe business (CELF6, CELF2, CELF5, CELF4). Prior to the 
introduction of the ECX, many exporters had also worked as akrabe, buying their 
own coffee from the Addis Ababa auction to secure themselves consistent supplies 
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of high-quality traceable coffee (CELF1): “Before the ECX you used to wash and 
clean the coffee [at your own processing stations], bring it to auction and then buy 
your own coffee. Now this system is blocked” (CELF5). When, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the ECX system severed the possibility of tracing coffee to the 
precise place it had been processed, these exporters were no longer able to serve the 
international specialty markets they depend on for part of their profits.  
Some of the exporters, in particular those selling high-quality coffees, reacted by 
moving into large-scale production themselves, where the possibility of direct 
export restores their access to traceable specialty coffee. As a leading exporter, who 
was a founding member of the ECX and runs a very sophisticated sales operation, 
responded when asked about specialty coffee: “We are now moving into farming. 
We used to have our own washing stations to serve the specialty market. When the 
ECX came we sold the stations and went into farming. We now have six farms 
totalling 1,000ha.” (CELF6). Another large exporter who had recently invested in a 
plantation commented: “Our farm is all about quality assurance. But mostly to 
secure a supply chain of traceable coffee”, adding that “some customers need good 
quality and traceability.” (CELF5). Even though specialty coffee may only represent 
part of the total sales for large exporters, it is an important part that allows them to 
present a full range of both traceable and non-traceable coffees of various qualities 
to large buyers, for whom variety is an important consideration in choosing 
suppliers. While this is a direct result of state action, it appears to have been an 
unexpected side-effect of the move to foist the ECX onto the coffee sector at break-
neck speed21. 
Moreover, the ECX drove exporters up the value chain into direct production in 
another unexpected way. Many participants in the Ethiopian coffee sector, 
including exporters and foreign buyers, complain that ECX prices are not 
sufficiently integrated with global market prices (CELF3, CB1). Prices at the  ECX 
                                                     
21 Oya (2007) shows how state action can inadvertently open up spaces of accumulation in 
the sphere of circulation. Capitalist farmers in his study were able to accumulate in part by 
exploiting weak regulation of grain markets. Here the situation is the reverse. Strong state 
regulation is, quite by accident, forcing productive forms of merchant capital into the sphere 
of production. 
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around the time of research were too high compared to international prices, driven, 
it would appear, by domestic retail coffee prices that were actually higher than 
international coffee prices (Minton et al. 2013). Such artificially high prices are paid 
by people who either want to export coffee simply to gain foreign exchange or who 
plan to smuggle coffee into the domestic market (see also Section 6.5.4). Another 
reason for artificially high prices may be exporters who ‘play the system’ by buying 
their own coffee at the ECX, thereby restoring traceability, albeit illegally. This 
requires bribing ECX employees, which is apparently common (AK1). To ensure 
they actually get the lots they want they would then be willing to pay very high 
prices, as they are effectively paying themselves anyway (CE). But high prices erode 
the margins of exporters, who buy their coffee at the ECX, making exports much 
less profitable (CELF3). 
Of course, there are instances where the accumulation path is reversed, that is, runs 
from plantation to export business. One plantation capitalist from the Jimma area 
for instance related how he began working as an akrabe when he inherited a hulling 
machine and warehouse from his father during the Derg period. By the late 1990s 
he had accumulated sufficient capital to add a wet processing station to his 
business. Despite still making large profits as an akrabe, he decided also to invest in 
a coffee plantation in 2000, saying: “I could see the competition [i.e. other akrabe] 
coming.” (CELF3). The farm was built up around the processing equipment, and he 
stopped working as an akrabe. He then opened a coffee export office in Addis 
Ababa, both to market the specialty coffee from his own farm, but also to buy and 
sell coffee as an exporter. Getting into the export business required investing in 
additional warehouse space in Addis Ababa, purchasing export processing 
equipment and an ECX trading licence, which alone cost ETB700,000. 
6.3.3.2 Traders 
Traders are the second most numerous group in the merchant capital group, and 
have on average the largest farms. Unlike akrabe, traders came to coffee plantations 
from a wide variety of backgrounds. Of the nine capitalists who accumulated 
through trade, all but one accumulated entirely outside of agriculture. Trade can be 
undertaken profitably on a wide variety of business scales, from small corner shops 
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to large wholesale trading enterprises, meaning that it is often used as a first step in 
capitalist accumulation. In Ethiopia a majority of the owners of leading businesses, 
regardless of their current specialisation, had originally accumulated in trading 
(Sutton and Kellow 2010). While the authors of the mapping exercise interpret this 
as being the result of the accumulation of generic business skills by traders, which 
allowed them to branch out into other sectors, including manufacturing, the low 
barriers to entry seem to be equally  important. 
Two of the coffee capitalists who began as traders started out as agricultural wage 
workers. One, the disinherited son of a small farmer, initially worked on the first 
capitalist coffee plantation under the imperial regime discussed in the last chapter 
in order to provide a living for himself. The time on the early capitalist coffee 
plantation left a deep impression on him, and awakened the desire to own a coffee 
farm. He saved enough of his wages to move back to his home area in Kaffa and 
join a relative in his tailoring business. After a few years he had saved up enough to 
start his own tailoring business. He was soon able to branch out into private textile 
trading, which was illegal under the Derg and had to be done clandestinely. Despite 
the prohibited nature of his business he was able to accumulate a large stockpile of 
textiles and livestock. Once his business was legalised, he managed to expand to the 
point where he had substantial amounts of textiles and owned nearly 80 head of 
livestock. He had run a side-line in coffee trading, though this was insignificant 
compared to his other operations. Once he saw other capitalists move into the 
plantation business, he grasped the opportunity to finally own a coffee farm and he 
invested in a coffee plantation in 2008 (LCF33). Here he could finally make use of 
the practical knowledge of coffee farming acquired during his years as a plantation 
worker. However, the remoteness of his farm and his relatively limited supply of 
capital meant that he was only able to develop 25ha in the first two years. To cover 
the period until his coffee makes any money, he has also planted 15ha of his land 
with spices. 
Another, also the son of a small farmer, who left home to work as an agricultural 
wage worker during the Derg, also started out by saving up enough to begin small-
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scale trading. He lived extremely frugally and saved up around ETB1,200 to open a 
small shop. The success of the shop allowed to him to take some land and farm 
coffee. He gradually expanded his holdings to around 10ha, hiring supervisors and 
labourers to work it. In this he was aided by the fact that he had attended school 
until year 10. He accumulated enough money to not only build himself a house, but 
also to invest in a small grain mill, which he later sold in favour of a much larger 
mill for which he constructed a warehouse. He soon had to bring his brother into 
the business to manage a second mill for spices. While the trading was his main 
route of accumulation, his 10ha of coffee land had furnished him with vital 
knowledge about agronomy and markets. When the zonal governments began 
soliciting local business people to invest in the coffee sector, he sold the first mill 
and used the proceeds, as well as income from the spice trade of around ETB80,000 
a year to set up his brother as an akrabe, while he himself invested in a coffee farm. 
His initial investment in the farm was just ETB115,000, for which he was granted 
60ha. These were, however, later measured at 115ha. (LCF36).  
Both of these examples of ‘rags-to-riches’ stories demonstrate the returns to even 
quite petty amounts of capital that can be had in rural Ethiopia22. High returns to 
even small amounts of selectively invested capital, a result of a generalised shortage 
of goods and services, combined with a lack of infrastructure and credit which stifle 
competition, allow for a cycle of saving, reinvestment and scale increase. While 
these capitalists were able to slowly build up capital from relatively low wages, 
another trader accumulated through well-paid salaried work for an international 
NGO. He is the scion of a major aristocratic family in the province of Jimma. His 
father and grandfather owned huge estates, worked by sharecroppers, in addition 
to a large number of houses. As the son of an extremely wealthy man, he enjoyed a 
privileged education by the standards of the time. This was, however, cut short by 
the revolution, which began when he still a child. His father was killed and his 
family were stripped of titles and possessions. He was young enough to be deemed 
                                                     
22 At the same time it is of course important not to forget the selection bias inherent in 
interviewing capitalists who accumulated enough to enter large-scale coffee farming. For 
each of these successful accumulators there is an unknown – but probably very large – 
number of people who failed to accumulate. 
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innocent and allowed to complete his education. This allowed him to become well 
enough educated to get the aforementioned well-paid NGO job. After studying 
agronomy on a scholarship abroad, he returned to Ethiopia just after the fall of the 
Derg. He used savings from his comfortable salary and scholarship, as well as his 
retirement fund, to set himself up as a wholesaler of car parts in Addis Ababa. To 
this he soon added a car repair workshop. A few years later he was approached by 
an old friend, a successful akrabe, who had become interested in coffee farming and 
had relevant knowledge of coffee, but lacked agronomic expertise. Having worked 
for years in the country’s largest coffee development programme and having a 
relevant degree made our trader the perfect partner. The trading and repair 
businesses were sold to finance his share in the planned plantation (LCF37). 
Some of the traders have also engaged in illegal practices to accumulate23. One 
capitalist relates how he spent many years as a smuggler traversing the porous 
borders of the Horn with ever greater quantities of goods of every kind, from 
livestock to machine parts. Having originally borrowed money for a pickup truck 
from his extended family – also traders – he began by distributing car and machine 
parts from the central market in Addis Ababa to regional centres, but soon realised 
that smuggling was much more profitable. Within a few years he was travelling as 
far as the Arab world and Italy in the search for importable goods. Tightening 
border controls and increasing police attention made him fear for the sustainability 
of his business and the security of the small fortune he had amassed. He decided to 
make his wealth unassailable by investing in a fixed asset, in this case a coffee farm, 
which he started in 2003. He had toyed with the idea of becoming an akrabe back in 
1998, attracted by the returns he could see others were making, but found coffee 
prices too volatile for his liking. In the first four years, he invested around ETB7.8m 
of his own money in the farm. Together with his farm manager, who spent 32 years 
working at JARI, he has produced specialty coffee good enough to win a prestigious 
SCAA (LCF35). Another capitalist used money from his father, who ran a medium-
                                                     
23 Oya (2007) describes how some of the large farmers he interviewed made a leap in their 
accumulation trajectories by engaging in illegal grain sales. Compare also Streeck's (2009) 
insistence on studying the rule-breaking behaviour of capitalist elites. 
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scale farm cultivating some 10ha with the use of wage labour, to enter textile 
trading. As he operated in the Kaffa region, where roads to the capital were bad at 
the time, profits were very high, and after a few years he had paid off his family 
and expanded the scale of his operations enough to be able to purchase whole 
petrol stations. He invested in the construction of a large hotel and shortly after 
began developing a coffee plantation of several hundred hectares. The speed of his 
accumulation raised questions with local authorities and a subsequent tax audit 
found that he had failed to pay more than ETB3m in income and various business 
taxes. He was forced to sell all of his belongings apart from the hotel and the one 
third of his land allocation he had already developed24 (LCF34). 
Two of the capitalists who accumulated in trading had been directly involved with 
the coffee business prior to becoming traders. One was a younger son of a trading 
family, who did not stand to inherit the family business, but whose family had 
enough local standing to allow him to become a sebsabe for a local akrabe. As 
explained before, the sebsabe is forwarded substantial sums of money to purchase 
coffee from farmers, and many akrabe prefer to work with sebsabe who are 
‘anchored’ in the area through fixed possessions, in this case a family business. The 
income from work as a sebsabe soon allowed him to invest in a small retail shop for 
dry goods, which he expanded into a sizable operation. When operating as a sebsabe, 
there are two options. The more common one is to use funds forwarded by an 
akrabe. However, the much more profitable option is for them to use their own 
capital. Akrabe are then prepared to pay much more, as their money is less at risk. 
Of course, only cash-rich people can operate as a sebsabe with their own capital. 
Retained profits allowed him to amass ETB700,000 to invest in a 75ha coffee farm 
(LCF31). Another trader had been one of the early coffee capitalists of the imperial 
era. He and his brothers had made money in the Addis Ababa textile trade during 
the 1950s. The coffee boom of the time attracted them to Jimma, where they 
purchased 150ha of suitable land from an absentee feudal lord. Here they grew 
                                                     
24 He is convinced the tax inspection was the result of jealousy among less successful rivals. 
Perhaps fittingly his office was adorned only with a desk, a large safe and a Kalashnikov 
assault rifle. 
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coffee for export. The farm was nationalised by the Derg and he was imprisoned 
and tortured. After his release he was allowed to return to Addis Ababa, where he 
made a modest living as a small textile trader. After the fall of the Derg he took all 
the savings he could muster and returned to the Jimma area to re-enter into the once 
again burgeoning coffee trade around Jimma, this time as a processor. Driven by the 
vision of once again owning a coffee farm, he imposed a rigid savings regime on 
what was by now a family business, shared with his sons. As soon as investment 
became available he implored his sons to invest in a plantation (LCF44). 
Almost all of the trader capitalists engage in ‘straddling’, as an accumulation 
strategy. ‘Straddling’ here refers to being involved in many different business types 
at once25. The most striking example is an individual who used a loan from his 
father, a supervisor on a large tea plantation, to begin a small trade in spices. He 
soon also began to buy and sell hides and skins, initially using working capital 
provided by a larger trader, later on his own account. Skin and hides trading is 
especially strong after public holidays and festivals, due to the amount of animals 
traditionally slaughtered for such occasions, providing a boost of capital, while 
spice trading has a smoother income structure. He saved his money and by the mid-
2000s had expanded his operations to the point where he was able to purchase a 
second-hand truck, which he rented out. Given extremely high taxes on vehicles 
purchases and the often dismal state of rural roads in Ethiopia, the transport 
business is very profitable. Renting out a medium sized truck can make ETB100,000 
and more per year. Only four years later, he was able to purchase a second truck. 
Soon afterwards he was able to acquire over 300ha of coffee land, originally in 
partnership with others, but they were soon bought out after he sold his vehicles.  
Being able to straddle multiple business lines as a trader is a sign of economic 
success and wealth. Poorer business people frequently have to sell one business in 
                                                     
25 Rather than the stricter sense in which Kitching (1982) originally defined it, i.e. as the use 
of income from salaried work to fund investments and accumulation. For Oya (2007) 
straddling among different business activities is the main way in which emergent agrarian 
capitalists acts as entrepreneurs, as they generally do not engage in Schumpeterian 
innovation. Reinert (2009) concurs that ‘entrepreneurship’ in poor countries more often than 
not means ‘emulation’ rather than ‘innovation’. 
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order to start another, potentially more promising one. However, for the newly 
started coffee capitalists, straddling is much more important. Farms have to be 
planted, weeded and maintained for four years until they make any money. 
Capitalists must therefore have access to some source of funds during this period. 
Of the capitalists who started as traders, five are still active in various forms of 
trading, often involving family members to run these branches of their businesses. 
Income streams from these businesses allow them to develop their farms until their 
first harvest, which can then be sold and the proceeds reinvested. Of course, having 
other businesses is also useful once plantations are in production. It can take a 
number of years before the whole farm is planted, with rising labour costs every 
year as the farm grows in size. Other income streams also insulate to a degree 
against the volatility of coffee prices, and allow farms to be developed more rapidly. 
Two of the capitalists, LCF35 and CELF7 were so wealthy that they were able to 
found plantations without straddling other businesses. While LCF35 used the 
savings accumulated in half a lifetime of smuggling, CELF7 achieved this by dint of 
coming from a family of very wealthy sesame traders. This has allowed him to 
acquire two of the largest plantations in SNNPR, totalling 2,500ha, and recently the 
Tepi plantation, which stretches over 11,000ha. The latter was purchased for around 
USD38m. 
The prime motivation for trader capitalists to move into coffee production, appears 
to have been the perceived security of holding land over other forms of business 
ventures. The idea of having a completely safe depository for capital seems very 
important. For instance, one of the traders never took out a loan until his coffee 
plants had begun bearing fruit, as he feared foreclosure, should he be unable to 
repay, underlining how concerned this group of capitalists tended to be about the 
loss of their capital stock, which is a constant threat to traders. 
6.4 Land acquisition 
While accumulating sufficient initial capital is of course a necessary condition for 
entering the plantation sector, acquiring sufficient land is vital to actually being able 
to set up a farm. As discussed in Chapter Four, in Ethiopia the land reform laws 
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passed under the Derg in 1975 mean that all land constitutionally belongs to the 
state. The EPRDF decided in 1991 to keep state ownership of all land in place, 
granting only usufruct rights to smallholder farmers. The federal constitution of 
1995 cemented this decision (Crewett and Korf 2008). Private individuals may gain 
access to land only through long-term lease agreements. All such leases have to be 
granted by government authority and agricultural land is only leased to officially 
registered investors. While the federal government very effectively sets broad 
policy parameters on land use issues and has shown itself capable of releasing a 
veritable land rush in parts of the country, the ability of the EPRDF state to control 
the allocation of such land is rather more curtailed. Instead local elites collude with 
capitalists to subvert legal processes. Ethiopia’s local capitalists are ‘unruly’ indeed. 
6.4.1 Leasing coffee land 
Chapter Four showed how the federal government began to encourage commercial 
agriculture more directly as part of its move towards a developmental state strategy 
after 2001. Growth in large-scale capitalist agriculture, which had become a tool for 
the government to help generate foreign exchange, was now an important policy 
goal. To increase investment in agriculture, large amounts of land had then to be 
leased to capitalist investors. Following a review of the land lease system in 2008, 
the federal government took control of large leases (above 5,000ha) and all leases in 
so-called ‘emerging regions’ (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella & Somali). 
However, the power to grant land leases under 5,000ha in both Oromia and SNNP 
remained with the respective regional governments (EG1). Given that all coffee 
farms, apart from the privatised state farms, are much smaller than 5000ha, the land 
acquisition process for coffee involves only the regional investment bureaus, as well 
as the relevant authorities at zonal and woreda level. 
Pressure was put on regional and zonal governments by federal level officials to 
allocate land to investors. As laid out in Chapter Four, the development of large-
scale agriculture was prioritised even more after the debacle of 2005. Using the 
Ethiopian millennium in 2007 as a symbolic date to hail the beginning of the 
‘Ethiopian renaissance’, the government instigated a growth push across the 
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economy and land leases were greatly accelerated. The government used state 
media to announce that agricultural land would be made available to interested 
investors, and regions were expected to provide targets for land leases, which were 
then handed down to zonal administrations (EG8).  
Figure 6.4 - Year of farm formation in the quantitative sample (Source: own survey) 
 
Figure 6.4 shows how successful the government push to get land to investors has 
been at the local level. Only 24% of the farms in my sample were established before 
2001, and around 55% were established after 2007. The peak just after the 
announcement of the new investment possibilities in land is clearly visible26. Many 
coffee capitalists who came from outside the sector remembered how they had been 
looking for investment opportunities at the time and were only attracted into coffee 
due to government media announcements and enthusiastic local officials. However, 
in many areas authorities either greatly reduced the amount of land they granted to 
investors or stopped giving out land entirely after a few years, possibly due to the 
scale of localised corruption and discontent. 
The official process for leasing land is structured to ensure government oversight 
and contains safeguards to protect people from eviction without compensation. In 
practice though, the process is often subverted. To obtain a lease, an investor must 
                                                     
26 This peak is before the steep rise in very large land deals in Ethiopia’s peripheral regions 
though, see Cotula et al. (2014) for a critical discussion. 
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first secure an investment licence from the regional investment office27. To then 
lease coffee land, initial application must be made to the woreda land office, which 
then has to be checked and approved at the level of the zone, before being passed to 
the region for final endorsement28. Only land that has been officially specified as 
investment land can be leased. The zonal land administration offices are supposed 
to map investment areas (using GPS) and perform soil tests to clarify what 
agricultural activities the land is suitable for. In addition the woreda has to certify 
that the land is free from ‘prior ownership’, meaning people with a legal claim to 
the land, and not in a protected forest area. The zone investment office is supposed 
to ensure the investor fulfils a host of criteria, including ownership of a minimum 
amount of capital (EG8). 
The reality I encountered was very different (see also the experience of Aba Jiffar 
2009). The zone land administration offices are quite weak. The only exception 
encountered to this was Kaffa zone (SNNPR), where the creation of a UNESCO 
biosphere reserve in the local Afromontane forests has meant a much greater 
emphasis on mapping and has channelled both money and personnel to the local 
authorities. Elsewhere the offices have not been able to map investment lands. The 
result is that “in practice the investors themselves scout out investment land, and 
then ask the investment office to allocate exactly that land” (EG5). This is confirmed 
by numerous investors in different areas. 
Investment offices generally do ask that investors be able to show that they own a 
minimum amount of capital. These minima vary by regions, from only ETB10,000 
per hectare in Gambella (LCF29) to ETB33,000 per hectare in Kaffa zone (EG8)29. In 
                                                     
27 Unless otherwise indicated, information on the land lease process comes from (EG5). 
28 Ethiopia’s history makes the land situation quite different to other countries. As shown in 
Chapter Four, all land became state property in 1975. While there are private and informal 
markets for land, obtaining land in quantities desired by the coffee capitalists requires 
leasing (or illegal grabbing, see below). Emerging capitalists therefore do not have to spend 
time and money investing in formal and informal social networks to secure their access to 
land, as for instance in Berry (1993). On the other hand land cannot be bought, so land 
purchases cannot be used as an indication of entrepreneurial spirit, as Hill (1963) does. 
29 Interestingly, in both cases the minimum an investor has to show is ETB5m, only that in 
Gambella this minimum applies to 500ha, while it is considered the minimum investment 
for 150ha in Kaffa. 
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addition potential investors also have to show a detailed project proposal and 
specify the amount of employment that will be created. This is done to try and 
eliminate land speculators. There are contrasting opinions as to how successful this 
has been, demonstrating significant regional variation. A capitalist from Jimma 
claims that: “The Oromia investment bureau is not well run. They do not take land 
back from people who do not invest. There are many people in the area who have 
been given 120ha or 140ha but are not serious [about investing]”. One the other 
hand a capitalist from Kaffa (in SNNP) claimed that this was a problem of the past: 
“In the old days people came from outside and took investment land, but did not 
invest. Now this does not happen anymore” (LCF34). Another investor in SNNP 
told of a friend who had his lease revoked, after failing to meet a six month deadline 
to start developing the 1,100ha he had been granted. 
Regardless of how effective the investment bureaus are at separating speculative 
and productive applications, the land allocation and leasing process is generally 
regarded as being marred by corruption, and especially so in Oromia and Gambella. 
“They [the Oromia investment bureau] do not even respect their own rules” is a 
fairly common sentiment (LCF1). One respondent who is looking to invest in 
Gambella described the land leasing process there like this: “The process is fast, but 
highly corrupted at regional level. Lots of people are taking land illegally, and you 
can buy the land from them. As the land is empty you just go and fence off 50ha. 
Some [capitalists] then go to the investment office [for a legal lease], some don’t.” 
(LCF29). 
Making land available for long leases must be regarded as the single biggest 
support the government provides to the new coffee capitalists30. Land is leased for 
periods of between 20 and 45 years, depending on the area, giving capitalists the 
security that they will be able to recoup their sunk costs. More importantly, land is 
extremely cheap. Lease rates and conditions are set by regional land use regulations 
and differ by region and locality (EIC 2014). Plantation owners report paying leases 
                                                     
30 The differences between the support given to the coffee and flower sectors are discussed 
in Chapter Eight. 
 238 
 
as low as ETB41 per hectare per year in parts of Bench Maji, and as high as ETB120 
per hectare per year in some areas around Jimma. The median lease rates were 
ETB114 per hectare per year in Oromia and ETB63 per hectare per year in SNNPR. 
Hence a 100ha farm in Oromia can be leased for just ETB11,400 per year, 
approximately the value of around 190kg of specialty coffee at the time of research – 
the annual output of less than one quarter of a hectare. As a percentage of total 
running costs, land lease costs are negligible. In addition, new farmers are also 
granted a 50% reduction in lease rates for the first four years to account for the fact 
that newly-planted coffee trees are not productive during this time. Lease rates are 
the same for land transferred from existing farms as they are for forest land, which 
needs expensive clearing and preparation. The extremely low cost of land greatly 
increases the profitability of the plantations and reduces the risk of establishing 
them31. The low lease rates of course mean forgone income for the state, and thus 
constitute subsidy to agrarian capitalists. 
6.4.2 Land holdings by large farms 
The difficulties involved in finding and compiling data on land leases in Ethiopia, 
as well as the efforts that were undertaken to ensure the data presented here is of 
the highest possible quality, are detailed in Chapter Three and do not need to be 
repeated here in detail. It should be noted though that both authorities and 
investors often simply do not know the exact size of land leases, because these are 
in many cases estimated rather than measured. When the land is later measured 
with GPS devices, most investors find their holdings are substantially different to 
what is stated in the lease agreement. Land sizes in official databases are frequently 
inaccurate by 50% and more. In the most extreme example encountered, an investor 
in Kaffa zone had been granted 1,000ha by the zone investment office, but when the 
land was measured it turned out to be only 161ha. 
Table 6.2 presents the best available data on land leases for large-scale coffee farms 
in Ethiopia. It gives the total amount of land leased for coffee plantations for the 
main coffee producing zones, as well as the number of plantations in each zone and 
                                                     
31 On the other hand, it removes a key element of competitive pressure from the coffee 
sector, as explained in Chapter Eight. 
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their mean size. Rather than relying on CSA data, the information presented in 
Table 6.2 is based on my own compilation of data from investment offices at 
regional, zonal and, in one case, woreda levels.  
Table 6.2 - Overview of coffee plantations in Ethiopia's main coffee areas (Source: author's 
compilation from investment lists at regional, zone and woreda level).  
NB: Excludes former state farms and illegal plantations. 
Zone Region 
Total coffee 
land leased 
(ha) 
Number of 
coffee 
plantations 
Mean 
plantation 
size (ha) 
Kaffa SNNPR 14,574 82 178 
Bench Maji SNNPR 12,020 20 601 
Jimma Oromia 10,252 69 149 
West Wellega Oromia 2,656 16 166 
Kellem Wellega Oromia 750 4 187.5 
Sheka* SNNPR 2915 18 161 
Illubabor* Oromia 1875 10 187 
South Omo* SNNPR 783 2 261 
Borena* Oromia 734 0 122 
Konta* SNNPR 280 1 280 
Sidama SNNPR 250 1 250 
West Arsi* Oromia 120 2 60 
Amaro* SNNPR 122 2 61 
Gurage* SNNPR 42.5 1 42.5 
Gedeo* SNNPR - - - 
Awassa* SNNPR - - - 
Konta* SNNPR - - - 
West Haraghe* Oromia - - - 
Arsi* Oromia - - - 
Total Oromia 
 
16,387 101 162.2 
Total SNNPR  30,965 127 243.8 
Grand total  47,102 227 207.5 
* indicates that the information is based on regional investment lists alone 
As shown in Table 6.2, around 47,100ha had been leased to active private coffee 
plantations in Oromia and SNNPR at the time of data collection in 2012/13. 
Excluded from this estimate are the recently privatised state farms, who collectively 
control another 30,000ha, as are the lands held by Ethio Agri-CEFT, part of Al-
Ahmoudi’s business interests, who control over 2,200ha in Gemadro, SNNPR. Also 
excluded are illegal coffee plantations, which are discussed below. My best estimate 
for the total size of active capitalist coffee plantations in Oromia and SNNPR in 2013 
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is then around 79,300ha. The capitalists in my sample collectively controlled 
22,940ha or about 29% of the total (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3.2). The CSA estimated 
the total coffee area on ‘peasant’ holding in Ethiopia at around 561,000ha in 2014, 
meaning that large-scale private plantations account for around 8% of the total 
coffee production area (CSA 2015a). 
As the table illustrates, large-scale plantations are concentrated in only a few of 
Ethiopia’s coffee producing regions, mainly Kaffa, Bench Maji and Jimma zones, 
while sizeable portions of land have also been transferred in West Wellega, Sheka 
and Illubabor. What is notable is the near-complete absence of large plantations in 
some of Ethiopia’s main coffee growing areas. A good example is in Sidama zone, 
historically Ethiopia’s leading coffee producing area and a global coffee trademark, 
where there only appears to be a single plantation of 250ha32. Similarly, in Gedeo 
zone, easily the most famous of Ethiopia’s coffee regions – though the coffee is 
better known by the name of its capital Jirga Cheffe – there are no large capitalist 
coffee plantations at all; a fact that was verified by a visit to the zone, interviews 
with other accumulators there, and a visit to the zone investment bureau. Both 
zones have high population densities and there is simply no land available for 
capitalists to set up large-scale plantations33. Where there are concentrations of 
plantations, their size differs greatly. The average plantation size ranges from just 
149ha in Jimma zone to a 601ha in Bench Maji. 
A close analysis of the different areas reveals very different patterns of land 
acquisition. In Jimma, long historical trajectories of capital accumulation, mostly but 
not exclusively in coffee, as well as locally-grounded personal networks help 
explain current accumulation patterns, which include systematic illegal land 
grabbing. In Kaffa, the expansion of coffee plantations has been accompanied by 
conflicts over the use of forest lands. In Bench Maji, the relative absence of capital 
accumulation historically and the need by the local government to show investment 
                                                     
32 This information is taken from ECGPEA. The Sidama zone office refused to provide any 
data on investments, citing the need for data protection. 
33  There is however evidence of accumulation occurring ‘from below’ (MCF). See also 
Chapter Eight. 
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success has meant that coffee capitalists were able to establish plantations that are 
much larger than in other parts of the country. In West Wellega, from the limited 
information available, farms appear to be of a younger vintage than in the other 
areas under study, and officials indicate that there is still a lot of land available for 
investment, marking the area out as a frontier zone for future investment. The area 
is also quite remote, and a modern road connecting the zone to the rest of Ethiopia’s 
road network was still under construction at the time of fieldwork. Kellem Wellega 
is even more remote – an asphalt road connecting it to West Wellega had only just 
been begun in 2012/13 – and land acquisition patterns there have been quite 
idiosyncratic, in ways that would not have been possible in areas with more 
developed state control. To illustrate processes of land acquisition by way of an 
example, the developments in Jimma are discussed in detail below. The illegal land 
grabbing documented below is by no means the only incidence of this though. 
Capitalists in many areas have availed themselves of land illegally, some even 
managing to do so under the Derg, as the civil war caused government control to 
slide. The collapse of the Derg regime was another opportunity to take land. 
However, most of the illegal land grabbing happens during the ‘normal’ operations 
of the Ethiopian polity. 
6.4.3 Jimma - local land grabbing 
As detailed in the last chapter, Jimma has long been a centre of capitalist coffee 
production in Ethiopia. The legacy of the plantations of the imperial era lived on in 
those who experienced them first hand, as well as in the knowledge of large-scale 
coffee agronomy preserved and developed in the Limu Kossa state farm and the 
Jimma Agricultural Research Institute (JARI). The plantations in Jimma zone are, on 
average, Ethiopia’s smallest. As shown in Table 6.3 the mean plantation size is 
149ha. The largest plantation is given as 728ha, though this information could not 
be verified, and it is quite possible that the largest plantation is in fact only around 
350ha. 
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Table 6.3 - Descriptive statistics for coffee plantations in Jimma zone (Source: compiled from zone 
investment office data). 
Number of 
plantations 
Mean size 
(ha) 
Total land 
leased (ha) 
Share of 
plantations 
>=100ha 
Maximum 
size (ha) 
Minimum 
size (ha) 
69 149 10,252 59% 728 11 
  
The relatively small mean plantation size is the result not just of the relative absence 
of very large plantations, but also of the high incidence of small plantations. Some 
41% of Jimma’s plantations are smaller than 100ha. Figure 6.5 shows the frequency 
distribution of coffee plantations in Jimma by size categories. Plantations are 
heavily concentrated in the smaller categories with most farms being smaller than 
150ha. 
Figure 6.5 - Frequency distribution of plantations by size category - Jimma zone (Source: compiled 
from zone investment data). 
 
Two distinct practices for acquiring land are at play in the area. Investors may 
essentially adhere to the official process but take a more proactive role in land 
selection due to the lack of capacity of authorities at zone and woreda level. In this 
instance investors simply suggest the land they want to the authorities. The other 
method of acquiring land is simply by taking it completely illegally. In this case 
land is taken, as one capitalist, describing his own experience, put it “by conquest!” 
(LCF3). In such an instance, the investor finds and chooses a piece of land he or she 
desires, and immediately starts clearing part of the land and planting coffee. Once 
planting has begun the investor waits for at least two months. At this point an 
application for a land lease is made to the zone investment office. When the zonal 
investment office seeks the opinion of the woreda, authorities there are forced to 
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certify the land as empty and ready for leasing. The reason being that a decision not 
to do so would entail a legal battle between investor and woreda. However, if the 
investor is not challenged within two months, he or she is entitled to compensation 
for the investments already made – a sum that is unaffordable for the cash-poor 
woreda administrations (EG5). Some zonal officials would like to take investors to 
court over infringements into protected forest lands and similar practices, but the 
threat of compensation is an effective deterrent even when court cases do go ahead 
(EG5). The investor in many cases ends up with a legal lease for the land of his or 
her choice. 
This practice is especially notable in Jimma zone, where these local land grabs are 
exclusively in forest land. Capitalists in this instance choose the land they want, hire 
workers, move them into the forest, have the land fenced off and begin clearing and 
planting. The authorities in this instance are not officially informed at all, although 
zonal officials are certain that corrupt woreda-level staff play along by covering up 
the practice. A former head of the Jimma zone investment office estimates that up to 
50% of all land taken by coffee capitalists in the zone was taken completely illegally. 
This means that the capitalists do not have a rental agreement or legal lease 
agreement and so of course do not pay lease fees or any other form of direct taxes. 
“They are only collecting income” (EG5). 
A peculiar concentration of these local land grabs has occurred in Limu Kossa 
woreda of Jimma zone. This woreda, centred on the small town of Limu Genet, 
contains the largest number of coffee plantations in the zone. Out of 68 officially 
registered plantations in Jimma zone, 43 are in Limu Kossa woreda. Excluding the 
state farm, which controls some 5,000ha in the woreda, the Limu Kossa capitalists 
have leased 5,787ha, or 56%, of the 10,263ha which have been officially allocated to 
coffee plantations in the zone. But these statistics only tell half the story. 
The woreda is home to a network of young aspiring coffee capitalists, many of whom 
have taken land illegally. They were inspired to take this action in part by a gate-
keeper who is a former government official. In addition to having been a civil 
servant, he used to work for an NGO, which put him in touch with local 
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entrepreneurs, many of whom were engaged in local coffee smuggling. He claims 
that: “most of the current young investors were sent to the forest by me.”(LCF11). 
Land in the forests of the woreda was taken “with no legal process”, beginning in 
2008 (LCF11). Once farms were established, however, many of the investors applied 
for official lease agreements to secure their control over their investments. 
According to this individual, there were “about 36 young investors, of whom only 
16 are now legalised”. The other 20 are still holding their land completely illegally 
(LCF11). These assertions are backed up by data from the woreda’s administration, 
which provided me with documentation showing that 16 illegal investors had 
identified themselves to the woreda administration and were now awaiting the 
legalisation of their holdings. Of these three had been arrested and the other 13 
were on process to have their land grabs retrospectively legalised34. All were from 
the local area. They collectively claimed to control up to 998ha or around 17% of all 
land dedicated to coffee plantations in the woreda. The woreda official claimed the 
local authorities had little choice but to legalise the majority of these, due to the fear 
of having to pay compensation (EG6). However, the head of the Jimma zone 
investment office stressed that these land grabs had occurred against the express 
wishes of zonal authorities and accused the woreda administration of collusion and 
corruption (EG5). 
This local land grab is the result of organisation and agency among a group of local 
capitalists35. Structurally, it was made possible by the presence of large stretches of 
forest, which are used by the local population, but officially belong to the 
government. The land grabbers claim to have come to agreements with surrounding 
small farmers and to have paid compensation to them, which is a common practice 
even in legal leases (LCF43, LCF18). Claiming to be fearful of not being allocated 
any land in what descended into a veritable land rush in the area between about 
                                                     
34 It was not possible to establish why these arrests had been made, or how those arrested 
were selected. 
35 While there is voluminous literature on land grabs in Africa (see Oya 2013 for a critical 
review), land grabbing by locals rarely features in these discussion. An exception are Ali, 
Deininger, and Harris (2015) who make clear that in Ethiopia most land has gone to 
domestic investors. 
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2008 and 2012, these young capitalists openly defied the Ethiopian state. Using their 
relative wealth they bribed local officials and mobilised substantial workforces to 
create facts on the ground. And yet, despite all of the coercive power at the disposal 
of the state, the zonal government chose compromise and negotiation. The legalistic 
explanations offered by zonal officials are not entirely convincing. It seems more 
likely that higher officials realised that killing off the most dynamic element in a key 
strategic sector, moreover a group that was developing with very limited 
government assistance, makes little sense, and that an arrangement should be found 
to ensure that developments are legalised, controlled and taxed. 
6.5 Production, knowledge and technology 
Apart from land, large-scale plantations require a mixture of productive capital and 
knowledge in order to be able to operate. Coffee farming, while not as technically 
challenging as modern floriculture, nonetheless requires much agronomic expertise. 
Tree varieties have to be selected, a planting plan has to be developed, and routines 
for weeding, mulching and fertilisation must be designed and implemented. Before 
this the first harvest workers, or at least the supervisors, have to be trained, and the 
harvested coffee has to be expertly sorted and processed. Moreover, farmers must 
have access to knowledge of the prices and quality requirements in a variety of 
possible final markets, including, at minimum, the ECX and ideally various national 
markets in consuming countries. Direct exports, especially into specialty markets, 
raise the knowledge-intensity in all aspects of production, marketing and sales, and 
the best results in terms of prices and contracts are achieved by those enterprises 
whose expertise can match that of their customers36. 
6.5.1 Farm mechanisation and processing equipment 
On all plantations in Ethiopia, the production process is essentially not mechanised 
at all, in that the labourers move on foot between the trees and perform their work 
using only unpowered hand tools, mostly machetes and secateurs. Similarly, 
harvesting is done entirely by hand. Mechanisation of directly production-related 
processes, part of the reason for very low production costs in Brazil for instance 
                                                     
36 This is a key aspect of differentiation among coffee capitalists, which is explored further in 
Section 6.7. 
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(Thompson 2015; Topik 2003), is neither feasible for Ethiopian shade-grown coffee, 
where trees hinder access by mechanical harvesters, nor economically sensible 
given the low cost of labour. Mechanisation is therefore limited to coffee processing 
and transport 37 . Transport equipment, mostly trucks, are used to move coffee 
workers, and organic material used for mulching and fertilisation around the farm. 
In addition to mechanisation proper farms also require other capital assets. 
Buildings have to be constructed to house the farm administration and for storage. 
As is explained below, many farms also offer accommodation to workers. Many 
farms also invest in generators to ensure the lighting of core farm buildings. Most 
farms are not close to roads and have to construct their own access ways. In most 
cases these consist of dirt tracks just wide enough to permit a truck to pass. These 
frequently become unpassable during the wet season. 
Detailed data on farm mechanisation was collected on all plantations that were 
covered in the quantitative survey. The figures presented here exclude processing 
equipment, which is reported separately below. Neither transport nor processing 
equipment are strictly necessary to operate a farm. Processing equipment can be 
rented from local akrabe, and farms can either hire trucks as necessary or rely on 
animal power for transportation. Most capitalists prioritise land development, 
which yields additional income, over equipment purchases. Even very large farms 
sometimes operate with a surprising lack of equipment. The largest farm 
encountered that had no transport equipment, save the private vehicle of the 
capitalist, had a planted area of 240ha. All transport was undertaken using donkeys 
and horses (LCF32). A further nine farms, ranging in size of planted area from 20ha 
to 90ha had only one or two small motorbikes as their sole mechanical equipment.  
                                                     
37 In this particular context, mechanisation is therefore not a particularly helpful indicator of 
how dynamic a producer is. It has been widely used in other contexts though. Oya (2002), 
for instance, uses a ‘means of production index’ as one differentiating criterion to identify 
farmers with ‘capitalistic tendencies’. There has also been widespread debate in India on 
how to identify capitalist farmers, in which measures of mechanisation played a role, see the 
debates in Patnaik (1990) and the summary by Thorner (1982a). 
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Figure 6.6 - Farm mechanisation and planted area (Source: own survey).  
NB: Processing equipment is excluded. 
 
Figure 6.6 plots total value of farm machines against the size of planted land. There 
is seemingly a positive relationship between the area planted and farm 
mechanisation, and a clear decline in the variance of findings as the planted area 
increases. This is because coffee plantations are developed sequentially. Initially, a 
portion of the total area of the leased land is cleared, planted and maintained – all of 
which requires labour which must be paid for. The area developed depends on how 
much money the capitalist can mobilise. As additional capital becomes available, 
either through coffee sales or from other sources, more land is developed. Greater 
expanses of planted land necessitate greater mechanisation, as transporting coffee 
and workers without vehicles becomes more and more of a drag on productivity. At 
the same time, a greater planted area gradually means greater sales, raising the 
probability that capital can be invested in transport equipment. The observed 
differences in capitalisation for a given farm size are driven by the heterogeneity of 
the capitalists. They begin to develop their plantations from very different starting 
points in terms of the amount of initial capital they are willing or able to invest. But 
even the richest capitalists develop their farms sequentially, albeit in much bigger 
steps, contributing to the funnel pattern observed in Figure 6.6.  
At the same time, the substantial heterogeneity in mechanisation expenditure per 
hectare demonstrates that Ethiopian coffee plantations are capable of surviving with 
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varying levels of equipment. Plantations of very different sizes, ranging from just 
20ha to over 430ha, operate with the same – relatively low – levels of mechanisation 
expenditure per hectare. This is an indication of the limited competition amongst 
Ethiopian plantations. Plantation capitalists, unlike exporters, do not see themselves 
as competing with one another, so much as competing with producers in other 
countries (LCF1, CELF6). As production costs on plantations are kept comparatively 
low due to cheap land and labour, there is – as yet – perhaps little pressure for less 
productive capitalists to match the most competitive producers in the country38. 
The other major area of capital investment for farms is processing equipment. This 
can take the form of either a hulling machine, for the production of naturals, or a 
washing station for wet processed coffee (see Annex V.1 for details on the different 
processing types). As mentioned above, while all farms must process their coffee in 
order to be able to sell it, it is not necessary for farms to possess their own 
processing equipment. Dry processed coffee can be dried on the farm and can then 
be hulled, against a fee, by an akrabe. This is, however, not possible for wet 
processed coffee. Any farm wanting to sell washed coffee must invest in its own 
equipment. At the time of research, a machine for wet processing coffee cost at least 
US$37,500. Moreover, additional investments are necessary for constructing all of 
the necessary tanks, waterways and storage facilities. Wet processing coffee is also 
more technically demanding than dry processing and requires expert knowledge.  
Of the farms surveyed 22, or around 60%, did not own any processing equipment, 
while 14, i.e. almost 40%, did. Out of the 14 farms that had invested in processing 
equipment, 12 had bought wet mills. As explained above, owning dry processing 
equipment is not essential for producing dry processed coffee, while a farm must 
purchase a wet mill to make washed coffees. Most capitalists who choose to invest 
in processing equipment therefore invest in a wet mill. Five of the capitalists who 
owned wet mills also possessed dry mills and were thus capable of producing and 
                                                     
38 For Brenner (1977) a central plank of the market discipline experienced by early English 
capitalist farmers was the need to pay rent in a competitive market for land. This pressure 
does not really exist in Ethiopia where land is very cheap and the land ‘market’ extremely 
restricted. See also Chapter Eight. 
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fully processing both naturals and washed coffees on their own premises. In all 
cases this represents a pathway of accumulation from cheaper dry processing 
equipment to the larger capital outlays necessary for a wet mill. In most coffee 
markets, wet processed coffee sells at a premium and so ownership of a washing 
station is something many – but not all – farm owners tend to aspire to (I return to 
this point below). As processing equipment represents a substantial investment, 
and most capitalists have to accumulate sufficient funds through sales, it was 
generally farms with more developed land that were capable of investing in 
processing equipment. Farms that have made the investment have on average 
developed 220ha, while farms without processing equipment have developed only 
109ha. Farms that have both forms of processing equipment, representing the 
largest capital outlays, on average had developed 386ha. 
6.5.2 Production and agronomy 
Looking at levels of agronomic sophistication, the sample initially appears to 
display little variance. While there are huge differences in agronomic practice 
between the large farms sampled here and smallholder coffee farms, the differences 
are much less pronounced amongst the large farms (NGO). Almost all the sampled 
plantation capitalists had, in one way or another, acquired the necessary knowledge 
to ensure good quality coffee production. Close to two thirds have hired 
experienced full-time farm managers, and most of those who have not, did hire 
specialists as part-time consultants, at least during the set-up phase. The gold-
standard in terms of scientific management is set by the former state farms, and by 
the Limu Kossa farm complex in particular39.  
As Table 6.4 shows, the sample as a whole is very close to agronomic best practices, 
as recommended for coffee cultivation. On all farms, coffee is planted under 
managed shade trees and tree densities per hectare are in line with recommendation 
for intensive coffee farming with high yields. The farms are in many cases so young 
that they have not yet exhausted the virgin forest soil on which they were 
established, obviating for now the need for fertiliser. The farmers are thus enjoying 
                                                     
39 Though some of the new mega-plantations such as Tepi or Gemeda apparently have 
similar yields 
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a pure ‘forest rent’ (Austin 2005)40. It is to be expected that declining soil fertility in 
coming years will force more of the newly established farms to choose between 
certified organic production and the application of fertiliser. 
Table 6.4 - Agronomic best practice and actual practice in the sample (Source: expert interviews and 
own data). 
Activity Agronomic advice Practice in the sample 
Improved varieties Yes Yes, all 
Trees per hectare 3,200 At least 3,000 
Shade management Yes, location specific Mostly yes 
Soil analysis & inorganic 
fertiliser application  
Yes Former state farms only 
Weeding 6x per year 
Average 4.2x per year, 
range from 2x to 6x 
Pruning After each harvest After each harvest 
Stumping After 25 years Farms are too young 
Selective hand picking of 
red, ripe cherries 
Yes Yes, all 
Drying on raised beds Yes Mostly yes41 
Dry, sun protected 
warehousing 
Yes Yes, all 
 
The biggest differences amongst the new capitalist farms are related to the intensity 
of the maintenance regime practiced between harvests. After the harvest, trees have 
                                                     
40 Part of which is also the very low lease prices paid. See section 6.4.1. For Austin a broad 
forest rent is the benefit derived from the use of non-renewable forest resources, which came 
from Asante’s rich ecological endowment and accrued (albeit highly unevenly) to society at 
large. Soil fertility is a prime example. 
41 There are some outliers though. One farm in particular produces award-winning naturals 
by drying the cherries on plastic sheeting on the ground, generally considered a taboo 
amongst coffee buyers, but practiced very successfully in this instance. 
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to be pruned to concentrate the coming fruit on just a few branches, mulching 
should be applied to tree bases to prevent run-off, and several rounds of weeding 
have to be undertaken to minimise the competition for valuable nutrients by other 
plants. Weeding improves coffee yields, but is labour intensive and hence 
comparatively expensive. Agronomists recommend at least six cycles of weeding 
per year, depending on location and precipitation. In general, farms which have 
completed their planting, and therefore are freed from having to reinvest profits to 
the same degrees as farms that are still planting their holdings, do tend to 
undertake weeding more often. On average the plantations in the sample are 
weeded around 4.2 times per year. All but two farms rely entirely on manual labour 
for weeding. There are big differences between farms though, with some farms only 
weeding twice a year while one farm weeded eight times per year, and around 15% 
weeded six times per year. The difference is directly related to command over 
capital, as all farmers who weed less than five times per year expressed 
dissatisfaction with the situation. 
6.5.3 State support 
The agronomic advantage enjoyed by plantations is largely the result of state 
resources, even though the state may often not be aware of this vital connection, let 
alone have planned for it. The state has played both a direct and an indirect role in 
facilitating good agronomic practice. Directly, it has done so by providing improved 
varieties via the Jimma Agricultural Research Institute and through seed sales from 
the former state farms, which are also supplied by JARI. The institute has released 
36 different varieties, of which 11 were released as late as 2011. New varieties have 
superior yields and are resistant to the feared coffee berry disease (CBD). Each 
variety is adapted only to certain highly localised climates, and the process of 
finding, selecting and breeding varieties has taken years (EG4).  
Despite its successes, the centre is woefully underfunded and struggles to maintain 
its equipment or recruit enough specialised staff. The institute can only provide 
around 17% to 20% of the seeds requested from it in any given year. By now some 
of the larger plantations have developed enough nursery capacity to also sell to 
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other capitalists, but the overall supply is still wanting, meaning that the use of 
improved varieties is limited almost exclusively to the former state farms, the new 
capitalist plantations and a few selected ‘model’ smallholder farmers. JARI 
collaborates closely with the new capitalists. Capitalists are able to buy directly 
from the institute and are informed whenever new varieties are ready for release 
(EG4). A few selected capitalists are even used as testers for as yet unreleased 
varieties (LCF5, LCF16). Plantation owners are invited to an annual field day at 
JARI, where appropriate agronomic practices are demonstrated. As a result “only 
the state farms and the private investors copy the centre’s practice” (EG4). 
But the new coffee capitalists also draw on state resources in rather more 
clandestine ways, in particular to avail themselves of agronomic expertise. Given 
the lack of agricultural extension services, capitalists hire government agronomic 
experts from both JARI and (former) state farms to moonlight on their plantations. 
Another popular practise is to hire retired senior JARI or – more commonly – state 
farm employees as farm managers. These people in many cases have decades of 
experience in coffee agronomy and know how to run a plantation. Indirectly and 
unwittingly, the state has thus supplied many of the capitalist plantations with 
experienced and well-trained agronomists. Yet this is a poor compensation for the 
absence of any serious training programmes to parallel those created to support the 
floriculture sector (see Chapter Seven). 
6.5.4 Yields 
Despite strenuous efforts to cross-check and triangulate information, the yield data 
for many farms quite simply make no sense, in that reported yields are implausibly 
low. Some farms reported yields far below the output levels of a badly managed 
smallholder plot (around 400kg/ha)42. This information is belied by data taken from 
more reliable respondents who reported yields of at least 800kg/ha43. The latter 
figures are corroborated by coffee experts and traders who confirmed that yields of 
this magnitude and above are the norm in the Ethiopian plantation sector.  
                                                     
42 All yields are expressed in kilogrammes of green coffee per hectare. 
43 Reliability is judged by looking at the consistency of data from cross-checking questions. 
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The motivation for underreporting yields is most likely related to the illicit trade in 
coffee, which appears to be rife in the sector (Dercon and Ayalew 1995). As 
explained in Chapter Five, Ethiopian law requires that all export-grade coffee must 
be exported. But domestic prices as high as, or above, international prices provide 
an incentive to smuggle the coffee into the domestic sector. Many capitalists were 
remarkably open about the fact that they engage in illicit coffee sales, but were loath 
to discuss volumes or other specifics. The very low yields and sales volumes 
reported by some of the capitalists are therefore best understood as an indication of 
just how wide-spread illicit trading in coffee is, even though it is not possible to 
quantify the phenomenon. 
Taking the yield data reported by those capitalists who have had harvests at face 
value gives an average yield of just 344kg/ha. This is patently absurd. The CSA 
estimates yields on smallholder farms at around 700kg/ha (CSA 2015b). This is 
almost certainly a very optimistic measure, but it shows clearly by just how much 
many of the capitalists underreport their harvests and sales. The head of Ethiopia’s 
coffee research estimates yields in the smallholder sector at around 400kg/ha to 
600kg/ha, while a well-run plantation should be able to produce at least 800kg to 
1,200kg per ha (EG4). For comparison, JARI is able to attain shade-grown yields of 
1,500kg/ha to 2,000kg/ha, rising to 2,400 to 2,600kg/ha for the highest yielding 
varieties. Looking only at yields from respondents deemed to be giving more 
reliable figures gives an average yield of around 1,100kg/ha. However, one 
particularly well-run farm manages yields of up to 2,100kg/ha (LCF5).  
Ethiopian coffee plantations thus achieve far higher yields than small-scale coffee 
farmers. This is primarily due to their superior agronomic knowledge and their 
ability to hire large amounts of human labour to put this knowledge into practice. 
The productivity effects of regular weeding and correct pruning and mulching 
practices (Dubale 1997), together with higher yielding varieties and tighter tree 
spacing combine to produce high yields. Regular weeding is very labour intense, 
but for cash rich capitalists this is a worthwhile investment. As one said with 
palpable pride: “Between our trees you can walk with slippers” (LCF37). Closer tree 
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spacing again raises the necessary labour input, as a much more intense pruning 
regime is required to stop trees from forming interlocking branches, which would 
lower productivity. Moreover, trees on smaller farms are often old. Coffee trees can 
live for decades but are fully productive for a maximum of about 20 years. After 
this time, they should be ‘stumped’, that is cut back to a short base, allowing them 
to grow new branches. The problem is that while stumping increases yields once 
trees are re-grown, farmers will have no income from stumped trees for about two 
years – a loss that very poor farmers often cannot afford (EG3). The plantation 
system is thus very different to a smallholder farm in terms of the way in which 
production is organised, even though both rely almost exclusively on manual 
labour. 
6.5.5 Sales 
The goal of all capitalists engaged in the coffee sector is, of course, to sell coffee, and 
sales are the most important drivers of further accumulation of capital, as sales 
proceeds are used to develop more land and buy equipment. There are major 
differences between farms, depending on whether they have begun sales and the 
sales channel they use. Of the farms surveyed, 28 had already brought in harvests 
and made sales, while seven had not. Farms that had already made sales were much 
larger, with mean land holdings of 246ha for those with sales against 148ha for 
those without. Farms with sales on average had developed over 70% of their land 
(175ha), while those without sales had developed only around 36% of their total 
holdings (53ha). 
For a coffee capitalist, the ECX system is easy to use. All coffee is simply delivered 
to the ECX and the capitalists then wait until it is sold. Sales are generally made by 
hired agents who work on a commission basis, though some farmers have formed 
groups to purchase ECX seats. There are no minimum quality requirements at the 
ECX and even under-grade (i.e. the lowest quality) coffee may be sold there44.  
                                                     
44 The existence of this market segment and its lack of quality requirements is an important 
difference to the market for cut flowers, see Chapter Eight. 
 255 
 
The direct export market functions very differently. As discussed in the last chapter, 
the market for direct exports is primarily used to sell to buyers in the specialty 
market, and is therefore a useful proxy for the production of high quality coffee45. 
Not only must the capitalist be able to achieve a level of quality that is attractive to 
foreign buyers looking for specialty coffee, but capitalists must also find their own 
buyers. Enterprising farm owners must therefore enter into international 
competitions for fine quality coffee, send samples to buyers and invite buyers to 
come to the farm. This requires a very different level of knowledge about 
international coffee markets and much more sophisticated marketing46. It is here 
that we see clear lines of differentiation among capitalists, with more dynamic 
producers using the more demanding direct export channel. The increased need for 
expertise is made worthwhile by the substantial premium paid in the specialty 
market. For instance, specialty coffee from Jimma normally trades at a premium of 
at least $1/lb compared to Jimma washed grade 5 coffee, the most commonly 
exported coffee from the area (CELF3). 
Of the 28 farms that had made sales, 21 farms (75%) had only sold to the ECX 
system, while seven farms (25%) had made sales directly to foreign buyers. Of 
these, one was a pure exporter that made no domestic sales47. Farms that had 
exported coffee directly are a lot larger than farms that had not. On average, direct 
exporters have developed 343ha, while farms using only the ECX system have 
planted 131ha (out of average holding of 476ha and 185ha, respectively). However, 
a majority of those selling only into the ECX system reported wanting to apply for a 
direct export licence in the future. I will return to the relationship between direct 
exports and accumulation in Section 6.7. But first it is time to look at the last major 
factor of production used by the coffee capitalists – wage labour. 
  
                                                     
45 By contrast, ECX grades are a poor predictor of coffee quality, and thus of the prices 
buyers are willing to pay. Specialty buyers tend to ignore the ECX grading system and make 
their own assessments of coffee (CB1). 
46 Including the ability to use the internet and to speak English. 
47 Generally exporters sell any coffee that finds no buyers in the direct export market to the 
ECX. 
 256 
 
6.6 Labour mobilisation and labour control 
Wages are the largest single cost item for coffee capitalists. Given very low land 
lease costs and a production process that relies mostly on manual labour and hand 
tools, this is not surprising. On average, capitalists estimate that wages account for 
almost 70% of their annual costs. This can reach over 90% for capitalists who are in 
the process of land clearing and who own little capital equipment, and the lowest 
estimate encountered was still 30%. Wage costs also give capitalists an important 
element of flexibility.  As we shall see, most of the employment by coffee 
plantations is temporary, making wage costs highly variable. With wages forming 
the most important element in overall costs, this means that plantations have highly 
adaptive variable costs and can react quickly to changes in the market. The coffee 
market, as discussed in the last chapter, is very volatile and subject to price 
collapses. All capitalists stated that they react to adverse business conditions by 
trying to control costs, and scaling back labour inputs was the most important way 
they could do this. 
6.6.1 The use of wage labour 
The most consistent result across all interviews was the use of wage labour. All of 
the interviewed capitalists rely exclusively on wage labour, and, in this sense, are 
modern capitalists48. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the presence of wage 
labour in and of itself is a poor indicator of capitalist relations of production, and as 
I will show in Section 6.7 not all of the plantation owners display ‘capitalistic 
tendencies’ to the same extent (see Oya 2002). All farmers are unambiguously 
capitalist though in that they use wage labour for intensive and large-scale planting 
regimes, which are expanded through reinvested profits, with the clear aim of 
                                                     
48 I found no instances of the use of family, network or kinship labour mobilisation systems, 
such as those reported by Berry (1993) or Cheater (1984). Of course, these studies were 
conducted a generation ago, and Cheater already reported back then that large capitalists 
using a ‘modern idiom of accumulation’ (i.e. one that does not rely on polygamy) were the 
only farmers in her sample to rely exclusively on wage labour (1984: 76). Similarly, Hill 
(1963: 189) reports that only the most progressive farmers are able to hire full time wage 
labourers. Also the farms examined by Berry and Cheater were much smaller (in terms of 
land planted) than the plantations under consideration here. It is hard to image how anyone 
in contemporary Ethiopia could mobilise hundreds of workers for a three month harvest 
season through social prestige or family connections. However, the situation may be very 
different at smaller production scales. 
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making  larger profits in the future (see also the debates in Thorner 1982a; Thorner 
1982b; and Patnaik 1990). Wage labour is almost always paid in cash, although non-
cash benefits such as subsidised food or housing are common.  
The labour input required by a coffee plantation differs seasonally and in terms of 
the functions required of different workers 49 . The majority of jobs are thus 
temporary50. Table 6.5 summarises the fluctuation in labour demand. Land clearing 
in preparation for planting and the main harvest periods are very labour intense, 
and farms will typically employ large numbers of temporary workers during these 
times. An average size plantation of around 142ha (the sample mean), requires 
around 300 workers in total during harvest time, which is the peak of labour 
demand. As explained in Section 6.5.2 timely harvesting is crucial to maintaining 
coffee quality. Plantations require much fewer staff during the rest of the year. 
However, all farms also operate with a backbone of permanent workers, who work 
on the farm the year round. 
Table 6.5 - Seasonality of labour inputs (Source: compiled from interview responses) 
Period Activity Labour demand 
June - July 
Land clearing, planting, 
pruning 
High for clearing land, 
modest for pruning 
October/November - 
December/Jan 
Main harvest and 
processing period 
Very high 
January/February 
 
Post-harvest pick-up Low 
Several times a year 
 
Weeding Moderate 
  
                                                     
49 It also differs with farms age, or more precisely, with the extent of land development. A 
capitalist who is still clearing land and planting requires many more workers outside of the 
harvest season. 
50 Which means the labour force is largely casualised. See Rutten (2003) for similar results in 
South Asia, where rural capitalists rely heavily on sub-contracting and agency labour to 
maintain a flexible labour force. 
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6.6.2 Employment creation 
Ethiopia’s coffee capitalists have created significant numbers of new jobs in a very 
short period of time. As Section 6.5.1 demonstrated, the production process is not 
mechanised and most steps are performed by workers with simple hand tools. The 
number of workers employed on a farm is therefore primarily a function of the 
amount of land that has been planted. The quantitative sample as a whole 
employed 7,010 workers, of whom 5,709, or 81%, were temporary. The plantations 
are very labour intensive. The whole sample has a mean peak employment density 
of 1.5 workers per ha. The mean for temporary workers is 1.3 workers per ha, while 
the mean for permanent workers is 0.2 workers per ha.  
Figure 6.7 plots the maximum number of employees at the height of the harvest on 
each farm in the quantitative survey against the amount of land that has been 
planted on each farm. There is a clear positive relationship between employment 
and land in production, albeit one that is characterised by substantial variation in 
employment levels at all farm sizes. Farms with 200ha and more land planted can 
function with levels of employment that the mean farm in the sample reaches at 
about 90ha. On the one hand, there are farms which employ numbers of workers 
more commonly associated with farms twice their size. In part, these are deliberate 
business strategies. Farms which either have less working capital available or aim 
for lower coffee qualities employ only skeleton crews of permanent workers outside 
of the harvest season, along with a few guards and administrators. On the other 
hand, farms with more intense quality management regimes require more workers 
across the year to maintain a tight schedule of weeding and other maintenance 
work. Similar results have also been found in Colombian coffee labour markets 
(Ortiz 1999). All farms of course hire large numbers of temporary workers for the 
harvest, but the proportions can be quite different. At the same time, it is clear from 
interviews that a majority of plantation owners feel they cannot attract sufficient 
amounts of workers51.  
                                                     
51 Similar findings have been reported for a long time. For instance, Berry (1993: 135) shows 
how labour supply is a binding constraint on expansion In the case of the Ethiopian 
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Figure 6.7 - Employment and land planted (Source: own survey) 
 
6.6.3 Labour mobilisation, migration and labour control  
From the point of view of the capitalists the mobilisation of a sufficiently large 
labour force and the subsequent control of that labour force are the most difficult 
challenges they face. Many have thus developed integrated solutions to this 
problem. Plantations do not exist in isolation and have to compete for workers. 
Large plantations compete with one another, with ‘smallholders’, who may farm 
10ha or more and hire wage workers, and with alternative employment options, 
such as coffee processing stations. In many coffee-growing areas local inhabitants 
are themselves small coffee farmers, who are busy working on their own farms 
during the harvest period. Over 60% of plantations surveyed therefore employ 
migrant workers and in many cases undertake substantial efforts to hire them. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, such migration patterns are not at all new. 
Contemporary migrant workers arrive in the coffee growing areas of Ethiopia 
around the beginning of the harvest season, looking for work. The most sought after 
work is coffee picking as this is the best remunerated. Migrants are attracted by the 
possibility of making, by the standards of rural Ethiopia, quite a lot of money in a 
relatively short period of time. As interviews with migrant workers showed, the 
wages available in coffee picking can be higher than those paid by poor Tigrayean 
                                                                                                                                                      
capitalists there do seem to be supply constraints at the prevailing wage levels. It is far from 
clear that farmers could not attract more workers with higher wages, see also Section 6.6.4. 
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or Amhara smallholders by several orders of magnitude. Many of the workers 
migrate for coffee work regularly, and capitalists often prefer to hire migrants, as 
they are considered more hardworking than ‘locals’ (LCF26). 
Plantations employ a variety of methods to attract and retain migrants. These range 
from well organised operations to source migrant workers, going so far as to 
organise their recruitment in, and transport from, their home areas, to simply 
waiting for migrants to arrive at the farm gate. While there is a tendency for larger 
farms to use more sophisticated patterns of labour sourcing, this is not uniform and 
micro-regional labour dynamics related to the ease of reaching the farm play a large 
role, as these determine how constrained the supply of migrants is. The larger and 
more remote a plantation is, the more intense generally are the efforts to attract 
migrants. 
Many plantations pay labour agents, so called delala, to bring them migrant 
workers. The term delala is interchangeably applied to very different institutional 
arrangements. At its simplest, the use of agents can refer to sending some “kids” to 
the local town to gather up “loitering” migrants and bring them to the farm. 
Plantation owners who own transport vehicles will instead send their trucks into 
town to advertise work and pick up migrant workers looking for jobs, who have 
been gathered by a local delala (LCF42). Larger delala run registered companies and 
travel to find migrant workers and bring them to the plantations (LCF16). 
Some plantations draw on their own migrant workforce to supply them with more 
workers by offering incentives to existing migrant workers to bring additional 
labourers from their home areas. The sophistication of these arrangements differs 
greatly. On one farm of over 100ha in the Limu Genet area for instance, migrant 
workers are encouraged to bring additional workers from their home areas when 
they return for the next harvest season. Any returning worker who brings 
additional migrant labourers receives free food and has his transport costs paid for 
(LCF43). This model appears to be open to any returning migrant, and the 
incentives on offer are quite meagre. 
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Another, substantially larger, farm in the Limu Kossa woreda offers much more 
significant benefits and has incorporated the recruitment of migrant workers 
directly into its labour control strategy. The farm uses very carefully selected 
migrant workers to recruit more migrants. These workers are sent out to their own 
home areas to recruit and bring back large groups of workers to the farm. The 
plantation covers all transport costs. When the recruiters return with labour 
migrants, who might number 150 to 200 each, the recruiters become the supervisors 
of these migrants for the duration of their stay. They are paid as supervisors and 
receive an additional bonus of ETB4,000 to ETB5,000 at the end of the harvest 
season. These arrangements appear to be mutually beneficial to both the plantation 
owners and the recruiters and are maintained over several years. Under this system 
labour mobilisation and labour control are seamlessly integrated. The higher salary 
and performance-related bonus paid to the recruiters ensure their incentives are 
aligned with those of the farm management, and the supervisors’ power over the 
workers under their control is strengthened – as the recruiters controls their access 
to future work (LCF5). 
Plantations also use a variety of other mechanisms to control workers, aiming to 
both keep them on the farm and to control their level of effort. The first priority of 
plantations is to retain workers throughout the entire harvest period, but hard 
working conditions even on the best-run farms make this a difficult task. 
Temporary workers are thus paid monthly, and in some cases only at the end of the 
harvest season. Providing accommodation is a popular way of keeping workers on 
the farms, and plantations in remote areas have few other options (LCF44). Two 
thirds of farms offer accommodation to permanent workers and over 40% offer 
accommodation to both permanent and temporary workers. Almost 90% of farms 
that employ migrants house them on the farm. Many also operate a company shop. 
Nearly two thirds of farms offer subsidised food to permanent workers, and around 
half subsidise the food of migrant workers. Generally, subsidised food means that 
workers are issued with staples, typically lentils and maize flour, for which only 
part of the cost (usually 50%) is deducted from the workers’ wages. On most farms 
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workers cook their own food. To prevent workers from visiting local towns, some 
farms even sell alcohol, cigarettes and chat.  
Plantations attempt to ensure hard work and quality through a combination of 
incentive-based payment systems, strict quality control and close supervision. 
Payment modalities on plantations differ for temporary and permanent employees. 
For temporary employees, all farms employ incentive-based payment systems, 
where pay is directly related to the amount of work performed, using a combination 
of piece-rates and task-rates (Annex VI details the different tasks undertaken on a 
plantation and how they are remunerated). Both rate systems incentivise labourers 
to work quickly, as this is the only way to make more money, and quality of output 
is often a condition of payment. During the harvest, for instance, coffee pickers 
commonly return to a central weighing station up to twice a day to have their coffee 
weighed. The quality of the coffee is easy to check. Some farms will only pay for red 
ripe cherries; others even deduct a day’s wages from any worker who delivers 
unripe cherries (LCF43). 
Permanent workers are generally paid a monthly salary. Elevation to permanent 
status entails an assured income the year round, and often access to additional 
benefits such as on-farm housing or better housing. Managerial and administrative 
workers as well as any drivers and the security guards tend to be permanent 
employees. There are substantial salary differences between permanent employees. 
A security guard may earn around ETB600 a month, while an experienced 
agronomist will make thousands of birr. Many farms also have a core crew of 
permanent field workers. However, for vital and time-sensitive operations, such as 
harvesting, even permanent workers are paid piece-rates in addition to their salary. 
All field-based workers are overseen directly in their work by supervisors, known 
as kapo. Even the smaller plantations consist of dozens of hectares of sprawling 
coffee forest, making the supervision of workers difficult. To overcome this problem 
workers are separated into work gangs, each of which is assigned a kapo. As the 
incentive-based payment systems reward speed, the control exercised by the kapo is 
 263 
 
vital to ensuring the quality of output. Typically, a single kapo will control between 
20 or 30 workers, depending on the farm (LCF43, LCF16). 
The sophistication of the control hierarchy depends on the size of the farm and the 
management skills of farm owners. Large, well-organised farms may be divided 
into functional ‘divisions’, each with its own area of activity, such as pruning, 
weeding or planting (LCF43). Each of these divisions may consist of one or more 
labour groups, each under its own kapo. Farms with several hundred hectare of 
planted area may even be divided into different geographical areas, each with its 
farm manager, who in turn oversees several kapo. A farm of over 300ha in Jimma 
zone for instance is sub-divided into three roughly equally-sided areas, each of 
which has its own farm manager, and each of these managers oversees the work of 
a dozen or so kapo during peak harvest season. 
6.6.4 Wages and working conditions 
The levels of wages paid on Ethiopian coffee plantations are subject to substantial 
variation between farms. Capitalists set wages relatively unencumbered by 
workers’ power, but must ensure they attract enough labourers at times of critical 
demand. Labour mobilisation is cited as a major problem by most plantation 
owners and farm managers, and many farms suffer from perennial labour shortages 
(CL, LCF16). The main determinant of wages seems to be the relative tightness of 
labour markets in different locations. Differences in wage rates are mostly between 
areas, while wage rates tend to be similar on neighbouring farms. Generally, where 
labour supply is limited relative to demand, farms have to offer higher wages. For 
instance, wages are low in areas with relatively little alternative employment 
available, such as those in parts of Illubabor and Kelem Wellaga (e.g. LCF25), 
whereas they tend to be high in Jimma, where plantations are concentrated. 
However, conditions can differ greatly even within one woreda. While most of the 
capitalists from Limu Kossa woreda complain about labour shortages, two capitalists 
state that not only do they find it easy to recruit enough harvest workers, but, even 
more surprisingly, that all of their workers come from the local area (LCF23, 
LCF18).  
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The coffee lands of Ethiopia are in effect a series of neighbouring, but 
geographically segmented, labour markets 52 . This segmentation occurs because 
workers have little access to transport. Within a given local area workers 
communicate amongst themselves with mobile phones to compare wage and non-
wage working conditions. Proximity means they can and do ‘vote with their feet’, 
and this is a factor in equalising wages across farms. But this mobility does not raise 
wages as farm owners try to avoid competing with one another on wage levels, and 
better wages are generally not on offer. Large farms do, however, differ in terms of 
the non-wage benefits they provide to their workers, perhaps as these are less 
directly costly to capitalists. 
Theoretically, workers have marketplace power due to tight labour markets, and 
enjoy substantial structural power, that is the power to disrupt the production 
process at times critical to the capitalist’s profit making, during harvest times (on 
marketplace and structural power see Silver 2003; for empirical examples see 
Selwyn 2012 and Wells 1996). But the work force is segmented into permanent and 
temporary employees. Migrants travel far to earn as much money as possible and 
are motivated to work rather than struggle. Capitalists also consciously hire 
migrants from different parts of the country, and consequently workers often 
belong to different ethnic groups, follow different religions, and speak different 
languages. These differences make it more difficult for workers to organise and act 
collectively. As mentioned above, individual exit and mobility are the only options 
open to most workers. Outside of the former state farms there are no official unions 
and on most farms there are no other collective workers’ bodies either. No capitalist 
mentioned labour unrest as a challenge to their business and none engaged in 
collective bargaining with their workers53. 
                                                     
52 Geographically segmented labour markets are common in many poor countries. Oya 
(2015) speaks of ‘village’ labour markets in Mauretania and to lesser extent in Senegal. 
53 An exception to this are the former state farms where there have been wildcat strikes by 
unionised workers, who then had to contend with the hostility of both union leadership and 
management, as well as threats of violence from security forces. 
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Figure 6.8 - Wage rates and farm size (Source: own survey) 
 
Other explanations for wage differences are not convincing. Wages on 
neighbouring plantations are similar even if these produce quite different qualities 
of coffee. They do not vary systematically with the volume or value of the output 
produced (as reflected in yields and sales prices) and are thus not reflective of the 
’marginal productivity’ of workers – a result also found in Colombia (Ortiz 1999). 
Nor are they related to the size of the farm. Figure 6.8 shows the daily piece rates (in 
ETB) paid for one kilogram of coffee cherries at the beginning of the harvest54. 
Larger farms do not pay the lowest wages, but beyond this there is no clear 
relationship. The highest wages are actually paid by farms with less than 100ha of 
land planted and there is substantial variation in farm size in each of the wage 
categories. 
                                                     
54 This is of course a relatively crude measure, which does not reflect differences in the 
provision of non-wage benefits. See (Cramer et al. 2014) for detailed wage calculations 
including all non-wage benefits. 
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Working conditions on coffee plantations are harsh and dangerous, with long 
working days and limited rest time. Workers are generally not provided with work 
clothes and on the farms visited many are dressed in ragged clothing. Plantations in 
Ethiopia are akin to forests and workers face dangers from snakes and insects. 
Workers also lack basic safety equipment or work shoes and injuries are common, 
especially during land clearing and weeding which are done using machetes. 
Despite the dangerous working environment, only 28% of farms offer health care 
support to their permanent workforce, a figure which drops to 14% for temporary 
workers. Child labour seems to be common in the sector, but has not been studied 
for the new capitalists. A 2005 report for the ILO found child labour on all of the 
three state farms examined (Kifle, Belay, and Beyene 2005). I encountered child 
labourers on one of the farms I visited, but was not able to investigate the 
phenomenon on any other farm. 
While, as mentioned above, wages are the main costs on coffee farms in Ethiopia, 
successful farms generate substantial profits from sales to overseas markets, 
suggesting that overall labour costs are low compared to revenues. Interviews with 
farmers have also shown that wages have been roughly stagnant in recent years, 
meaning that rises in coffee prices have not been passed on to workers (see also 
Cramer et al. 2014 for longitudinal evidence on Ethiopian coffee wages between 
2010 and 2012). This is especially problematic as the vast majority of Ethiopian 
coffee plantation workers are poor; much poorer in fact than most people in rural 
Ethiopia. A survey in the Jimma area found that wage workers employed on coffee 
farms are much more likely to be poor than those who do not work for wages 
(Cramer et al. 2014). And (Rizzo 2011) shows that in SNNPR it is the poorest 5% to 
15% of the population, who "often migrate to coffee producing areas for coffee 
picking” (2011: 6).  
Coffee workers have not benefited from the expansion of capitalist coffee 
plantations to the degree they could have. It would be politically naïve in the 
extreme to expect capitalists to unilaterally raise wages – even though they could 
afford to – without pressure from the outside. Legislation to protect workers is in 
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place in Ethiopia, but has not lifted conditions beyond what has been reported. 
Organisation and unionisation could help workers bargain for better wages, but few 
efforts seem to be underway. It also seems unlikely that truly independent labour 
unions would be allowed to operate in Ethiopia at all. Without such a unionisation 
drive it is unlikely that conditions can be significantly and permanently improved55. 
A push by workers for higher wages and better working conditions would be aided 
if the coffee produced were more valuable, as this would allow wages to rise with a 
less-than-proportionate increase in unit labour costs, and if there were pressure 
from buyers to adhere to minimum standards in production. Both of these 
conditions could be most easily met in the market for specialty coffee, where prices 
are high and buyers may display a level of interest in the conditions that surpasses 
certification. As I will show now, it is precisely in this market that we encounter the 
most dynamic and successful groups of coffee capitalists. 
6.7 Dynamic accumulators 
Many analyses of agrarian change are concerned with identifying capitalist 
accumulators in an environment where most producers are not able to accumulate. 
The accumulation of productive assets, market orientation and the sophistication of 
agronomic techniques employed is often used to distinguish between different 
types of farms. For instance, such approaches have featured in discussions on 
agrarian change in India (see, among many others, Patnaik 1990). In the Ethiopian 
coffee sector such an approach is of little use, as the capitalist nature of production 
on Ethiopia’s coffee plantations is not in dispute. Moreover, while levels of farm 
capitalisation do differ, capital equipment is in most cases only indirectly related to 
production. A more relevant method is used by (Oya 2002; Oya 2007) who employs 
a means of production index, in conjunction with other quantitative and qualitative 
measures, to differentiate between farmers with more pronounced capitalist 
tendencies and those with less such tendencies. In a similar vein, we could try to use 
measures of capital accumulation, cross-referenced with information from 
                                                     
55 Other options, such as certification seem to have limited effect on working conditions. See 
(Cramer et al. 2014) for a detailed impact assessment of certification in the Ethiopian coffee 
sector. 
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qualitative interviews to try to see whether accumulators differ in the amount of 
dynamism they display. 
Looking at Ethiopian coffee plantations this is not a straightforward task though. 
The strength of Ethiopia as a coffee origin lies in its status as a producer of shade-
grown and hand-picked fine Arabica coffees. As seen in Chapter Five, Brazil and 
Vietnam have very successfully expanded the production of very cheap low-quality 
Robusta coffee, in Brazil’s case through very high levels of mechanisation, and 
Ethiopia would almost certainly find it difficult to compete in that market. But for 
high-quality Arabicas the mechanisation of production makes little sense. 
Moreover, the market for specialty coffee is somewhat unpredictable. The best 
coffees in the world are quite often produced, almost by accident, by smallholder 
cooperatives with little or no technology, nor access to specialised agronomic advice   
(NGO). To give a simple example, one of the capitalists in my sample produced 
award-winning naturals by drying his cherries on plastic tarpaulins on the ground – 
against all standard agronomic practice which recommends using raised beds, and 
in contradiction to Ethiopian government policy which insists that wet processing is 
the royal road to adding value.  
A more fruitful approach is to ask who has been the most dynamic producer in the 
sense of serving the highest value markets. And here we see a clear pattern emerge, 
with the use of direct export markets also signalling a more successful accumulation 
regime. Direct export markets in Ethiopia are, as explained above, almost 
exclusively used for specialty coffee, as non-specialty buyers do not require 
traceability and can purchase through exporters who buy coffees from the ECX. 
Farms that sell via the direct export channel have thus been able to attract foreign 
buyers, produce the required quality and have shown themselves capable of 
organising the packaging and transport of their coffees. This is not to claim that 
only farms that export directly have been successful in accumulating – far from it – 
but as I will demonstrate, they have been the most successful. Just to clarify this 
point, the coffee produced by farms that sell to the ECX, rather than export directly, 
is in most cases also sold. By law all coffee above a certain quality grade must be 
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exported and export grade coffee fetches much better prices at the ECX. The 
difference is simply that this coffee is then sold by coffee export companies, who 
buy the coffee from the ECX, rather than by the farms themselves. 
To ensure a more meaningful comparison, in the following I compare as direct 
exporters only those farms that have had sales, i.e. I eliminate farms that have had 
no sales yet from the analysis. Farms without sales have generally accumulated less 
and so their inclusion would overstate the importance of direct exports. The direct 
exporters in the sample distinguish themselves by their interest in producing high-
quality coffee and by their eagerness to learn about and understand the 
international coffee trade. They do not map clearly on any particular type of family 
background or accumulation path. 
As noted in Section 6.5.5, farms that serve the direct export market are much larger 
than farms which do not. They had developed 309ha, as opposed to 131ha on farms 
that do not export directly56. As they also have larger land holdings, this larger 
absolute number represents a higher share of their land. On average, farms that 
export directly have developed 78% of their land, while farms that do not export 
have developed 69% of their land. Direct exporters have also accumulated much 
more capital. Excluding processing equipment, direct exporters had on average 
invested over ETB1.34m in farm transport equipment and other fixed capital, while 
farms not exporting directly had invested only around ETB600,000. Direct exporters 
are also more likely to own processing equipment and are the most likely to own 
both a dry and a wet mill. Given higher levels of capitalisation it is not surprising 
that direct exporters have a lower wage share.  
However, this accumulation is not just due to having spent more time accumulating 
capital. Rather than having spent more time on the same accumulation route as all 
the other farms, the exporters chose a different accumulation path once their farms 
were established. Farms that export directly started their farms at around the same 
time that non-exporters did, so their superior accumulation performance is not 
simply a question of having been in the market longer. It is due to these capitalists 
                                                     
56 The numbers are slightly different to earlier as farms without sales have been excluded. 
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having had the business acumen to move into an especially lucrative market. There 
are almost no differences between direct exporters and others in terms of the share 
of own capital they brought into the plantation and their use of loan finance, 
meaning that their accumulation is driven by sales, rather than credit. 
As would be expected, plantations that export directly invest more in the quality of 
their coffee. They weed on average one more time over the course of the year. To 
enable them to perform a more intense quality management and maintenance 
regime, they also employ a higher share of permanent workers compared to non-
exporters: 19.5% compared to 13%. Direct exporters also seem to treat their workers 
better. They tend to pay better salaries (though not by much) and around a third of 
them offer health care services of some sort to temporary workers, while only 
around 12% of non-exporters do. There is no such difference in the provision of 
health care to permanent workers. One of the causes might be the higher than 
average levels of education that exporting capitalists have enjoyed. While the 
average non-exporting farmer has completed 12 years of schooling and attended 
higher education for some time, the average exporting farmer has completed an 
undergraduate degree – in many cases in either business or agricultural science. 
The quantitative data presented here is of course based on a relatively limited 
sample and the results on a small group within that sample, such as the direct 
exporters, should be read with some caution. The results are backed up by the 
information gathered in qualitative interviews though. Some of the most 
sophisticated actors in Ethiopia’s coffee business are its large exporters, who are not 
only in daily contact with international coffee buyers, but also often run complex 
operations to manage their stocks of coffee57. As noted in Section 6.3.3 several of 
them invested in plantations in the wake of the ECX and their only reason for doing 
so was to produce specialty coffee, so as to be able to offer their customers 
traceability at least for part of their product range. They are also cash rich and find 
it easy to mobilise capital and hence have invested heavily in their plantations. 
                                                     
57 They were not included in my quantitative sample and therefore are not included in the 
figures presented above. 
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Another group that is notable for their export success are farms started by returned 
diaspora Ethiopians. They are often from the US or Germany, where they have been 
exposed to the urban café culture and they also often enter the plantation sector 
with the express wish of becoming specialty exporters. 
As indicated above, these findings have important policy implications. First, an 
increase in the number of specialty producers would make it easier for workers to 
push for better wages and working conditions. Rather than seeking an incessant 
expansion of production, policy should instead focus on providing the agronomic 
expertise, marketing support and capital necessary to produce and sell specialty 
coffees. Specialty roasters, with their carefully crafted brand images, are also 
potentially more susceptible to consumer pressure with regard to the conditions of 
production. Second, as already mentioned, it shows that the government strategy of 
pushing for washed coffee production should be finessed. While it is true that 
washed coffees on average trade at a premium compared to naturals, this is because 
most sundried coffee is of very low quality. High-quality sundried coffees are 
fashionable among Western consumers in particular and can fetch premium prices 
in specialty markets. They are also much cheaper to produce and cause much less 
pollution58. Almost half of the direct exporters do not produce washed coffee, and 
this is well-considered and successful business strategy. Support programmes 
should not be premised on a switch to wet processed coffee. 
One aspect of dynamism that is remarkable for its relative absence in the coffee 
sector is collective action by the new capitalists at sector-wide level, which presents 
a hindrance to any serious strategy for value addition. While the capitalists have 
founded a trade body, the ECGPEA, this is a fairly feeble organisation. ECGPEA is 
supposed to represent the views of plantation owners vis-à-vis the government, 
conduct trainings on a variety of topics (but mostly around marketing), and help 
put its members in touch with its foreign buyers. As mentioned before, at the time 
of research ECGPEA was trying valiantly to fulfil this remit, but was working out of 
a borrowed office with almost no staff and very limited financial resources. 
                                                     
58 The water used in wet processing coffee becomes a pollutant. 
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Training, judging from the annual three day event I witnessed, appears to rely more 
on the exchange of knowledge among members, rather than on bringing in outside 
expertise (the exception to this being experts from JARI). While ECGPEA does 
manage to put some of its members in touch with buyers, it does not begin to have 
anything like the resources necessary to mount an effective international marketing 
campaign. To this day ECGPEA has no website. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
the contrast to the situation in the cut flower sector is stark. Here we find a well-
resourced and staffed trade body that has played a leading role in the expansion of 
the sector. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has documented – for the first time – the rise of Ethiopia’s new coffee 
capitalists in great empirical detail. We have seen how they were able to become 
plantation owners through the accumulation of capital in other sectors and for the 
most part outside of agriculture. I have shown how they were able to secure the 
land and labour necessary to found and expand their operations. Until they were 
able to command the capital necessary to start a plantation the capitalists followed 
varied and complex pathways of accumulation. I have mapped out some of these 
paths to demonstrate the high levels of contingency and idiosyncrasy involved. 
However, these accumulation patterns must also be understood in the light of the 
historical context laid out in Chapter Five. The remarkable dynamism witnessed 
recently was only possible because the private plantation system had been so long 
‘in the making’. 
The discussion has placed a particular emphasis on the contradictory effects of state 
action on the accumulation patterns in the sector. It was the Ethiopian state, in 
pursuit of its own strategic agenda, that created the possibilities for the private 
coffee plantations to expand to the degree they have done, by opening up land for 
investment. The accumulation processes witnessed in the coffee plantation sector 
are the direct results of Ethiopia’s turn towards a developmental state strategy. On 
the other hand, the state has then often had only partial control over the process of 
land acquisition at ground level. The new capitalists in the sector have 
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demonstrated resilience and inventiveness in seeking to overcome or circumvent 
state regulation and were not averse to undertaking illegal activities to further their 
own interest, including grabbing land illegally59. To again draw on Streeck’s words, 
they have been “unruly Schumpeterian entrepreneurs” (2009: 4).  
A similarly contradictory effect results from the rushed introduction of the ECX, 
and the subsequent re-opening of the direct export route. The fact that large farmers 
can now sell their coffee directly to overseas buyers has opened up new routes of 
accumulation for the most capable and dynamic capitalists, who now have access to 
a premium market segment. This is not the result of cleverly conceived industrial 
policy, but as shown in the previous chapter, is directly related to the government’s 
need to control coffee revenues. 
Beyond opening up land for investment and making it available at low prices, the 
state has actually done little to directly support the production of coffee by these 
enterprises. The plantations therefore have comparatively little technological 
equipment, and what they do possess they have accumulated in a piecemeal 
fashion. Nonetheless they have established production systems that set them apart 
from the norm in Ethiopia’s coffee sector. The plantations have survived by 
pursuing a largely non-mechanised method of production that allows them to scale 
back the major costs factor – wages.  
In this the new capitalists have been aided by the fact that there appears to be 
relatively little open class conflict between workers and capitalists on the 
plantations 60 . Workers are not effectively organised, and strategies for labour 
control seem to have generally achieved their aims. Farm owners have been able to 
preside over stagnant nominal wages for years. Combined with cheap land, the low 
cost labour provided overwhelmingly by Ethiopia’s rural poor has allowed the 
coffee capitalists to build often highly profitable operations, in many cases on the 
                                                     
59 This is a good illustration why, as Jessop (2016) insists, the state must not be seen as 
unitary identity or actor, endowed with a singular will or goal. The developmental goals of 
the federal political elite are not necessarily shared, or interpreted the same way, by local 
government officials – for whom collaborating with local capitalists may be far more 
lucrative.  
60 Though future research should investigate this in much greater depth. 
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back of comparatively small initial investments. However, growing plantation 
workforces and increased labour migration are likely to further class conflict and 
even dispersed labour forces with a high proportion of migrants can sometimes be 
organised with surprising speed and effectiveness, see for instance Wells (1996). A 
failure to correct the harsh and frequently dangerous labour practices prevalent in 
the sector plants the seeds of future discontent, and prevents the up-skilling 
necessary to maintain international competitiveness. 
At the same time, increasing consumer demands for ‘sustainable’ production 
systems and the growing sophistication of coffee production in many competitor 
countries will make a competitive edge built primarily on low wages less and less 
viable61. As I have documented, the most successful accumulators have been those 
who have been capable of tapping into the high-value markets for specialty coffee. 
Capitalists who engage in direct exports have been able to develop more land and 
also offer (marginally) better working conditions. And they have been able to do 
this despite the weaknesses of Ethiopia’s coffee research system. In fact, as Chapter 
Five has shown, this particular route for accumulation was – somewhat 
paradoxically – opened up through the government’s attempt to establish more 
advanced systems for controlling the foreign exchange flows generated by the 
sector. 
We turn now to the comparator case, the floriculture sector. Even more than coffee, 
flowers are produced for export – there is only a very small domestic market in 
Ethiopia. And just like the private coffee plantations that were the topic of this 
chapter, the flower farms we are about to examine are a new phenomenon in 
Ethiopia. But as we shall see, there are big differences between the two cases in 
terms of the role played by the state and in the involvement of foreign capital. 
While the state had only a limited role in nurturing Ethiopia’s coffee capitalists, 
floriculture was declared a ‘priority sector’ soon after its emergence and has been at 
the centre of Ethiopia’s industrial policy since (Schaefer and Abebe 2015). In part 
                                                     
61  On this increasing ‘symbolic’ aspect in coffee consumption and hence demand, see 
Daviron and Ponte (2005). 
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this is due to the presence of foreign investors and the formation of an effective 
lobby for the capitalists engaged in flower production. The next chapter will analyse 
accumulation processes in the cut flower sector, before we turn to a direct 
comparison between the coffee and floriculture cases in Chapter Eight. 
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Annex VI 
 
Production activities and remuneration methods 
 
Activity Explanation Payment method 
Land clearing Before coffee can be planted in a forest the land must be cleared of much of the undergrowth. The amount of 
light that penetrates through the canopy is carefully managed by leaving most of the larger shade trees in place. 
Land clearing is undertaken almost exclusively with machetes and is very hard work. Injuries from machete 
blows are common. 
Task rate – ETB per 
area cleared, area 
measures differ 
Nursery work Coffee is planted as a seedling. Prior to planting the young seedlings have to be nurtured in an irrigated nursery 
with additional sun protection until they are large enough to survive in the plantation proper. Sun protection is 
usually constructed from wooden frames and netting or woven twigs, covered with leaves. Seedlings are most 
commonly planted at a height of around 30cm. 
Day rate 
Digging Holes have to be dug both for planting new seedlings, and for the construction of temporary structures such as 
raised beds of netting for drying coffee. 
Piece rate – ETB per 
hole 
Planting New seedlings are planted for two different reasons. On the one hand old, sick or damaged trees have to be 
replaced to maintain yields in the medium-term (a). On the other hand, farms tend to manage investment costs 
by expanding the planted area gradually each year, meaning that substantial planting efforts can persist for 
many years after a farm was first founded (b). Plantations have planting densities of at least 2,000 trees per ha, 
but 3,000-3,200 trees per ha and above are more common. 
Piece rate (a) – ETB 
per seedling and 
task rate (b) ETB 
area planted. 
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Weeding Weeds compete with coffee trees for resources (water and nutrients) and must be regularly removed to raise 
yields. Most farms weed exclusively with machetes. A few however, use chemical herbicides. Agronomists 
recommend six rounds of weeding in the highly fertile Ethiopian highland periphery. Most farms weed less 
often though.  
Task rate – ETB per 
area 
Pruning After the harvest coffee trees must be pruned, i.e. cut back. Pruning not only strengthens the growth of the tree 
for the next season and helps maintain healthy trees, it also keeps the size of the trees manageable. In the wild 
coffee trees can grow several metres tall. On plantations tree growth is generally constrained to about 2m or 2.5m 
to allow for easier harvesting. Trees on plantations are also only allowed to have two main branches. This 
concentrates the berries on the plant and means the trees can devote more resources to growing berries, rather 
than additional branches. 
Task rate – ETB per 
area 
Stumping Coffee trees are perennial and live for decades, but their fruit bearing capacity declines over their lifetime. In 
most Ethiopian climates they become fully productive after about four years and remain at a relative high level 
of productivity for about twenty years thereafter. When trees reach an age of about 25 years, they must be cut 
back to a stump to allow the tree to grow back, which restores productivity. Some farms insist on stumping after 
periods of 10 or 15 years. While a stumped tree will not produce any coffee for some years, stumping of old trees 
is vital to maintaining yields. However, none of the plantations are old enough yet to have had to stump trees.   
N/A as no farm has 
had to stump trees 
yet. 
Fungus removal Highland coffee forests are moist for much of the year and provide ideal growing conditions for fungi, the 
world’s most successful life form. Certain forms of fungi grow on coffee trees and divert resources from the 
berries. They must therefore be rubbed off to allow for ideal growth. No respondent could name the responsible 
fungus or fungi, but they should not be confused with coffee berry disease (CBD) or coffee leaf rust, which are 
also caused by fungi, but can spark serious epidemics.  
Task rate – ETB per 
area 
Coffee picking Coffee has to be selectively picked by groups of workers moving systematically and repeatedly across the 
plantation to find only the ripe red berries which will produce the highest quality coffee. Unripe or overripe 
berries must be avoided. Once the harvest is over, groups of workers also scour the farm for fallen berries, which 
produce very low quality coffee for sale in the domestic market  
Piece rate – ETB per 
kg. The rate varies 
across the harvest 
(Source: compiled from interview responses) 
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Chapter seven 
 
Capital and the state in floriculture 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The Ethiopian floriculture sector was chosen as a second case for analysis of the 
origins and dynamics of capital accumulation, as well as its interaction with state 
policy and actions. Floriculture was selected as the comparator case to coffee 
production because the combination of communalities and contrasts between these 
two cases allows us both to explore different patterns of capital accumulation and to 
examine how these are nurtured – or not – by the Ethiopian state. As a systematic 
comparison between accumulation and state action in coffee and floriculture is the 
subject of the next chapter, I will focus here primarily on floriculture. 
Unlike coffee cultivation, the growth of floriculture in Ethiopia is a very recent 
development. While there had been some attempts at establishing open field flower 
farms under the Derg regime, the contemporary flower sector, characterised by 
production in greenhouses, did not begin in earnest until 1998. In this chapter I 
trace the emergence of the sector through private capitalist initiative and its 
subsequent rapid growth due to the Ethiopian government’s coordinated industrial 
policy. The Ethiopian state not only provided land for investment, but also put in 
place a subsidy and support regime that saw the government provide capital, 
organise air transport and construct the necessary infrastructure, as well as invest in 
education and training at vocational and degree levels. The success of this policy 
regime in expanding the Ethiopian flower sector is considered a case study for the 
success of selective industrial policy in Africa (Altenburg 2010; Altenburg 2011; 
Gebreyesus 2014; UNCTAD and UNIDO 2011). 
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I pursue four main aims in this chapter. First, I analyse the structure and growth of 
the floriculture sector and its connections to international markets. Second, I 
demonstrate that the success of the sector was in many ways – but by no means 
exclusively –due to the dedicated support for the sector’s capitalists provided by the 
Ethiopian state. Unlike in the coffee sector, the Ethiopian state actively nurtured 
floriculture capitalists. While the relationship between capital and the state in the 
sector is not free from conflicts, in particular over the control of revenues, 
government officials went to great lengths to support floriculture farms. Support for 
the sector was driven by the highest levels of Ethiopia’s policy elite. The sector is 
seen by the Ethiopian government as a blueprint for the expansion of high-value 
export agriculture (Oqubay 2015), and – as I shall argue in the next chapter –  for 
industrial policy more generally. Third, I show how the growth of the sector has 
largely been driven by foreign capital. While there are successful domestic 
capitalists operating in the sector, domestic accumulation has played a relatively 
minor role – and one that has diminished over time. As we shall see, foreign farms 
in many ways operate a different business model. Fourth, I argue that while it was 
an unintended consequence of government policy that much of the support offered 
to the sector has thus gone to support the accumulation of foreign capital, the 
growth of the sector has nonetheless fulfilled a strategic role for the Ethiopian state, 
which – as in coffee – has succeeded in controlling much of the foreign exchange 
generated, and is free to use the proceeds to build the EPRDF’s developmental state.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 gives an overview 
of the global market for cut flowers and explains the value chain and its 
implications of the sector in Ethiopia, before Section 7.3 lays out the growth 
performance of the Ethiopian floriculture sector. As in the case of coffee, the 
contemporary flower sector, despite its much briefer existence, must be understood 
as the product of a historical process of evolution, and Section 7.4 introduces that 
history with a particular focus on the actions of the Ethiopian state. Section 7.5 
analyses the patterns of capital accumulation that characterise the sector, while 
Sections 7.6 and 7.7 deal with the control over land and labour respectively. In 
Section 7.8 I discuss the qualitative differences between foreign and domestic 
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capitalists and how these differences gave rise to different business models in the 
sector. Finally, Section 7.9 analyses how the development of the sector fits into the 
strategic plans of Ethiopia’s political elite by demonstrating how the Ethiopian state 
retains control over much of the foreign exchange generated by the sector. A brief 
conclusion summarises the main points made in the chapter. 
Before we proceed though, a brief reminder about the data used in this chapter is 
required. Like the previous chapters on coffee, this chapter is built on a mixture of 
both quantitative and qualitative data. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the 
data sources used here differ from previous chapters. As before, the qualitative data 
comes from semi-structured interviews conducted with current and former flower 
farms owners, farm managers, employees of the sectoral trade association and 
government officials at federal and regional level. The quantitative data comes from 
raw data from four rounds of a sector-specific census, collected by EDRI and GRIPS 
in 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2013. All calculations and analyses were conducted by me. 
Lastly, the discussion focuses only on flower farms engaged in production under 
greenhouses, disregarding the 10% of total land given over to open field flower 
production1, which is very different in terms of the capital requirements.  
7.2 The international market for cut flowers 
Modern high-technology agriculture has more in common with industrial 
production systems than with the rain-fed ox plough farming practised in the 
Ethiopian highlands. Strict product standards in international markets and the 
logistical requirements of delivering unspoilt fresh produce over long distances 
have combined with management practices aimed at maximising profits through 
ever greater standardisation and efficiency to produce labour processes and capital 
requirements in agriculture indistinguishable from industry. Some speak of the 
“industrialisation of freshness” (Cramer 2015).  
                                                     
1 In 2013, according to census data for that year, there was a total of 1,438ha under flowers, 
of which 1,295ha were under greenhouses, leaving just 143ha for the production of open 
field flowers. 
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Contemporary floriculture is an example of this trend. Plants are grown in 
greenhouses, which are artificial environments finely adjusted to support the 
growth of flowers with particular traits, such as large and attractive heads, while 
combatting the disease load inherent in monocultures. The production process is 
completely dependent on modern technology, from the plant science needed to 
produce new varieties and determine the optimal inputs of fertilisers, herbicides 
and pesticides, to the chemistry of the inputs themselves, and the computer-
controlled irrigation systems that keep the flowers alive. The flowers must adhere to 
strict phytosanitary standards to be allowed onto the European market. Cut flowers 
are a delicate and highly perishable product. As the flowers start dying as soon as 
they are cut, they must be carefully packed and cooled during all stages of transport 
so as to reach the final consumer in an attractive state. Flowers are luxury goods 
and are generally purchased for decoration or as gifts, so their visual appearance is 
vital to sales. Due to these properties the international trade in cut flowers, 
especially across long distances, only developed after the growth of commercial 
aviation cut transport times, thus allowing for the delivery of fresh flowers from 
growing locations thousands of miles away2. 
Until the 1960s the Netherlands were (almost) the sole large exporters of cut flowers 
in the world3. But rising costs led producers in both Europe and the US to look for 
cheaper locations to produce flowers, and today cut flowers are grown for export in 
a large number of countries around the world. Production is increasingly shifting  
away from high-income countries. The pioneer of this development was Colombia, 
and that country’s success in building a flower export sector was soon emulated 
elsewhere (Taylor 2011). The contemporary global flower market is organised 
through three major hubs: the US, the EU and Japan (Wijnands 2005). As most of 
Ethiopia’s exports go to the EU, I will limit my discussion to that hub. 
                                                     
2 I use the term cut flowers and floriculture interchangeably in the Ethiopian context, despite 
the fact that globally cut flowers only constitute around 40% of the sales in the  floriculture 
sector, which also includes live flowers (van Rijswick 2015). 
3 Although globally China and India had – and continue to have – by far the largest areas 
committed to growing flowers (Wijnands 2005). 
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Despite having lost market share in the last decades, the Netherlands continue to 
play a major role in the global cut flower trade. The country is both a large producer 
and a major re-exporter, and it completely dominates the European hub in both 
imports and exports. According to UN COMTRADE data, the Netherlands had 
export volumes, including re-exports, of over US$4.9bn is 2011 and of over 
US$4.6bn in 2012 and 2013. For comparison, Figure 7.1 shows the real export 
performance of the top Latin American and African producers since 20004. The 
Latin American producers are larger, but it is clear that growth has been strong in 
both regions. Kenya is still the largest producer in Africa, with exports in 2012 of 
around US$450m (KFC 2015). But Ethiopia is catching up with Kenya in the most 
important export market, the EU. By 2013 Ethiopia had become the 3rd largest 
external supplier to the EU (after Kenya and Ecuador), and provided 16.4% of the 
EU’s external flower supplies, while Kenya provided 37.7% (ITC 2014). Still, all of 
these producers are dwarfed by the Netherland’s dominant position in the 
European floriculture hub. 
 
 
                                                     
4 The UN Comtrade data after 2012 contains some obvious errors, including a near-tripling 
of Ethiopian exports not found in official Ethiopian data, and so is not displayed here. 
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Figure 7.1 – Real value of annual flower exports for selected producers 2000-2012  
(Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade, SITC rev3 code 2927).  
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In terms of imports, the EU is one of the most important markets for cut flowers 
both globally and for Ethiopia (Oqubay 2015). Figure 7.2 shows the global import 
shares of the top 10 flower importing countries. The list is dominated by EU 
member states, although the US, Russia and Japan are important markets as well. 
Ethiopian farms are diversifying their sales destinations and were exporting to over 
80 different countries by 2010 (Taylor 2011). 
Figure 7.2 - Import share of leading flower importers (in %) in 2012 
(Source: International Trade Centre) 
 
As in the case of coffee though, we have to understand the full value chain in order 
to grasp the implications of market structures. The value chain for cut flowers is 
relatively complicated, owing to the need for an interlocking cool chain. Figure 7.3 
illustrates the chain from the Ethiopian point of view. For simplicity, I have 
excluded all of the input supply, apart from the planting material itself (see Taylor 
2011 for an overview of these parts of the chain). Two elements of the chain are 
especially important to understanding the dynamics of the sector in Ethiopian. First, 
most (but as we shall see not all) farms are dependent for their supply of new 
varieties on breeders, who are heavily concentrated in the Netherlands and other 
rich countries. These supply varieties either to propagators, who prepare the seeds 
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for planting, or directly to farms, who have installed the necessary propagation 
facilities. Breeders are paid royalties for the use of the varieties they supply. 
Figure 7.3 - The cut flower value chain to the EU as seen from Ethiopia  
(Source: adapted from Schaefer & Abebe 2015; Riisgaard 2008) 
 
Second, there are two distinct sales routes. The figure is slightly misleading in that 
the retail segment at the end of the chain is really differentiated into two broad 
types of buyers: those who specialise in flowers and those for whom flowers is one 
product among many they offer. The former tend to buy flowers at auction, while 
the latter tend to prefer direct sales, though this distinction is of course very rough 
(CBI 2014). Farms can either sell their flowers to flower auctions, or directly to 
importers. Auctions trade very high-quality flowers, as this is where specialised 
retailers will ultimately source most of their products, and the best flowers can 
achieve high prices here. However, auctions are at the same time the less 
demanding sales channel. As well as high-quality flowers, auctions will accept 
almost all levels of quality and have very low minimum volume requirements. 
Farms do not have to undertake any real marketing activities and flowers will be 
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purchased by changing buyers (FF12). In 2013 the two largest auctions for the EU, 
FloraHolland in the Netherlands and Landgard in Germany, had turnover volumes 
of €4.3bn and €1.2bn respectively (ZBG 2015). Auctions can be accessed as soon as a 
farm has produce to deliver and provides an assured payment mechanism. 
Direct sales are more difficult to achieve and manage. In the direct sales channels 
farms enter into purchasing agreements with buyers, who may contract the farm to 
deliver a certain quantity over a period of time. To be able to serve this channel 
farms must be in a position to supply a wider range of varieties, and quality 
requirements are more consistently stringent (FF9, FFM1, FFM2). Therefore farms 
have to be bigger and the production and packaging process must be even more 
tightly managed than is anyway the case. Finding buyers also means that farms 
have to invest in marketing (FF12). Not all buyers are alike and quality 
requirements as well as preferences in terms of varieties, colours and sizes vary. 
Buyers in Russia and the Middle East, where flower markets are smaller, are 
reputed to be less strict about quality. Supermarkets, especially in the UK, are 
interested in medium-quality flowers and are increasingly purchasing their flowers 
via direct sales agreements with growers. Direct sales agreements offer longer term 
contracts to growers, and the prices in the direct sales market are generally higher 
for the same level of quality. However, buyers can renege on contracts and payment 
is less sure than at the auction (CBI 2014, FFM1, FFM2). I return to the relevance of 
these sales channels for accumulation in Ethiopia’s flower sector below.  
In all sales channels, demand is highly seasonal with large spikes around holidays 
where gifts of flowers are traditional in consuming countries. As we shall see, this 
means that farms have to maintain a very flexible labour force. The cut flower 
industry – both globally and in Ethiopia – has been controversial due to a mixture 
of labour abuses and environmental pollution. In response, buyers are increasingly 
demanding that producers certify their adherence to social and environmental 
standards (see for instance Evers, Amoding, and Krishnan 2014; Gebreyesus 2015; 
Raynolds 2012; Riisgaard 2009) 
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7.3 Floriculture in Ethiopia 
As the tired cliché has it, the Ethiopian flower sector has indeed ‘bloomed’ since its 
humble beginnings. Figure 7.4 shows how the sector grew from near insignificance 
in 2003/04 to a nominal export value of US$199.7m in 2013/14, when flowers 
contributed 6.1% of total merchandise export receipts for that financial year (NBE 
2015). As the domestic market for flowers in Ethiopia is tiny, export figures are a 
useful proxy for the overall growth of the sector, which has been explosive from 
2004/05 onwards. However, Figure 7.4 also shows that growth slowed from 2009/10 
onwards. The sector suffered its first contraction in the value of exports from 
2011/12 to 2012/13. The slower growth from 2009/10 onwards is due both to internal 
factors and to the slowdown in global demand and ensuing fall in prices for cut 
flowers in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
A similar trend can be seen looking at the number of businesses active in the 
Ethiopian floriculture sector. Figure 7.5 shows the total number of farms in the 
sector by ownership type in the years in which a new sector census was undertaken, 
as well as the years 2005 and 2006. The number of farms rose to a peak of 77 farms 
in 2009. Thereafter, the number drops steadily to reach 66 by 2013. As will be 
discussed again in more detail below, the composition of the sector has changed 
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dramatically since 2005. While the number of foreign farms has grown 
continuously, the number of Ethiopian farms in 2013 is only marginally higher than 
in 2005. Meanwhile joint venture operations, which made up around 16% of farms 
as recently as 2009, had all but ceased to exist by 2013. 
The reduction in the number of farms between 2009 and 2013 is also reflected in the 
amount of land under flowers. While there had been 1,035ha under flowers in 2009, 
this figure had fallen to only 911ha by 2012. As will be shown later, this reflects the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the sector. However, by 2013 the amount of 
land under flowers had reached record heights, with a total of 1,438ha planted. A 
careful comparison of the data sets for 2012 and 2013 has ruled out the possibility 
that this is merely a statistical artefact due to the omission or inclusion of large 
farms.  
The seeming discrepancy between the performance of the sector in terms of export 
earnings and the amount of land under cultivation is due to the very different 
performances of different types of growers. These differences in performance are 
systematic and their causes will be explored below. But first we turn to the 
historical development of the sector in Ethiopia and an analysis of how the state 
nurtured and supported the sector’s capitalists. 
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7.4 State and capital in the growth of floriculture 
Much of the literature on the emergence and development of Ethiopian floriculture 
highlights the pioneering role of private capital, while also reserving praise for the 
decisive role played by government industrial policy (Gebreyesus and Iizuka 2010). 
The history of floriculture in Ethiopia has been told elsewhere many times (e.g. 
(Gebreyesus and Sonobe 2012; Oqubay 2015; Schaefer and Abebe 2015; Taylor 2011) 
and I will therefore focus my discussion of this history on the interaction between 
the Ethiopian government on the one hand and private capitalists on the other, 
while also paying attention to the institutional framework that was created to 
support the sector. Details on the early growth period of the sector, prior to about 
2003, are somewhat vague and there are a number of competing different versions. 
They differ in the phasing of different investors, the key actors involved and the 
respective importance attributed to the state and private capital. The history 
presented here triangulates information from academic sources, grey literature, 
journalistic reports and interviews.  
The roots of the sector go back to the 1980s, when under the Derg large state-owned 
farms began growing open field summer flowers (Schaefer and Abebe 2015). 
Despite their large size – some 160ha on two enterprises – these farms only ever 
exported small quantities, presumably because the production of flowers was a side 
line for them (Oqubay 2015). As discussed in Chapter Four, after the end of the 
revolutionary war in 1991, the new EPRDF government began the transition 
towards a market economy. The first private flower farms in Ethiopia, all of which 
grew flowers in open fields, were established from 1992 onwards by a group of four 
friends, some of whom had worked on the state-run farms and therefore knew how 
to grow open field flowers. They travelled to Kenya to observe the flower sector 
there and upon their return decided to try to establish flower farms in Ethiopia. 
Lacking sufficient capital, they sought a loan from the DBE. After 18 months the 
bank agreed to lend them US$900,000, about 75% of what they had requested, but 
only against collateral worth 125% of the loan. The collateral requirement was met 
by putting up the private houses and cars owned by the group (FF7). Exports from 
this group, which included Ethio-Flora and Meskal Flower farm, began in 1993. By 
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1995 there were four farms exporting flowers and vegetables from Ziway, using the 
country’s only railway line to get produce out. 
However, these early capitalist pioneers fell victim to their own buccaneering spirit. 
In an interesting parallel to the land acquisition practices by coffee capitalists 
discussed in the last chapter, they had rented land directly from local farmers, 
which was illegal in Oromia at the time. In 1996 the flower farmers were therefore 
forced to return the land (Ethiopia Investor 2012). One of the capitalists, acting on 
behalf of all investors in the fledgling sector, managed to secure a meeting with the 
prime minister. The PM had recently been to Kenya and had seen the burgeoning 
floriculture sector there, which “had obviously impressed him greatly” (FF7). He 
took a personal interest in the development of the sector in Ethiopia and instituted a 
committee, chaired by himself and comprised of sector capitalists and government 
officials, which was to meet every three months. A high-level delegation of 
government officials, which included the deputy prime minister and several 
members of the cabinet, visited one of the pioneering farms. That same year a law 
permitting the rental of land from private individuals was passed.  
Meskal Flower farm pioneered the production of roses in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s, 
and exported the first Ethiopian-grown roses in 1997 (Melese and Helmsing 2010). 
Ethiopia is agro-ecologically especially suited to the production of high-quality 
roses (Joosten 2007), and rose production would soon dominate Ethiopian 
floriculture. Meskal Flower also introduced the use of greenhouses, albeit ones 
using a wood-framed construction. However, despite the interest shown by 
government officials at the highest levels and the action taken to help farms, all of 
the first generation of farms – but not all of the first generation of capitalists – failed 
due to the lack of infrastructure, inputs and, ultimately, government support. State 
backing, while at times enthusiastic, had been piecemeal and lacking in overall 
vision or strategy. This was before the EPRDF changed its economic strategy and 
began viewing agricultural exports as vital to the success of its own economic plans. 
Consequently, the sector was not yet seen as a priority. For instance, Ethiopia’s 1998 
export promotion strategy did not mention floriculture (Schaefer and Abebe 2015). 
290 
 
But at least one of the original capitalists managed to survive by diversifying into 
vegetable production, and this individual was later to play a leading role in 
establishing the sectoral association, the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers and 
Exporters Association (EHPEA).  
The year 1999 saw the entry of Golden Roses from the UK, which was not only the 
first foreign farm to attempt to grow flowers in Ethiopia, but also introduced the 
first steel-framed PVC-clad greenhouses to the country – a production technology 
that today is almost universal5. Golden Roses also brought with it a focus on high-
quality roses, which it started to grow in 2000. By 2002 another domestic flower 
farm had begun production, and a total of five farms were licensed to produce 
flowers in Ethiopia. Among these was a second foreign farm, owned by an Italian 
capitalist. At the behest of the then prime minister, who wanted a single 
interlocutor in the sector to ease dialogue, the pioneering capitalists in the sector 
formed the EHPEA in 2002. The association was to prove an important driver of 
accumulation in the sector expansion through its lobbying for policy support and 
the extension services it provides to members. The sector was still minuscule at this 
point. The World Bank (2004) reports exports of cut flowers from Ethiopia worth 
US$457,000 in 1998 and US$351,000 in 1999, rising to US$891,000 by 2001, which at 
the time represented just 0.3% of the cut flower exports from Africa. By comparison, 
Kenya was responsible for 55.1% of African cut flower exports in 2001, sending over 
US$165m worth of cut flowers abroad that year. 
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the EPRDF began with the construction of 
a developmental state from 2001 onwards. This entailed a shift in its view of large-
scale capitalist agriculture. Thus, the government’s first ever poverty reduction 
strategy paper, the so-called ‘Sustainable development and poverty reduction plan’, 
which was published in 2002 and covered the years 2002/03 to 2004/05 mentions the 
floriculture sector as a potential growth industry for the first time (MOFED 2002b). 
                                                     
5 A notable exception is one foreign farm with experience in Ecuador, which follows a very 
different business model to all other farms in Ethiopia by emphasising varieties choice over 
other considerations. This farm uses wooden framed greenhouses to save on investment 
costs. 
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However, the sector received only passing mention in this otherwise very detailed 
document, and the sector is not featured in the 2002 industrial development 
strategy, which includes key agricultural sectors and explicitly focuses on 
developing labour-intense export-oriented privately-owned businesses (MOFED 
2002a, see also Chapter Four). Nonetheless, the inclusion of the sector in a strategic 
development plan shows the government’s determination to develop the sector 
further. And fact that the only mention of floriculture in the document occurs in a 
listing of sectors believed to have a “high potential of foreign exchange earning” 
(MOFED 2002b) also demonstrates that the generation of foreign exchange was a 
priority from the earliest days of policy support to the sector. Capitalist agriculture 
is supposed to provide the foreign exchange necessary to finance the state 
investment at the core of the EPRDF’s economic and political strategy. But unlike in 
the coffee sector, in floriculture the government was an early and enthusiastic 
supporter of foreign direct investment. 
Five more farms were licensed in 2003. Of these only one was domestic, while two 
were foreign and two were joint ventures between domestic and foreign capitalists. 
The year marks an important milestone in the development of the sector. First, the 
Ethiopian floriculture sector began to diversify its product range, as one of the joint 
ventures chose to focus on summer flowers, rather than roses, and one of the new 
foreign farms began producing cuttings, rather than cut flowers6. Second, the first 
Dutch flower company arrived in the country. Dutch capital, backed by the Dutch 
government, was to play a central role in the development of the sector, and Dutch 
capitalists still dominate the sector today. And third, as mentioned above, the first 
joint venture companies between domestic and foreign capital were established. 
Joint ventures play an interesting role in the sector. While most were ‘legitimate’ 
businesses, some were almost completely owned by foreigners and hence ‘joint’ 
ventures mostly on paper. These were used to provide an easy entry point for 
foreign capital. In some cases these companies were primarily a mechanism of land 
speculation. 
                                                     
6 Cuttings are decorative plant and flower parts, often used to fill bouquets, while cut 
flowers mean the whole head and stem, usually stripped of leaves, of the plant. 
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Foreign direct investment by Dutch capital was preceded and accompanied by the 
involvement of the Dutch government in the sector. A trade mission in 2003 
established an interest in the sector on the part of the Dutch government (Melese 
and Helmsing 2010). Subsequently, funds were made available to Dutch-owned and 
co-owned existing farms and new investments under the Dutch agency for 
international business and cooperation’s (EVD) programme for co-operation with 
emerging markets (PSOM) (Triodos Facet 2010)7. A second Dutch trade mission 
followed in 2004. The PSOM programme, which offered a reimbursement of up to 
60% of costs for investments, was reorganised as the private sector initiative 
programme (PSI) in 2008 (Melese and Helmsing 2010). The requirement that 
businesses in receipt of grants must be at least partially Dutch-owned was dropped 
following the threat of legal action from the EU (Taylor 2011). The last PSOM/PSI 
funds made available to Ethiopian floriculture were granted in 2005 (Gietema 2012). 
Donor money was also vital to expanding and strengthening the EHPEA. The 
association was initially supported by British aid money. At the request of the 
Ethiopian PM, DFID paid for office space, donated a vehicle and hired an 
international consultant for a three-year placement with the association. As more 
and more Dutch companies began entering the sector after 2003, and especially 
from 2005 onwards, the Dutch government became the main supporter of the 
association (FF7). 
The most important function of the association is to provide a collective voice for 
the sector’s capitalists and thus allow them to effectively lobby the government8. 
The association persuaded the Ethiopian government take the growth potential of 
the sector seriously. Once the government realised that this sector could help 
achieve its own political and economic objectives – employment, which helps secure 
social peace, and foreign exchange to help build the developmental state and 
capacity in other sectors – it launched its activist industrial policy in support of the 
                                                     
7 The EVD has since been renamed Agentschap NL. 
8 As of February 2015 the association had 96 members, of which 75 were active firms. Its 
membership is heavily slanted toward floriculture and includes almost all flower farms in 
Ethiopia. 
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sector. The association was also one of the driving forces behind the creation of 
Ethiopia Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA), which is discussed below. 
These lobbying successes were achieved through joint forums with the government, 
which took place regularly under Meles Zenawi, but became less frequent after the 
introduction of the EHDA and appear to have ceased entirely under the current PM 
(FF9). Apart from lobbying, EHPEA is active in setting standards to help with the 
external image of the sector and in providing training for the workers of member 
companies. 
In the early 2000s, the sector was beginning to expand and the government, while 
supportive, still lacked a coordinated policy towards the sector. This was partially 
alleviated by the formation of a national export coordination committee (NECC) 
under the chairmanship of the prime minister in 2004 (Oqubay 2015). The 
committee was created to promote all export sectors to maximise the direly-needed 
foreign exchange earnings. Until the establishment of EHDA in 2007, the NECC and 
particular individuals within it were the first port of call for flower capitalists, and 
the committee was the driving force behind the provision of services to the sector 
by the government (FF12).  
By 2005, the sector comprised 37 farms, of which 15 were domestic, and it had 
grown important enough, in the eyes of government, to warrant its explicit 
inclusion in the next five year strategic plan PASDEP. For the first time floriculture 
was described a priority sector and a set of targets was given for the sector. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, PASDEP covers the period from 2004/05 to 2009/10. The 
main PASDEP document notes that there were 322ha dedicated to flower 
production under greenhouses in 2004/05 and that the sector was employing 21,356 
people. The plan envisaged 1,600ha under greenhouses, along with a total of 70,000 
jobs, by the end of the plan period (MOFED 2005). The inclusion of floriculture as a 
priority sector for national development in PASDEP meant that DBE could begin 
extending credit to the sector and the first loans to flower farms were duly made 
that year (DBE2). As discussed in Section  7.5, DBE played a key role in financing the 
growth of the sector, and was of particular importance to domestic capitalists. The 
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sector’s capitalists were now eligible to access the full gamut of Ethiopia’s 
investment incentives, including a five-year tax holiday and tax-free imports of 
capital goods and customs duty draw-backs (Taylor 2011). 
In another significant development, that year Ethiopian Airlines began chartered 
cargo flights carrying flowers from Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa. The 
sector did not yet have the capacity to fill a whole aircraft, but the government 
forced Ethiopian Airlines to fly with less than the full payload, causing the heavy 
losses for the carrier (FF7) that flying a cargo plane half-empty implies. This episode 
demonstrated the government’s willingness to subsidise the sector, and its ability to 
act quickly and decisively in favour of sector capitalists when called upon. The 
prime minister later instructed Ethiopian Airlines to substantially expand its cargo 
capabilities. The role of Ethiopian Airlines is crucial to government strategy in the 
sector and is taken up again in  7.9.  
The arrival of Sher Ethiopia, a subsidiary of the Dutch flower company Afriflora, 
from Kenya in 2005 profoundly changed Ethiopia’s flower sector. According to the 
company, they came at the direct invitation of the government of Ethiopia (Afriflora 
n.d.). Sher Ethiopia’s arrival was important for three reasons. First, the company 
made a substantial investment in Ethiopia. Sher Ethiopia was set up on a 1000ha 
lease in Ziway and had erected greenhouses on over 400ha by 2011. Second, the 
company had relocated much of its capital and key personnel from Kenya and later 
closed down its operations in Kenya entirely, thus sending a bullish signal about 
Ethiopia as an investment location. In fact, Sher Ethiopia has attracted the original 
‘barbarians at the gate’ – the US financial firm KKR & Co, famous for its pioneering 
use of leveraged buyouts. KKR & Co made its first direct investment in Africa in 
2014 by acquiring a stake of undisclosed size in Sher Ethiopia (KKR 2014). And 
third, the company used only part of the greenhouses it constructed for its own 
production and provided the rest as turnkey installations to other capitalists in hire-
purchase agreements. These agreements substantially lower the barriers to entry for 
the sector, as a new capitalist would not have to worry about designing or setting 
up infrastructure (Taylor 2011).  
295 
 
7.4.1 Developing standards 
By 2006, the sector was well-established and had reached exports of US$63.6m (see 
Figure 7.4). Despite the strong export performance and a generally supportive 
policy environment, leading growers became concerned that further growth could 
be hampered by both a lack of overall strategy and by the increasingly negative 
image the sector ‘enjoyed’ abroad. For instance, a 2007 NGO report highlighted an 
absence of standards, low pay and insecure job tenure, along with health risks to 
workers, and called on consumers to press for minimum standards (War on Want 
2007). EPHEA, in conjunction with the Ethiopian ministry of agriculture, decided to 
ask the Dutch government to provide assistance. The Dutch government in turn 
commissioned a study to develop a strategy for the Ethiopian horticulture sector 
(which was published as Joosten 2007). Based on this strategy the Dutch 
government designed an assistance programme, the Ethiopian Netherlands 
horticulture partnership (Helder and de Jager 2006; Humphries, van Oene, and de 
Jager 2006), which began in 2007 and ran until 2012. The programme included the 
provision of practical training for farm owners, managers and workers, a capacity 
building programme to improve of phytosanitary standards, and the development 
of a code of practice (COP) (de Jager et al. 2007). The COP was designed by 
Wageningen University and was considered “a prerequisite for reinforcing the 
reputation of Ethiopian flowers on the international market” (de Jager et al. 2015). 
Initially designed as a voluntary certification system, the code was subsequently 
adopted by the Ethiopian government and was signed into law in 2011 (Ethiopian 
Flower Export, 2011). The code is now a three-tier certification system (bronze, 
silver and gold), the lowest tier of which is mandatory. As an EHPEA-
commissioned 2007 report makes clear, the primary function of the COP was to ease 
access to the European retail market, which Ethiopian-based growers were keen to 
enter (Danse, Edwin, and Suzanne 2007). As bronze-level certification mostly means 
that Ethiopian labour laws must be adhered to, it allows even the worst farms to 
have some level of certification, as long as they are not found to be in violation of 
existing laws. The code is thus best understood as a marketing tool, premised on the 
fact that real improvements in existing social and environmental conditions had to 
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be made to ensure the viability of the sector. Silver-level certification by contrast is 
equivalent to the GlobalGap standard for floriculture (GlobalGap 2015). By 2014, 
only three farms had achieved gold-level certification, which is equivalent to the 
MPS-SQ standards (FF11). 
As secondary and tertiary concerns the aforementioned report names increasing 
pressure from Ethiopian civil society groups to improve working conditions and 
regulate pollution, and the need to comply with existing Ethiopian legislation 
(Danse, Edwin, and Suzanne 2007). European retailers tend to demand more 
exacting standards than the Dutch auction and often make adherence to such 
standards a condition of entering into direct sales agreements (Joosten 2007). 
Improving wages and non-wage working conditions, let alone paying living wages, 
do not appear to have figured prominently, if at all, among the targets in the design 
of the COP. 
But access to foreign markets was not the only issue threatening the further 
expansion of the sector. By 2007 the sector was already dominated by foreign 
capital. Keen to attract more capital from abroad to hasten the growth of the sector, 
the Ethiopian government increasingly became aware that it had to match the types 
of investment support available in competitor countries, and especially Kenya. 
While the relocation of Sher from Kenya to Ethiopia had given the country a boost 
as an investment location, investors were increasingly expressing frustration at 
Ethiopia’s administration. In response, the Ethiopian government founded a service 
agency for the sector – the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA). 
7.4.2 Building institutions 
The EHDA was designed to be the main government agency charged with 
supporting the development of the horticulture sector, of which floriculture is an 
important sub-sector. It was established in 2007 as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for investors in 
the horticulture sector. The idea to bundle all ‘services’ an investor requires was 
adapted from Kenya (FF7). The agency is supposed to help investors access the full 
package of support measures the Ethiopian government provides. However, the 
EHDA is not a regulatory body and the regulatory functions for the sector remain 
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dispersed over a number of different government institutions, which severely limits 
the power of the EHDA. Due to its lack of regulatory authority, the agency is not 
able to force other parts of the government to adhere to its wishes, and is only 
partially capable of playing its allocated role effectively (EHDA1). However, some 
growers see the EHDA as a block which has diminished the ability of growers to 
talk to government officials. Leading growers rely on more direct contacts to high-
levels officials and implementing officials (FL). 
In addition to helping investors access the incentives and privileges they are 
entitled to, the agency engages in capacity building and marketing promotion. 
Capacity building is mostly aimed at domestic investors. The agency provides 
consultants to help them overcome knowledge gaps. Marketing promotion means 
the agency tries to promote both the products and the overall image of Ethiopian 
horticulture abroad. To this end it works with Ethiopian embassies to improve 
market penetration by distributing samples, finding importers, attending trade 
shows. The agency also intervenes in labour conflicts to keep production going and 
encourages farms to engage in CSR-type social projects. 
7.4.3 The global financial crisis 
An insightful episode that reveals much about the government’s commitment to the 
sector occurred in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The subsequent 
recessions and sovereign debts crises engulfing Europe in 2008 dampened demand 
for flowers. Falling prices put pressure on producers in Ethiopia and the sector was 
facing a wave of foreclosures as some 42 farms were unable to service their debt 
(EG10). The prime minister convened an emergency unit consisting of the central 
bank, the DBE, the EHDA and sector representatives (Schaefer and Abebe 2015). 
The crisis committee decided to reschedule all of the DBE loans taken out by the 
sector’s capitalists. While this action undoubtedly saved many farms (DBE2), it also 
provided money to farms that did not need it (FF11). In fact, successful sector 
capitalists all agreed that the problems experienced by these farms predated the 
crisis and were mostly due to incompetent or uninterested management, while 
well-run farms, both domestic and foreign, did not need assistance to weather the 
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storm (FF6). Successful capitalists were also greatly aided by the fact that they were 
selling into the European market while the Ethiopian birr was heavily depreciating 
against the Euro. This meant that loans taken out in Ethiopia, which were 
denominated in birr successively lost real value. One foreign capitalist for instance 
borrowed the equivalent of US$540,000 from the DBE and had to repay just 
US$500,000 (FF5) 
The bailout thus helped keep farms in operation that were not economically viable 
even before the crisis hit (FF13, FF5). The episode is the clearest possible indication 
though of the government’s will to see success in the sector and of its ability to take 
rapid and decisive action in pursuit of this goal. 
By the year 2010 the sector had become successful enough to warrant closer 
attention by Ethiopian policy makers, which manifested itself in much more 
detailed planning. While the sector had been mentioned in the PASDEP, in the 
Growth and Transformation Plan, which was adopted that year, the sector warrants 
a much larger section in the main policy documents (MOFED 2010b), as well as a 
series of detailed annual targets in the plan’s policy matrix (MOFED 2010a). The 
report recognised problems in marketing, logistics and transport, and sought to 
solve these “in collaboration with actors in the sector” (MOFED 2010b: 54). The 
problem of land was to be addressed by identifying suitable land, equipping it with 
basic infrastructure and placing it in a land bank to make it more easily accessible to 
prospective investors or existing capitalists seeking to expand their businesses. 
EHDA has identified some 60,000ha fit for horticultural development (EG10). 
Export earnings are expected to increase by 214% over the plan period, while the 
amount of land covered with flowers is supposed to increase by a cumulative 89% 
(MOFED 2010a). Tellingly, the plan contains no targets for employment.  
It is fair to say the Ethiopian state has played a vital, but contested, role in the 
development of the flower sector. The sector clearly would not have grown to its 
current extent – or possibly at all – without the dedicated and flexible support it 
received from the state. In turn this support was dependent on the interests of 
Ethiopia’s policy making elite which was keen to produce a success story for the 
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EPRDF’s developmental state, while securing the foreign exchange necessary to 
drive this project forward in other – more strategic – sectors, such as manufacturing 
and the government mega-projects. Against this background we turn now to an 
analysis of the patterns of capital accumulation that this policy has produced. 
7.5 Capital accumulation 
The patterns of capital accumulation in the Ethiopian floriculture sector have 
received little attention in the otherwise expansive literature on the sector. This 
oversight is partly due to the research interests with which researchers have 
approached the sector. Some of the literature is focused on the role of the sector in 
global value chains and is therefore more concerned with how the sector ‘fits’ into 
the global, or perhaps better international, value chain for cut flowers (Gebreyesus 
and Sonobe 2012; Global Development Solutions 2006; Taylor 2011) 9 . Another 
prominent strand of the literature has examined the sector from the point of view of 
the industrial policy measures applied by the Ethiopian state, usually seeking to 
evaluate their relative success or failure (Belwal and Chala 2008; Gebreyesus and 
Iizuka 2010; Oqubay 2015; Schaefer and Abebe 2015). 
However, much less attention is paid to how firms are able to enter the sector, and 
what determines their success or failure. I argue that one crucial element appears to 
be the ownership structure, in the sense of foreign and domestic ownership. This, 
however, tends to receive only superficial consideration. For instance, Taylor (2011) 
discusses the sector’s ownership structure, but the discussion is limited to ‘firm 
counts’, which fails to illustrate the systematic differences between firms. Suzuki 
and Mano (2015) analyse the dynamics of firm exits and take-overs, but do not 
adequately account for who is entering the sector and how the composition of the 
sector is changing. A partial exception is Oqubay (2015), who highlights some 
aspects of the domination of the sector by foreign capital and stresses some of the 
qualitative differences between domestic and foreign firms, but this analysis is 
mostly concerned with linkage effects and government policy, and lacks detail as to 
                                                     
9 Although, with the partial exception of Taylor (2011), the cuttings sub-sector, which in 
Ethiopia is entirely foreign owned, has received no attention. 
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the drivers of these differences. Melese and Helmsing (2010) explicitly analyse the 
differences between domestic and Dutch-owned farms in particular, but they did 
not have access to comprehensive datasets on the sector. Before we turn to the 
particulars for entry into the sector it is necessary to clarify how much capital is 
necessary to start a flower farm. 
7.5.1 Minimum capital requirements 
Floriculture farms are technologically relatively sophisticated installations, 
especially compared to Ethiopian coffee plantations, and are correspondingly 
expensive to set up. For a new farm to be established, land has to be cleared and 
prepared for planting, greenhouse frames have to be erected and covered with 
plastic sheeting, a reliable source of water must be installed (usually a borehole), 
and irrigation infrastructure has to be installed, along with an electrical grid. Most 
farms also feature computer systems to control the irrigation systems and, in some 
cases, also the nutrient supply systems. In addition to the greenhouses, farms have 
to erect a packhouse and a cold storage facility, which are often in the same 
building. Depending on their business model, farms may have their own 
propagation unit, allowing them to supply their own planting material. These are 
more sophisticated in terms of technology than the regular greenhouses. Beyond 
this farms need office buildings for administrative and managerial functions and 
backup generators to ensure the cool chain is not broken during one of the frequent 
electricity outages. Many farms also maintain separate sales and management 
offices in Addis Ababa. Compared to other forms of agriculture, floriculture farms 
are therefore characterised by large investments of capital per hectare. 
Interviews yielded cost estimates of total initial investment costs ranging from 
US$405,000 per ha (FF9), to around US$470,000 per ha (FF2, FF13) for investments 
made between 2006 and 201010. The DBE was apparently willing to support projects 
with investment costs of up to US$650,000 per ha (FF5). Farm owners generally 
emphasised the need to reach an approximate size of about 10ha to be able to offer 
sufficient quantities of flowers across a wide enough product range in order to 
                                                     
10 The farm that reported the lower number is reputed to be particularly badly run. 
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access all marketing channels. Assuming median investment costs of US$450,000 
per ha, setting up a flower farm on a long-term sustainable business scale requires 
an investment of around US$4.5m. Excluding Sher Ethiopia, the mean areas covered 
with flowers on a farm was 17.1ha in 2013, but 22 farms, or about a third of those 
surveyed, had less than 10ha. Propagation units cost around three times as much 
per hectare as normal greenhouses (FF11). 
The lowest investment cost for a farm with greenhouses, US$300,000 per ha, was 
encountered on a farm using a growing style imported from Latin America. This 
emphasises planting a large selection of varieties and constantly adjusting and 
cycling these to meet a wide range of buyer demands, while minimising initial 
investment costs by relying on wood-framed greenhouses and mud-and-wattle 
buildings, rather than the conventional steel-framed greenhouses and buildings 
made of either metal sheeting or breeze blocks. To be successful, this business 
model must serve the direct sales market, which requires knowledge of demand 
trends and a well-developed network of contacts among both buyers and breeders 
(see Section  7.8). This particular business model appears to be unique to one foreign 
farm. 
Investment costs appear to have remained relatively stable in recent years. A new 
investment by Colombian horticulture company Bellafior, which is expanding its 
production into Ethiopia and aims to cover around 36ha over three years with a 
mixture of greenhouses and open fields for floriculture, has an investment volume 
of US$18m (Agribusiness Africa 2014). As not all of the 18ha will be covered with 
greenhouses, the investment costs for the area under greenhouses are likely to be 
more than US$500,000 per ha. Costs do seem to have risen substantially since the 
early days of the sector though. A 2004 World Bank report found investment 
volumes in floriculture ranging from US$220,000 per ha to around US$250,000 per 
ha (World Bank 2004)11. In interviews, farm owners complain that the price of 
plastic sheeting for greenhouses, a recurring expenditure for farms, has risen from 
                                                     
11 I have used historical exchange rates to account for the large devaluation of the Ethiopian 
birr over the last decade. 
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US$8/m2 in the latter half of the 2000s to over US$13/m2, while quality has 
apparently declined (FF5). 
7.5.2 Sources of initial capital 
The question is then, how did capitalists manage to access the substantial funds 
necessary to enter the sector? Good quantitative data on initial sources of capital is 
available for the whole sector, but there is only one data point. The 2010 census 
round asks about the percentage of initial capital obtained from a variety of 
different sources. The question captures the source of funds that were used for the 
initial investment necessary to set up farming operations. This question was 
discontinued in later census rounds. As the year 2010 was the high water mark for 
the number of farms operating in Ethiopia, and data from the 2013 census round 
shows that only six farms began operations after 2010, data on initial investment 
from 2010 provides a good approximation of the entire sector. 
It is important in this context to provide some background information on the DBE 
before examining the data in detail. Ethiopia’s development bank not only played a 
pivotal role in bailing out the sector during the financial crisis, it also provided a 
large share of the initial capital for investment in the sector. The bank is wholly 
owned and run by the Ethiopian government and is designed to  act as a strategic 
development bank, lending long-term and at subsidized interest rates to firms 
active in sectors designated as ‘priority’ by government (DBE2). Other than the 
state-owned commercial bank, and, to a lesser degree, the party-affiliated 
endowment companies (see Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011), the DBE is the main 
vehicle for the government to finance domestic investment. The DBE has a 
substantial balance sheet and the government has expanded this as the priority 
sectors grew. In 2013, the bank had a paid-up capital of ETB1.8bn and discussions 
were underway to increase this to ETB6bn (DBE2). Total accumulated lending in 
2013 reached ETB27bn (DBE2). As mentioned above, the DBE began lending to 
flower projects in 2005, with technical support from the Dutch Rabobank. The DBE 
lends to the sector using a 70/30 loan facility, where 70% of the initial investment 
volume is the maximum amount the banks will lend, while the capitalist must bring 
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in the other 30% as a condition for securing the loan. The bank used to accept the 
project itself as collateral, essentially providing unsecured loans. This was exploited 
by some early investors, who defrauded the bank, and a cash deposit was made 
mandatory (see Schaefer and Abebe 2015 for details). Since 2007 the bank has only 
accepted cash collateral for the capitalist’s 30% share. 
The bank purposefully takes on risks that commercial banks are unable or unwilling 
to. Private banks in Ethiopia often do not have the necessary expertise to evaluate 
large-scale industrial or agricultural projects and also limit repayment periods to 12 
years. They are therefore ill-suited to the lumpy investments and long gestation 
periods that characterise large production projects. The DBE extends loans for up to 
20 years, although the average across the whole loan portfolio is about nine years 
(DBE2).  
Table 7.1 - Sources of initial capital (in %) by ownership type. 
(Source: Author's calculation from 2010 census data). 
  
Mean fraction of initial finance obtained from 
Ownership 
type 
Own 
funds 
(%) 
Development 
Bank of 
Ethiopia (%) 
Local 
commercial 
bank (%) 
Foreign 
bank 
(%) 
Other 
sources 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Domestic 34 54 4 0 8 100 
Foreign 55 30 3 1 11 100 
Joint venture 77 11 9.5 2.5 0 100 
All farms 52 33 5 1 9 100 
 
Table 7.1 presents data on the mean fraction of initial investment funds obtained 
from different sources, both for the sector as a whole and for different ownership 
types. Just two sources of finance accounted for 85% initial investment in the farms 
active in 2010: own funds and loans from the DBE. For the sector as a whole own 
funds, that is funds that were already owned by the capitalist or company prior to 
entering the farm in question, were by far the most important source of finance, 
supplying 52% of all initial capital invested in floriculture. Loans provided by the 
DBE supplied 33% of funds for initial investments. The catch-all category ‘other 
sources’ was the source of 9% of initial funds, although only seven farms reported 
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having sourced funds from this category. Banks other than DBE played only a 
marginal role, due to the unwillingness of private finance in Ethiopia to lend to high 
risk long-gestation projects (Schaefer and Abebe 2015), although they were more 
active in financing the expansion of existing project, which is less risky. 
The distributional pattern seen in Table 7.1 shows considerable variation across 
different ownership types. The pattern just outlined holds fairly well for foreign 
farms, but not for domestic farms or joint venture operations. Foreign farms relied 
on own funds for 55% of initial investment needs and on DBE loans for a further 
30%. Of the 43 foreign companies active in the sector in 2010, 14 supplied the 
entirety of their initial financial needs from own funds. However, a number of 
foreign farms used own funds only for very low fractions of their overall initial 
investment needs. The ‘other sources’ that supplied 11% of the funds for foreign 
farms are easily explained. Five of the seven farms that took funds from ‘other 
sources’ were foreign farms, and four of these farms relied on such sources for more 
than 90% of their initial funds. Of these four companies, two are subsidiaries of 
mother companies in other countries, while the other two have sister companies 
that operate farms outside of Ethiopia. The ‘other’ source of funds is therefore in 
most cases a related foreign company, which supplied the funds from its own 
capital stock.  
Domestic farms were much more reliant on DBE loans to finance their initial 
investments. DBE loans accounted for 54% of the initial investment funds used by 
domestic farms, while own funds only covered 34%. ‘Other sources’ supplied 8% of 
funds. The two domestic farms that reported using ‘other sources’ are both 
subsidiaries of other companies, implying that their mother companies are the 
sources of these funds. Strikingly, none of the domestic capitalists were able to meet 
their initial financial requirements entirely from own sources, while 12 of the 22 
domestic farms active in 2010 report taking 70% of their initial funds from DBE 
loans. Only 30% of foreign farms had taken out the maximum allowed in DBE 
loans, as opposed to the 55% of domestic farms. 
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Joint venture farms, of which there were still 12 in 2010, present a different picture 
yet again. For them own funds are by far the most important source of start-up 
finance, representing 77% of funds used for initial investment, while DBE loans 
accounted for only 11%. And even this low percentage of DBE loans in the overall 
investment finance portfolio is driven by just one joint venture farm, which took out 
a DBE loan to cover 70% of investment needs. Of the 12 joint venture farms, 10 took 
no funds from DBE at all. Seven of the joint venture operations are co-owned by 
Dutch partners, three have UK partners, and one each have partners from Belgium 
and Israel. The mean share of the largest shareholder in these ventures, presumed to 
be the foreign partner12, is 69%. It stands to reason that the rationale for such 
partnerships is to marry foreign capital to local knowledge of the policy and 
regulatory environment. That this type of ownership arrangement has all but 
disappeared in Ethiopia today and has mostly been folded into foreign ownership 
underlines the weakness of the Ethiopian partners in many of these arrangements, 
which may in some cases have been of a purely legalistic and instrumental nature 
anyway. 
7.5.3 Pathways of accumulation 
The capital requirements for investing in floriculture are, certainly by the standards 
of average Ethiopian incomes, substantial. The most accessible option for an 
Ethiopian businessperson to access the necessary funds is the DBE loan facility. But 
even accepting the lowest estimate for initial investment cost of US$300,000 per ha 
of greenhouse space, and this is premised on adopting a very specific production 
style and most probably not achievable for inexperienced growers, a prospective 
investor seeking a loan would still have to bring US$90,000 per ha in order to 
qualify for the DBE loan facility. 
As explained in Chapter Three, I interviewed a total of 16 flower capitalists across 
13 separate interviews, of whom six were domestic, seven were foreign and three 
were from the Ethiopian diaspora. This means that domestic and diaspora 
                                                     
12 This is an assumption, but it is in line with information from interviews and with census 
data from other rounds where there is explicit data on ownership shares in joint venture 
farms. 
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capitalists were heavily oversampled. Two of the domestic capitalists had left the 
sector by the time of the interview. It is useful to compare the backgrounds and 
experiences of these different groups 13 . All but two of the foreign capitalists 
interviewed came from floriculture backgrounds. Of these two, one farm is the 
subsidiary of a foreign-owned business group with a long history in Ethiopia, 
reaching back to the imperial regime. Their main business is the import and 
distribution of vehicles and machines. The family that own this business group are 
wealthy, but still made use of the DBE’s offer to provide 70% of the capital as credit. 
The other farm was founded by Sheik Al-Amoudin’s business group, which has 
extensive experience in agriculture. Floriculture was a new venture for them 
though. As part of Ethiopia’s largest private business group, access to capital was 
not an issue. The group decided to invest after having been asked to by the 
government. These two investors were the only companies interviewed that were 
not family-run businesses. 
The other five foreign farms were all founded by capitalists with experience in 
floriculture. One capitalist was a former foreign military officer who had originally 
come to Ethiopia to train air force pilots. His father had grown flowers in Latin 
America for many years and helped provide capital, while 70% came from the DBE. 
Another grower hailed from a European family with experience in flower sales and 
had himself operated a flower farm in Latin America prior to coming to Ethiopia. 
The investment funds necessary came from the sale of the business there. One of the 
others is a subsidiary of a Dutch floriculture company and the mother company 
provided much of the seed capital. Another was set up as a subsidiary of a 
European-owned flower company from Kenya, which chose to expand into 
Ethiopia rather than acquire more land in Kenya. The branch in Kenya supplied 
much of the seed funding. Lastly, one was a joint investment project between 
experienced Dutch growers and a large Dutch horticulture company. This last 
company is unusual in that the majority of its capital came from a foreign bank 
loan, backed by Dutch government guarantees.  
                                                     
13 One of the domestic capitalists refused to discuss his accumulation history though. 
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In summary, most of the foreign capitalists had extensive experience in floriculture 
prior to entering the sector. The farms lacking this experience were the subsidiaries 
of large international business groups, who could easily buy in the necessary 
expertise and for whom the investment represented only a small share of their 
overall capital and hence a comparatively small risk. These companies also have 
many years of experience operating in Ethiopia, and at least in one case felt it 
necessary to invest in flowers to oblige the government.  
The latter experience is paralleled by domestic and especially diaspora investors as 
well. Both domestic and diaspora investors report that the federal government was 
pushing for investment in the sector from at least 2006 onwards, and was courting 
investors quite aggressively. To domestic investors the government promoted the 
sector as a low-risk investment (FF6, FF9). However, domestic capitalists were less 
successful than their foreign counterparts at bringing farms into operation even 
once an investment licence had been granted. The lower conversion rate from 
licence application to active projects amongst domestic investors may be evidence 
of the mis-targeting of policy support (Macchiavello and Morjaria 2012). Only one 
of the domestic and diaspora capitalists had any experience in floriculture prior to 
establishing their current farms. This individual was a pioneer of the Ethiopian 
flower sector, whose first farm failed (see Section  7.4). Domestic and diaspora 
capitalists had to buy expertise by hiring expensive consultants. These cost in the 
region of US$1,000 per day, and both domestic and diaspora capitalists report 
having spent sums of up to US$18,000 on such expertise while setting up their 
farms (e.g. FF13, FF9), though some also report having received support from 
programmes financed by the Dutch government (e.g. FFM1). Moreover, in the early 
days of the sector some Ethiopian farms were cheated by consultants, who led them 
to overinvest on material or to buy at inflated prices from companies with which 
they had financial links (FF5, FF13, FF7). In addition to having to purchase more 
external expertise, domestic and diaspora capitalists also had access to less money 
for investment. In my qualitative sample, foreign capitalists invested significantly 
more in their initial year than domestic capitalists did: the former spent ETB23.7m 
on average and the latter ETB11.8m. Capital spending per hectare was, with some 
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exceptions, broadly comparable; foreign capitalists simply established larger farms. 
For the population of flower capitalists as a whole the respective figures are 
ETB28.9m and ETB21.3m14.  
All domestic capitalists interviewed were highly educated and had at least an 
undergraduate degree15. This is also true for the population of flower capitalists, 
both foreign and domestic, though foreign capitalists were far more likely to have 
degrees in agronomy, while most domestic and diaspora capitalists have degrees in 
business administration and related disciplines. The high level of education 
amongst Ethiopian and diaspora capitalists reflects their social origins in the 
Ethiopian elite. One is the scion of a successful Ethiopian business family, with prior 
investments in manufacturing and the import trade. The family provided 30% of the 
seed capital and borrowed the rest from the DBE. Two others did not come from 
wealthy families, but had managed to accumulate substantial amounts of capital 
prior to entering the floriculture business. One had made money as a mercato trader, 
before opening a share company with friends, who had invested successfully in 
textile manufacturing and hotels16 . This capitalist completed a degree prior to 
opening the share company. The DBE provided a loan for 70% of the initial capital. 
Another capitalist made money in trucking for humanitarian relief efforts, before 
expanding into grain trading and acquiring a former state vegetable farm when this 
was privatised. The farm was opened with a foreign business partner. They jointly 
provided 30% of the seed capital from their other businesses and borrowed the 
remaining 70%. This investment was one of the first ‘real’ joint ventures in the 
country. The first joint venture had a domestic capital share of just 0.5% (FF8). 
One domestic capitalist got part of the seed capital by working in a professional 
position in the Ethiopian branch office of a transnational corporation. He used 
                                                     
14 The census does not provide data on the amount of land initially developed, so it is not 
possible to assess in how far the higher capital spend in the population is due to foreign 
capitalists developing more land or spending larger amounts per hectare. 
15 As mentioned above, one of the domestic capitalists refused to answer any questions 
pertaining to his background. His education level could not be established. 
16 The mercato (the Amharic term is taken from Italian) is a gigantic open air market in Addis 
Ababa, catering to both retail and wholesale markets. It is the centre of Ethiopia’s trade in 
food, consumer goods and spare parts. 
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severance pay and accumulated savings from that position to start a share company 
with 20 other acquaintances. They decided to invest in a flower farm and were able 
to borrow 70% of the necessary capital from the DBE. This farm has since been 
taken over by a foreign investor, perhaps indicating the instability of the original 
arrangement. Just one domestic capitalist began his career in agriculture. After 
attending university he took over a 10ha mixed produce farm from his father. Using 
proceeds from the farm he was able to expand into livestock fattening and livestock 
trading. He is the only domestic respondent to have had experience in floriculture 
from working on open field farms during the Derg regime. After his first foray into 
floriculture failed, also an open field farm, he was able to fall back onto his livestock 
business. He opened a greenhouse-based flower farm with a foreign business 
partner, unusually using a commercial bank loan for 70% of the capital. Though the 
circumstances are not clear, it seems the foreign partner later pulled out and he 
became the sole owner of the farm. 
 The diaspora investors interviewed were diverse in their accumulation paths. One 
came from a family of professionals abroad, who were able to provide 30% of the 
start-up capital, while the DBE provided the rest. Another had originally come back 
to Ethiopia to open a successful alcohol import business. Wanting to expand into 
another business that generates foreign exchange, he was “enticed” by the 
government to invest in flowers. The sale of his first business covered 30% of the 
necessary funds and the DBE provided the other 70%. The last diaspora investor 
made money working in the UK financial sector. By pooling his savings with an 
Ethiopian business partner, whom he later bought out, he was able to put down the 
30% necessary to get the DBE to lend the rest. 
The domestic and diaspora investors have travelled a wide variety of accumulation 
paths. The large capital requirements, even when taking advantage of generous 
DBE loans, mean that they need to have either had substantial business success in 
their own right, or have access to money through their families or business partners. 
What is perhaps most striking is the almost complete absence of agricultural, let 
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alone floricultural, experience prior to entering this knowledge-intense sector. This 
analysis will be taken up again in the next chapter. 
We should also briefly examine farm failure, which is an important aspect of the 
accumulation pattern in the sector. As shown in Section 7.3, there has been a 
substantial reduction in the number of farms since 2009, and since 2012 for domestic 
and foreign farms in particular. The ‘churn’ in the sector has been substantial since 
the early days. For instance, between 2007 and 2009 alone seven farms were taken 
over by rivals and nine farms exited the sector completely (Suzuki and Mano 2015). 
Following the crisis, another ten farms were foreclosed up to 2013, the majority 
were domestic (Oqubay 2015). Farms are foreclosed by the DBE as a measure of last 
resort, when loan rescheduling fails to produce a solution (see also Section  7.4.3). 
Successful farms, which have developed their entire land lease and are constrained 
in their expansion by a lack of land, can further accumulate land by taking over 
failed farms (EL, FF5, FF3). Successful sector capitalists and government officials all 
report that farm foreclosures are due to indifferent management, and that this is a 
more common problem for domestic investors. As we have seen, domestic investors 
are less likely than foreign capitalists to be fully focused on floriculture. “Ethiopian 
investors may own three firms [in addition to their flower farm], but focus on their 
other businesses.” (EG10). Some may also have been pushed or enticed by the 
government to invest and appear to have underestimated the challenges inherent in 
running a flower farm: “You must focus completely on the farm and be there with 
your flowers every day” (FF11). Interestingly, according to census data domestic 
farms are far more likely to employ ‘advanced’ management tools such as 
performance related pay, but foreign capitalists maintain that even the best 
domestic farms are not on a par with experienced Dutch growers (FF12). The 
profitability of a farm depends more on product choice, market knowledge, and the 
design of the overall labour process than on labour management tools.   
We turn now to the other two major factors of production – land and labour – 
before discussing why the outcomes have been so different for foreign and domestic 
farmers. Once this has been established I will argue that the strategic aims of the 
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Ethiopian government were well-served by the floriculture sector, despite its 
(relative) ‘failure’ to incubate successful domestic capital accumulation. 
7.6 Land and farm size 
As explained in Chapter Four, it is government policy to avoid mass expropriation 
of smallholders in the central highlands, as this would entail unacceptable political 
risks (see also Makki 2012; Makki 2014). Floriculture, which uses relatively small 
amounts of land to produce large amounts of foreign exchange and generates a lot 
of employment in peri-urban areas, is therefore ideal from the government’s point 
of view.  
Good land for floriculture, and in particular for growing roses, must have particular 
characteristics: The land needs to be situated close to a plentiful supply of water 
(Wijnands 2005). Nights should be relatively cool, but daytime temperatures should 
be high, with good solar irradiation. Rainfall should be reliable, but not excessive 
(de Vries 2010). In general, these conditions are met in the Rift Valley regions of 
Ethiopia, where all Ethiopian flower farms are located. The floriculture areas of 
Ethiopia consist of two distinct growing areas, with different agro-ecological 
profiles, which necessitate quite different systems of production. Highland areas, 
from 2,400m to 2,600m, are especially suitable for the production of large-headed 
rose varieties, which fetch premium prices in the market, but have much lower 
yields than smaller-headed varieties. Intermediate types can also be grown here. 
Lower-lying areas, from about 1,800m down to 1,000m are good for growing small 
bud and intermediate varieties. These fetch lower prices per stem but have higher 
yields (Joosten 2007). Environmentally, the only downsides to Ethiopia as a growing 
location is the prolonged summer rain season in the highlands, which increases the 
disease burden on plants due to the high levels of humidity it produces (de Vries 
2010). 
However, agro-ecological factors are not the only consideration when it comes to 
identifying suitable land for a flower farm. Land for floriculture must be close to an 
international airport to allow for prompt export. Such an airport must be equipped 
with cold storage facilities so that flowers can be packed with minimal deterioration 
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in quality. Most flower farms in Ethiopia are in the vicinity of Addis Ababa airport, 
where the Ethiopian government has built a cold storage hall. In 2013 no farm was 
more than five hours drive from the airport in Addis Ababa, and the mean driving 
time to the airport was under two hours. 
However, as shown in Chapter Four, access to land is an intensely political topic in 
Ethiopia. Once policy support for the sector really took off in 2005, the Ethiopian 
government sought to make land easily available to investors. To this end the 
federal government encouraged regional governments to lease land from their own 
holdings to investors and to help the new capitalists negotiate land leases directly 
with local farms. As is also the case with coffee, it appears there is substantial 
corruption in the land allocation processes at regional and sub-regional levels 
(FF11), which are also accompanied by speculation, as some ‘investors’ took land in 
the hope of being bought out by capitalists actually seeking to build farms (EL). 
According to the EHDA, the early days of the sector attracted “licence hunters and 
land grabbers”, leading the government to impose a minimum investment 
threshold (GE10). Federal and regional agencies frequently contradict one another’s 
rulings on land issues (EL). The result was that some farmers lost access to state 
land they had been using, but had no legal rights to, in which case they received no 
compensation (FFM2). Other farmers were expropriated by the government to make 
room for the flower farms. Given the severe shortcomings of Ethiopia’s 
compensation system in cases of land expropriation (see Ambaye 2013), the result 
was often a simmering resentment to the new developments, even though members 
of these farming households are often employed there: “if anything happens [i.e. a 
worker gets seriously injured] on the farm, I fear they [the surrounding population] 
will destroy it” (FFM2). Misgivings about land administration in the regions were 
also an important factor in the spate of protests that began in Oromia region in 
October 2015 (Berhane 2015). 
7.6.1 The distribution of land holdings 
High quality census data on land leases and land development with greenhouses is 
only available from 2005 onwards. Total land leases grew from 1,081ha in 2005 to a 
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peak of 2,897ha in 2009, after which they dropped back slightly to 2,606ha in 2013. 
The amount of land under greenhouses grew more steadily, as greenhouse 
construction represents a costly investment, compared to taking out a lease. Over 
the same period land under greenhouses grew from 282ha in 2005 to 1,296ha in 
2013. Growth in greenhouse construction slowed down markedly after 2010 but was 
still positive over the whole period. 
However, the distribution of floriculture land in Ethiopia is dominated by foreign 
farms. While domestic farms had leased more land than foreign farms in 2005, this 
dominance had already been overturned by 2006. Total land leases by domestic 
farms reached their highest level, 665ha, in 2007 and have declined in most years 
since, bottoming out at 356ha in 2011, before recovering slightly after that. Foreign 
land leases, on the other hand, have driven the expansion of total land leases almost 
by themselves, growing every year, apart from a slight reduction in 2010. By 2013 
foreign farms held a total of 2.066ha of leased land, dwarfing the 485ha held by 
domestic farms that year. Particularly interesting is the period from 2011 onwards, 
as foreign farms expand their holdings by taking over leases previously held by 
domestic farms.  
The polarised distribution in land is even starker when looking at land that was 
actually developed with greenhouses. This data, disaggregated by ownership type, 
is presented in Figure 7.6. As aforementioned, total land under greenhouses 
expanded in every year for which there is data, although the growth rate has 
slowed dramatically since 2010. Domestic farms as a group have hardly increased 
the amount of land they have under greenhouses since 2006, and the small gains 
that were made had been reversed by 2013. After a high point of 217ha in 2010, the 
land under greenhouses held by domestic farms fell back to 182ha in 2013, which is 
lower than the 195ha that group had held in 2006. Foreign farms, on the other hand, 
have expanded the amount of land under greenhouses they hold in every year since 
2005 and by 2013 totally dominated the distribution of land under greenhouses. 
They grew from just 111ha under greenhouses in 2005 to 1,095ha under 
greenhouses in 2013. Over the same period joint venture farms have all but 
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vanished, leaving just two farms by 2013, holding a combined total of 19ha under 
greenhouses. The sector has gone from an almost completely even distribution of 
land between foreign and domestic firms in 2005, to a situation in which foreign 
farms hold 84.5% of all greenhouses, while domestic farms hold only 14%.  
  
The domination by foreign capital is due to both rises in the relative number of 
foreign farms vis-à-vis domestic farms and the larger average size of foreign farms. 
As seen in Figure 7.5, foreign farms made up 71% of all farms in 2013, up from 32% 
in 2005. And, as shown in Table 7.2, which presents the mean amount of land under 
greenhouses per farms for different ownership categories between 2005 and 2013, 
foreign farms have also expanded more rapidly. 
Domestic farms have increased the amount of land under greenhouses from an 
average of 8ha in 2005 to an average of 11ha in 2013. At the same time foreign farms 
appear to have grown from an average 9ha under greenhouses in 2005 to an 
average of 23ha in 2013. However, this average is heavily distorted by the presence 
of Sher Ethiopia with its enormous landholdings. Sher Ethiopian alone held 420ha 
under greenhouses in 2013. But even excluding Sher Ethiopia, foreign farms on 
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average are larger than domestic farms, and the gap between foreign and domestic 
farms has been growing in recent years, from 1ha in 2007 to at least 3ha from 2010 
onwards.  
Table 7.2 - Mean amount of land under greenhouses by ownership type (in ha) 2005 – 2013. 
(Source: author’s calculation from census data) 
 
Mean land under greenhouses (in ha) held by 
Year Domestic farms 
Foreign farms      
(incl. Sher 
Ethiopia) 
Foreign farms      
(excl. Sher 
Ethiopia) Joint ventures 
2005 8 9 n.d. 6 
2006 9 9 n.d. 6 
2007 9 10 10 7 
2008 9 11 11 7 
2009 10 15 12 14 
2010 9 23 13 12 
2011 10 23 13 10 
2012 10 23 14 8 
2013 11 23 14 10 
 
Foreign capital has been the driving force behind the expansion of the sector. To 
speak of an Ethiopian floriculture sector is correct only in that the sector is located 
in Ethiopia and uses Ethiopian land and Ethiopian labour to grow flowers. The vast 
majority of means of production are not owned or controlled by Ethiopian capital. 
As we shall see in the next section, the foreign capital was also responsible for the 
bulk of employment the sector has created. 
7.7 Employment, wages and labour agency 
The Ethiopian floriculture sector has been very successful in creating employment. 
The sector relies exclusively on wage labour to fulfil its labour demand and 
employs both skilled and relatively unskilled workers. Amongst the unskilled 
workers we find predominantly production and packhouse workers. The majority 
of these unskilled workers in the sector are women. In 2007, the last year for which 
data is available, 70% of production workers were women. This figure is confirmed 
in interviews (FFM2). Some farms have a gendered division of labour, whereby 
women are employed directly in production, while men form the maintenance 
316 
 
teams (FFM2). Their work is overseen by supervisors, who are better trained and 
are responsible for ensuring productivity and labour discipline. All farms also 
require more specialised workers though, from clerical and administrative office 
staff to floriculture specialists in production. Unlike in coffee, labour costs represent 
only a fraction of a flower farm’s fixed costs, generally not exceeding 5% (Taylor 
2011, various interviews). 
7.7.1 Employment creation 
Job creation in the sector has been very rapid. The sector is extremely labour 
intensive. Both foreign and domestic farms required an average of 24 production 
workers per hectare planted in 2013. One foreign farmer said that in Colombia that 
figure is closer to 12 workers per hectare (FF5). In the early days of the sector labour 
was pulled in from surrounding villages, but that labour supply was soon 
exhausted. The rapidly growing labour demand was met through increased labour 
migration to the flower growing areas (Mano et al. 2011). The town of Ziway, which 
is home to Sher Ethiopia and a major centre for flower production, has experienced 
very rapid population growth (Taylor 2011). 
The majority of jobs created have been for production workers. These are for the 
most part relatively unskilled positions in the greenhouses and packhouses. In 2013, 
these accounted for 91% of all jobs in the sector. Workers receive on-the-job training, 
supplemented by training sessions provided through the EHPEA’s training 
department. For rose growers it takes between five days and a week to train a 
worker (FF9, FF11). For propagation work, which is more complex, it can take three 
months to train a worker (FF11). Job growth in this category has been strong. 
Production workers are employed under different contractual arrangements: on 
permanent contracts, temporary contracts, or employed as day labourers. Under 
Ethiopian employment law (specifically Labour Proclamation 377/2003), workers 
employed on a temporary contract must be made permanent after 45 days of 
employment, and adherence to this rule is a condition of getting bronze level COP 
certification, which, as mentioned above, is mandatory for all farms (EHPEA 2013).  
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The demand for labour in Ethiopian floriculture production is directly related to the 
demand for Ethiopian flowers in its export markets, of which the EU is by far the 
most important. Peak periods of demand are in the lead-up to Valentine’s day, 
Mother’s day, and Easter. In periods of high demand, volumes of purchases and 
prices rise. Labour demand rises concomitantly as farms struggle to deliver 
sufficient quantities. Conversely, demand and prices are low from June to 
September, with the lowest demand from July to mid-August, and in the so-called 
‘green weeks’ leading up to Christmas (FF4). The lull in summer is also partly due 
to the fact that European flower producers are better able to meet demand from the 
EU during summer, when they do not have to heat their greenhouses. Ethiopian 
farms therefore require substantial flexibility in terms of labour supply across the 
year, and they employ two distinct mechanisms to try and maintain this flexibility. 
On the one hand they make substantial use of (paid) overtime arrangements 
(FFM1), making workers work much longer hours in periods of peak demand. This 
includes the use of enforced overtime, which is illegal in Ethiopia (Aman 2011). On 
the other hand they use temporary contracts and day labourers. 
Figure 7.7 – Number of workers (LHS) & share of temporary workers (RHS) in production 2008-2013  
(Source: EDRI survey, various years)17 
 
                                                     
17 Separate data on production workers is only available from 2008 onwards. 
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Figure 7.7 shows the numbers of permanent and non-permanent production 
workers and the percentage of production workers on non-permanent contracts 
between 2008 and 2013. The figures given are averaged over calendar years and 
therefore do not reflect the seasonality of employment in the sector. They do, 
however, very clearly show a trend towards decreasing casualization, at least in 
relative terms. By 2008 there were 19,882 production workers, of whom 37% were 
not on permanent contracts. The number of production workers rose steadily as the 
output of the sector grew, reaching an all-time high of 32,973 workers in 2012. By 
then the proportion of non-permanent workers had fallen to 24%, but had grown in 
absolute terms compared to 2008. In 2013, the number of production workers 
dropped to 25,140, a reduction by 23% compared to 2012. Most of this fall came 
from a reduction in the use of casualised workers. Their number dropped to only 
3,018, a decrease of 71%. Non-permanent workers made up only 12% of the 
production workforce in 201318. The sharp reduction of non-permanent workers 
from 2012 to 2013 underlines the precarious nature of casual employment, as these 
workers will be the first to be dismissed when demand lessens. 
The development of employment in production, like the distribution of land 
discussed above, shows substantial differences between foreign and domestic farms 
and joint ventures. Figure 7.8 reproduces the employment figures for production 
showing the distribution of employment for each types of ownership. Almost all of 
the increase in the employment of production workers between 2008 and 2013 has 
occurred on foreign farms. The number of production workers on domestic farms 
increased from 5,198 in 2008 to 5,304 in 2012, a rise of just 2%. By contrast, the 
number of production workers on foreign farms more than doubled from 11,982 in 
2008 to 26,453 in 2012. During the same period joint ventures saw their production 
workforce decrease from 2,707 to 1,216. The subsequent fall in employment in 2013 
affected both domestic and foreign farms in similar proportions, and the production 
workforce on joint venture farms collapsed into near insignificance. Over the last 
                                                     
18 These figures should be viewed with caution as they are based on self-reporting by 
companies. As Ethiopian labour law enforcement has become more stringent with the 
imposition of the mandatory bronze level COP certification, firms may lie about their use of 
casualised labour. 
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few years that part of employment growth in the sector that matters most for the 
poor has expanded almost exclusively due to the presence of foreign capitalists, 
whilst the latest fall in such employment has been shared almost equally in 
proportional terms by both foreign and domestic farms. 
 
However, the sector has also been an important source of employment for skilled 
labour, both in production and in administrative and managerial positions. In the 
beginning it was very difficult to find Ethiopian staff who were qualified for more 
senior positions. The educational component of the Ethiopian Netherlands 
Horticulture Partnership was intended to help train a new generation of Ethiopian 
technical specialists. Due to the lack of qualified and experienced personnel in the 
country, the government had allowed farms to hire foreign professionals to fill gaps 
in technical and managerial positions that could not be staffed with Ethiopians, but 
this was considered far from satisfactory (Taylor 2011). An EHPEA survey revealed 
a substantial demand for more local skilled staff and trained professionals. In 
response a diploma programme was set up at Jimma University. The diploma 
quickly proved to be insufficiently advanced to meet the needs of the sector and 
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eventually full BSc and MSc degrees in horticulture were established at the same 
university (FF7). Whilst equipping graduates with solid theoretical foundations, the 
degrees still left them ill-prepared for the practical challenges of working on a farm, 
where the scope for error is very small (FFM2). So a practical training centre was 
opened to give training to both recent graduates and existing employees 
(Gebreyesus and Sonobe 2012). Another important component of training is 
provided by the EHPEA’s own training department. Skilled workers still require at 
least one month of one-the-job training (FF3). 
The education programme was very successful in providing people with the 
necessary skills to the sector. In 2013 there were 1,789 managers and supervisors 
from Ethiopia and 85 managers and supervisors from overseas, while the 
corresponding figures for 2009 were 1,321 and 130, respectively. In other words the 
share of foreign senior staff fell from 9.8% to 4.8% in just four years, which shows 
the powerful ‘import substitution’ effect of educating higher level specialists in 
Ethiopia. Domestic farms have always relied on Ethiopian staff. Strikingly though, 
by 2013 more than half of the foreign farms had Ethiopian farm mangers and 15% 
even had Ethiopian general managers. By comparison, in 2007 only 32% of foreign 
farms had Ethiopian farm managers, while just 8% employed Ethiopian general 
managers. So while the sector is dominated by foreign capital, that capital is 
increasingly using Ethiopian skilled labour. 
Moreover, the sector is using more skilled labour per unit of land. In 2009 domestic 
farms on average had 1.5 managers and supervisors per hectare planted, and 
foreign farms had 1.9, while the average for all farms was 1.7. By 2013 the all-farm 
average has increased to 1.9 per hectare, showing that production was more closely 
supervised and managed. All of this increase was due to foreign farms, who were 
employing 2.2 managers and supervisors per hectare, while this number had 
dropped to just 1.2 on domestic farms. Given the knowledge-intensity of 
production, this development does not auger well for the future of domestic farms.  
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7.7.2 Wages and working conditions 
The introduction of standards in the form of the COP appears to have had a positive 
impact on working conditions. Standards tend to be more effective in the direct 
sales route, where buyers have greater influence than in the auction route (Taylor 
2011; also see Riisgaard 2009 for similar results in Kenya and Tanzania). A much 
greater effect though is likely to come from the pressures inherent in maintaining a 
stable production regime in a demanding and highly competitive market (see 
Gibbon and Riisgaard 2014 & Riisgaard and Gibbon 2014 for the situation in 
Kenya). 
The best evidence on wages in Ethiopian floriculture comes from the FTEPR project. 
Unlike the EDRI data this does not rely on self-reporting by employers. Moreover, 
the FTEPR data takes into account all aspects of the ‘social wage’, such as the 
provision of food and medical services. The FTEPR project reports a median daily 
wage of ETB12.5 (US$1.13 at the time) in 2009 (Cramer et al. 2014b: 73). Large and 
statistically significant effects were found for returns to education while there was 
no significant difference between genders – at least among unskilled production 
workers (Cramer et al. 2014b: 12). The FTEPR team also report that 90% of 
employers provided clean toilets, 90% paid for overtime and more than half had 
some provision of medical care. However, the same report also notes that 40% of 
farms applied pesticides while workers were in the greenhouses, and that 44% of 
workers had experienced payment delays, while 29% reported physical or sexual 
abuse at the workplace (Cramer et al. 2014b: 86). 
Looking at the self-reporting forms, the EDRI census shows that there have been 
large increases in nominal wages. In 2013 self-reported daily cash wages for 
production workers, not including the social wage were ETB23.4 for new workers, 
rising to ETB30.2 after completing training, or US$1.27 and US$1.64. Most of this 
increase simply means that wages have kept pace with inflation: adjusted for four 
years of CPI inflation ETB12.5 in 2009 equal ETB24.5 in 2013. The rest of the increase 
is due to the need to retain workers in the face of competition from other sectors, in 
particular urban labour markets in construction and manufacturing, and the 
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possibility of migrating to the Middle East in search of work (see for instance 
Fernandez 2010; Fernandez 2013). The latter option, which drew especially young 
women who hoped to find work in domestic service, had a hugely destabilising 
effect on the floriculture workforce (FF1, FF11, FFM2). When the Ethiopian 
government closed the legal migration route to the Middle East in late 2013, this 
reportedly greatly reduced turnover (FF13).  
It seems less likely that rising nominal and real wages in the sector have been the 
result of labour activism. While almost the entire workforce of the sector is 
apparently unionised (Oqubay 2015), unions in Ethiopia are extremely weak. Ever 
since the Ethiopian government’s repression of the Ethiopian Teacher Association 
(ILO 2002), unions have had to battle restrictive legislation and an unwillingness of 
private employers to engage with unions (CETU 2012), as well as internal 
weaknesses such as a lack of trained staff (Bersoufekad 2003). However, the 2003 
labour proclamation has strengthened the position of unions with regard to 
collective bargaining rights (ILO 2013). 
The situation of unions in Ethiopian floriculture has hardly been researched and the 
published material available is contradictory. While a report commissioned by 
Ethiopia’s main agricultural union reports that over 90% of surveyed floriculture 
workers believe the unions promote their interests (Aman 2011), an independent 
researcher claims that respondents thought unions had little power to influence 
wages or conditions and complained about corrupt union leaders (Beyene 2014). 
The latter researcher concludes that: “It appears that unionization among flower 
workers in the Rift Valley area was functioning with the purpose of fulfilling 
international marketing requirements rather than empowering its members to claim 
their rights.” (Beyene 2014: 60). It is possible that improvements in wages are due to 
increasing certification of farms according to international standards. Further 
research will be necessary to establish whether the adoption of international 
standards has had an impact on wages and working conditions (see for instance 
Gebreyesus 2015; Riisgaard 2011). Given the relative weakness of organised labour 
in the sector, it is not surprising that a recent survey found that more than half the 
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sampled workers reported low levels of job satisfaction due to concerns about low 
wages, job insecurity and health risks (Staelens et al. 2014). 
To summarise the argument so far, it is clear that domestic farms have not been able 
to match the growth of their foreign counterparts, with the result that foreign 
capital dominates the sector – as we have seen – in terms of capital expenditure, 
land leases and control over labour.  
7.8 Knowledge, markets and differentiation among 
capitalists 
7.8.1 Access to varieties 
As has already been demonstrated above, bringing to market, selling and delivering 
fresh flowers is a complicated and logistically demanding process. Much depends 
on the correct choice of varieties. Picking the right varieties to grow requires 
knowledge of agronomy, the market, and contacts to specialised buyers who can 
supply information about what end customers want. It is striking how differently 
foreign and domestic growers view the significance of variety choice. Foreign 
growers stress the importance of choosing the right varieties, ones that will grow 
well in the particular micro-climate of the farm and fetch good prices in the market, 
with great consistency. While some Ethiopian growers are aware of the vital 
importance of variety choice, and acknowledge that foreign companies have an 
advantage in this regard (FF13), others appear blasé: “Flower is flower. You pick 
them from the catalogue. It is just like choosing your clothes” (FF10)19. Ethiopian 
growers are, with some notable – and successful – exceptions, not only less careful 
and less well informed when it comes to variety choice, they also grow fewer 
varieties. In 2012, the average foreign farm grew 12 varieties of roses, while the 
average domestic farm grew only seven. One particular foreign grower offers a 
selection of around 40 varieties, with an even greater number constantly being 
trialled in test patches on the farm (FF5). 
                                                     
19 Perhaps not surprisingly this grower had left the sector. 
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While domestic growers are certainly at a disadvantage in term of understanding 
the market for flowers, and therefore may underestimate the importance of variety 
selection, they also face supply constraints. Roses and other flower varieties, as 
described in Section  7.2, are produced by commercial breeders, who are constantly 
striving for novelty in a fashion-driven market. Breeders are concentrated in the 
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Israel (Wijnands 2005). They use ‘classic’ 
techniques of increasing their profits, namely market segmentation and price 
discrimination. Breeders reserve access to the newest varieties likely to fetch the 
best prices for the ‘best’ growers, namely those they know and trust. The general 
managers of foreign farms in Ethiopia in 2013 had on average more than twice as 
much experience in floriculture as their counterparts on domestic farms. Due to 
their long years in the business, foreign growers have been able to build these vital 
trust relationships with breeders.  
At the same time, breeders offer different contractual arrangements to different 
growers. While Ethiopian growers mostly report that they purchase varieties on a 
five-year basis, with all royalties payable upfront (FF6), foreign growers are often 
offered contracts that demand pre-payment of royalties only for a year at a time, 
with some contracts offering even shorter periods (FF4). In part, this behaviour is 
understandable as some domestic growers have in the past chosen to simply not 
pay any royalties, in effect stealing the intellectual property of the breeders that 
supplied them (FF9). The end result is that domestic growers are collectively treated 
as potential thieves and are offered markedly less flexible contracts as a result. 
Having to provide pre-payment for longer periods not only creates liquidity 
pressures for the farms, but it also locks farms into growing particular varieties for 
long periods of time, giving them little room to adapt to market trends or the 
demands of particular buyers. This makes their participation in the more lucrative 
direct sales market less likely. 
Beyond their superior access to varieties in the market, at least some of the foreign 
farms have also managed to build the technical capabilities necessary to secure their 
own supplies of varieties. As shown in Table 7.3, while all domestic farms are 
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reliant on breeders for their supply of varieties, almost 20% of foreign farms have 
access to other channels. A small number obtain varieties from their mother 
companies (see Section  7.5), whereas  around 13% of foreign farms in Ethiopia breed 
their own varieties, something no domestic farm is capable of.  
Table 7.3 - Sources of new varieties by ownership type  
(Source: EDRI census, 2013 round) NB: figures are rounded and do not always sum to 100%. 
 Share of farms purchasing varieties from 
Ownership 
type 
Breeders 
(%) 
Mother 
company 
(%) 
Own 
development 
(%) 
Domestic 100 0 0 
Foreign 82 4 13 
Joint Venture 50 0 50 
 
7.8.2 International linkages and experience 
Besides their easier and better access to breeders, and hence varieties, foreign farms 
are also often integrated into international business structures, giving them greater 
access to capital and allowing them to sell to other branches of the business abroad. 
Data for the 2013 census at first glance reveal little variation between foreign and 
domestic farms in terms of integration into wider business structures. About 35% of 
the farms in each group are a subsidiary of another company. However, a closer 
examination of the data does reveal a significant difference. All of the six Ethiopian 
farms that are subsidiaries are owned by mother companies from Ethiopia. Four 
farms are owned by mother companies that own two farms and one belongs to a 
mother company whose field of activity cannot be identified. Another farm, Selam 
Flower Plc, claims to be owned by “Effort Company”, which almost certainly refers 
to the party-linked Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT)20.  
By contrast, of the 16 foreign farms which are owned by another company, only two 
are owned by companies located in Ethiopia21. Of the 14 companies whose mother 
                                                     
20 Confusingly, while Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011) confirm that EFFORT used to own 
a company called Selam Horticulture, this was no longer listed as an EFFORT company in 
2011.  
21 And these mother companies are of course foreign-owned or the farms would not be 
classed as foreign. 
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companies reside outside of Ethiopia, seven are owned by Dutch companies, three 
by Indian companies, and one each by companies from the UK, Belgium, 
Switzerland and Germany. More importantly though, almost all of the mother 
companies have experience in floriculture or other forms of technologically 
advanced agriculture. This of course conveys a significant advantage to their 
daughter companies in terms of knowledge about production technology, 
production process management and marketing. In addition to these linkages, 
another four foreign companies had sister companies engaged in floriculture in 
other countries. 
7.8.3 Business models and firm ownership 
Given their superior experience, international connections and – at least in some 
cases - technical capabilities, it is not surprising to find that foreign farms tend to 
operate a different business model to domestic ones. While they are of course both 
in the business of selling cut flowers, the similarity is in some cases superficial. 
Table 7.4 shows the average fraction of sales through different marketing channels 
by ownership type. For the sector as a whole, direct exports account for 65% of sales 
while 33% go via the Dutch auction. However, the Dutch auction accounts for 70% 
of sales by domestic farms, on average, while the direct sales account for only 29%. 
The opposite is true for foreign farms. They make an average of 79% of their sales in 
the direct sales channel and use the auction only for 19%.  
The average figures just presented hide part of the picture. Of the 46 foreign farms 
active in 2013, 30 farms sold all of their produce through direct sales. By contrast, 
only three of the 17 domestic farms active that year sold more than 50% of their 
flowers via direct sales, and five domestic farms – almost one third – had no direct 
sales at all in 2013. Foreign farms are predominantly engaged in direct sales, 
whereas the standard for domestic farms is to sell to auction. There are of course 
exceptions, i.e. successful domestic farms that sell all or most of their flowers 
directly and foreign farms that rely completely on auction sales, but by and large 
foreign and domestic farms operate different business models. Those foreign farms 
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that rely primarily on the auction route tend to be producers of very high quality 
flowers (FF12).  
Partly this bifurcation of the Ethiopian floriculture sector according to ownership 
type is due to the integration of some foreign farms into international floriculture 
companies, such that these farms only sell to their mother companies abroad. In 
part, however, it is also due to the superior market knowledge possessed by foreign 
farms, who have much easier access to relevant networks, both internationally and 
in their home countries. 
Table 7.4 - Marketing channels by ownership type in 2013.  
(Source: calculated from EDRI census data.) NB: figures are rounded and do not sum to 100%. 
  
Mean fraction of total sales going to 
Ownership 
type 
Auction in 
the 
Netherlands 
(%) 
Other 
auctions 
(%) 
Direct export 
(%) 
Domestic 
market 
(%) 
Domestic 70 0 29 1 
Foreign 19 1 79 3 
Joint venture 48 0 50 3 
All farms 33 1 65 2 
 
One might be tempted to think of this foreign domination as a hidden failure within 
Ethiopia’s premier case study for the success of its industrial policy, but this would 
be mistaken. The strategic goal of the EPRDF is not primarily the successful creation 
of a dynamic group of domestic capitalists. Rather, dominant elements of Ethiopia’s 
political elites seek to secure the political and economic means to pursue their 
project of state-led development – fuelled both by the belief that this is the best way 
to ensure the development of Ethiopia and by concerns for their own political and 
economic survival. Creating employment is a necessary ingredient as this helps 
secure social peace and buys time for a successful developmental state to grow. But 
more important is control over large amounts of foreign exchange, without which 
the public investment programmes at the heart of this project cannot proceed. I turn 
now to an explanation of how this control was established in the floriculture sector. 
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7.9 State control of foreign exchange 
As in the coffee sector, it is clear that the overarching concern for the government 
was the generation of foreign exchange, followed by the need to create employment 
– a point which is acknowledged by leading Ethiopian policy makers, see Oqubay 
(2015). Although some capitalists point to the limited concern for the welfare of 
workers in the early days of the sector to suggest that the generation of foreign 
exchange was the more important goal (FF5). Both of these objectives should be 
understood as contributions to the EPRDF’s overall politico-economic project, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. In the flower sector, where practically all produce is 
exported, the main worry for the government is not so much to ensure that goods 
are actually exported and thus generate foreign exchange, but to make sure that the 
foreign exchange is available to the Ethiopian state (I return to this point in the next 
chapter). To achieve this latter aim the government employed a mixture of 
regulation and activist industrial policy. 
The regulatory arm of the foreign exchange control regime for the sector is handled 
by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), which is the central bank and controls the 
inflow, distribution and outflow of foreign exchange. The NBE decides whether 
farms are eligible for export permits, without which farms may not trade abroad. As 
there is almost no domestic market for flowers, farms crucially depend on their 
ability to export. When flower farms export they are paid in international reserve 
currencies. They are then forced to remit 90% of this foreign exchange to the NBE, 
which pays them out in Ethiopian birr (FF12). The remainder can be used to import 
inputs or make payments abroad. Failure to remit the correct amount, even if 
resulting from errors made by either NBE or the Customs and Revenue Authority, 
means the farm is held to be ‘in arrears’. Farms that are in arrears are not eligible for 
the renewal of their export permit and so will be unable to export until they have 
settled their accounts with the NBE (FL). Sector capitalists largely agree that some 
regulation was necessary, as farms were cheating the government by illegally 
keeping foreign exchange earnings abroad. A directive regulating foreign exchange 
earnings was passed in 2008, but had limited impact. As of 2010 export permits had 
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to be sought on a monthly basis (FL) 22. In 2011 the rules were changed again. The 
amount to be repatriated was based on the weight exported rather than the stem 
count as before. Exporters complained that the new rules were inflexible, as the 
minimum to be repatriated is only infrequently reassessed and hence does not 
move with market prices. Consequently, when prices are too low, as happens 
during the seasonal lulls in demand, farms reduce exports as they would have to 
repatriate more than they are paid for the flowers (FF11). In these circumstances it is 
more economical for farms to destroy their produce (FF4). Moreover, it is 
apparently very easy to be placed in arrears and lose the export permit even for 
minor mistakes. One capitalist complained that his farm had lost its export licence 
for a month as a result of an error of around €2,000 – a trifling amount for a 
company with annual turnover over €10m (EL). Farm owners hence take a rather 
dim view of these regulations (Oqubay 2015). A domestic capitalist summed up the 
situation: “They [the Ethiopian government] want to have hard currency but are 
blocking it out of ignorance” (FF1). 
Another problem is that the system of regulation is considered to be unfair. Should 
they choose to, foreign companies can quite easily circumvent this regulation by 
selling flowers to their parent companies at falsely low prices (FF8). They could 
then legally transfer all of the foreign exchange thus generated to Ethiopia, while 
much of the real profit accrues to the mother companies which sells the flowers on. 
Domestic companies without parent or sister companies abroad would find it much 
more difficult to engage in such fraud. It is not possible to assess how prevalent 
such practices are, but some foreign growers believe them to be widespread (e.g. 
FF12), and some domestic growers agree (FF2). A leading Ethiopian policy maker 
also counts the diversion of funds by foreign farms as one of the major challenges 
facing the sector (Oqubay 2015). 
The other way in which foreign exchange is harnessed for use in the state’s strategic 
interest is through Ethiopian Airlines, which handles the vast majority of 
                                                     
22  To export herbs, farms need daily export licences. By contrast, in Israel – a major 
competitor in this field – such licences are granted for one year at a time (FF3). 
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floriculture exports (Gebreyesus and Iizuka 2010). The government has used this 
airline in three strategic ways, all in service of its industrial policy. First, the airline 
has operated flights at a loss to serve the cut flower sector and the government has 
subsidised airline fuel to mitigate the transportation costs faced by the farms (Abebe 
and Schaefer 2015; Schaefer and Abebe 2015). Second, the government took the 
opportunity offered by the growth of the sector to massively – and very successfully 
– expand the cargo operations of its national carrier. This included the construction 
of a new cold storage facility at Addis Ababa airport (Oqubay 2015). Both of these 
have been costly measures aimed at supporting the growing flower sector and 
further developing an internationally competitive national carrier at the same time.  
Ethiopian Airlines ‘soaks up’ much of the foreign exchange generated by the sector. 
Ethiopian flower farms – foreign and domestic – have to pay for cargo at Ethiopian 
Airlines in foreign exchange (FF1). Transportation costs make up about 50% of the 
cost structure of these farms. However, freight is not a true cost to the farms, as the 
costs of transport are generally passed on to the customer (FF5). On the other hand, 
Ethiopian farms must remain internationally competitive so that price increases by 
Ethiopian Airlines may have to be partially absorbed by farms in the form of lower 
profit margins. Either way the foreign exchange remains with a fully government-
owned corporation and can be used to build this corporation. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, Ethiopian Airlines is the largest foreign exchange earner in the 
country (World Bank 2014). But beyond this it is – as the leading national champion 
– also a key component of the EPRDF’s growth strategy in its own right. 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the processes of accumulation at play in the Ethiopian 
floriculture sector. I have shown how the sector first emerged through the initiative 
of private capitalists and was then supported in its growth through the direct and 
forceful involvement of the Ethiopian state. I have, however, also underlined the 
key role played by foreign capital and donor assistance in the growth of the sector. 
The growth of Ethiopia’s cut flowers sector is a much-cited example of successful 
selective industrial policy and a rare example of such a feat by a country as poor as 
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Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state developed the necessary institutional framework for 
the sector to thrive and the growth of the sector would not have been possible 
without massive state investments in infrastructure and transport. 
While this chapter parallels the analysis of the previous two chapters, the emphasis 
is different. Where Chapters Five and Six aimed at mapping out a sector and the 
historical roots of its development for the first time and at analysing how a group of 
domestic accumulators emerged, this chapter has shown how and why domestic 
accumulators have found it difficult to develop in floriculture. Much of the growth 
in the sector has been due to foreign capital and the actions of foreign capitalists. 
Analysing their backgrounds has shown how they were for the most part already 
familiar with both the technical and the marketing aspects of floriculture. Within a 
relatively short period of time they had come to dominate the sector. They have also 
provided the bulk of employment in the sector. 
The domestic capitalists that did manage to establish themselves in the sector have 
benefited greatly from government intervention. The Ethiopian state not only 
provided them with cheap land, but also put up most of the capital needed to 
establish farms. It even shielded these capitalists from the impact of the global 
financial crisis by rescheduling loans. While foreign capitalists of course also 
profited from state largesse, they were much less dependent on state action for their 
survival. I have argued that the reasons for the diverging performance between 
foreign and domestic investors are the formers’ superior market knowledge and 
international connections. 
The next chapter compares state action and accumulation patterns across the two 
sectors – coffee and cut flowers. It will show how differences in state action have led 
to widely different outcomes, but will also highlight the commonalities in the 
government’s approach to both sectors, namely the integration of both into the 
EPRDF’s larger strategic plan. Crucially, it will show how the Ethiopian state has 
chosen to focus on the path cleared by its success in floriculture. Industrial 
development will depend on enticing foreign capital into Ethiopia – as rapidly as 
possible – by applying the lessons learnt from the floriculture sector: using 
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Ethiopia’s disciplined state apparatus to supply both the necessary infrastructure 
and a supportive institutional framework, while maintaining control of foreign 
exchange flows. This is the latest incarnation of the EPRDF’s developmental state. 
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Chapter eight 
 
Concluding remarks: towards a 
comparison 
 
8.1 Comparing accumulation in coffee and flowers 
We are now in a position to compare the processes of capital accumulation between 
the two sectors. As I have demonstrated in the previous two chapters, the 
accumulation patterns in coffee and flowers differ in substantial ways. To 
understand why the observed differences occurred we must focus on the 
connections between the identity and types of the accumulators, the variances in 
technical and market requirements in the two sectors, and the role of the state. The 
latter, which centres on industrial policy and regulation, will be dealt with in the 
next section. 
The most striking difference between the capitalists in both sectors is the much 
lower prevalence of domestic accumulators in the flower sector. This relatively low 
rate of participation by domestic capitalists in the flower sector has two reasons: 
high barriers to entry and high rates of business failure among domestic farms. In 
the coffee sector, by contrast, barriers to entry were lower and business failures less 
common. Barriers to entry and rates of business failure are determined by the 
technical requirements for production and the nature of market competition in both 
sectors. 
The main barrier to entry in the flower sector is the capital-intensive nature of 
production, which means that setting up a flower farm is very expensive. As shown 
in the previous chapter, setting up a flower farm costs around US$450,000 per 
hectare, and reaching what many capitalists felt was the minimum viable scale 
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(around 10ha) costs  around US$4.5m. Even when using the DBE’s 70/30 credit offer 
a capitalist has to provide US$1.35m in cash. By contrast, in the coffee sector 
investment costs are much lower. As shown in Chapter Six, bringing a hectare of 
previously uncleared land into production costs around US$2,160. Moreover, coffee 
farms can be developed sequentially to a greater extent than flower farms can, as 
coffee plantations also do not have to reach a particular size to be able to serve the 
market, nor are there necessarily minimum scales in terms of efficiency1. Some 
farmers began by developing areas as small as 10ha in their first year of operation, 
thus necessitating capital outlays of around US$21,600, or around 5% of the cost of a 
single hectare of flowers under greenhouses. The costs of entering the coffee sector 
are therefore dramatically lower than in the flower sector. This means that not only 
were there relatively fewer domestic investors in the flower sector, but those 
investors that did enter were much wealthier. While of course some of the investors 
in the coffee sector were wealthy prior to entering the sector – the larger exporters 
for instance – the lower cost of entry has meant that capitalists operating at much 
smaller business scales also had the option of setting up plantations. Where the 
coffee sector allowed owners of local hotels and relatively small-scale traders to 
enter, the capital requirements in the flower sector made it much more likely for 
investors there to come from large established business groups. 
The second factor in explaining the different participation by domestic investors 
across both sectors is to be found in the rate of exit, which was very high in the 
flower sector. By contrast, I came across only two cases of farm closure in the coffee 
sector, and both were related to disputes among business partners2. The rate of exit 
is directly related to the competitive pressures in the flower sector. As Brenner (1977) 
illustrates, market competition acts as a disciplining device that drives a systematic 
need to innovate when capitalists are forced to produce at certain costs in order to 
                                                     
1 This is not true if they want to operate their own processing plant, which is more profitable. 
However, farms do not have to process their own coffee. The DBE estimates that a farm 
would need a planted area of at least 150ha to operate a wet mill profitably. I have 
encountered plantation owners with smaller farms who had invested in wet mills and were 
operating at a profit though. 
2 How the rate of business closures will develop in the coffee plantation sector will be 
interesting to see. 
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be able to sell their output at a profit. In the example Brenner uses, 16th and 17th 
century England, a competitive market for land rentals ensured that capitalists were 
constantly forced to innovate to lower the costs of production or they would be 
pushed out of the market by more efficient producers, who were able to afford to 
pay higher rents. By contrast, however, Ethiopia, where all land is owned by the 
government, has no real land rental market. Here market discipline functions via 
other mechanisms, and, moreover, by ones that function very differently in the 
coffee and flower sectors. In neither case, though, is the competitive pressure the 
direct result of the presence of other producers in the country. 
In the flower sector, prices are set in overseas markets over which growers have no 
control. But to be able to sell their flowers at all, these flowers have to fulfil exacting 
criteria in terms of freshness, appearance and shelf life, all of which necessitate 
expensive inputs. Reducing production costs by saving on inputs such as person 
hours worked or pesticides will diminish flower quality and thereby reduce sales 
prices or even make sales impossible, if the flower quality does not meet buyer’s 
expectations. In addition to costly inputs, the farms themselves have high running 
costs. Cool houses consume a lot of energy, and the plastic sheeting of the 
greenhouses, as well as all of the electronic controlling systems need constant 
maintenance. At the same time, as shown in the previous chapter, almost all 
domestic capitalists had to borrow heavily to be able to set up their farms, meaning 
that they must make minimum monthly loan repayments, or face foreclosure. All in 
all these monthly outgoings, which cannot be avoided for more than the briefest of 
periods without serious repercussions, combined with externally fixed prices mean 
that farm owners are under existential pressure to meet minimum productivity 
levels. Farms that fail to achieve a level of efficiency that keeps their cost-revenue 
ratios within acceptable bounds cannot survive.   
In the coffee sector market discipline is much less pronounced. As mentioned in 
Chapter Six, coffee capitalists all realised that it is relatively simple to avoid losing 
money while operating a plantation. The reason is that the market, and especially 
the domestic market, accepts a wide range of quality levels. At the same time, the 
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major costs on a coffee plantation are labour costs. In Chapter Six it was shown that 
there is a direct connection between labour inputs and coffee quality: a dramatic 
reduction in labour inputs will lower the quality of the coffee and will probably 
exclude it from the lucrative specialty market. However, the lower quality coffee 
can still be sold into the mid- to low-quality market, allowing the farmer to break 
even. Coffee plantations do not, apart from labour costs, have many outgoings that 
are indispensable to the operation of the farm, almost all other costs can be reduced 
without seriously impeding yields and quality – at least in the short term. This 
greater flexibility means that coffee farms are much more resilient to price 
reductions and to incompetent management. While a coffee capitalist must combine 
organisational ability and market knowledge to operate a plantation that produces 
large profits, a plantation can exist with low or no profits for a considerable period 
of time3. As a result of the lower entry costs discussed above, coffee plantations, at 
least at small initial scales, are much less dependent on credit, which removes the 
need to make monthly repayments, thereby further reducing competitive pressure. 
An issue that cuts across barriers to entry and market discipline is the knowledge 
intensity of both production and marketing. The minimum knowledge 
requirements in both areas are higher in the flower sector; greater knowledge opens 
up new market segments in coffee, but is not essential to farm survival. Setting up a 
flower farm and growing flowers is technically demanding, and capitalists who lack 
the necessary know-how are forced to purchase it at high costs. Moreover, as the 
previous chapter demonstrated, the selection of varieties, which requires both 
agronomic expertise and knowledge of market trends, is crucial to business success.   
In coffee, agronomic expertise is vital to both farm survival and business success. 
But given Ethiopia’s long history of growing coffee, and the presence of JARI, such 
expertise is also available to farmers at comparatively low costs. Ethiopian experts 
in coffee agronomy frequently work for monthly salaries that are a fraction of the 
                                                     
3 The coffee plantation sector is still young, and the lead time to production is much longer 
than in flowers, so it will be interesting to see how competitive dynamics play out in coming 
years. I expect that more efficient high-quality producers will buy out less efficient ones, not 
because the latter are forced to sell, but because they find it profitable to do so. 
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day rates charged by international floricultural consultants4. Market knowledge, on 
the other hand, is not at all necessary for coffee plantation owners. As we saw in 
Chapter Five, they can simply transport their coffee to the ECX, have it graded and 
wait for a buyer to purchase it. Should they, however, be able to gain insight into 
the specialty trade and engage in direct exports, they can achieve far higher prices. 
To slightly misuse Wood's (1994, 2002b) categories, the specialty market is strictly 
an opportunity, not an imperative5. The combination of opportunities for rapid 
accumulation provided by the specialty market and the possibility for farms to 
survive at relatively low levels of productivity while selling only low-quality coffee 
are likely to bring about differentiation among coffee capitalists in the future. 
Barriers to entry, competitive pressures and knowledge requirements thus combine 
to produce very different environments for accumulation across the two sectors. 
These are not the only factors at work though. The observed patterns of 
accumulation must also be placed in the context of the government’s industrial 
development strategy. 
8.2 Differences in industrial policy 
The industrial policy regimes applied to the coffee and flower sectors differed in 
almost all key aspects. Where the flower sector enjoyed an evolving set of targeted 
support interventions, the coffee sector was mostly subjected to marketing 
regulation. The two exceptions to this pattern were in access to land, where the 
federal state strove to make land for investment available in both sectors, and in 
investment incentives, which were comparable across both sectors. Regarding land, 
the coffee sector probably enjoyed an advantage in this respect, as local 
governments generally supported the coffee capitalists. The relative remoteness and 
lower population density of the coffee plantation areas helped keep down the level 
                                                     
4 There is also anecdotal evidence of domestic flower capitalists who received misleading 
and wrong advice from international consultants, some of whom purposefully convinced 
inexperienced growers to purchase overpriced equipment from firms the consultants had 
business links with.  
5 See Chapter Two for a discussion of Wood’s notion of the market imperative in capitalist 
systems. 
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of conflicts over land6. In the crowded agricultural areas around Addis Ababa 
however, access to land for flower farms was much more difficult and the regional 
and local governments were frequently unwilling to grant requests for land for fear 
of stoking tensions7. Moreover, while new coffee plantations were often granted 
‘state’ lands, these public lands were soon taken up around Addis Ababa, and the 
government instead had to help ‘facilitate’ land deals with local small farmers. 
Consequently, the coffee lands were extremely cheap to lease. In addition, the 
government granted new coffee plantations a 50% reduction in lease rates for the 
first four years, to account for the fact that coffee trees are not productive in this 
period. The cheap public land granted to coffee plantations constitutes an indirect 
subsidy and is the largest direct support offered to the coffee sector. 
Capitalists in both sectors also had access to similar sets of investment incentives, as 
these depend solely on having legal status as a recognised investor8 . Legally-
registered investors may import certain capital goods (including vehicles) duty free, 
and can take advantage of a generous tax holiday, as well as a number of smaller 
benefits. These were taken advantage of to various degrees by all capitalists in both 
sectors. The smallest capitalists in the coffee sector reaped the least benefit, as they 
lacked the money to import capital goods and hence could only use the tax holiday.  
By contrast, the sectors offer a very different picture in terms of help in accessing 
capital. While the DBE did eventually provide subsidised loans to both sectors, 
these were made available to the coffee sector only relatively late, while flower 
farms could draw on this source of finance early on. In the coffee sector, the DBE 
also imposed an ill-thought out minimum size criterion of 150ha, which excluded 
the smaller farms from accessing DBE – arguably those capitalists that would have 
most needed financial support. Consequently, relatively few coffee plantations used 
                                                     
6 As noted in Chapter Six, plantations did not emerge in the most densely populated coffee 
growing areas, despite the favourable agro-climatic conditions there. 
7 The widespread protests that broke out in many parts of central Oromia in late 2015 are 
testament to just how deep resentment about land issues runs. 
8  This of course means that illegally planted coffee farms do not have access to these 
incentives, but this can hardly be blamed on the state. 
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DBE loans, and prior accumulation was the largest source of finance. In the flower 
sector however, DBE was by far the largest provider of finance. 
A similarly pronounced difference between the sectors was evident in 
infrastructural support. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the government provided 
new cold storage facilities at Addis Ababa airport and used the growth of the flower 
sector as an opportunity to massively expand the cargo capacity of Ethiopian 
Airlines. This integrated cool chain was a vital necessity without which the 
expansion of the flower sector would simply not have been possible. It could be 
argued that the ECX system, with its network of regional warehouses and grading 
centres, represents a similar support for the coffee sector, but this comparison is not 
valid. The ECX channels all coffee produced in Ethiopia, meaning that the vast 
majority of the coffee that passes through the ECX system was not grown on large-
scale farms, while the cold storage facilities exclusively serve the flower capitalists. 
More importantly though, as shown in Chapter Five, the ECX was neither intended 
to serve as a support institution for the coffee capitalists, nor was it helpful in their 
export business. Farms in neither sector received direct infrastructure support and 
had to build access roads and water supplies at their own expense. 
Across both sectors the government sought to assist capitalists by providing input, 
albeit to very different degrees. In the flower sector, where inputs such as pesticides 
and herbicides are essential to the operation of farms, the government put in place 
measures to ease imports, while also actively developing domestic input suppliers 
for items such as packaging9, and for transport services. In the coffee sector, the new 
capitalists relied heavily on the JARI for the provision of improved varieties. 
Unofficially, JARI also played an important role in providing expertise, as its staff 
and former staff are often engaged privately as consultants or even as full-time farm 
managers. However, JARI long preceded the current wave of investments in 
plantations and has not been expanded to cope with the new demand. It is better 
seen as a remnant from the first expansion of plantations under the imperial regime, 
than a targeted piece of industrial policy to support current accumulation. No 
                                                     
9 For linkage formation in the flower sector see Taylor (2011) and Oqubay (2015). 
340 
 
efforts were undertaken by the government to create a domestic supply chain for 
inputs, or even to encourage their use. 
The government also intervened in the labour market much more actively in the 
flower than in the coffee sector. To support the flower sector, the government 
opened up new specialised graduate and postgraduate degrees and established a 
vocational training centre – all in response to lobbying by the sector’s capitalists. 
Officials of both the regional and federal governments also intervene directly in 
labour disputes in the sector with the aim of minimising disruptions to production. 
By contrast, the coffee sector has seen no expansion of educational offerings in 
response to the surge in investment, and extension programmes that do provide 
expertise to the sector are targeted exclusively at smallholders10. At the local level, 
in some woreda officials assist in publicising requests for workers by local coffee 
capitalists in the local area, and some even provide harvest workers by ‘lending out’ 
secondary school pupils or convicts. None of these efforts, however, are federally 
coordinated or amount to a coherent policy. 
A final difference, one that is both an effect of the variation in policy regimes and a 
cause of ongoing dissimilarity between the sectors, is the nature of the policy 
dialogue, by which I mean the access capitalists have to high-level policy makers. 
The coffee plantation capitalists have very limited representation at federal level. 
The producer association, ECGPEA, lacks both funding and staff, and therefore 
struggles to be an effective lobbying organisation for its members’ interests. 
Individual coffee capitalists also generally do not have meetings with Ethiopia’s 
political elite11. The situation in the flower sector is very different. As noted in 
Chapter Seven, the early and ongoing involvement of foreign capitalists meant that 
the flower sector’s business association, EPHEA, is well funded and staffed – to the 
extent that it maintains its own research department. From the early days of the 
sector, government officials at the highest levels took an active interest in the sector 
                                                     
10 Examples are the programmes run by foreign NGOs to support cooperatives and the 
extension support offered by the Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency. 
11 A partial exception are the larger exporters, who, as shown in Chapter Five, have recently 
moved into production. However, as also illustrated in Chapter Five, their relationship with 
the federal government has been tumultuous at times. 
341 
 
and met its representatives frequently. The government has even provided a new 
regulatory agency, the EHDA, to promote dialogue with the sector. While some of 
the flower capitalists felt that the EHDA actually impeded dialogue with the 
government, many of the foreign capitalists still enjoy privileged access to decision 
makers on a personal level12. Prior to the EHDA the sector enjoyed privileged access 
to high-level decision makers and many of the sector capitalists continue to 
privately enjoy such access. This access has of course made it much easier for the 
sector’s capitalists to be heard within the government, and has allowed them to help 
shape the sector’s industrial policy13. 
8.2.1 Explaining differences in industrial policy regimes 
How can we account for the differences in both the scope and ambition of 
government support between the two sectors? My argument is that the key lies not 
so much in the differential ability to lobby for government support, but rather in the 
priority the government affords to the generation of foreign exchange. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, this need is related to the strategic aims of Ethiopia’s 
policy elites, who have attached their singular claim to legitimacy to delivering 
rapid (socio-)economic development. Understanding this need requires the kind of 
in-depth analysis I provided, which links elite strategies to the particular, 
historically evolved politics of state-building and power in Ethiopia. 
On the face of it, the lack of support for the coffee sector, which provides far greater 
amounts of foreign exchange than the flower sector, still seems baffling. The key to 
understanding the difference is to ask what support was necessary to ensure the 
generation of, and control over, foreign exchange in both sectors. As I made clear in 
the previous chapter, without targeted support  neither foreign nor domestic farms 
in the flower sector could have grown to the extent that they did (Oqubay 2015; 
Schaefer and Abebe 2015). Crucially, this support encompassed all stages of 
                                                     
12 Several foreign capitalists proudly showed me the mobile numbers of leading government 
officials on their own mobile phones. 
13 Although, as I have shown in Chapter Seven, this does not mean that they are always 
consulted or that policies are made in their favour, rather than to suit the government’s own 
strategic aims. But where there is overlap between the government’s goals and the sector’s 
interests the flower capitalists have proven an effective lobby. 
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production and marketing, including financial and administrative in setting up a 
farm in the first place. Almost all domestic investors made use of the DBE’s loan 
facilities, indicating just how much of a constraint the high capital requirements 
would have been in the absence of such loans.  
In the coffee sector, however, the application of industrial policy was simply not 
necessary to the same extent. The long history of coffee growing and Ethiopia’s 
earlier experiences of large-scale plantations under both the imperial and Derg 
regimes meant that key support institutions, such as a competent research institute 
and sufficient processing capacity, were in place14. In particular, Ethiopia already 
had people who understood large scale coffee farming, due to having worked on 
private plantations in their youth, or because they were active or former employees 
of the gigantic state farms. In the coffee sector, the government was therefore 
content to simply put in place the means to control the marketing of coffee, the ECX 
system. No support of production was offered15. As explained above, loans were 
granted only late in the development of the sector, and even then targeted only the 
largest producers. 
In short, the flower sector had to be nurtured by the government in order to begin 
producing a revenue stream. The coffee sector, by contrast, was much more able to 
sustain its own growth process using institutions and capabilities that were already 
present and merely required recombining by enterprising capitalists. The flower 
sector also had positive side effects, from the point of view of the government, such 
as providing much needed employment in the politically sensitive central highlands 
and the opportunity to develop the national carrier. The industrial policy success in 
the flower sector also had an important demonstration effect for the efficacy of a 
growth strategy that relies on foreign capital for rapid expansion16. 
                                                     
14 Even if these were not able to serve the coffee sector as a whole. 
15 The Ethiopian government has prepared a development strategy for the coffee sector as a 
whole, but at the time of writing this had not yet been published. It will be interesting to see 
whether this attempts to tackle the long-standing production and productivity issues in the 
sector. 
16 I suspect – but have no way of proving – that this was necessary for a faction within the 
ruling elite to win support for a further opening of the economy to foreign investment. 
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8.3 Summarising the main findings 
In this study I have illustrated how agrarian capital accumulation is taking place in 
the Ethiopian coffee and cut flower sectors, and I have clarified the role of the state 
in nurturing this growth in one sector, and all but ignoring it in the other17. In both 
sectors I have related domestic accumulation to the structuring effects of 
international markets. I proceeded by framing the concepts and analytical 
narratives against contrasting theories to come up with key questions, before 
addressing the challenges of operationalising empirical work to address those 
questions. I contextualised my empirical work within the main global, national and 
local dynamics using mostly secondary sources. Against this context, which is vital 
to explaining the empirical results, I laid out the fresh empirical contribution of my 
work for the two sectors. 
In Chapter Two I argued that the Marxist political economy on the agrarian 
question offers the most flexible and useful framework for examining processes of 
agrarian accumulation. Building on the works of Marxist classics, as well as more 
contemporary works by political Marxists, I developed a theoretical structure that 
focuses on rural class formation and its interaction with state policy. I pointed to 
weaknesses in the most important alternative theories currently used to understand 
processes of structural transformation, namely new institutional economics and 
developmental state theory. I argued that new institutional economics does not 
have a satisfactory theory of institutional change, and instead reverts to extra 
theoretical explanations of rapid institutional shift, while the developmental state 
approach generally pays insufficient attention to processes of capital accumulation. 
I demonstrated in Chapter Three how such an enquiry cannot realistically progress 
without relying on in-depth fieldwork. In particular, I showed how standard survey 
methods would most likely have led to a misplaced trust in results achieved 
through probabilistic sampling from incomplete and biased sampling frames. 
Generating a complete sampling took months of fieldwork, and drew on a wide 
variety of sources of data, including triangulating information held at different 
                                                     
17 See Iliffe (1983) on the concept of the ‘nurturing state’. 
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levels of government and, crucially, snowballing. At least one group of highly 
dynamic producers would have been missed by relying on government records and 
association membership lists alone, as these were operating without any official 
licence and hence are ‘invisible’ to standard survey methods. I also put forward the 
argument that accumulation, which is a process in time, must be understood as 
such, and cannot be adequately analysed simply from a synchronic snapshot such 
as a quantitative survey. Uncovering this historical dimension required both in-
depth qualitative interviews and a close analysis of the existing historical literature 
on capital accumulation in Ethiopia. 
In Chapter Four I presented a historical overview of the changing political economy 
of Ethiopia’s state building project over three different regimes. I outlined the first 
development of agrarian capitalism under the imperial regime, and its violent end 
in the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. My main focus in this chapter was the evolution 
in the organisation of the EPRDF state and its turn towards an aggressive 
programme of state-led development and industrial expansion, which was 
accelerated for reasons of political survival after 2005. As this programme relies 
crucially on high levels of public investment – only partly financed by external 
funds – the generation and control of foreign exchange is a key priority for the 
federal government, and the industrial policy regime applied to the economy as a 
whole, and specifically to the flower and coffee sectors, has to be understood in this 
light. 
Chapter Five served to lay out the international and domestic context in which 
capital accumulation in the coffee sector took place, both historically and recently. I 
demonstrated that coffee revenues have been of strategic importance to the 
Ethiopian state for almost a century and showed how the current investment into 
large plantations has important historical precedents, whose institutional legacies 
help understand how the current accumulation proceeded. The main focus of the 
chapter was on the evolution of coffee sector regulation under the EPRDF, which I 
argued is geared primarily towards the control of the foreign exchange generated 
by coffee exports. I illustrated how actions by the Ethiopian state, along with the 
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particularities of international markets had opened up space for large-scale private 
plantations to thrive. 
In Chapter Six I presented the results of the first ever systematic investigation of 
large-scale private coffee plantations in contemporary Ethiopia. I examined the 
complex patterns of capital accumulation and showed how capitalists had secured 
control over land and labour. Capitalists in the sector mostly had funds from prior 
accumulation outside of agricultural production. The largest group can be broadly 
defined as merchant capital, of which an important subgroup were coffee 
processors. Using them as an example I demonstrated how their move into 
production was necessitated by the unplanned effects of government action. 
Moreover, I demonstrated how the accumulation processes themselves had often 
eluded government control with instances of illegal land grabbing and an active 
market in smuggled coffee. This is an important warning against attempts to ‘read 
off’ effects from policies without taking account of the often substantial local 
heterogeneity. I also demonstrated how the most dynamic accumulators had used 
the particular configuration of government policy and external market 
opportunities to carve out space for highly profitable sales into the specialty coffee 
market. This dynamic is likely to be a driver of further differentiation among the 
coffee capitalists in the future. 
A parallel analysis of the accumulation patterns in the floriculture sector was 
presented in Chapter Seven. As in the coffee sector, I discussed the structure of 
international flower markets and presented the historical evolution of the sector in 
Ethiopia. The main emphasis was on demonstrating the differential success of 
domestic and foreign capitalists. Foreign capitalists used their advantages in terms 
of sectoral knowledge and experience to operate a business model distinct from that 
of many of their domestic peers. Another key finding was that the industrial policy 
for the sector also contained a mechanism which allows the government to track 
and control the foreign exchange flows the sector generates. As in the coffee sector, 
the actions of the state are best understood by relating policies to the strategic aims 
of Ethiopia’s political elites. 
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These results allow for a wider evaluation of ideas about agrarian transitions, in 
particular about the combination of internal and external dynamics in explaining 
processes of agrarian capital accumulation and its connection to structural 
transformation. Unlike in the ‘classic’ transitions discussed by Byres (1996),  it is 
clear that in Ethiopia the manufacturing sector is largely not of ‘agrarian origin’, but 
rather is heavily – but by no means completely – financed by external funds (see 
Chapter Four), or, where domestic, relies on capital largely accumulated outside of 
agriculture18. This gives some credence to Bernstein's (2016) notion that the agrarian 
question of capital is now of less importance for the development of capitalist 
economies, as other (external) funds are available to finance industrial development 
(see also the discussion in Chapter Two). However, as I have shown, agrarian 
capital accumulation is occurring in Ethiopia, and in a manner only partially 
foreseen and controlled by the state. These ongoing transformations affect tens of 
thousands of people and have transformed vast areas of land. Studying their 
mechanisms and implications is therefore of great importance. And while a degree 
of industrial development is indeed possible without a thoroughgoing capitalist 
transformation of agriculture, even the (in absolute terms) limited industrial 
development witnessed in Ethiopia has necessitated an industrial policy regime 
focused on expanding agricultural exports – and the revenue streams they generate 
– to  overcome balance of payments constraints. The agrarian question of capital 
thus remains an important explanatory framework for those seeking to understand 
not only how and why agrarian capital accumulation occurs, but also how these 
patterns link into wider processes of structural transformation. 
A final question is what the future holds for Ethiopia’s new agrarian capitalists. 
Both sectors are relatively young and in coffee in particular the sector is still in a 
period of development. The prospects of capitalists in both sectors also depend to a 
degree on developments in international markets, and on the degree to which 
capitalists can avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the most lucrative 
                                                     
18 Confirming the main tendencies of my own finding, a wide-ranging survey by Sutton and 
Kellow (2010) showed that leading domestic firms in a number of industrial sectors have 
their origins in merchant capital, and especially trade. 
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market segments. In coffee, a particularly dynamic group of domestic plantation 
owners has successfully entered the market for specialty coffee, while in the flower 
sector domestic capitalists are lagging behind their foreign counterparts in terms of 
quality and variety choice. How the emergence of new groups of agrarian capitalists 
will affect the Ethiopian political economy in the long run remains to be seen. In 
Côte d'Ivoire for instance, a group of plantation capitalists were able to successfully 
transform themselves into an industrial class (Rapley 1994). The leading capitalists 
in the flower sector are already part of mixed business groups19. Future studies will 
have to examine whether the new coffee capitalists are moving out of their own 
sector into the wider economy. 
8.4 Avenues for future research 
The results presented here could be taken forward in a number of interesting ways. 
In the flower sector, a useful study in terms of policy would systematically track the 
owners and managers of failed farms in order to fully identify all factors that 
contributed to the relative weakness of domestic capital formation there 20 . In 
keeping with the focus on domestic accumulators, further studies could also focus 
on the closely related vegetable horticulture sector, where, as anecdotal evidence 
suggests, domestic capitalists are having more success, owing to lower capital 
requirements and a less technically demanding production process. 
In the coffee sector, the study of capital accumulation could be logically ‘completed’ 
in two ways: vertically and horizontally. A horizontal study would expand the 
survey conducted here into a full census (or at least a large-N sample survey) of 
private coffee plantations in all parts of the country. This information appears to me 
indispensable to anyone wishing to formulate support policies for the sector. As I 
have argued throughout, such a survey would have to be complemented by in-
depth qualitative work. A vertical study, by contrast, would hone in on that area of 
capital accumulation I excluded from my enquiry, namely accumulation ‘from 
                                                     
19 As discussed in Chapter Seven though, they moved from other businesses into the flower 
sector, rather than vice versa. 
20 Of course, it would also be interesting to track failed foreign capitalists and map any 
systematic differences in reasons for business failures between foreign and domestic farms. 
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below’ through the slow process of differentiation among (relatively) small-scale 
farmers. I encountered evidence of such differentiation during my research (see also 
Cramer et al. 2014 and Ponte 2002), but there is – to the best of my knowledge – as 
yet no systematic study of these patterns, and we thus have no real idea of their 
scale or dynamics. 
Further studies in both sectors could focus on the lived experiences of wage 
workers, and in particular on labour struggles and emerging forms of organisation, 
as well as on personal histories of migration. These would complement the data on 
wages and working conditions collected by Cramer et al. (2014), with information 
on how to increase the bargaining power of workers. Lastly, an in-depth historical 
study, including of archival material, would be necessary to flesh out the historical 
sketches of both Ethiopia’s political economy and previous instances of agrarian 
accumulation I have provided here. For, as Polly Hill says: “If we know no history 
our minds are not blank, but cluttered with half-truths and inventions” (1963: 4). 
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